by Adam Hartung | Sep 17, 2014 | Current Affairs, Disruptions, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
Sony was once the leader in consumer electronics. A brand powerhouse who’s products commanded a premium price and were in every home. Trinitron color TVs, Walkman and Discman players, Vaio PCs. But Sony has lost money for all but one quarter across the last 6 years, and company leaders just admitted the company will lose over $2B this year and likely eliminate its dividend.
McDonald’s created something we now call “fast food.” It was an unstoppable entity that hooked us consumers on products like the Big Mac, Quarter Pounder and Happy Meal. An entire generation was seemingly addicted to McDonald’s and raised their families on these products, with favorable delight for the ever cheery, clown-inspired spokesperson Ronald McDonald. But now McDonald’s has hit a growth stall, same-store sales are down and the Millenial generation has turned its nose up creating serious doubts about the company’s future.
Radio Shack was the leader in electronics before we really had a consumer electronics category. When we still bought vacuum tubes to repair radios and TVs, home hobbyists built their own early versions of computers and video games worked by hooking them up to TVs (Atari, etc.) Radio Shack was the place to go. Now the company is one step from bankruptcy.
Sears created the original non-store shopping capability with its famous catalogs. Sears went on to become a Dow Jones Industrial Average component company and the leading national general merchandise retailer with powerhouse brands like Kenmore, Diehard and Craftsman. Now Sears’ debt has been rated the lowest level junk, it hasn’t made a profit for 3 years and same store sales have declined while the number of stores has been cut dramatically. The company survives by taking loans from the private equity firm its Chairman controls.
How in the world can companies be such successful pioneers, and end up in such trouble?
Markets shift. Things in the world change. What was a brilliant business idea loses value as competitors enter the market, new technologies and solutions are created and customers find they prefer alternatives to your original success formula. These changed markets leave your company irrelevant – and eventually obsolete.
Unfortunately, we’ve trained leaders over the last 60 years how to be operationally excellent. In 1960 America graduated about the same number of medical doctors, lawyers and MBAs from accredited, professional university programs. Today we still graduate about the same number of medical doctors every year. We graduate about 6 times as many lawyers (leading to lots of jokes about there being too many lawyers.) But we graduate a whopping 30 times as many MBAs. Business education skyrocketed, and it has become incredibly normal to see MBAs at all levels, and in all parts, of corporations.
The output of that training has been a movement toward focusing on accounting, finance, cost management, supply chain management, automation — all things operational. We have trained a veritable legion of people in how to “do things better” in business, including how to measure costs and operations in order to make constant improvements in “the numbers.” Most leaders of publicly traded companies today have a background in finance, and can discuss the P&L and balance sheets of their companies in infinite detail. Management’s understanding of internal operations and how to improve them is vast, and the ability of leaders to focus an organization on improving internal metrics is higher than ever in history.
But none of this matters when markets shift. When things outside the corporation happen that makes all that hard work, cost cutting, financial analysis and machination pretty much useless. Because today most customers don’t really care how well you make a color TV or physical music player, since they now do everything digitally using a mobile device. Nor do they care for high-fat and high-carb previously frozen food products which are consistently the same because they can find tastier, fresher, lighter alternatives. They don’t care about the details of what’s inside a consumer electronic product because they can buy a plethora of different products from a multitude of suppliers with the touch of a mobile device button. And they don’t care how your physical retail store is laid out and what store-branded merchandise is on the shelves because they can shop the entire world of products – and a vast array of retailers – and receive deep product reviews instantaneously, as well as immediate price and delivery information, from anywhere they carry their phone – 24×7.
“Get the assumptions wrong, and nothing else matters” is often attributed to Peter Drucker. You’ve probably seen that phrase in at least one management, convention or motivational presentation over the last decade. For Sony, McDonald’s, Radio Shack and Sears the assumptions upon which their current businesses were built are no longer valid. The things that management assumed to be true when the companies were wildly profitable 2 or 3 decades ago are no longer true. And no matter how much leadership focuses on metrics, operational improvements and cost cutting – or even serving the remaining (if dwindling) current customers – the shift away from these companies’ offerings will not stop. Rather, that shift is accelerating.
