Why Microsoft Windows 10 Really Doesn’t Matter

Yesterday Microsoft conducted a pre-launch of Windows 10, demonstrating its features in an effort to excite developers and create some buzz before consumer launch later in 2015.

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By and large, nobody cared.  Were you aware of the event? Did you try to watch the live stream, offered via the Microsoft web site?  Were you eager to read what people thought of the product?  Did you look for reviews in the Wall Street Journal, USA Today and other general news outlets?

Windows10_1

Microsoft really blew it with Windows 8 – which is the second most maligned Windows product ever, exceeded only by
Vista.  But that wasn’t hard to predict, in June, 2012.  Even then it was clear that Windows 8, and Surface tablets, were designed to defend and extend the installed Windows base, and as such the design precluded the opportunity to change the market and pull mobile users to Microsoft.

And, unfortunately, that is how Windows 10 has been developed.  At the event’s start Microsoft played a tape driving home how it interviewed dozens and dozens of loyal Windows customers, asking them what they didn’t like about 8, and what they wanted in a Windows upgrade.  That set the tone for the new product.

Microsoft didn’t seek out what would convert all those mobile users already on iOS or Android to throw away their devices and buy a Microsoft product.  Microsoft didn’t ask its defected customers what it would take to bring them back, nor did it ask the over 50% of the market using Windows 7 or older products what it would take to get them to go to Windows mobile rather than an iPad or Galaxy tablet.  Nope.  Microsoft went to its installed base and asked them what they would like.

Imagine it’s 1975 and for two decades you have successfully made and sold small offset printing presses.  Every single company of any size has one in their basement.  But customers have started buying really simple, easy to use Xerox machines.  Fewer admins are sending even fewer jobs to the print shop in the basement, as they choose to simply run off a bunch of copies on the Xerox machine.  Of course these copies are more expensive than the print shop, and the quality isn’t as good, but the users find the new Xerox machines good enough, and they are simple and convenient.

What are you to do if you make printing presses?  You probably need to find out how you can get into a new product that actually appeals to the users who no longer use the print shop.  But, instead, those companies went to the print shop operators and asked them what they wanted in a new, small print machine.  And then the companies upgraded their presses and other traditional printing products based upon what that installed base recommended.  And it wasn’t long before their share of printing eroded to a niche of high-volume, and often color, jobs.  And the commercial print market went to Xerox.

That’s what Microsoft did with Windows 10.  It asked its installed base what it wanted in an operating system.  When the problem isn’t the installed base, its the substitute product that is killing the company.  Microsoft didn’t need input from its installed base of loyal users, it needed input from people who have quit using HP laptops in favor of iPads.

There are a lot of great new features in Windows 10.  But it really doesn’t matter.

The well spoken presenters from Microsoft laid out how Windows 10 would be great for anyone who wants to go to an entirely committed Windows environment.  To achieve Microsoft’s vision of the future every one of us will throw away our iOS and Android products and go to Windows on every single device.  Really.  There wasn’t one demonstration of how Windows would integrate with anything other than Windows.  And there appeared on intention of making the future an interoperable environment.  Microsoft’s view was we would use Windows on EVERYTHING.

Microsoft’s insular view is that all of us have been craving a way to put Windows on all our devices.  We’ve been sitting around using our laptops (or desktops) and saying “I can’t wait for Microsoft to come out with a solution so I can throw away my iPhone and iPad.  I can’t wait to tell everyone in my organization that now, finally, we have an operating system that IT likes so much that we want everyone in the company to get  rid of all other technologies and use Windows on their tablets and phones – because then they can integrate with the laptops (that most of us don’t use hardly at all any longer.)”

Microsoft even went out of its way to demonstrate how well Win10 works on 2-in-1 devices, which are supposed to be both a tablet and a laptop.  But, these “hybrid” devices really don’t make any sense.  Why would you want something that is both a laptop and a tablet?  Who wants a hybrid car when you can have a Tesla?  Who wants a vehicle that is both a pick-up and a car (once called the El Camino?) Microsoft thinks these are good devices, because Microsoft can’t accept that most of us already quit using our laptop and are happy enough with a tablet (or smartphone) alone!

