Pizza Hut – How Lock-in Causes Growth Stalls, Irrelevancy and Bad Results

Pizza Hut – How Lock-in Causes Growth Stalls, Irrelevancy and Bad Results

We see it all too often.  A successful business seems to lose its way.  Somehow, after decades of success, its results soften, then tumble and the company becomes a victim of its competition.  We scratch our heads and wonder, “why did that happen?”

Pizza Hut is well on its way to disappearing.  Kind of like Pizza Inn, A&W and Howard Johnson’s.  And that seems kind of remarkable considering the company at one time defined pizza for most Americans.  From a fast growing franchise in the 1960s to a high profile acquisition by PepsiCo in the 1970s, to anchoring the Yum Brands spin out from PepsiCo in 1997, Pizza Hut just finished 8 straight quarters of declining same store sales.  Pizza Hut was once a concept as hot as Apple Stores, but now it looks more like Sears.  How could this happen?

Pizza Hut

When Pizza Hut was growing it locked in on its success formula.  And one of the biggest Lock-ins was its name.  Pizza Hut was a place where you ate pizza, and the buildings all looked the same with that hut-like red roof.  At a time when few Americans outside the northeast ate pizza, this Wichita, Kansas founded (and headquartered until the 1990s) company told people what a pizzeria should look like, and what you should eat.

The company was ardent about controlling what franchisees served.  No nachos, or other trendy foods, because they didn’t fit the pizza theme.  No delivery, because good pizza required you eat it immediately from the oven.  Pizza should be thick and hearty, even served in a deep dish so you have plenty of bread and feel really full.  Whether anyone in Italy ever a pizza anything like this really did not matter.

And Pizza Hut would help guide customers as to what toppings they wanted — and usually there should be at least 3 – by offering pre-designed pizzas with names like “meat lovers,” “supreme,” “super supreme” or “veggie lover’s” so an uninformed clientele (originally prairie state, then midwestern, then expanding into the southwest and the south) could buy the product without a lot of fuss.

This success formula may sound cliche today, but it worked.  And it worked really well for 30 years, then pretty well for another 10-15.  But, eventually, doing the same thing over, and over, and over, and over had less appeal.  Almost everyone in the country knew what a Pizza Hut was, what the stores looked like and what the product was like.  Competitors came along by the dozens with all kinds of variations, and different kinds of service – like being in a mall, or delivering the product.  Inevitably this competition led to price wars.  To keep customers Pizza Hut had to lower its prices, even offering 2 pizzas for the price of one.  Pizza Hut never lost track of its success formula, and never stopped doing what once made it great.  But margins eroded, and then sales started declining.

Lots of people don’t care about Pizza Hut any more.  They want an alternative.  An alternative product, like California Pizza Kitchen or Wolfgang Pucks.  Or an alternative to pizza altogether like the new “fast casual” chains such as Chipotle’s, Baja Fresh or Panera.  For a whole raft of reasons, people decided that although they once ate Pizza Hut (even ate a LOT of it) they were going to eat something else.

But Pizza Hut was locked in.  First, its name.  Pizza. Hut.  To fulfill the “brand promise” of that name everything about that store is pre-designed.  From the outside to the inside tables to the equipment in the kitchen.  6,300 stores that are almost identical.  Any change and you have to make 6,300 changes.  Adding new product categories means reprinting 126,000 menus, changing 6,300 kitchen layouts, buying 6,300 new ovens, figuring out the service utensils for 6,300 wait staff.  That’s lock-in.  Making any change is so hard that the incentive is entirely toward improve what you’ve always done rather than doing something new.

Growth Stalls are Deadly

Growth Stalls are Deadly

Eventually, like Pizza Hut, growth stalls.  It only takes 2 quarters of declining sales to hit a growth stall, and when that happens less than 7% of businesses will ever again consistently grow at a meager 2%.  Growth stalls tell us “hey, the market shifted.  What you’re doing isn’t selling any more.”

But most management teams don’t think about a market shift, and instead react by trying to do more of the same.  They treat this like its an operational problem.  More quality campaigns, more money spent on advertising, more promotions, asking employees to work a little harder, more product for the same (or lower) price – more, better, faster, cheaper.  But this doesn’t work, because the problem lies in a market shift away from your “core” that requires an entirely different strategy.

Because management is incented to ignore this shift as long as possible, the company soon becomes irrelevant.  Customers know they’ve been going to competitors, and they start to realize it’s been a long time since they bought from that old supplier.  They realize their interest in that old company and its products has simply gone away.  They don’t pay attention to the ads.  And they don’t have any interest in new product announcements.  Actually, they find the company irrelevant.  Even when the discounts are big, they don’t buy.  They do business where they identify with the company and its products, even when those products cost more.

And thus the results start to tumble horribly.  Only by now management is so far removed from market trends that it has no idea how to regain relevancy.  In Pizza Hut’s case, leadership is undertaking what they’d like to think is a brand overhaul that will change its position in customers’ minds.  But, unfortunately, they are doing the ultimate in defend & extend management to try and save the old success formula.

Pizza Hut is introducing a maze of new ways to have its old product, in its old stores.  10 crust choices, 6 sauce choices, 22 of those pre-designed pizza offerings, 5 different liquids you can have dribbled over the pizza, and a rash of exotic new toppings – like banana.  So now you can order your pizza 1,000 different ways (actually, more like 10,000.)   Oh, and this is being launched with a big increase in traditional advertising.  In other words, an insane implementation of what the company has always done; giving customers an American style pizza, in a hut, promoted on TV – even most likely buying what is now considered iconic – a Super Bowl ad.

Yum Brands investors have reasons to be concerned.  Pizza Hut is really important to sales and earnings.  But its leaders are intent on doing more of the same, even though the market has already shifted.  The prognosis does not look good.

Hewlett Packard’s Musical Chairs Game

Hewlett Packard’s Musical Chairs Game

Hewlett Packard is splitting in two.  Do you find yourself wondering why?  You aren’t alone.

Hewlett Packard is nearly 75 years old.  One of the original “silicone valley companies,” it started making equipment for engineers and electronic technicians long before computers were every day products.  Over time HP’s addition of products like engineering calculators moved it toward more consumer products.  And eventually HP became a dominant player in printers.  All of these products were born out of deep skills in R&D, engineering and product development.  HP had advantages because its products were highly desirable and unique, which made it nicely profitable.

But along came a CEO named Carly Fiorina, and she decided HP needed to grow much bigger, much more quickly.  So she bought Compaq, which itself had bought Digital Equipment, so HP could sell Wintel PCs.  PCs were a product in which HP had no advantage. PC production had always been an assembly operation of other companies’ intellectual property.  It had been a very low margin, brutally difficult place to grow unless one focused on cost lowering rather than developing intellectual capital.  It had nothing in common with HP’s business.