It has been 80 years since Harvard professor Joseph Schumpeter described “creative destruction” as the process in which new technologies obsolete the old, and the creativity of new competitors destroys the value of older companies. Unfortunately, not many CEOs are familiar with this concept. And even fewer ever think it will happen to them. Most continue to hope that if they just make a few more improvements their company won’t really become obsolete, and they can turn around their bad situation.
For employees, suppliers and investors such hope is a weak foundation upon which to rely for jobs, revenues and returns.
According to the management gurus at McKinsey, today the world population is getting older. Substantially so. Almost no major country will avoid population declines over next 20 years, due to low birth rates. Simultaneously, better healthcare is everywhere, and every population group is going to live a whole lot (I mean a WHOLE LOT) longer. Almost every product and process is becoming digitized, and any process which can be done via a computer will be done by a computer due to almost free computation. Global communication already is free, and the bandwidth won’t stop growing. Secrets will become almost impossible to keep; transparency will be the norm.
These trends matter. To every single business. And many of these trends are making immediate impacts in 2015. All will make a meaningful impact on practically every single business by 2020. And these trends change the assumptions upon which every business – certainly every business founded prior to 2000 – demonstrably.
Are you changing your assumptions, and your business, to compete in the future? If not, you could soon look at your results and see what the leaders at Sony, McDonald’s, Radio Shack and Sears are seeing today. That would be a shame.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 23, 2014 | Current Affairs, Leadership
Every quarter I have to be reminded that “earnings season” is again upon us. The ritual of public companies announcing their sales and profits from recent quarters that generates a lot of attention in the business press. And I always wonder why this is a big deal.
What really matters to investors, employees, customers and vendors is “what will your business be like next quarter, and year?” We really don’t much care about the past. What we really want to know is “what should we expect in the future?”
For example, two companies announce quarterly results. One has a Price/Earnings (P/E) multiple of 12.8 and a dividend yield of 2.05%. The other has a multiple of 13.0, and a yield of 3.05%. For both companies net earnings overall were pretty much flat, but Earnings Per Share (EPS) improved due to an aggressive stock repurchase program. Both companies say they have new products in the pipeline, but they conservatively estimate full year results for 2014 to be flat or maybe even declining.
Do you know enough to make a decision on whether to buy either stock? Both?
Truthfully, the two companies are Xerox and Apple. Now does it matter?
While both companies have similar results and forward looking statements, how you view that information is affected by your expectations for each company’s future. So, in other words, the actual results are pretty meaningless. They are interpreted through the lens of expectations, which controls your decision.
You can say Xerox has been irrelevant for years, and its products increasingly look unlikely to change its future course, so you are disheartened by results you see as unspectacular and likewise see no reason to own the stock. For Apple you could say the same thing, and bring up the growing competitor sales of Android-based products. Or, you might say that Apple is undervalued because you have great faith in the growth of mobile products sales and you believe new devices will spur Apple to even better results. Whatever your conclusion about the announced earnings, those conclusions are driven by your view of the future – not the actual results.
Another example. Two companies have billions in sales, and devote their discussion of company value to technology and the use of new technology to pioneer new markets. Both companies report they continue a string of losses, and have no projection for when losses will become profits. There are no dividends. There is no P/E multiple, because there is no E. There is no EPS, again because there is no E. One company is losing $12.86/share, the other is losing $.61/share. Again, do these results tell you whether to buy either, one or both?
What if the first one (with the larger losses) is Sears Holdings, and the latter is Tesla? Now, suddenly your view on the data changes – based upon your view of the future. Either Sears is on the precipice of a turnaround to becoming a major on-line retailer that will sell some real estate and leverage the balance of its stores to grow, so you buy it, or you think Sears has lost all relevancy and you don’t buy it. Either you think Tesla is an industry game changer, so you buy it, or you think it is an over-rated fad that will never become big enough to matter and the giant global auto companies will destroy it, so you don’t buy it. It’s your future view that guides your conclusions about past results.
