by Adam Hartung | Apr 29, 2009 | Books, Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, General, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lock-in, Openness
Today the U.S. Federal Reserve indicated that the worst of America's economic downturn may be over, according to "Fed stands pat, and says worst may be over" at Marketwatch.com. Fed officials seem to think that the rate of decline has slowed. Note, they didn't say the economy is growing. The rate of decline is slowing. They hope this points to a bottoming, and eventually a return to growth.
With interest rates between banks at 0%, and short-term rates for strong companies near that level, there really isn't much more the Fed can do to create growth. It will keep buying Treasury securities and keep pushing banks to loan. But growth requires the private sector. That means businesses – or what reporters call "Main Street."
The government doesn't create growth. It can stimulate growth with low interest rates and money that will stimulate business investment. Growth requires people make products or services, and sell them. Those who are waiting on the government to create a growing economy will never gain anything from their wait, because it's up to them. Only by making and selling things do you get economic growth.
Recent events, closing banks and massive write-offs, are a big Challenge to old ways of doing business. Those who keep applying old practices are struggling to generate profits. The tried-and-true practices of American industrialism just aren't turning out gains like the once did. And they won't. The world has shifted. Entrepreneurs in India, Malaysia and China – places we like to think of as poor and "third world" – are building fortunes in the information economy. American businesses have to shift. If you make posts to install on highway sides, well lots of people can do that and competition is intense. To make money you need to make products that help move more people on the highway faster and safer – some kind of post that perhaps can provide traffic information to web sites and aid people to look for alternate routes. Posts aren't what people want, they want better traffic flow and today that ties to more information about the highway, who's using it, and what's happening on it.
Growth will return when businesspeople move toward supplying the shifted market with what it wants. Like Apple with a solution for digital music that involved players and distribution. Or Amazon with a solution for digitally obtaining books, magazines and newspapers, storing them, presenting them and even reading them to you. These companies, and products, appeal to the changed market – the market that values the music or the words and not the vinyl/tape/CD or the ink-on-paper. The customers that want the information, not necessarily the tangible item we used to use to get the information.
For the economy to grow requires a lot more businesses realize this market shift is permanent, and adjust. During the Great Depression those who refused to shift from agriculture to industrial production found the next 40 years pretty miserable – as rural land prices dropped, commodity prices dropped and the number of people working in agriculture dropped. Agrarianism wasn't bad, it just wasn't profitable. And going forward, industrialism isn't bad – but to grow revenues and profits we have to start thinking about how to deliver what people want – not what we know how to make. You have to deliver what the market wants to grow sales – even if it's different from what you used to make.
Starbucks offered people a lot of different things. And the old CEO tried to capitalize upon that by expanding his brand into liquor, music recording, agency for entertainers, movie production, and a widespread set of products in his stores – including food. But then an even older CEO returned, and he said Starbucks was all about coffee. He launched some new flavors, and he pushed out an instant coffee product. But a year later "Starbucks profit falls 77% on store closure charges" reports Marketwatch.com. His "focus" efforts have cut revenues, and cut profits enormously. He's cut out growth in his effort to "save" the company.
By trying to go backward, Chairman Schultz has seriously damaged the brand and the company. He has closed 570 stores – which were a big part of the brand and perhaps the thing of greatest value. Stores attracted people for a lot more than just coffee. People met at the stores, and buying coffee was just one activity they undertook. So as the stores were shuttered, the brand began to look in serious trouble and people started staying away. The vicious cycle fed on itself, and same store sales are down 8%. No new flavor or packaged frozen coffee bits for take home use is going to turn around this troubled business. It will take a change to giving people what they need – not what Mr. Schultz wants to sell.
With more and more people working from home the "virtual office" for many small businesspeople can still be a local Starbucks. When you can't afford take a client out for a snazzy lunch you can afford to take them for a coffee. When your wasteline can't take ice cream, you can afford a no-cal hot coffee in a great environment. Starbucks never was about the coffee, it was about meeting customer needs in a shifted market. And when the CEO realizes this he has the chance to save the company by taking into the new markets where customers want to go. Not by bringing out new instant coffee granules.