Microsoft presenters repeatedly reminded us that Windows is evolving.  Which completely ignores the fact that the market has been disrupted.  It has moved from laptops to mobile devices.  Yes, Windows has a huge installed base on machines that we use less and less.  But Windows 10 pretends that there does not exist today an equally huge, and far more relevant, installed base of mobile devices that already has millions of apps people use every single day over and over.  Microsoft pretended as if there is no world other than Windows, and that a more robuts Windows is something people can’t wait to use!  We all can’t wait to go back to a exclusive Microsoft world, using Windows, Office, the new Spartan browser – and creating documents, spreadsheets and even presentations using Office, with those hundreds of complex features (anyone know how to make a pivot table?) on our phones!

Just like those printing press manufacturers were sure people really wanted documents printed on presses, and couldn’t wait to unplug those Xerox machines and return to the old way of doing things.  They just needed presses to have more features, more capabilities, more speed!

The best thing in Windows 10 is Cortana, which is a really cool, intelligent digital assistant.  But, rather than making Cortana a tool developers can buy to integrate into their iOS or Android app the only way a developer can use Cortana is if they go into this exclusive Windows-only world.  That’s a significant request.

Microsoft made this mistake before.  Kinect was a great tool.  But the only way to use it, initially, was on an xBox – and still is limited to Windows.  Despite its many superb features, Kinect didn’t develop anywhere near its potential.  Cortana now suffers from the same problem.  Rather than offering the tool so it can find its best use and markets, Microsoft requires developers and consumers buy into the Windows-exclusive world if you want to use Cortana.

Microsoft hasn’t yet figured out that it lost relevance years ago when it missed the move to mobile, and then launched Windows 8 and Surface to markets that didn’t really want those products.  Now the market has gone mobile, and the leader isn’t Microsoft.  Microsoft has to find a way to be relevant to the millions of people using alternative products, and the Windows 10 vision, which excludes all those competing devices, simply isn’t it.

There was lots of neat geeky stuff shown.  Surface tablets using Windows 10 with an xBox app can now do real gaming, which looks pretty cool and helps move Microsoft forward in mobile gaming.  That may be a product that sets Sony’s Playstation and Nintendo’s Wii on their heels.  But that’s gaming, and historically not where Microsoft makes any money (nor for that matter does Sony or Nintendo.)

There is a new interactive whiteboard that integrates Skype and Windows tablets for digital enhancement of brainstorming meetings.  But it is unclear how a company uses it when most employees already have iPhones or Samsung S5s or Notes.  And for the totally geeky there was a demo of a holographic headset.  But when it comes to disruptive products like this success requires finding really interesting applications that otherwise cannot be completed, and then the initial customers who have a really desperate need for that application who will become devoted users.

Launching such disruptive products has long been the bane of Microsoft’s existence.  Microsoft thinks in mass market terms, and selling to its base.  Not developing breakthrough applications and finding niche markets to launch new uses.  Nor has Microsoft created a developer community aligned with that kind of work.  They have long been taught to simply continue to do things that defend and extend the traditional base of product uses and customers.

The really big miss for this meeting was understanding developer needs.  Today developers have an enormous base of iOS and Android users to whom they can sell their products.  Windows has less than 3% share in mobile devices.  What developer would commit their resources to developing products for Windows 10, which has an installed base only in laptops and desktops?  In other words, yesterday’s technology base?  Especially when to obtain the biggest benefits of Windows 10 that developer has to find end use customers (companies or consumers) willing to commit 100% to Windows everywhere – even including their televisions, thermostats and other devices in our ever smarter buildings?

Windows 10 has a lot of cool features.  But Microsoft made a big miss by listening to the wrong people.  By assuming its installed base couldn’t wait for a Microsoft-exclusive solution, and by behaving as if the installed base of mobile devices either didn’t exist or didn’t matter, the company showed its hubris (once again.)  If all it took to succeed were great products, the market would never have shifted from Macintosh computers to Windows machines in the 1990s.  Microsoft simply doesn’t realize that it lacks the relevance to pull of its grand vision, and as such Windows 10 has almost no chance of stopping the Apple/Google/Samsung juggernaut.

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Will Steve Ballmer Be a Good LA Clippers Leader?

Will Steve Ballmer Be a Good LA Clippers Leader?