HP laptop

To fight this new margin battle HP replaced Ms. Fiorina with Mark Hurd, who recognized the issues in PC manufacturing and proceeded to gut R&D, product development and almost every other function in order to push HP into a lower cost structure so it could compete with Dell, Acer and other companies that had no R&D and cultures based on cost controls.  This led to internal culture conflicts, much organizational angst and eventually the ousting of Mr. Hurd.

But, by that time HP was a company adrift with no clear business model to help it have a sustainably profitable future.

Now HP is 4 years into its 5 year turnaround plan under Meg Whitman’s leadership.  This plan has made HP much smaller, as layoffs have dominated the implementation.  It has weakened the HP brand as no important new products have been launched, and the gutted product development capability is still no closer to being re-established.  And PC sales have stagnated as mobile devices have taken center stage – with HP notably weak in mobile products.  The company has drifted, getting no better and showing no signs of re-developing its historical strengths.

So now HP will split into two different companies.  Following the old adage “if you can’t dazzle ’em with brilliance, baffle ’em with bulls**t.”  When all else fails, and you don’t know how to actually lead a company, then split it into pieces, push off the parts to others to manage and keep at least one CEO role for yourself.

Let’s not forget how this mess was created.  It was a former CEO who decided to expand the company into an entirely different and lower margin business where the company had no advantage and the wrong business model.  And another that destroyed long-term strengths in innovation to increase short-term margins in a generic competition.  And then yet a third who could not find any solution to sustainability while pushing through successive rounds of lay-offs.

This was all value destruction created by the persons at the top.  “Strategic” decisions made which, inevitably, hurt the organization more than helped it.  Poorly thought through actions which have had long-term deleterious repercussions for employees, suppliers, investors and the communities in which the businesses operate.

The game of musical chairs has been very good for the CEOs who controlled the music.  They were paid well, and received golden handshakes.  They, and their closest reports, did just fine.  But everyone else….. well…..

The Week Microsoft Lost Relevancy, and Apple Stole the Show

The Week Microsoft Lost Relevancy, and Apple Stole the Show

Few businesses fail in a fiery, quick downfall.  Most linger along for years, not really mattering to anyone – including customers, suppliers or even investors.  They exist, but they aren’t relevant.

When a company is relevant customers are eager for new product releases, and excited to talk to salespeople. Media want to report on the company, its products and its leaders.  Investors want to hear about what the company will do next to drive revenues and increase profits.

But when a company loses relevancy, that all disappears.  Customers quit paying attention to new products, and salespeople are not given the time of day. The company begs for coverage of its press releases, but few media outlets pay attention because writing about that company produces few readers, or advertisers.  Investors lose hope for big gains, and start looking for ways to sell the stock or debt without taking too big a loss, or further depressing valuations.

In short, when a company loses relevancy it is on the downward slope to failure.  It may take a long time, but lacking market relevancy the company has practically no hope of increasing revenues or profits, or of creating many new and exciting jobs, or of being a great customer for suppliers.  Losing relevancy means the company is headed out of business, it’s just a matter of time.  Think Howard Johnson’s, ToysRUs, Sears, Radio Shack, Palm, Hostess, Samsonite, Pierre Cardin, Woolworth’s, International Harvester, Zenith, Sony, Rand McNally, Encyclopedia Britannica, DEC — you get the point.

Many people may not be aware that Microsoft made an exclusive deal with the NFL to provide Surface tablets for coaches and players to use during games, replacing photographs, paper and clipboards for reviewing on-field activities and developing plays.  The goal was to up the prestige of Surface, improve its “cool” factor, while showing capabilities that might encourage more developers to write apps for the product and more businesses to buy it.

NFL Surface user

But things could not have gone worse during the NFL’s launch.  Because over and again, announcers kept calling the Surface tablets iPads. Announcers saw the tablet format and simply assumed these were iPads.  Or, worse, they did not realize there was any tablet other than the iPad.  As more and more announcers made this blunder it became increasingly clear that Apple not only invented the modern tablet marketplace, but that it’s brand completely dominates the mindset of users and potential buyers.  iPad has become synonymous with tablet for most people.

In a powerful way, this demonstrates the lack of relevancy Microsoft now has in the personal technology marketplace.  Fewer and fewer people are buying PCs as they rely increasingly on mobile devices. Practically nobody cares any more about new releases of Windows or Office.  In fact, the American Customer Satisfaction Index reported people think Apple is now considered the best PC maker (the Macintosh.) HP was near the bottom of the list, with Dell, Acer and Toshiba not faring much better.

And in mobile devices, Apple is clearly the king.  In its first weekend of sales the new iPhone 6 and 6Plus sold 10million units, blasting past any previous iPhone model launch – and that was without any sales in China and several other markets.  The iPhone 4 was considered a smashing success, but iPhone 4 sales of 1.7million units was only 17% of the newest iPhone – and the 9million iPhone 5 sales included China and the lower-priced 5C.  In fact, more units could have been sold but Apple ran out of supply, forcing customers to wait.  People clearly still want Apple mobile devices, as sales of each successive version brings in more customers and higher sales.

There are many people who cannot imagine a world without Microsoft.  And the vast majority of people would think that predicting Microsoft’s demise is considerably premature given its size and cash hoard.  But, that looks backward at what Microsoft was, and the assets it previously created, rather than looking forward.

Just how fast can lost relevancy impact a company?  Look no further than Blackberry (formerly Research in Motion.)  Blackberry was once totally dominant in smartphones.  But in the second quarter of last year Apple sold 32.5million units, while Blackberry sold only 1.5million (which was still more than Microsoft sold.)

The complete lack of relevancy was exposed last week when Blackberry launched its new Passport phone alongside Apple’s iPhone 6 actions. While the press was full of articles about the new iPhone, were you even aware of Blackberry’s most recent effort?  Did you recall seeing press coverage?  Did you read any product reviews?  And while Apple was selling record numbers, Blackberry analysts were wondering if the Passport could find a niche with “nostalgic customers” that would sell enough units to keep the company’s hardware unit alive.  Reviewers now compare Passport to the market standard, which is the iPhone – and still complain that its use of apps is “confusing.”  In a world where most people use their own smartphone, the only reason most people could think of to use a Passport was if their employer told them they were forced to.

Like with Radio Shack, most people have to be reminded that Blackberry still exists.  In just a few years Blackberry’s loss of relevancy has made the company and its products a backwater.  Now it is quite clear that Microsoft is entering a similar situation.  Windows 8 was a weak launch and did nothing to slow the shift to mobile.  Microsoft missed the mobile market, and its mobile products are achieving no traction.  Even where it has an exclusive use, such as this NFL application, people don’t recognize its products and assume they are the products of the market leader. Microsoft really has become irrelevant in its historical “core” personal technology market – and that should scare its employees and investors a lot.