The critical factor when reviewing earnings is actually not the reported results. The critical factor is what you think the future is for these 4 companies. No matter how good or bad the historical results, your decision about whether to own the stock, buy the company products, work for the company or join its vendor program all hinges on your view about the company’s future.
Which makes not only the “earnings season” hoopla foolish, but puts a pronounced question mark on how executives – especially CEOs – in public companies spend their time as it relates to reporting results.
Enormous energy is spent by most CEOs and their staff on managing earnings. From the beginning to the end of every quarter the CFO and his/her staff pour over weekly outcomes in divisions and functions to understand revenues and costs in order to gain advance knowledge on likely results. Then, for the next several days/weeks the CFO’s staff, with the CEO and the leadership team, will pour over those results to make a myriad number of adjustments – from depreciation and amortization to deferring revenue changing tax structures or time-matching various costs – in order to further refine the reported results. Literally thousands of person-hours will be devoted to managing the reported results in order to provide the number they think is most appropriate. And this cycle is repeated every quarter.
But how many hours will be spent by that same CEO and the leadership team managing expectations about the company’s next year? How much time do these leaders spend developing scenarios, and communications, that will describe their vision, in order to manage investor expectations?
While every company has a CFO leading a large organization dedicated to reporting historical results, how many companies have a like-powered C level exec managing the expectations, and leading a large staff to create and deliver communications about the future?
It seems pretty clear that most management teams should consider reallocating their precious resources. Instead of spending so much time managing earnings, they should spend more time managing expectations. If we think about the difference between Xerox and Apple, one is quickly aware of the difference the CEOs made in setting expectations. People still wax eloquently about the future vision for Apple created by CEO Steve Jobs, who’s been dead 2.5 years, while almost no one can tell you the name of Xerox’ CEO. If you think about the difference between Sears and Tesla one only needs to think briefly about the difference between the numbers driven hedge fund manager and cost-cutting CEO Ed Lampert compared with the “visionary” communications of Elon Musk.
Investors should all think long term. Investors should care completely about what the next 3 to 5 years will mean for companies in which they place their money. What sales and earnings are reported from months ago is pretty meaningless. What really matters is what is yet to happen.
What we don’t need is a lot of time spent talking about old earnings. What we need is a lot more time spent talking about the future, and what we should expect from our investments.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 11, 2013 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Leadership
The good folks at Wichita State (a final four contender as U.S. basketball fans know) and Purdue released their 2013 Airline Quality Rating. United Airlines came in dead last. To which United responded that they simply did not care. Oh my.
Interestingly, this study is based wholly on statistical performance, rather than customer input. The academics utilize on-time flight performance, denied passenger boardings, mishandled bags and complaints filed with the Department of Transportation. It does not even begin to explore surveying customers about their satisfaction. Anyone who flies regularly can well imagine those results. Oh my.
So how would you expect an innovative, adaptive growth-oriented company (think like Amazon, Apple, Samsung, Virgin, Neimann-Marcus, Lulu Lemon) to react to declining customer performance metrics? They might actually change the product, to make it more desirable by customers. They might hire more customer service representatives to identify customer issues and fix problems quicker. They might adjust their processes to achieve higher customer satisfaction. They might train their employees to be more customer-oriented.
But, United decidedly is not an innovative, adaptive organization. So it responded by denying the situation. Claiming things are getting better. And talking about how it is spending more money on its long-term strategy.
United doesn't care about customers – and really never has. United is focused on "operational excellence" (using the word excellence very loosely) as Messrs. Treacy and Wiersema called this strategy in their mega-popular book "The Discipline of Market Leaders" from 1995. United's strategy, like many, many businesses, is to constantly strive for better execution of an old strategy (in their case, hub-and-spoke flight operations) by hammering away at cutting costs.
Locked in to this strategy, United invests in more airplanes and gates (including making acquisitions like Continental) believing that being bigger will lead to more cost cutting opportunities (code named "synergies".) They beat up on employees, fight with unions, remove anything unessential (like food) invent ways to create charges (like checked bags or change fees), fiddle with fuel costs, ignore customers and constantly try to engineer minute enhancements to operations in efforts to save pennies.