Starbucks is sort of a model of the recession. When you try to do what you always did, and you blame the lousy economy for your troubles, you'll see results worsen. As businesspeople we must realize that the recession was due to a market shift. We went off the proverbial cliff trying to extend the old business – just like Apple almost did by trying to be the Mac and only the Mac. To get the economy growing we have to look to see what people really want, and supply that. And what they want may be somewhat, or a whole lot, different from what we used to give them. But when we start supplying this changed market what it wants then the economy will quit contracting and start growing.
So be more like Steve Jobs, and less like Charles Schultz. Quit trying to go backward and regain some past glory. Instead, look into the future to figure out what people want and that competitiors aren't giving them. Be willing to Disrupt your business in order to take Disruptive solutons to the market. And get your ideas into White Space where you can develop them into profitable businesses. Don't wait for someone else to turn the economy around – just to find out then it's too late for you to compete.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 22, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Lock-in
Yesterday I discussed how Sun Microsystems nailed its coffin shut in the mid-1990s when it committed itself to hardware instead of following the market into software. Even though Sun was the then leader in Unix operating systems (Solaris) and internet application development (Java), the company chose to only offer its software on its own hardware (Solaris) – or give it away (Java). Had Sun recognized the market shift to valuing software rather than "systems" the company could have transitioned itself and avoided being gobbled up by Oracle – which is sure to close Sun's R&D facility and discontinue hardware sales.
Now we hear that the New York Times company behaved very similarly at almost the same time, putting itself at unnecessary risk that has destroyed huge value for shareholders and cost thousands of jobs. In 1995 NYT was worth between $1.5B and $2B. The Boston Globe recently reported in "What Went Wrong?" that same year the founder of Monster offered to sell a chunk of his new company to the Globe (which is owned by NYT) for $1million. And Monster would start cooperating with the Globe to offer help-wanted ads on-line as well as in the newspaper. At the time, help wanted ads alone was a $100million business at the Globe. For 1% of just one segment of the Globe's revenue – and a far lesser fraction of NYT sales and equity value – the company could have been part of the great migration to the web.
Globe and NYT management said no. And for the rest of the decade advertising growth remained on a tear, driving the value of NYT up to about $6.5 to $7billion by 2000. And even though the recession came in 2001, NYT's value remained in that range until 2004. But then, in 2004, early market shifts started to become pronounced. Like the proverbial snowball rolling downhill, internet usage had become a big market and advertisers were looking for lower cost and more capable options. Advertisers from auto companies to movie studies started moving ad dollars to the web – as did companies advertising for help. The value of NYT started to drop, and hasn't stopped yet. In 5 years more than $6billion of that value has evaporated – leaving the whole of NYT – including not only the Globe but the venerable New York Times worth a mere $700million (see 5year chart here). Value is dropping precipitously as losses mount ("New York Times loss widens; shares fall 16%" was headline on Marketwatch yesterday), and the company leverages its Manhattan real estate to try preserving its now unprofitable Success Formula.
When business was good NYT had the opportunity to Disrupt itself and invest in some White Space to help understand the direction of future markets. Instead, management clung to the old Success Formula and ignored impending market shifts. While the company racked up profits it eschewed investing in new projects, because there were no Disruptions causing it to consider White Space. And now that the market has shifted it very likely is too late to save the company (investor Rupert Murdoch with investments across all media, including the web, is licking his chops for the opportunity to take over these influential journals with which he has long tangled politically. Even if only to watch them decline and remove a thorn in his side.) Because of decisions made in 1995, when business was good, the nails were being driven into the coffin. Management failed to recognize how deadly those decisions were, because they were focused on Defending & Extending the past rather than exploring how markets might change.
The Sun and NYT story emphasize how easy it is to remain Locked-in. Profits during good times – often right at the peak of the business – become an excuse to do more of the same. But what we see over and over is that long-term success requires Disruptions during these best times. Companies that make the transitions don't wait for the crisis. When times are good they invest in new market opportunities, so they can learn what works and how to compete. They Disrupt their old model so they pay attention to market shifts, and invest in White Space where they learn and inform the entire organization about what's coming. Lock-in is very dangerous because it is so easy to ignore. But if you want to survive market shifts you must create an organization that can evolve with new markets. That requires you manage Lock-in by constantly Disrupting and keeping White Space alive.