 

 

Wrong assumptions create lousy outcomes – Sony, McDonald’s, Radio Shack, Sears

Sony was once the leader in consumer electronics.  A brand powerhouse who’s products commanded a premium price and were in every home. Trinitron color TVs, Walkman and Discman players, Vaio PCs.  But Sony has lost money for all but one quarter across the last 6 years, and company leaders just admitted the company will lose over $2B this year and likely eliminate its dividend.

McDonald’s created something we now call “fast food.” It was an unstoppable entity that hooked us consumers on products like the Big Mac, Quarter Pounder and Happy Meal. An entire generation was seemingly addicted to McDonald’s and raised their families on these products, with favorable delight for the ever cheery, clown-inspired spokesperson Ronald McDonald.  But now McDonald’s has hit a growth stall, same-store sales are down and the Millenial generation has turned its nose up creating serious doubts about the company’s future.

Radio Shack was the leader in electronics before we really had a consumer electronics category. When we still bought vacuum tubes to repair radios and TVs, home hobbyists built their own early versions of computers and video games worked by hooking them up to TVs (Atari, etc.) Radio Shack was the place to go.  Now the company is one step from bankruptcy.

Sears created the original non-store shopping capability with its famous catalogs. Sears went on to become a Dow Jones Industrial Average component company and the leading national general merchandise retailer with powerhouse brands like Kenmore, Diehard and Craftsman.  Now Sears’ debt has been rated the lowest level junk, it hasn’t made a profit for 3 years and same store sales have declined while the number of stores has been cut dramatically.  The company survives by taking loans from the private equity firm its Chairman controls.

Closed Sears Store

How in the world can companies be such successful pioneers, and end up in such trouble?

Markets shift.  Things in the world change. What was a brilliant business idea loses value as competitors enter the market, new technologies and solutions are created and customers find they prefer alternatives to your original success formula.  These changed markets leave your company irrelevant – and eventually obsolete.

Unfortunately, we’ve trained leaders over the last 60 years how to be operationally excellent.  In 1960 America graduated about the same number of medical doctors, lawyers and MBAs from accredited, professional university programs.  Today we still graduate about the same number of medical doctors every year.  We graduate about 6 times as many lawyers (leading to lots of jokes about there being too many lawyers.)  But we graduate a whopping 30 times as many MBAs.  Business education skyrocketed, and it has become incredibly normal to see MBAs at all levels, and in all parts, of corporations.

The output of that training has been a movement toward focusing on accounting, finance, cost management, supply chain management, automation — all things operational.  We have trained a veritable legion of people in how to “do things better” in business, including how to measure costs and operations in order to make constant improvements in “the numbers.”  Most leaders of publicly traded companies today have a background in finance, and can discuss the P&L and balance sheets of their companies in infinite detail.  Management’s understanding of internal operations and how to improve them is vast, and the ability of leaders to focus an organization on improving internal metrics is higher than ever in history.

But none of this matters when markets shift.  When things outside the corporation happen that makes all that hard work, cost cutting, financial analysis and machination pretty much useless.  Because today most customers don’t really care how well you make a color TV or physical music player, since they now do everything digitally using a mobile device.  Nor do they care for high-fat and high-carb previously frozen food products which are consistently the same because they can find tastier, fresher, lighter alternatives.  They don’t care about the details of what’s inside a consumer electronic product because they can buy a plethora of different products from a multitude of suppliers with the touch of a mobile device button.  And they don’t care how your physical retail store is laid out and what store-branded merchandise is on the shelves because they can shop the entire world of products – and a vast array of retailers – and receive deep product reviews instantaneously, as well as immediate price and delivery information, from anywhere they carry their phone – 24×7.

“Get the assumptions wrong, and nothing else matters” is often attributed to Peter Drucker.  You’ve probably seen that phrase in at least one management, convention or motivational presentation over the last decade.  For Sony, McDonald’s, Radio Shack and Sears the assumptions upon which their current businesses were built are no longer valid.  The things that management assumed to be true when the companies were wildly profitable 2 or 3 decades ago are no longer true.  And no matter how much leadership focuses on metrics, operational improvements and cost cutting – or even serving the remaining (if dwindling) current customers – the shift away from these companies’ offerings will not stop.  Rather, that shift is accelerating.

It has been 80 years since Harvard professor Joseph Schumpeter described “creative destruction” as the process in which new technologies obsolete the old, and the creativity of new competitors destroys the value of older companies. Unfortunately, not many CEOs are familiar with this concept.  And even fewer ever think it will happen to them.  Most continue to hope that if they just make a few more improvements their company won’t really become obsolete, and they can turn around their bad situation.

For employees, suppliers and investors such hope is a weak foundation upon which to rely for jobs, revenues and returns.

According to the management gurus at McKinsey, today the world population is getting older. Substantially so. Almost no major country will avoid population declines over next 20 years, due to low birth rates.  Simultaneously, better healthcare is everywhere, and every population group is going to live a whole lot (I mean a WHOLE LOT) longer.  Almost every product and process is becoming digitized, and any process which can be done via a computer will be done by a computer due to almost free computation. Global communication already is free, and the bandwidth won’t stop growing.  Secrets will become almost impossible to keep; transparency will be the norm.

These trends matter.  To every single business.  And many of these trends are making immediate impacts in 2015.  All will make a meaningful impact on practically every single business by 2020.  And these trends change the assumptions upon which every business – certainly every business founded prior to 2000 – demonstrably.

Are you changing your assumptions, and your business, to compete in the future?  If not, you could soon look at your results and see what the leaders at Sony, McDonald’s, Radio Shack and Sears are seeing today.  That would be a shame.

 

Five Worst CEOs Revisited – How Many Jobs Did They Create this Labor Day?

Five Worst CEOs Revisited – How Many Jobs Did They Create this Labor Day?

It’s Labor Day, and a time when we naturally think about our jobs.

When it comes to jobs creation, no role is more critical than the CEO.  No company will enter into a growth phase, selling more product and expanding employment, unless the CEO agrees.  Likewise, no company will shrink, incurring job losses due to layoffs and mass firings, unless the CEO agrees.  Both decisions lay at the foot of the CEO, and it is his/her skill that determines whether a company adds jobs, or deletes them.

Ed Lampert, CEO Sears

Over 2 years ago (5 May, 2012) I published “The 5 CEOs Who Should Be Fired.”  Not surprisingly, since then employment at all 5 of these companies has lagged economic growth, and in all but one case employment has shrunk.  Yet, 3 of these CEOs remain in their jobs – despite lackluster (and in some cases dismal) performance. And all 5 companies are facing significant struggles, if not imminent failure.

#5 – John Chambers at Cisco

In 2012 it was clear that the market shift to public networks and cloud computing was forever changing the use of network equipment which had made Cisco a modern growth story under long-term CEO Chambers.  Yet, since that time there has been no clear improvement in Cisco’s fortunes.  Despite 2 controversial reorganizations, and 3 rounds of layoffs, Cisco is no better positioned today to grow than it was before.