Like many companies, United is fixated on this strategy, even if it can't make any money. Even if this strategy once drove it to bankruptcy. Even if its employees are miserable. Even if quality metrics decline. Even if every year customers are less and less happy with the product. All of that be darned! United just keeps doing what it has always done, for over 3 decades, hoping that somehow – magically – results will improve.
Today people have choices. More choices than ever. That's true for transportation as well. As customers have become less happy, they simply won't pay as much to fly. The impact of all this operational focus, but let the customer be danged, management is price degradation to the point that United, like all the airlines, barely (or doesn't – like American) cover costs. And because of all the competition each airline constantly chases the other to the bottom of customer satisfaction – each lowering its price as it mimics the others with cost cuts.
In 1963 National Airlines ran ads asking "is this any way to run an airline?" Well, no.
Success today – everywhere, not just airlines – requires more than operational focus. Constantly cutting costs ruins the brand, customer satisfaction, eliminates investment in new products and inevitably kills profitability. The litany of failed airlines demonstrates just how ineffective this strategy has become. Because operational improvements are so easily matched by competitors, and ignores alternatives (like trains, buses and automobiles for airlines) it leads to price wars, lower profits and bankruptcy.
Nobody looks to airlines as a model of management. But many companies still believe operational excellence will lead to success. They need to look at the long-term implications of this strategy, and recognize that without innovation, new products and highly satisfied new customers no business will thrive – or even survive.
by Adam Hartung | Mar 1, 2013 | Current Affairs, In the Swamp, Leadership, Web/Tech
Marissa Mayer created a firestorm this week by issuing an email requiring all employees who work from home to begin daily commuting to Yahoo offices. Some folks are saying this is going to be a blow to long-term employees, hamper productivity and will harm the company. Others are saying this will improve communications and cooperation, thin out unproductive employees and help Yahoo.
While there are arguments to be made on both sides, the issue is far simpler than many people make it out to be – and the implications for shareholders are downright scary.
Yahoo has been a strugging company for several years. And the reason has nothing to do with its work from home policy. Yahoo has lacked an effective strategy for a decade – and changing its work from home policy does nothing to fix that problem.
In the late 1990s almost every computer browser had Yahoo as its home page. But Yahoo long ago lost its leadership position in content aggregation, search and ad placement. Now, Yahoo is irrelevant. It has no technology advantage, no product advantage and no market advantage. It is so weak in all markets that its only value has been as a second competitor that keeps the market leader from being attacked as a monopolist!
A series of CEOs have been unable to develop a new strategy for Yahoo to make it more like Amazon or Apple and less like – well, Yahoo. With much fanfare Ms. Mayer was brought into the flailing company from Google, which is a market leader, to turn around Yahoo. Only she's been on the job 7 months, and there still is no apparent strategy to return Yahoo to greatness.
Instead, Ms. Mayer has delivered to investors a series of tactical decisions, such as changing the home page layout and now the work from home policy. If tactical decisions alone could fix Yahoo Carol Bartz would have been a hero – instead of being pushed out by the Board in disgrace.
Many leading pundits are enthused with CEO Mayer's decision to force all employees into offices. They are saying she is "making the tough decisions" to "cut the corporate cost structure" and "push people to be more productive." Underlying this lies thinking that the employees are lazy and to blame for Yahoo's failure.
Balderdash. It's not employees' fault Yahoo, and Ms. Mayer, lack an effective strategy to earn a high return on their efforts.
It isn't hard for a new CEO to change policies that make it harder for people to do their jobs – by cutting hours out of their day via commuting. Or lowering productivity as they are forced into endless meetings that "enhance communication and cooperation." Or forcing them out of the company entirely with arcane work rules in a misguided effort to lower operating costs or overhead. Any strategy-free CEO can do those sorts of things.