Anyone who reads my column knows I’ve been no fan of Steve Ballmer as CEO of Microsoft.  On multiple occasions I chastised him for bad decisions around investing corporate funds in products that are unlikely to succeed.  I even called him the worst CEO in America The Washington Post even had difficulty finding reputable folks to disagree with my argument.

Unfortunately, Microsoft suffered under Mr. Ballmer.  And Windows 8, as well as the Surface tablet, have come nowhere close to what was expected for their sales – and their ability to keep Microsoft relevant in a fast changing personal technology marketplace.  In almost all regards, Mr. Ballmer was simply a terrible leader, largely because he had no understanding of business/product lifecycles.

lifecycle slide  Microsoft was founded by Bill Gates, who did a remarkable job of taking a start-up company from the Wellspring of an idea into one of the fastest growing adolescents of any American company.

Under Mr. Gates leadership Microsoft single-handedly overtook the original PC innovator – Apple – and left it a niche company on the edge of bankruptcy in little over a decade.

Mr. Gates kept Microsoft’s growth constantly in the double digits by not only making superior operating system software, but by pushing the company into application software which dominated the desktop (MS Office.)  And when the internet came along he had the vision to be out front with Internet Explorer which crushed early innovator, and market maker, Netscape.

But then Mr. Gates turned the company over to Mr. Ballmer.  And Mr. Ballmer was a leader lacking vision, or innovation.  Instead of pushing Microsoft into new markets, as had Mr. Gates, he allowed the company to fixate on constant upgrades to the products which made it dominant – Windows and Office.  Instead of keeping Microsoft in the Rapids of growth, he offered up a leadership designed to simply keep the company from going backward.  He felt that Microsoft was a company that was “mature” and thus in need of ongoing enhancement, but not much in the way of real innovation.  He trusted the market to keep growing, indefinitely, if he merely kept improving the products handed him.

As a result Microsoft stagnated.  A “Reinvention Gap” developed as Vista, Windows 7, then Windows 8 and one after another Office updates did nothing to develop new customers, or new markets.  Microsoft was resting on its old laurels – monopolistic control over desktop/laptop markets – without doing anything to create new markets which would keep it on the old growth trajectory of the Gates era.

Things didn’t look too bad for several years because people kept buying traditional PCs.  And Ballmer famously laughed at products like Linux or Unix – and then later at entertainment devices, smart phones and tablets – as Microsoft launched, but then abandoned products like Zune, Windows CE phones and its own tablet.  Ballmer kept thinking that all the market wanted was a faster, cheaper PC.  Not anything really new.

And he was dead wrong.  The Reinvention Gap emerged to the public when Apple came along with the iPod, iTunes, iPhone and iPad.  These changed the game on Microsoft, and no longer was it good enough to simply have a better edition of an outdated technology.  As PC sales began declining it was clear that Ballmer’s leadership had left the company in the Swamp, fighting off alligators and swatting at mosquitos with no strategy for how it would regain relevance against all these new competitors.

So the Board pushed him out, and demoted Gates off the Chairman’s throne.  A big move, but likely too late.  Fewer than 7% of companies that wander into the Swamp avoid the Whirlpool of demise.  Think Univac, Wang, Lanier, DEC, Cray, Sun Microsystems (or Circuit City, Montgomery Wards, Sears.)  The new CEO, Satya Nadella, has a much, much more difficult job than almost anyone thinks.  Changing the trajectory of Microsoft now, after more than a decade creating the Reinvention Gap, is a task rarely accomplished.  So rare we make heros of leaders who do it (Steve Jobs, Lou Gerstner, Lee Iacocca.)

So what will happen at the Clippers?

Critically, owning an NBA team is nothing like competing in the real business world.  It is a closed marketplace.  New competitors are not allowed, unless the current owners decide to bring in a new team.  Your revenues are not just dependent upon you, but are even shared amongst the other teams.  In fact your revenues aren’t even that closely tied to winning and losing.  Season tickets are bought in advance, and with so many games away from home a team can do quite poorly and still generate revenue – and profit – for the owner.  And this season the Indiana Pacers demonstrated that even while losing, fans will come to games.  And the Philadelphia 76ers drew crowds to see if they would set a new record for the most consecutive games lost.