Increasingly, CEO Chambers’ actions reorganizations and layoffs look like so many machinations to preserve the company’s legacy rather than a clear vision of where the company will grow next.  Employee morale has declined, sales growth has lagged and although the stock has rebounded from 2012 lows, it is still at least 10% short of 2010 highs – even as the S&P hits record highs.  While his tenure began with a tremendous growth story, today Cisco is at the doorstep of losing relevancy as excitement turns to cloud service providers like Amazon.  And the decline in jobs at Cisco is just one sign of the need for new leadership.

#4 Jeff Immelt at General Electric

When CEO Immelt took over for Jack Welch he had some tough shoes to fill.  Jack Welch’s tenure marked an explosion in value creation for the last remaining original Dow Jones Industrials component company.  Revenues had grown every year, usually in double digits; profits soared, employment grew tremendously and both suppliers and investors gained as the company grew.

But that all stalled under Immelt.  GE has failed to develop even one large new market, or position itself as the kind of leading company it was under Welch.  Revenues exceeded $150B in 2009 and 2010, yet have declined since.  In 2013 revenues dropped to $142B from $145B in 2012.  To maintain revenues the company has been forced to continue selling businesses and downsizing employees every year.  Total employment in 2014 is now less than in 2012.

Yet, Mr. Immelt continues to keep his job, even though the stock has been a laggard.  From the near $60 it peaked at his arrival, the stock faltered.  It regained to $40 in 2007, only to plunge to under $10 as the CEO’s over-reliance on financial services nearly bankrupted the once great manufacturing company in the banking crash of 2009.  As the company ponders selling its long-standing trademark appliance business, the stock is still less than half its 2007 value, and under 1/3 its all time high.  Where are the jobs?  Not GE.

#3 Mike Duke at Wal-Mart

Mr. Duke has left Wal-Mart, but not in great shape.  Since 2012 the company has been rocked by scandals, as it came to light the company was most likely bribing government officials in Mexico.  Meanwhile, it has failed to defend its work practices at the National Labor Relations Board, and remains embattled regarding alleged discrimination of female employees.  The company’s employment practices are regularly the target of unions and those supporting a higher minimum wage.

The company has had 6 consecutive quarters of declining traffic, as sales per store continue to lag – demonstrating leadership’s inability to excite people to shop in their stores as growth shifts to dollar stores.  The stock was $70 in 2012, and is now only $75.60, even though the S&P 500 is up about 50%.  So far smaller format city stores have not generated much attention, and the company remains far behind leader Amazon in on-line sales.  WalMart increasingly looks like a giant trapped in its historical house, which is rapidly delapidating.

One big question to ask is who wants to work for WalMart?  In 2013 the company threatened to close all its D.C. stores if the city council put through a higher minimum wage.  Yet, since then major cities (San Francisco, Chicago, Los Angeles, Seattle, etc.) have either passed, or in the process of passing, local legislation increasing the minimum wage to anywhere from $12.50-$15.00/hour.  But there seems no response from WalMart on how it will create profits as its costs rise.

#2 Ed Lampert at Sears

Nine straight quarterly losses.  That about says it all for struggling Sears.  Since the 5/2012 column the CEO has shuttered several stores, and sales continue dropping at those that remain open.  Industry pundits now call Sears irrelevant, and the question is looming whether it will follow Radio Shack into oblivion soon.

CEO Lampert has singlehandedly destroyed the Sears brand, as well as that of its namesake products such as Kenmore and Diehard.  He has laid off thousands of employees as he consolidated stores, yet he has been unable to capture any value from the unused real estate.  Meanwhile, the leadership team has been the quintessential example of “a revolving door at headquarters.”  From about $50/share 5/2012 (well off the peak of $190 in 2007,) the stock has dropped to the mid-$30s which is about where it was in its first year of Lampert leadership (2004.)

Without a doubt, Mr. Lampert has overtaken the reigns as the worst CEO of a large, publicly traded corporation in America (now that Steve Ballmer has resigned – see next item.)

#1 Steve Ballmer at Microsoft

In 2013 Steve Ballmer resigned as CEO of Microsoft.  After being replaced, within a year he resigned as a Board member.  Both events triggered analyst enthusiasm, and the stock rose.

However, Mr. Ballmer left Microsoft in far worse condition after his decade of leadership.  Microsoft missed the market shift to mobile, over-investing in Windows 8 to shore up PC sales and buying Nokia at a premium to try and catch the market.  Unfortunately Windows 8 has not been a success, especially in mobile where it has less than 5% shareSurface tablets were written down, and now console sales are declining as gamers go mobile.

As a result the new CEO has been forced to make layoffs in all divisions – most substantially in the mobile handset (formerly Nokia) business – since I positioned Mr. Ballmer as America’s worst CEO in 2012.  Job growth appears highly unlikely at Microsoft.

CEOs – From Makers to Takers

Forbes colleague Steve Denning has written an excellent column on the transformation of CEOs from those who make businesses, to those who take from businesses.  Far too many CEOs focus on personal net worth building, making enormous compensation regardless of company performance.  Money is spent on inflated pay, stock buybacks and managing short-term earnings to maximize bonuses.  Too often immediate cost savings, such as from outsourcing, drive bad long-term decisions.

CEOs are the ones who determine how our collective national resources are invested.  The private economy, which they control, is vastly larger than any spending by the government. Harvard professor William Lazonick details how between 2003 and 2012 CEOs gave back 54% of all earnings in share buybacks (to drive up stock prices short term) and handed out another 37% in dividends.  Investors may have gained, but it’s hard to create jobs (and for a nation to prosper) when only 9% of all earnings for a decade go into building new businesses!

There are great CEOs out there.  Steve Jobs and his replacement Tim Cook increased revenues and employment dramatically at Apple.  Jeff Bezos made Amazon into an enviable growth machine, producing revenues and jobs.  These leaders are focused on doing what it takes to grow their companies, and as a result the jobs in America.

It’s just too bad the 5 fellows profiled above have done more to destroy value than create it.

Motorola’s Road to Irrelevancy – Focusing on Its Core

Motorola’s Road to Irrelevancy – Focusing on Its Core

Remember the RAZR phone?  Whatever happened to that company?

Motorola has a great tradition.  Motorola pioneered the development of wireless communications, and was once a leader in all things radio – as well as made TVs.  In an earlier era Motorola was the company that provided 2-way radios (and walkie-talkies for those old enough to remember them) not only for the military, police and fire departments,  but connected taxies to dispatchers, and businesses from electricians to plumbers to their “home office.”