Just look at how effective this approach was for
- "Chainsaw" Al Dunlap at Scott Paper
- "Fast Eddie" Lampert at Sears
- Carol Bartz at Yahoo
- Meg Whitman at HP
- Brian Dunn at Best Buy
- Gregory Rayburn at Hostess
- Antonio Perez at Kodak
The the fact that some Yahoo employees work from home has nothing to do with the lack of strategy, innovation and growth at Yahoo. That failure is due to leadership. Bringing these employees into offices will only hurt morale, increase real estate costs and push out several valuable workers who have been diligently keeping afloat a severely damaged Yahoo ship. These employees, whether in an office or working at home, will not create a new strategy for Yahoo. And bringing them into offices will not improve the strategy development or innovation processes.
Regardless of anyone's personal opinions about working from home, it has been the trend for over a decade. Work has changed dramatically the last 30 years, and increasingly productivity relies on having time, alone, to think and produce charts, graphs, documents, lines of code, letters, etc. Technologies, from PCs to mobile devices and the software used on them (including communications applications like WebEx, Skype and other conferencing tools) make it possible for people to be as productive remotely as in person. Usually more productive removed from interruptions.
Taking advantage of this trend helps any company to hire better, and be more productive. Going against this trend is simply foolish – regardless the intellectual arguments made to support such a decision. Apple fought the trend to PCs and almost failed. When it wholesale adopted the trend to mobile, seriously reducing its commitment to PC markets, Apple flourished. It is ALWAYS easier to succeed when you work with, and augment trends. Fighting trends ALWAYS fails.
Yahoo investors have plenty to be worried about. Yahoo doesn't need a "tough" CEO. Yahoo needs a CEO with the insight to create, and implement, a new strategy. And a series of tactical actions do not sum to a new strategy. As importantly, the new strategy – and its implementation – needs to augment trends. Not go against trends while demonstrating the clout of a new CEO.
If you've been waiting to figure out if Ms. Mayer is the CEO that can make Yahoo a great company again, the answer is becoming clear. She increasingly appears very unlikely to have what it takes.
by Adam Hartung | Oct 4, 2012 | Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lifecycle, Web/Tech
If you're still an investor in Hewlett Packard you must be new to this blog. But for those who remain optimistic, it is worth reveiwing why Ms. Whitman's forecast for HP yesterday won't happen. There are sound reasons why the company has lost 35% of its value since she took over as CEO, over 75% since just 2010 – and over $90B of value from its peak.
HP was dying before Whitman arrived
I recall my father pointing to a large elm tree when I was a boy and saying "that tree will be dead in under 2 years, we might as well cut it down now." "But it's huge, and has leaves" I said. "It doesn't look dead." "It's not dead yet, but the environmental wind damage has cost it too many branches, the changing creek direction created standing water rotting its roots, and neighboring trees have grown taking away its sunshine. That tree simply won't survive. I know it's more than 3 stories tall, with a giant trunk, and you can't tell it now – but it is already dead."
To teach me the lesson, he decided not to cut the tree. And the following spring it barely leafed out. By fall, it was clearly losing bark, and well into demise. We cut it for firewood.
Such is the situation at HP. Before she became CEO (but while she was a Director – so she doesn't escape culpability for the situation) previous leaders made bad decisions that pushed HP in the wrong direction:
- Carly Fiorina, alone, probably killed HP with the single decision to buy Compaq and gut the HP R&D budget to implement a cost-based, generic strategy for competing in Windows-based PCs. She sucked most of the money out of the wildly profitable printer business to subsidize the transition, and destroy any long-term HP value.
- Mark Hurd furthered this disaster by further investing in cost-cutting to promote "scale efficiencies" and price reductions in PCs. Instead of converting software products and data centers into profitable support products for clients shifting to software-as-a-service (SAAS) or cloud services he closed them – to "focus" on the stagnating, profit-eroding PC business.
- His ill-conceived notion of buying EDS to compete in traditional IT services long after the market had demonstrated a major shift offshore, and declining margins, created an $8B write-off last year; almost 60% of the purchase price. Giving HP another big, uncompetitive business unit in a lousy market.