PS – a note of thanks to reader Tejune Kang for pointing me to the Globe article about Monster. I encourage all readers to forward me your insights to companies Locked-in and at risk, as well as those practicing The Phoenix Principle.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 21, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
"With Oracle, Sun avoids becoming another Yahoo," headlines Marketwatch.com today. As talks broke down because IBM was unwilling to up its price for Sun Microsystems, Oracle Systems swept in and made a counter-offer that looks sure to acquire the company. Unlike Yahoo – Sun will now disappear. The shareholders will get about 5% of the value Sun was worth a decade ago at its peak. That's a pretty serious value destruction, in any book. And if you don't think this is bad news for the employees and vendors just wait a year and see how many remain part of Oracle. A sale to IBM would have fared no better for investors, employees or vendors.
It was clear Sun wasn't able to survive several years ago. That's why I wrote about the company in my book Create Marketplace Disruption. Because the company was unwilling to allow any internal Disruptions to its Success Formula and any White Space to exist which might transform the company. In the fast paced world of information products, no company can survive if it isn't willing to build an organization that can identify market shifts and change with them.
I was at a Sun analyst conference in 1995 where Chairman McNealy told the analysts "have you seen the explosive growth over at Cisco System? I ask myself, how did we miss that?" And that's when it was clear Sun was in for big, big trouble. He was admitting then that Sun was so focused on its business, so focused on its core, that there was very little effort being expended on evaluating market shifts – which meant opportunities were being missed and Sun would be in big trouble when its "core" business slowed – as happens to all IT product companies. Sun had built its Success Formula selling hardware. Even though the real value Sun created shifted more and more to the software that drove its hardware, which became more and more generic (and less competitive) every year, Sun wouldn't change its strategy or tactics – which supported its identity as a hardware company – its Success Formula. Even though Sun became a leader in Unix operating systems, extensions for networking and accessing lots of data, as well as the creator and developer of Java for network applications because software was incompatible with the Success Formula, the company could not maintain independent software sales and the company failed.
Sort of like Xerox inventing the GUI (graphical user interface), mouse, local area network to connect a PC to a printer, and the laser printer but never capturing any of the PC, printer or desktop publishing market. Just because Xerox (and Sun) invented a lot of what became future growth markets did not insure success, because the slavish dedication to the old Success Formula (in Xerox's case big copiers) kept the company from moving forward with the marketplace.
Instead, Sun Microsystems kept trying to Defend & Extend its old, original Success Formula to the end. Even after several years struggling to sell hardware, Sun refused to change into the software company it needed to become. To unleash this value, Sun had to be acquired by another software company, Oracle, willing to let the hardware go and keep the software – according to the MercuryNews.com "With Oracle's acquisition of Sun, Larry Ellison's empire grows." Scott McNealy wouldn't Disrupt Sun and use White Space to change Sun, so its value deteriorated until it was a cheap buy for someone who could use the software pieces to greater value in another company.
Compare this with Steve Jobs. When Jobs left Apple in disrepute he founded NeXt to be another hardware company – something like a cross between Apple and Sun. But he found the Unix box business tough sledding. So he changed focus to a top application for high powered workstations – graphics – intending to compete with Silicon Graphics (SGI). But as he learned about the market, he realized he was better off developing application software, and he took over leadership of Pixar. He let NeXt die as he focused on high end graphics software at Pixar, only to learn that people weren't as interesed in buying his software as he thought they would be. So he transitioned Pixar into a movie production company making animated full-length features as well as commercials and short subjects. Mr. Jobs went through 3 Success Formulas getting the business right – using Disruptions and White Space to move from a box company to a software company to a movie studio (that also supplied software to box companies). By focusing on future scenarios, obsessing about competitors and Disrupting his approach he kept pushing into White Space. Instead of letting Lock-in keep him pushing a bad idea until it failed, he let White Space evolve the business into something of high value for the marketplace. As a result, Pixar is a viable competitor today – while SGI and Sun Microsystems have failed within a few months of each other.