Motorola was the company that developed not only the thing in a customer’s hand, but the base stations in offices and even the towers (and equipment on those towers) to allow for wireless communication to work.  Motorola even invented mobile telephony, developing the cellular infrastructure as well as the mobile devices.  And, for many years, Motorola was the market share leader in cellular phones, first with analog phones and later with digital phones like the RAZR.

Dynatac phone

But that was the former Motorola, not the renamed Motorola Solutions of today.  The last few years most news about Motorola has been about layoffs, downsizings, cost reductions, real estate sales, seeking tenants for underused buildings and now looking for a real estate partner to help the company find a use for its dramatically under-utilized corporate headquarters campus in suburban Chicago.

How did Motorola Solutions become a mere shell of its former self?

Unfortunately, several years ago Motorola was a victim of disruptive innovation, and leadership reacted by deciding to “focus” on its “core” markets.  Focus and core are two words often used by leadership when they don’t know what to do next.  Too often investment analysts like the sound of these two words, and trumpet management’s decision – knowing that the code implies cost reductions to prop up profits.

But smart investors know that the real implication of “focusing on our core” is the company will soon lose relevancy as markets advance.  This will lead to significant sales declines, margin compression, draconian actions to create short-term P&L benefits and eventually the company will disappear.

Motorola’s market decline started when Blackberry used its server software to help corporations more securely use mobile devices for instant communications.  The mobile phone transitioned from a consumer device to a business device, and Blackberry quickly grabbed market share as Motorola focused on trying to defend RAZR sales with price reductions while extending the RAZR platform with new gimmicks like additional colors for cases, and adding an MP3 player (called the ROKR.)  The Blackberry was a game changer for mobile phones, and Motorola missed this disruptive innovation as it focused on trying to make sustaining improvements in its historical products.

Of course, it did not take long before Apple brought out the iPhone and with all those thousands of apps changed the game on Blackberry.  This left Motorola completely out of the market, and the company abandoned its old platform hoping it could use Google’s Android to get back in the game.  But, unfortunately, Motorola brought nothing really new to users and its market share dropped to nearly nothing.

The mobile phone business quickly overtook much of the old Motorola 2-way radio business.  No electrician or plumber, or any other business person, needed the old-fashioned radios upon which Motorola built its original business.  Even police officers used mobile phones for much of their communication, making the demand for those old-style devices rarer with each passing quarter.

But rather than develop a new game changer that would make it once again competitive, Motorola decided to split the company into 2 parts.  One would be the very old, and diminishing, radio business still sold to government agencies and niche business applications.  This business was profitable, if shrinking. The reason was so that leadership could “focus” on this historical “core” market.  Even if it was rapidly becoming obsolete.

The mobile phone business was put out on its own, and lacking anything more than an historical patent portfolio, with no relevant market position, it racked up quarter after quarter of losses.  Lacking any innovation to change the market, and desperate to get rid of the losses, in 2011 Motorola sold the mobile phone business – formerly the industry creator and dominant supplier – to Google.  Again, the claim was this would allow leadership to even better “focus” on its historical “core” markets.

But the money from the Google sale was invested in trying to defend that old market, which is clearly headed for obsolescence.  Profit pressures intensify every quarter as sales are harder to find when people have alternative solutions available from ever improving mobile technology.

As the historical market continued to weaken, and leadership learned it had under-invested in innovation while overspending to try to defend aging solutions, Motorola again cut the business substantially by selling a chunk of its assets – called its “enterprise business” – to a much smaller Zebra Technologies.  The ostensible benefit was it would now allow Motorola leadership to even further “focus” on its ever smaller “core” business in government and niche market sales of aging radio technology.

But, of course, this ongoing “focus” on its “core” has failed to produce any revenue growth.  So the company has been forced to undertake wave after wave of layoffs.  As buildings empty they go for lease, or sale.  And nobody cares, any longer, about Motorola.  There are no news articles about new products, or new innovations, or new markets.  Motorola has lost all market relevancy as its leaders used “focus” on its “core” business to decimate the company’s R&D, product development, sales and employment.

Retrenchment to focus on a core market is not a strategy which can benefit shareholders, customers, employees or the community in which a business operates.  It is an admission that the leaders missed a major market shift, and have no idea how to respond.  It is the language adopted by leaders that lack any vision of how to grow, lack any innovation, and are quickly going to reduce the company to insignificance.  It is the first step on the road to irrelevancy.

Straight from Dr. Christensen’s “Innovator’s Dilemma” we now have another brand name to add to the list of those which were once great and meaningful, but now are relegated to Wikipedia historical memorabilia – victims of their inability to react to disruptive innovations while trying to sustain aging market positions – Motorola, Sears, Montgomery Wards, Circuit City, Sony, Compaq, DEC, American Motors, Coleman, Piper, Sara Lee………..

 

Microsoft’s Last Stand

Microsoft’s Last Stand

Over the last couple of weeks big announcements from Apple, IBM and Microsoft have set the stage for what is likely to be Microsoft’s last stand to maintain any sense of personal technology leadership.

Custer Tries Holding Off An Unstoppable Native American Force

Custer Tries Holding Off An Unstoppable Native American Force

To many consumers the IBM and Apple partnership probably sounded semi-interesting.  An app for airplane fuel management by commercial pilots is not something most people want.  But what this announcement really amounted to was a full assault on regaining dominance in the channel of Value Added Resellers (VARs) and Value Added Dealers (VADs) that still sell computer “solutions” to thousands of businesses.  Which is the last remaining historical Microsoft stronghold.

Think about all those businesses that use personal technology tools for things like retail point of purchase, inventory control, loan analysis in small banks, restaurant management, customer data collection, fluid control tracking, hotel check-in, truck routing and management, sales force management, production line control, project management — there is a never-ending list of business-to-business applications which drive the purchase of literally millions of devices and applications.  Used by companies as small as a mom-and-pop store to as large  as WalMart and JPMorganChase.  And these solutions are bundled, sold, delivered and serviced by what is collectively called “the channel” for personal technology.

This “channel” emerged after Apple introduced the Apple II running VisiCalc, and businesses wanted hundreds of these machines. Later, bundling educational software with the Apple II created a near-monopoly for Apple channel partners who bundled solutions for school systems.

But, as the PC emerged this channel shifted.  IBM pioneered the Microsoft-based PC, but IBM had long used a direct sales force. So its foray into personal computing did a very poor job of building a powerful sales channel.  Even though the IBM PC was Time magazine’s “Man of the Year” in 1982, IBM lost its premier position largely because Microsoft took advantage of the channel opportunity to move well beyond IBM as a supplier.

Microsoft focused on building a very large network of developers creating an enormous variety of business-to-business applications on the Windows+Intel (Wintel) platform.  Microsoft created training programs for developers to use its operating system and tools, while simultaneously cultivating manufacturers (such as Dell and Compaq) to build low cost machines to run the software.  “Solution selling” was where VARs bundled what small businesses – and even many large businesses – needed by bringing together developer applications with manufacturer hardware.