- His purchase of Palm for $1.2B was a ridiculous price for a business that was once an early leader, but had nothing left to offer customers (sort of like RIM today.) HP used Palm to bring out a Touchpad tablet, but it was so late and lacking apps that the product was recalled from retailers after only 49 days. Another write-off.
- Leo Apotheker bought a small Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software company – only more than a decade after monster competitors Oracle, SAP and IBM had encircled the market. Further, customers are now looking past ERP for alternatives to the inflexible "enterprise apps" which hinder their ability to adjust quickly in today's rapidly changing marektplace. The ERP business is sure to shrink, not grow.
Whitman's "Turnaround Plan" simply won't work
Meg is projecting a classic "hockey stick" performance. She plans for revenues and profits to decline for another year or two, then magically start growing again in 3 years. There's a reason "hockey stick" projections don't happen. They imply the company is going to get a lot better, and competitors won't. And that's not how the world works.
Let's see, what will likely happen over the next 3 years from technology advances by industry leaders Apple, Android and others? They aren't standing still, and there's no reason to believe HP will suddenly develop some fantastic mojo to become a new product innovator, leapfrogging them for new markets.
- Meg's first action is cost cutting – to "fix" HP. Cutting 29,000 additional jobs won't fix anything. It just eliminates a bunch of potentially good idea generators who would like to grow the company. When Meg says this is sure to reduce the number of products, revenues and profits in 2013 we can believe that projection fully.
- Adding features like scanning and copying to printers will make no difference to sales. The proliferation of smart devices increasingly means people don't print. Just like we don't carry newspapers or magazines, we don't want to carry memos or presentations. The world is going digital (duh) and printing demand is not going to grow as we read things on smartphones and tablets instead of paper.
- HP is not going to chase the smartphone business. Although it is growing rapidly. Given how late HP is to market, this is probably not a bad idea. But it begs the question of how HP plans to grow.
- HP is going not going to exit PCs. Too bad. Maybe Lenovo or Dell would pay up for this dying business. Holding onto it will do HP no good, costing even more money when HP tries to remain competitive as sales fall and margins evaporate due to overcapacity leading to price wars.
- HP will launch a Windows8 tablet in January targeted at "enterprises." Given the success of the iPad, Samsung Galaxy and Amazon Kindle products exactly how HP will differentiate for enterprise success is far from clear. And entering the market so late, with an unproven operating system platform is betting the market on Microsoft making it a success. That is far, far from a low-risk bet. We could well see this new tablet about as successful as the ill-fated Touchpad.
- Ms. Whitman is betting HP's future (remember, 3 years from now) on "cloud" computing. Oh boy. That is sort of like when WalMart told us their future growth would be "China." She did not describe what HP was going to do differently, or far superior, to unseat companies already providing a raft of successful, growing, profitable cloud services. "Cloud" is not an untapped market, with companies like Oracle, IBM, VMWare, Salesforce.com, NetApp and EMC (not to mention Apple and Amazon) already well entrenched, investing heavily, launching new products and gathering customers.
HPs problems are far deeper than who is CEO
Ms. Whitman said that the biggest problem at HP has been executive turnover. That is not quite right. The problem is HP has had a string of really TERRIBLE CEOs that have moved the company in the wrong direction, invested horribly in outdated strategies, ignored market shifts and assumed that size alone would keep HP successful. In a bygone era all of them – from Carly Fiorina to Mark Hurd to Leo Apotheker – would have been flogged in the Palo Alto public center then placed in stocks so employees (former and current) could hurl fruit and vegetables, or shout obscenities, at them!
Unfortately, Ms. Whitman is sure to join this ignominious list. Her hockey stick projection will not occur; cannot given her strategy.
HP's only hope is to sell the PC business, radically de-invest in printers and move rapidly into entirely new markets. Like Steve Jobs did a dozen years ago when he cut Mac spending to invest in mobile technologies and transform Apple. Meg's faith in operational improvement, commitment to existing "enterprise" markets and Microsoft technology assures HP, and its investors, a decidedly unpleasant future.