It's incredibly easy to Defend & Extend your Success Formula, even after the business starts failing. It's easy to remain Locked-in to the original Success Formula and keep working harder and faster to make it a little better or cheaper. But when markets shift, you will fail if you don't realize that longevity requires you change the Success Formula. Where Unix boxes were once what the market wanted (in high volume), shifts in competitive hardware (PC) and software (Linux) products kept sucking the value out of that original Success Formula.
Sun needed to Disrupt its Lock-ins – attack them – in order to open White Space where it could build value for its software products. Where it could learn to sell them instead of force-bundling them with hardware, or giving them away (like Java.) And this is a lesson all companies need to take to heart. If Sun had made these moves it could have preserved much more of its value – even if acquired by someone else. Or it might have been able to survive as a different kind of company. Instead, Sun has failed costing its investors, employees and vendors billions.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 20, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, Film, General, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lock-in, Television
How do you pick a movie to see – whether at the theatre or at home? The movie studios think you pick movies by what you see on TV ads, according to the Los Angeles Times "Studios struggle to rein in marketing costs."
I remember the old days when my friends and I grabbed a newspaper and shopped the ads looking for a flick to go see. And we were influenced by television ads as well. But, as time went by, we started asking each other, "Is that movie any good, or are all the best parts in the ad?" (Admit it, you've asked that question too.) Then we found out we could get sneak peaks from shows like "Siskel & Ebert at the movies," so one of us would try to watch that and see if we liked the longer scenes. And we didn't ever agree with the critics, but we could listen to hear if they described a movie we would like. Now, not only myself but my sons follow the same routine. Only we go to the internet looking for a YouTube! clip, and for reviews from all kinds of people – not just critics. Mostly when we see a TV ad we hit the mute button.
Everywhere, businesses are still wasting money on old business notions. For movie studios, they keep trying to get people to watch a big budget by advertising the thing. (To death. Until nobody watches the ad any more because they have it memorized. And get angry that the ad keeps showing.) But even the above article admits that studios know this isn't the best way any more. With the internet around, we all listen less to advertisements, and gain access to more real input. From web sites, or Twitter, or friends on Facebook, or colleagues on Linked-in. We watch a lot less TV, and what we watch is more targeted to our interest and available on cable. Or we download our TV from the web using Hulu.com. Yet, the studios are so Locked-in to their outdated Success Formula that they keep spending money on TV ads – even though they know the value isn't there any more.
So why do the studios spend so much on advertising? Because they always have. That's Lock-in. Lacking a better idea, a better plan, a better approach that would really reach out to potential viewers they keep doing what they know how to do, even as they question whether or not they should do it! The industrial era concept was "I spent a fortune making this movie, and distributing it into theatres, so I better not stop now. Keep spending money to advertise it, create awareness, and get people into the theatres." The studios see movie making as an industrial enterprise, where those who spend the most have the greatest chance of winning. Spend a lot to make, spend to distribute, spend to advertise. To industrial era thinkers, all this spending creates entry barriers that defends their business.
And that's why movie studios struggle. It's unclear how well those ideas ever worked for filmmaking – because we all saw our share of blockbuster bombs and remember the "American Graffiti" or "Blair Witch Project" that was cheap and good. But for sure we all know the world has now permanently shifted. Today, small budget movies like "Slum Dog Millionaire" can be made (offshore in that case – but not necessarily) quite well. The pool of new actors, writers, directors, cinematographers and editors keeps growing – driving production quality up and cost down. And distribution can be via DVD – or web download – between low cost and free. A movie doesn't even have to be shown in a theatre for it to be commercially successful any more. And any filmmaker can promote her product on the internet, building a word of mouth driving popularity and sales.
From filmmaking to recordings to short programs to books, the market has shifted. Things don't have to be big budget to be good. The old status quo police, like Mr. Goldwyn or Mr. Meyer, simply have far less role. Digitization and globalization means that you don't need film for movies – or paper for books. Thus, democratizing the production, as well as sales, of "media" products. Thus the old media companies are struggling (publishers, filmmakers, magazines, newspapers and recording studios) because they no longer have the "entry barriers" they can Defend to allow their old Success Formulas to produce above average returns. And they never will again. The world has changed, and the market has permanently shifted.