It only took a few years for Microsoft to overtake Apple and IBM by dominating and growing the VAR channel.  Apple did a poor job of creating a powerful developer network, preferring to develop everything users should want itself, so quickly it lacked a sufficient application base.  IBM constantly tried to maintain its direct sales model (and upsell clients from PCs to more expensive hardware) rather than support the channel for developing applications or selling solutions based on PCs.

But, over the last several years Microsoft played “bet the company” on its launch of Windows 8.  As mobile grew in hardware sales exponentially, and PC sales flattened (then declined,) Microsoft was tepid regarding any mobile offering.  Under former CEO Steve Ballmer, Microsoft preferred creating an “all-in-one” solution via Win8 that it hoped would keep PC sales moving forward while slowly allowing its legions of Microsoft developers to build Win8 apps for mobile Surface devices — and what it further hoped would be other manufacturer’s tablets and phones running Win8.

This flopped.  Horribly. Apple already had the “installed base” of users and mobile developers, working diligently to create new apps which could be released via its iTunes distribution platform.  As a competitive offering, Google had several years previously launched the Android operating system, and companies such as HTC and Samsung had already begun building devices. Developers who wanted to move beyond Apple were already committed to Android.  Microsoft was simply far too late to market with a Win8 product which gave developers and manufacturers little reason to invest.

Now Microsoft is in a very weak position.  Despite much fanfare at launch, Microsoft was forced to take a nearly $1B write-off on its unsellable Surface devices.  In an effort to gain a position in mobile, Microsoft previously bought phone maker Nokia, but it was simply far too late and without a good plan for how to change the Apple juggernaut.

Apple is now the dominant player in mobile, with the most users, developers and the most apps.  Apple has upended the former Microsoft channel leadership position, as solution sellers are now offering Apple solutions to their mobile-hungry business customers.  The merger with IBM brings even greater skill, and huge resources, to augmenting the base of business apps running on iOS and its devices (presently and in the future.)  It provides encouragement to the VARs that a future stream of great products will be coming for them to sell to small, medium and even large businesses.

Caught in a situation of diminishing resources, after betting the company’s future on Windows 8 development and launch, and then seeing PC sales falter, Microsoft has now been forced to announce it is laying off 18,000 employees.  Representing 14% of total staff, this is Microsoft’s largest reduction ever. Costs for the downsizing will be a massive loss of $1.1-$1.6B – just one year (almost to the day) after the huge Surface write-off.

Recognizing its extraordinarily weak market position, and that it’s acquisition of Nokia did little to build strength with developers while putting it at odds with manufacturers of other mobile devices, the company is taking some 12,000 jobs out of its Nokia division – ostensibly the acquisition made at a cost of $7.2B to blunt iPhone sales.  Every other division is also suffering headcount reductions as Microsoft is forced to “circle the wagons” in an effort to find some way to “hold its ground” with historical business customers.

Today Apple is very strong in the developer community, already has a distribution capability with iTunes to which it is adding mobile payments, and is building a strong channel of VARs seeking mobile solutions.  The IBM partnership strengthens this position, adds to Apple’s iOS developers, guarantees a string of new solutions for business customers and positions iOS as the platform of choice for VARs and VADs who will use iBeacon and other devices to help businesses become more capable by utilizing mobile/cloud technology.

Meanwhile, Microsoft is looking like the 7th Cavalry at the Little Bighorn.  Microsoft is surrounded by competitors augmenting iOS and Android (and serious cloud service suppliers like Amazon,) resources are depleting as sales of “core” products stagnate and decline and write-offs mount, and watching as its “supply line” developer channel abandons Windows 8 for the competitive alternatives.

CEO Nadella keeps saying that that cloud solutions are Microsoft’s future, but how it will effectively compete at this late date is as unclear as the email announcement on layoffs Nokia’s head Stephen Elop sent to employees.  Keeping its channel, long the source of market success for Microsoft, from leaving is Microsoft’s last stand.  Unfortunately, Nadella’s challenge puts him in a position that looks a lot like General Custer.

 

Two Lessons For Us All from Crumbled Crumbs Bake Shop

Two Lessons For Us All from Crumbled Crumbs Bake Shop

Crumbs Bake Shop – a small chain of cupcake shops, almost totally unknown outside of New York City and Washington, DC – announced it was going out of business today.  Normally, this would not be newsworthy.  Even though NASDAQ traded, Crumbs small revenues, losses and rapidly shrinking equity made it economically meaningless.  But, it is receiving a lot of attention because this minor event signals to many people the end of the “cupcake trend” which apparently was started by cable TV show “Sex and the City.”

However, there are actually 2 very important lessons all of us can learn from the rise, and fall, of Crumbs Bake Shop:

crumbs cupcake

1 – Don’t believe in the myth of passion when it comes to business

Many management gurus, and entrepreneurs, will tell you to go into business following something about which you are passionate.  The theory goes that if you have passion you will be very committed to success, and you will find your way to success with diligence, perseverance, hard work and insight driven by your passion.  Passion will lead to excellence, which will lead to success.

And this is hogwash.

Customers don’t care about your passion.  Customers care about their needs.  Rather than being a benefit, passion is a negative because it will cause you to over-invest in your passion.  You will “never say die” as you keep trying to make success out of an idea that has no chance.  Rather than investing your resources into something that fulfills people’s needs, you are likely to invest in your passion until you burn through all your resources.  Like Crumbs.

The founders of Crumbs had a passion for cupcakes.  But, they had no way to control an onslaught of competitors who could make different variations of the product.  All those competitors, whether isolated cupcake shops or cupcakes offered via kiosks or in other shops, meant Crumbs was in a very tough fight to maintain sales and make money.  It’s not you (and your passion) that controls your business destiny.  Nor is your customers.  Rather, it is your competition.

When there are lots of competitors, all capable of matching your product, and of offering countless variations of your product, then it is unlikely you can sustain revenues – or profits.  There are many industries where cutthroat competition means profits are fleeting, or downright elusive.  Airlines come to mind.  Magazines. And many retail segments.  It doesn’t matter how much passion you have, when there are too many competitors it’s a lousy business.

2 – Trends really do matter

Cupcakes were a hot product for a while.  And that’s great.  But it wasn’t hard to imagine that the trend would shift, and cupcakes would be displaced by something else.  Whatever profits you might have when you sit on a trend, those profits evaporate fast when the trend shifts and all competitors are fighting for sales in a declining market.

Remember Mrs. Field’s cookies?  In the 1980s an attractive cook and her investment banker husband built a business on soft, chewy, warm cookies sold in malls and retail streets across America.  It seemed nobody could get enough of those chocolate chip cookies.