In America the major sports only modestly overlap, so you have a clear season to appeal to fans.  And even if you don’t make it into the playoffs, you still share in the profits from games played by other teams.  As a business, a team doesn’t need to win a championship to generate revenue – or make a profit.  In fact, the opposite can be true as Wayne Huizenga learned owning the Championship winning Florida Marlins baseball team.  He payed so much for the top players that he lost money, and ended up busting up the team and selling the franchise!

In short, owning a sports franchise doesn’t require the owner to understand lifecycles. You don’t have to understand much about business, or about business competition. You are protected from competitors, and as one of a select few in the club everyone actually works together – in a wholly uncompetitive way – to insure that everyone makes as much money as possible.  You don’t even have to know anything about managing people, because you hire coaches to deal with players, and PR folks to deal with fans and media.  And as said before whether or not you win games really doesn’t have much to do with how much money you make.

Most sports franchise owners are known more for their idiosyncrasies than their business acumen.  They can be loud and obnoxious all they want (with very few limits.)  And now that Mr. Ballmer has no investors to deal with – or for that matter vendors or cooperative parties in a complex ecosystem like personal technology – he doesn’t have to fret about understanding where markets are headed or how to compete in the future.

When it comes to acting like a person who knows little about business, but has a huge ego, fiery temper and loves to be obnoxious there is no better job than being a sports franchise owner.  Mr. Ballmer should fit right in.

Why Microsoft is Still Speculative

Why Microsoft is Still Speculative

Hope springs eternal in the human breast” (Alexander Pope)

As it does for most investors.  People do not like to accept the notion that a business will lose relevancy, and its value will fall.  Especially really big companies that are household brand names.  Investors, like customers, prefer to think large, established companies will continue to be around, and even do well.  It makes everyone feel better to have a optimistic attitude about large, entrenched organizations.

And with such optimism investors have cheered Microsoft for the last 15 months.  After a decade of trading up and down around $26/share, Microsoft stock has made a significant upward move to $41 – a new decade-long high. This price has people excited Microsoft will reach the dot.com/internet boom high of $60 in 2000.

After discovering that Windows 8, and the Surface tablet, were nowhere near reaching sales expectations after Christmas 2012 – and that PC sales were declining faster than expected – investors were cheered in 2013 to hear that CEO Steve Ballmer would resign.  After much speculation, insider Satya Nadella was named CEO, and he quickly made it clear he was refocusing the company on mobile and cloud.  This started the analysts, and investors, on their recent optimistic bent.

CEO Nadella has cut the price of Windows by 70% in order to keep hardware manufacturers on Windows for lower cost machines, and he announced the company’s #1 sales and profit product – Office – was being released on iOS for iPad users.  Investors are happy to see this action, as they hope that it will keep PC sales humming. Or at least slow the decline in sales while keeping manufacturers (like HP) in the Microsoft Windows fold.  And investors are likewise hopeful that the long awaited Office announcement will mean booming sales of Office 365 for all those Apple products in the installed base.

But, there’s a lot more needed for Microsoft to succeed than these announcements.  While Microsoft is the world’s #1 software company, it is still under considerable threat and its long-term viability remains unsure.

Windows is in a tough spot.  After this price decline, Microsoft will need to increase sales volume by 2.5X to recoup lost profits.  Meanwhile, Chrome laptops are considerably cheaper for customers and more profitable for manufacturers.  And whether this price cut will have any impact on the decline in PC sales is unclear, as users are switching to mobile products for ease-of-use reasons that go far beyond price.  Microsoft has taken an action to defend and extend its installed base of manufacturers who have been threatening to move, but the impact on profits is still likely to be negative and PC sales are still going to decline.

Meanwhile, the move to offer Office on iOS is clearly another offer to defend the installed Office marketplace, and unlikely to create a lot of incremental revenue and profit growth.  The PC market has long been much bigger than tablets, and almost every PC had Office installed.  Shrinking at 12-14% means a lot less Windows Office is being sold. And, In tablets iOS is not 100% of the market, as Android has substantial share.  Offering Office on iOS reaches a lot of potential machines, but certainly not 100% as has been the case with PCs.