Is your business still spending money on things that don't matter? Does your approach to the market, your Success Formula dictate spending on advertising, salespeople, PR, external analysts, paid reviewers or others that really don't make nearly as much difference any more? When will you change your approach? The movie studios are preparing to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on summer ad promotions for new movies. Is this necessary, given that the downturn has increased the demand for escapist entertainment? Is your business doing the same?
If you want to cut your cost, you shouldn't cut 5% or 10% across the board. That won't help your Success Formula meet market needs better. Instead, you need to understand market shifts and cut 90% from things that no longer matter – or that have diminishing value. Quit doing the things you do because you always did them, and make sure you do the things you need to do. You want to be the next "Slumdog Millionaire" not the next "Ishtar." You want to be Apple, not Motorola. You want to be Google, not Tribune Corporation. Spend money on what pays off, not what you've always spent it on.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 16, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, Food and Drink, General, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
All of America may have learned the jingle "America spells cheese K*R*A*F*T", but that doesn't mean Kraft is a good investment. When the recession first began, investors were excited about buying companies that had well known brands – especially in food. The idea was that everyone has to eat, so food companies won't get hammered like an industrial company (think Caterpillar or General Electric) when the economy shrinks. Second, people will eat out less and in more so food might actually see an uptick in growth. Third, people will want well known brands because it well help them feel good during the depressing downturn. So, Kraft was to be a good, safe investment. After all, even though it's only been spun out of cigarrette company Altria a few months, this thinking was powerful enough for the Dow editors to replace failed AIG with Kraft on the (in)famous Dow Jones Industrial Average.
Too bad things didn't work out that way (see chart here). Although the stock held up through the summer near it's spin-out high at 35, Kraft's value fell out of the proverbial bed since then. Down about 40%. What's worse, as several companies have "bounced back" during the recent stock market rebound Kraft shares have gone nowhere. And now Crain's Chicago Business reports "Analyst downgrades Kraft on volume risk." This UBS analyst has noted that instead of going up, or sideways, sales (and volume) at Kraft have declined. While he might have expected a potential 1% decline, instead he's seeing drops of more like 2.5%. In light of this poor performance, he thinks the best Kraft can do for the next 12 months is a meager improvement – or more likely sideways performance.
Kraft has been in a growth stall for a long time. Since well before spinning out of Altria. The company stopped launching new products years ago. Instead, it has been trying to increase sales with line extensions of its existing products – things like 100 calorie packs of Oreos. There hasn't been a real new product at Kraft since DiGiorno pizza and Boboli crust some 10 years ago. Simultaneously, the company sold some of its high growth businesses, like Altoids, in order to "focus on core brands". All of which meant that while cash flow has been stable, there's been no growth. Turns out folks may be eating at home more, but they aren't paying up for worn-out brands like Velveeta, instead turning to store brands and generics. Shoppers are looking for new things to improve their meals during this recession – but Kraft simply doesn't have any.
Without innovation, Kraft has gone nowhere. For a decade the company has merely Defended & Extended its 1940s business model. It keeps trying to do more of the same, perhaps faster and better. It couldn't do cheaper because of rising commodity prices last year, so it actually raised prices. As a result, customers are quite happy to buy comparable, but cheaper, products setting Kraft up for price wars in almost all its product lines. And there's nothing Kraft can point to as a new product which will actually grow the top line. Just a hope in more advertising of its old products, doing more of the same.
When Kraft spun out the CEO was replaced in order for Kraft to revitalize its moribund organization. Good move. The previous CEO was so in love with D&E management that he bragged about his "strategy" of spending more on Velveeta and older brands – in other words he was wedded to the outdated Success Formula and had no plans to change it.