But then, one day, we did.  We’d collectively had enough cookies, and we simply quit buying them.  Mrs. Fields (and other cookie brand) stores were rapidly replaced with pretzels and other foodstuffs.

Or look at Krispy Kreme donuts.  In the 1990s people went crazy for them, often lining up at stores waiting for the neon sign to come on saying “hot donuts”.  The company exploded into 400 stores as the stock flew like a kite.  But then, in a very short time, people had enough donuts.  There were a lot more donut shops than necessary, and Krispy Kreme went bankrupt.

So it wasn’t hard to predict that shifting food tastes would eventually put an end to cupcake sales growth.  Yet, Crumbs really didn’t prepare for trends to change.  Despite revenue and profit problems, the leadership did not admit that cupcake sales had peaked, the market was going to decline, competition would become even more intense and Crumbs would need to find another business if it was to survive.

Few trends move as fast as tastes in sweets.  But, trends do affect all businesses.  Once we bought cameras (and film,) but now we use phones – too bad for Kodak.  Once we used copiers, now we use email – too bad for Xerox.  Once we watched TV, now we download from Netflix or Amazon – too bad for NBC, ABC, CBS and Comcast. Once we went to stores, now we order on-line – too bad for Sears. Once we used PCs, now we use mobile devices – too bad for Microsoft.  These trends did not affect these companies as fast as shifting tastes affected Crumbs, but the importance of understanding trends and preparing for change is a constant part of leadership.

So Crumbs Bake Shop failure was one which could have been avoided.  Leadership needed to overcome its passion for cupcakes and taken a much larger look at customer needs to find alternative products.  It wasn’t hard to identify that some diversification was going to be necessary.  And that would have been much easier if they had put in place a system to track trends, observing (and admitting) that their “core” market was stalled and they needed to move into a new trend category.

Will Steve Ballmer Be a Good LA Clippers Leader?

Will Steve Ballmer Be a Good LA Clippers Leader?

Anyone who reads my column knows I’ve been no fan of Steve Ballmer as CEO of Microsoft.  On multiple occasions I chastised him for bad decisions around investing corporate funds in products that are unlikely to succeed.  I even called him the worst CEO in America The Washington Post even had difficulty finding reputable folks to disagree with my argument.

Unfortunately, Microsoft suffered under Mr. Ballmer.  And Windows 8, as well as the Surface tablet, have come nowhere close to what was expected for their sales – and their ability to keep Microsoft relevant in a fast changing personal technology marketplace.  In almost all regards, Mr. Ballmer was simply a terrible leader, largely because he had no understanding of business/product lifecycles.

lifecycle slide  Microsoft was founded by Bill Gates, who did a remarkable job of taking a start-up company from the Wellspring of an idea into one of the fastest growing adolescents of any American company.

Under Mr. Gates leadership Microsoft single-handedly overtook the original PC innovator – Apple – and left it a niche company on the edge of bankruptcy in little over a decade.

Mr. Gates kept Microsoft’s growth constantly in the double digits by not only making superior operating system software, but by pushing the company into application software which dominated the desktop (MS Office.)  And when the internet came along he had the vision to be out front with Internet Explorer which crushed early innovator, and market maker, Netscape.

But then Mr. Gates turned the company over to Mr. Ballmer.  And Mr. Ballmer was a leader lacking vision, or innovation.  Instead of pushing Microsoft into new markets, as had Mr. Gates, he allowed the company to fixate on constant upgrades to the products which made it dominant – Windows and Office.  Instead of keeping Microsoft in the Rapids of growth, he offered up a leadership designed to simply keep the company from going backward.  He felt that Microsoft was a company that was “mature” and thus in need of ongoing enhancement, but not much in the way of real innovation.  He trusted the market to keep growing, indefinitely, if he merely kept improving the products handed him.

As a result Microsoft stagnated.  A “Reinvention Gap” developed as Vista, Windows 7, then Windows 8 and one after another Office updates did nothing to develop new customers, or new markets.  Microsoft was resting on its old laurels – monopolistic control over desktop/laptop markets – without doing anything to create new markets which would keep it on the old growth trajectory of the Gates era.

Things didn’t look too bad for several years because people kept buying traditional PCs.  And Ballmer famously laughed at products like Linux or Unix – and then later at entertainment devices, smart phones and tablets – as Microsoft launched, but then abandoned products like Zune, Windows CE phones and its own tablet.  Ballmer kept thinking that all the market wanted was a faster, cheaper PC.  Not anything really new.

And he was dead wrong.  The Reinvention Gap emerged to the public when Apple came along with the iPod, iTunes, iPhone and iPad.  These changed the game on Microsoft, and no longer was it good enough to simply have a better edition of an outdated technology.  As PC sales began declining it was clear that Ballmer’s leadership had left the company in the Swamp, fighting off alligators and swatting at mosquitos with no strategy for how it would regain relevance against all these new competitors.

So the Board pushed him out, and demoted Gates off the Chairman’s throne.  A big move, but likely too late.  Fewer than 7% of companies that wander into the Swamp avoid the Whirlpool of demise.  Think Univac, Wang, Lanier, DEC, Cray, Sun Microsystems (or Circuit City, Montgomery Wards, Sears.)  The new CEO, Satya Nadella, has a much, much more difficult job than almost anyone thinks.  Changing the trajectory of Microsoft now, after more than a decade creating the Reinvention Gap, is a task rarely accomplished.  So rare we make heros of leaders who do it (Steve Jobs, Lou Gerstner, Lee Iacocca.)

So what will happen at the Clippers?

Critically, owning an NBA team is nothing like competing in the real business world.  It is a closed marketplace.  New competitors are not allowed, unless the current owners decide to bring in a new team.  Your revenues are not just dependent upon you, but are even shared amongst the other teams.  In fact your revenues aren’t even that closely tied to winning and losing.  Season tickets are bought in advance, and with so many games away from home a team can do quite poorly and still generate revenue – and profit – for the owner.  And this season the Indiana Pacers demonstrated that even while losing, fans will come to games.  And the Philadelphia 76ers drew crowds to see if they would set a new record for the most consecutive games lost.

In America the major sports only modestly overlap, so you have a clear season to appeal to fans.  And even if you don’t make it into the playoffs, you still share in the profits from games played by other teams.  As a business, a team doesn’t need to win a championship to generate revenue – or make a profit.  In fact, the opposite can be true as Wayne Huizenga learned owning the Championship winning Florida Marlins baseball team.  He payed so much for the top players that he lost money, and ended up busting up the team and selling the franchise!

In short, owning a sports franchise doesn’t require the owner to understand lifecycles. You don’t have to understand much about business, or about business competition. You are protected from competitors, and as one of a select few in the club everyone actually works together – in a wholly uncompetitive way – to insure that everyone makes as much money as possible.  You don’t even have to know anything about managing people, because you hire coaches to deal with players, and PR folks to deal with fans and media.  And as said before whether or not you win games really doesn’t have much to do with how much money you make.