Further, while there are folks who look forward to running Office on an iOS device, Office is not without competition.  Both Apple and Google offer competitive products to Office, and the price is free.  For price sensitive users, both individuals and corporations, after 4 years of using competitive products it is by no means a given they all are ready to pay $60-$100 per device per year.  Yes, there will be Office sales Microsoft did not previously have, but whether it will be large enough to cover the declining sales of Office on the PC is far from clear.  And whether current pricing is viable is far, far from certain.

While these Microsoft products are the easiest for consumers to understand, Nadella’s move to make Microsoft successful in the mobile/cloud world requires succeeding with cloud products sold to corporations and software-as-service providers.  Here Microsoft is late, and facing substantial competition as well.

Just last week Google cut the price of its Compute Engine cloud infrastructure (IaaS) platform and App Engine cloud app platform (PaaS) products 30-32%.  Google cut the price of its Cloud Storage and BigQuery (big data analytics) services by 68% and 85% as it competes headlong for customers with Amazon.  Amazon, which has the first-mover position and large customers including the U.S. federal government, cut prices within 24 hours for its EC2 cloud computing service by 30%, and for its S3 storage service by over 50%. Amazon also reduced prices on its RDS database service approximately 28%, and its Elasticache caching service by over 33%.

To remain competitive, Microsoft had to react this week by chopping prices on its Azure cloud computing products 27%-35%, reducing cloud storage pricing 44%-65%, and whacking prices on its Windows and Linux memory-intensive computing products 27%-35%.  While these products have allowed the networking division formerly run by now CEO Nadella to be profitable, it will be increasingly difficult to maintain old profit levels on existing customers, and even a tougher problem to profitably steal share from the early cloud leaders – even as the market grows.

While optimism has grown for Microsoft fans, and the share price has moved distinctly higher, it is smart to look at other market leaders who obtained investor favorability, only to quickly lose it.

Blackberry was known as RIM (Research in Motion) in June, 2007 when the iPhone was launched.  RIM was the market leader, a near monopoly in smart phones, and its stock was riding high at $70.  In August, 2007, on the back of its dominant status, the stock split – and moved on to a split adjusted $140 by end of 2008.  But by 2010, as competition with iOS and Android took its toll RIM was back to $80 (and below.)  Today the rechristened company trades for $8.

Sears was once the country’s largest and most successful retailer.  By 2004 much of the luster was coming off when KMart purchased the company and took its name, trading at only $20/share.  Following great enthusiasm for a new CEO (Ed Lampert) investors flocked to the stock, sure it would take advantage of historical brands such as DieHard, Kenmore and Craftsman, plus leverage its substantial real estate asset base.  By 2007 the stock had risen to $180 (a 9x gain.) But competition was taking its toll on Sears, despite its great legacy, and sales/store started to decline, total sales started declining and profits turned to losses which began to stretch into 20 straight quarters of negative numbers.  Meanwhile, demand for retail space declined, and prices declined, cutting the value of those historical assets. By 2009 the stock had dropped back to $40, and still trades around that value today — as some wonder if Sears can avoid bankruptcy.

Best Buy was a tremendous success in its early years, grew quickly and built a loyal customer base as the #1 retail electronics purveyor.  But streaming video and music decimated CD and DVD sales.  On-line retailers took a huge bite out of consumer electronic sales.  By January, 2013 the stock traded at $13.  A change of CEO, and promises of new formats and store revitalization propped up optimism amongst investors and by November, 2014 the stock was at $44.  However, market trends – which had been in place for several years – did not change and as store sales lagged the stock dropped, today trading at only $25.

Microsoft has a great legacy.  It’s products were market leaders.  But the market has shifted – substantially.  So far new management has only shown incremental efforts to defend its historical business with product extensions – which are up against tremendous competition that in these new markets have a tremendous lead.  Microsoft so far is still losing money in on-line and gaming (xBox) where it has lost almost all its top leadership since 2014 began and has been forced to re-organize.   Nadella has yet to show any new products that will create new markets in order to “turn the tide” of sales and profits that are under threat of eventual extinction by ever-more-capable mobile products.

While optimism springs eternal long-term investors would be smart to be skeptical about this recent improvement in the stock price.  Things could easily go from mediocre to worse in these extremely competitive global tech markets, leaving Microsoft optimists with broken dreams, broken hearts and broken portfolios.