So he was replaced by a competent executive named Irene Rosenfeld. This was touted as a big move, by bringing in the Chairman of PepsiCo's Frito-Lay Division. PepsiCo is noted for its fairly Disruptive environment, instituted during the reign of Chairman Andrall Pearson who aggressively moved people around (and out) in his effort to "muscle build" the organization. But reality was that Dr. Rosenfeld had worked at Kraft for many years before going to PepsiCo, and was returning (according to her bio on the Kraft web site). And her leadership has been, well, more of the same. There have been no Disruptions at Kraft – no White Space – and no new products. So the growth stall that began during the Altria ownership has continued unabated.
Despite Kraft's lack of performance – and you could say poor performance given that sales and volume are down, as well as profits since she took the top job – Dr. Rosenfeld's salary was increased at the end of March (according to Marketwatch.com "Compensation rose for Kraft Foods' CEO in 2008"). It seems the Board of Directors was concerned that the stock options she was awarded in early February had fallen in value (because the share price dropped dramatically – hurting all investors) so they felt they had to raise her base pay. Since the "at risk" pay didn't pan out, well they felt compelled to make her compensation less risky. Then they invented some excuses to make themselves feel better, like they want the CEO to be paid comparably with other CEOs.
(I guess they don't care about the 20 other senior execs who have seen their base pay frozen. Say, do you suppose I could appeal to my publisher that I want pay like other authors? Like Barack Obama who got almost $3million in royalties last year? Or do you suppose the publisher might tell me if I want that much money I should sell more books – looking at my results to determine how much I should get? I rather like this "comparable pay" idea – sounds sort of like union language for CEO contracts.)
Kraft is going nowhere, and Dr. Rosenfeld is the wrong person in the Chairman/CEO job. Kraft is stalled, and investors as well as employees are suffering. Kraft desperately needs leaders that will Disrupt the organization, refocus it externally on market needs, become obsessive about improving versus competitors in base businesses while identifying fringe competitors changing the market landscape. And above all introduce some White Space where Kraft can innovate new products and services that will get the company growing again! Kraft has enormous resources, but the company is frittering them away Defending & Extending a 60+ year old Success Formula that has no growth left in it. More than ever in Kraft's long history, the company needs to overcome it's Lock-in to innovate – and the Board needs to realize that requires a change in leadership.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 9, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lifecycle, Lock-in, Web/Tech
$193billion dollars. An amount that seems only viable for governments to discuss. But that is how much the value of Sun Microsystems declined in less than one decade (see chart here). At the height of its dominance as a supplier to telecom companies in the 1990s Sun was worth over $200billion. Recently IBM made an offer at just under $8billion. But Sun has rejected the IBM bid, which was more than double its recent market value, and Sun is now worth only about 60% of the bid. An amazing loss of value for a company that never paid a dividend. And the failure can be tied to a single problem.
Forbes magazine is having a field day with the leadership at Sun these days. "Sun May Be Pulling a Yahoo!" the magazine exclamed on Monday when Sun said it was turning down the IBM offer. The similarity is that both companies turned down values at above market price, but both probably won't receive offers from anyone else. The difference, however, is that Yahoo! has a chance to compete with Google, and Microsoft would have suffocated those chances. Sun, on the other hand, won't survive and the only way investors will get any value is if Sun agrees to the buyout.
Reinforcing the thinking that Sun won't make it on its own, Forbes today led with "Sun's Six Biggest Mistakes" which decries recent (last 4 years) tactical failings of the company. But in truth, Sun was destined to fail 8 years ago – as I argued clearly in my book Create Marketplace Disruption (buy a copy from my blog or at Amazon.com.) The company never overcame Lock-in to its initial Success Formula, and when its market shifted in 2000 the company went into a nosedive from which no tactical changes could save it.
Scott McNealy was the patriarch of Sun Microsystems. Son of an auto executive, he had a love for "big iron" as he called the large, robust American cars of the 50s, 60s and 70s. And when he started Sun Microsystems he imbued it with an identity for "big iron." Mr. McNealy wasn't interested in creating a software company, he wanted to sell hardware – like the days when computing was all about big mainframe machines. His might be smaller and cheaper than mainframes, but the identity of Sun was clearly tied to selling boxes that were powerful, and expensive.