Most sports franchise owners are known more for their idiosyncrasies than their business acumen.  They can be loud and obnoxious all they want (with very few limits.)  And now that Mr. Ballmer has no investors to deal with – or for that matter vendors or cooperative parties in a complex ecosystem like personal technology – he doesn’t have to fret about understanding where markets are headed or how to compete in the future.

When it comes to acting like a person who knows little about business, but has a huge ego, fiery temper and loves to be obnoxious there is no better job than being a sports franchise owner.  Mr. Ballmer should fit right in.

How Cable TV is Deaf to the Market Roar of Change

How Cable TV is Deaf to the Market Roar of Change

Do you really think in 2020 you’ll watch television the way people did in the 1960s?  I would doubt it.

In today’s world if you want entertainment you have a plethora of ways to download or live stream exactly what you want, when you want, from companies like Netflix, Hulu, Pandora, Spotify, Streamhunter, Viewster and TVWeb.  Why would you even want someone else to program you entertainment if you can get it yourself?

Additionally, we increasingly live in a world unaccepting of one-way communication.  We want to not only receive what entertains us, but share it with others, comment on it and give real-time feedback.  The days when we willingly accepted having information thrust at us are quickly dissipating as we demand interactivity with what comes across our screen – regardless of size.

These 2 big trends (what I want, when I want; and 2-way over 1-way) have already changed the way we accept entertaining.  We use USB drives and smartphones to provide static information.  DVDs are nearly obsolete.  And we demand 24×7 mobile for everything dynamic.

Yet, the CEO of Charter Cable company wass surprised to learn that the growth in cable-only customers is greater than the growth of video customers.  Really?

It was about 3 years ago when my college son said he needed broadband access to his apartment, but he didn’t want any TV.  He commented that he and his 3 roommates didn’t have any televisions any more. They watched entertainment and gamed on screens around his apartment connected to various devices.  He never watched live TV.  Instead they downloaded their favorite programs to watch between (or along with) gaming sessions, picked up the news from live web sites (more current and accurate he said) and for sports they either bought live streams or went to a local bar.

To save money he contacted Comcast and said he wanted the premier internet broadband service.  Even business-level service.  But he didn’t want TV.  Comcast told him it was impossible. If he wanted internet he had to buy TV.  “That’s really, really stupid” was the way he explained it to me. “Why do I have to buy something I don’t want at all to get what I really, really want?”

Then, last year, I helped a friend move.  As a favor I volunteered to return her cable box to Comcast, since there was a facility near my home.  I dreaded my volunteerism when I arrived at Comcast, because there were about 30 people in line.  But, I was committed, so I waited.

The next half-hour was amazingly instructive.  One after another people walked up to the window and said they were having problems paying their bills, or that they had trouble with their devices, or wanted a change in service.  And one after the other they said “I don’t really want TV, just internet, so how cheaply can I get it?”

These were not busy college students, or sophisticated managers.  These were every day people, most of whom were having some sort of trouble coming up with the monthly money for their Comcast bill.  They didn’t mind handing back the cable box with TV service, but they were loath to give up broadband internet access.

Again and again I listened as the patient Comcast people explained that internet-only service was not available in Chicagoland.  People had to buy a TV package to obtain broad-band internet. It was force-feeding a product people really didn’t want.  Sort of like making them buy an entree in order to buy desert.

As I retold this story my friends told me several stories about people who banned together in apartments to buy one Comcast service.  They would buy a high-powered router, maybe with sub-routers, and spread that signal across several apartments.  Sometimes this was done in dense housing divisions and condos.  These folks cut the cost for internet to a fraction of what Comcast charged, and were happy to live without “TV.”

But that is just the beginning of the market shift which will likely gut cable companies.  These customers will eventually hunt down internet service from an alternative supplier, like the old phone company  or AT&T.  Some will give up on old screens, and just use their mobile device, abandoning large monitors.  Some will power entertainment to their larger screens (or speakers) by mobile bluetooth, or by turning their mobile device into a “hotspot.”

And, eventually, we will all have wireless for free – or nearly so.  Google has started running fiber cable in cities including Austin, TX, Kansas City, MO and Provo, Utah.  Anyone who doesn’t see this becoming city-wide wireless has their eyes very tightly closed.  From Albuquerque, NM to Ponca City, OK to Mountain View, CA (courtesy of Google) cities already have free city-wide wireless broadband. And bigger cities like Los Angeles and Chicago are trying to set up free wireless infrastructure.

And if the USA ever invests in another big “public works infrastructure” program will it be to rebuild the old bridges and roads?  Or is it inevitable that someone will push through a national bill to connect everyone wirelessly – like we did to build highways and the first broadcast TV.

So, what will Charter and Comcast sell customers then?

It is very, very easy today to end up with a $300/month bill from a major cable provider.  Install 3 HD (high definition) sets in your home, buy into the premium movie packages, perhaps one sports network and high speed internet and before you know it you’ve agreed to spend more on cable service than you do on home insurance.  Or your car payment.  Once customers have the ability to bypass that “cable cost” the incentive is already intensive to “cut the cord” and set that supplier free.

Yet, the cable companies really don’t seem to see it.  They remain unimpressed at how much customers dislike their service. And respond very slowly despite how much customers complain about slow internet speeds.  And even worse, customer incredulous outcries when the cable company slows down access (or cuts it) to streaming entertainment or video downloads are left unheeded.

Cable companies say the problem is “content.”  So they want better “programming.”  And Comcast has gone so far as to buy NBC/Universal so they can spend a LOT more money on programming.  Even as advertising dollars are dropping faster than the market share of old-fashioned broadcast channels.

Blaming content flies in the face of the major trends.  There is no shortage of content today.  We can find all the content we want globally, from millions of web sites.  For entertainment we have thousands of options, from shows and movies we can buy to what is for free (don’t forget the hours of fun on YouTube!)

It’s not “quality programming” which cable needs.  That just reflects industry deafness to the roar of a market shift.  In short order, cable companies will lack a reason to exist.  Like land-line phones, Philco radios and those old TV antennas outside, there simply won’t be a need for cable boxes in your home.

Too often business leaders become deaf to big trends.  They are so busy executing on an old success formula, looking for reasons to defend & extend it, that they fail to evaluate its relevancy.  Rather than listen to market shifts, and embrace the need for change, they turn a deaf ear and keep doing what they’ve always done – a little better, with a little more of the same product (do you really want 650 cable channels?,) perhaps a little faster and always seeking a way to do it cheaper – even if the monthly bill somehow keeps going up.

But execution makes no difference when you’re basic value proposition becomes obsolete.  And that’s how companies end up like Kodak, Smith-Corona, Blackberry, Hostess, Continental Bus Lines and pretty soon Charter and Comcast.