Update: On April 2 Microsoft announced it is providing Windows for free to all manufacturers with a 9″ or smaller display.  This is an action to help keep Microsoft competitive in the mobile marketplace – but it does little for Microsoft profitability.  Android from Google may be free, but Google’s business is built on ad sales – not software sales – and that’s dramatically different from Microsoft that relies almost entirely on Windows and Office for its profitability

Update: April 3 CRN (Computer Reseller News) reviewed Office products for iOS – “We predict that once the novelty of “Office for iPad” wears off, companies will go back to relying on the humble, hard-working third parties building apps that are as stable, as handsome and far more capable than those of Redmond. It’s not that hard to do.”

 

 

Microsoft Should Give XBox Biz to Nintendo

Microsoft Should Give XBox Biz to Nintendo

Microsoft has a new CEO. And a new Chairman.  The new CEO says the company needs to focus on core markets.  And analysts are making the same cry.

Amidst this organizational change, xBox continues its long history of losing money – as much as $2B/year.  And early 2014 results show that xBox One is selling at only half the rate of Sony’s Playstation 4, with cumulative xBox One sales at under 70% of PS4, leading Motley Fool to call xBox One a “total failure.”

While calling xBox One a failure may be premature, Microsoft investors have plenty to worry about.

Firstly, the console game business has not been a profitable market for anyone for quite a while.

The old leader, Nintendo, watched sales crash in 2013, first quarter 2014 estimates reduced by 67% and the CEO now projecting the company will be unproftable for the year.  Nintendo stock declined by 2/3 between 2010 and 2012, then after some recovery in 2013 lost 17% on the January day of its disappointing sales expectation.  Not a great market indicator.

The new sales leader is Sony, but that should give no one reason to cheer.  Sony lost money for 4 straight years (2008-2012), and was barely able to squeek out a 2013 profit only because it took a massive $4.6B 2012 loss which cleared the way to show something slightly better than break-even.  Now S&P has downgraded Sony’s debt to near junk status.  While PS4 sales are better than xBox One, in the fast shifting world of gaming this is no lock on future sales as game developers constantly jockey dollars between platforms.

Whether Sony will make money on PS4 in 2014 is far from proven.  Especially since it sells for $100/unit (20%) less than xBox One – which compresses margins.  What investors (and customers) can expect is an ongoing price war between Nintendo, Sony and Microsoft to attract sales.  A competition which historically has left all competitors with losses – even when they win the market share war.

And on top of all of this is the threat that console market growth may stagnate as gamers migrate toward games on mobile devices.  How this will affect sales is unknown.  But given what happened to PC sales it’s not hard to imagine the market for consoles to become smaller each year, dominated by dedicated game players, while the majority of casual game players move to their convenient always-on device.

Due to its limited product range, Nintendo is in a “fight to the death” to win in gaming. Sony is now selling its PC business, and lacks strong offerings in most consumer products markets (like TVs) while facing extremely tough competition from Samsung and LG.  Sony, likewise, cannot afford to abandon the Playstation business, and will be forced to engage in this profit killing battle to attract developers and end-use customers.

When businesses fall into profit-killing price wars the big winner is the one who figures out how to exit first.  Back in the 1970s when IBM created domination in mainframes the CEO of GE realized it was a profit bloodbath to fight for sales against IBM, Sperry Rand and RCA.  Thinking fast he made a deal to sell the GE mainframe business to RCA so the latter could strengthen its campaign as an IBM alternative, and in one step he stopped investing in a money-loser while strenghtening the balance sheet in alternative markets like locomotives and jet engines – which went on to high profits.

With calls to focus, Microsoft is now abandoning XP.  It is working to force customers to upgrade to either Windows 7 or Windows 8.  As PC sales continue declining, Microsoft faces an epic battle to shore up its position in cloud services and maintain its enterprise customers against competitors like Amazon.

After a decade in gaming, where it has never made money, now is the time for Microsoft to recognize it does not know how to profit from its technology – regardless how good.  Microsoft could cleve off Kinect for use in its cloud services, and give its installed xBox base (and developer community) to Nintendo where the company could focus on lower cost machines and maintain its fight with Sony.

Analysts that love focus would cheer.  They would cheer the benefit to Nintendo, and the additional “focus” to Microsoft.  Microsoft would stop investing in the unprofitable game console market, and use resources in markets more likely to generate high returns.  And, with some sharp investment bankers, Microsoft could also probably keep a piece of the business (in Nintendo stock) that it could sell at a future date if the “suicide” console business ever turns into something profitable.