Everything about the company's development linked to this identity (see the book for details). The company strategy was tied to being a leader in selling hardware systems. First powerful desktop systems but increasingly powerful network servers. Iron that would replace mainframes and extend computing power to challenge supercomputers. All tactics, from R&D to manufacturing and sales tied to this Identity. And because the products were good, and met a market need in the 80s and 90s, this Success Formula flourished and reinforced the Identity.
A lot of new products came out of Sun Microsystems. They were an early leader in RISC chips to drive faster processing. And faster memory schemes and disk array technology. These reinforced the sale of hardware systems. The company also extended the capabilities of Unix software, but of course you could only buy this enhanced system if you bought one of their computers. Sun even invented Java, a major advancement for internet applications. But then they gave away this software because it didn't reinforce the sale of their hardware. Sun felt that if everyone used Java it would generally grow internet ue, which would grow server demand, which would help them sell more server hardware – so don't even bother trying to build a software sales capability. That did not reinforce the Identity, so it wasn't part of the Success Formula. Everything leadership and the company did was focused on its core – Defending and Extending the sales of Unix Workstations and Servers. It's hedgehog concept was to be the world's best at this, and it was. Sun intended to Defend & Extend that Identity and its Success Formula at all costs.
But then the market shifted. The telecom companies over-invested in infrastructure, and their demand for Sun hardware fell dramatically. Workstations based on PC technology caught up with Sun hardware for many applications, rendering the Sun workstations overpriced. Makers of PC servers developed advancements making their servers faster, and considerably cheaper, meaning Sun servers weren't required or were overpriced for company applications. Within 2 years, the market had shifted away from needing all those Sun boxes, causing Sun sales and market value to collapse.
Sun made one mistake. It never addressed the potential for a market shift that could obsolete its Success Formula. Sun never challenged its Identity. Sun leaders never developed scenarios that envisioned solutions other than an extended Sun leadership position. They only looked at competitors they met originally (such as DEC and SGI) and when they beat those competitors leadership quit obsessing about new comers, causing them to miss the shift to lower price platforms. Although Scott McNealy was an outrageous sort of character, he created lots of disturbance in Sun without creating any Disruption. People felt the heat of his presence, but there was no tolerance for anyone who would shed light on market changes (especially after Ed Zander was installed as COO). Nobody challenged the Success Formula. Nobody in leadership was allowed to consider Sun doing something different – like selling software profitably. And thus, there was no White Space in Sun. No place to with permission to do new things, and no resources to do anything but promote "big iron."
When any company remains tied to its Identity and its Lock-in failure will eventually happen. Markets shift. Then, all the tactical efforts in the world are insufficient. It takes a new Success Formula – maybe even an entirely new identity. Like Virgin becoming an airline rather than a record company. Or Singer a defense contractor rather than a sewing machine company. Or maybe something as simple as GE becoming something besides a light bulb and electric generation company – getting into locomotives and jet engines. The one big mistake made by Sun can be made by anyone. To remain Locked-in too long and let market shifts destroy your value.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 7, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, General, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Science
"GM, Segway unveil Puma urban vehicle" headlines Marketwatch.com. The Puma is an enlarged Segway that can hold 2 people in a sitting position. Both companies are hoping this promotion will create excitement for the not-yet-released product, thus generating a more positive opinion of both companies and establish early demand. Unfortunately, the product isn't anything at all like the iPod and the comparison is way off the mark.
The iPod when released with the iTunes was a disruptive innovation which allowed customers to completely change how they acquired, maintained and managed their access to music. Instead of purchasing entire CDs, people could acquire one song at a time. You no longer needed special media readers, because the tunes could be heard on any MP3 device. And your access was immediate, from the download, without going to a store or waiting for physical delivery. People that had not been music collectors could become collectors far cheaper, and acquire only exactly what they wanted, and listen to the music in their own designed order, or choose random delivery. The source of music changed, the acquisition process changed, the collection management changed, the storage of a collection changed – it changed just about everything about how you acquired and interacted with music. It was not a sustaining innovation, it was disruptive, and it commercialized a movement which had already achieved high interest via Napster. The iPod/iTunes business put Apple into the lead in an industry long dominated by other companies (such as Sony) by bringing in new users and building a loyal following.