Sometimes smart leadership is knowing when to “cut and run.”

Links:

2012 recognition that Sony was flailing without a profitable strategy

January, 2013 forecast that microsoft would abandon gaming

 

Microsoft’s $7.2B Nokia Mistake

Just over a week after Microsoft announces plans to replace CEO Steve Ballmer the company announced it will spend $7.2B to buy the Nokia phone/tablet business.  For those looking forward to big changes at Microsoft this was like sticking a pin in the big party balloon!

Everyone knows that Microsoft's future is at risk now that PC sales are declining globally at nearly 10% – with developing markets shifting even faster to mobile devices than the USA.  And Microsoft has been the perpetual loser in mobile devices; late to market and with a product that is not a game changer and has only 3% share in the USA

But, despite this grim reality, Microsoft has doubled-down (that's doubled its bet for non-gamblers) on its Windows 8 OS strategy, and continues to play "bet the company".  Nokia's global market share has shriveled to 15% (from 40%) since former Microsoft exec-turned-Nokia-CEO Stephen Elop committed the company to Windows 8.  Because other Microsoft ecosystem companies like HP, Acer and HP have been slow to bring out Win 8 devices, Nokia has 90% of the miniscule market that is Win 8 phones.  So this acquisition brings in-house a much deeper commitment to spending on an effort to defend & extend Microsoft's declining O/S products.

As I predicted in January, the #1 action we could expect from a Ballmer-led Microsoft is pouring more resources into fighting market leaders iOS and Android – an unwinnable war.  Previously there was the $8.5B Skype and the $400M Nook, and now a $7.2B Nokia.  And as 32,000 Nokia employees join Microsoft losses will surely continue to rise.  While Microsoft has a lot of cash – spending it at this rate, it won't last long!

Some folks think this acquisition will make Microsoft more like Apple, because it now will have both hardware and software which in some ways is like Apple's iPhone.  The hope is for Apple-like sales and margins soon.  But, unfortunately, Google bought Motorola months ago and we've seen that such revenue and profit growth are much harder to achieve than simply making an acquisition.  And Android products are much more popular than Win8.  Simply combining Microsoft and Nokia does not change the fact that Win8 products are very late to market, and not very desirable.

Some have postulated that buying Nokia was a way to solve the Microsoft CEO succession question, positioning Mr. Elop for Mr. Ballmer's job.  While that outcome does seem likely, it would be one of the most expensive recruiting efforts of all time.  The only reason for Mr. Elop to be made Microsoft CEO is his historical company relationship, not performance.  And that makes Mr. Elop is exactly the wrong person for the Microsoft CEO job! 

In October, 2010 when Mr. Elop took over Nokia I pointed out that he was the wrong person for that job – and he would destroy Nokia by making it a "Microsoft shop" with a Microsoft strategy.  Since then sales are down, profits have evaporated, shareholders are in revolt and the only good news has been selling the dying company to Microsoft!  That's not exactly the best CEO legacy. 

Mr. Elop's job today is to sell more Win8 mobile devices.  Were he to be made Microsoft CEO it is likely he would continue to think that is his primary job – just as Mr. Ballmer has believed.  Neither CEO has shown any ability to realize that the market has already shifted, that there are two leaders far, far in front with brand image, products, apps, developers, partners, distribution, market share, sales and profits. And it is impossible for Microsoft to now catch up.

It is for good reason that short-term traders pushed down Microsoft's share value after the acquisition was announced.  It is clear that current CEO Ballmer and Microsoft's Board are still stuck fighting the last war.  Still trying to resurrect the Windows and Office businesses to previous glory.  Many market anallysts see this as the last great effort to make Ballmer's bet-the-company on Windows 8 pay off.  But that's a bet which every month is showing longer and longer odds.

Microsoft is not dead.  And Microsoft is not without the ability to turn around.  But it won't happen unless the Board recognizes it needs to steer Microsoft in a vastly different direction, reduce (rather than increase) investments in Win8 (and its devices,) and create a vision for 2020 where Microsoft is highly relevant to customers.  So far, we're seeing all the wrong moves.