Unfortunately, increasing the size of a product that has not yet demonstrated customer efficacy, economic viability or developed a strong following and trying to sell it through an existing distribution system that has long been decried as uneconomic and displeasing to customers is not an iPod experience. And that is what this GM/Segway announcement is trying to do.
Despite all the publicity when it was first announced, the Segway has not developed a strong following. After 7 years of intense marketing, and lots of looks, Segway has sold only 60,000 units globally – a fraction of competitive product such as bicycles, motorized scooters, motorcycles and mass transit. Segway has not "jumped into the lead" in any segment of transportation. It has yet to develop a single dominant application, or a loyal group of followers. The product achieves a smattering of sales, but the vast majority of observers simply say "why?" and comment on the high price. Segway has never come close to achieving the goals of its inventor or its investors.
This product announcement gives us more of the same from Segway. It's the same product, just bigger. We are given precious little information about why someone would own one, other than it supposedly travels 35 miles on $.35 of electricity. But how fast it goes, how long to recharge, how comfortable the ride, whether it can carry anything with you, how it behaves in foul weather, why you should choose it over a Nano from Tata or another small car, or a motorscooter or motorcycle — these are all open items not addressed.
And worse, the product isn't being launched in White Space to answer these questions and build a market. Instead, the announcement says it will be sold through GM dealers. This simply ignores answering why any GM dealer would ever want to sell the thing – given its likely price point, margin, use – why would a dealer want to sell Puma/Segways instead of more expensive, capable and higher margin cars?
Great White Space projects are created by looking into the future and identifying scenarios where this project – its use – can be a BIG winner that will attract large volumes of customers. Second, it addresses competitive lock-ins and creates advantages that don't currently exist and otherwise would not exist. Thirdly, it Disrupts the marketplace as a game changer by bringing in new users that otherwise are out of the market. And fourth it has permission to try anything and everything in the market to create a new Success Formula to which the company can migrate for rapid growth.
This project does none of that. It's use is as unclear as the original Segway, and the scenario in which this would ever be anything other than a novelty for perfect weather inner-city upscale locations is totally unclear. This product captures all the current Lock-ins of the companies involved – trying to Defend & Extend one's technology base and the other's distribution system – rather than build anything new. The product appears simply to be inferior in almost all regards to competitive products, with no description of why it is a game changer to other forms of transportation. And the project is starting with most important decisions pre-announced – rather than permission to try new things. And there is absolutely no statement of how this project will be resourced or funded – by two companies that are both in terrible financial shape.
The iPod and iTunes are brands that turned around Apple. They are role models for how to use Disruptive innovation to resurrect a troubled company. It's really unfortunate to see such wonderful brand names abused by two poorly performing companies without a clue of how to manage innovation. The biggest value of this announcement is it shows just how poorly managed Segway has been – given that it's partnering with a company that is destined to be the biggest bankruptcy ever in history, and known for its inability to understand customer needs and respond effectively.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 1, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Lifecycle, Lock-in, Web/Tech
How many of these company names do you remember — Sperry Rand? Burroughs? Univac? NCR? Control Data? Wang? Lanier? DataPoint? Data General? Digital Equipment/DEC? Gateway? Cray? Novell? Banyan? Netscape?
I'm only 50, yet most of these companies were originated, became major successes, and failed within my lifetime. Now, prepare to add a couple more. In the 1980s Silicon Graphics set the standard for high-speed computing, using their breakthrough technology to open the door on graphics. There never would have been a PS3 or Wii were it not for the pioneering work at SGI. The company invented high speed graphics calculating methods that allowed for "real-time" animation on a computer, as well as "color fill" and "texture mapping" – all capabilities we take for granted on our computer screen today but that were merely dreams to early GUI users. But now SGI has disappeared according to the Cnet.com article "First GM, Now Silicon Graphics. Lessons Learned?" The company that expanded the high-speed computing market most on SGI's early lead was Sun Microsystems, building the boxes upon which the first all-computer animated movie was made – Toy Story. But 2 weeks ago we learned Sun will most likely soon disappear into the bowels of IBM ("Final Chapter for Sun Micro Could be Written by IBM" at WSJ.com)
When Clayton Christensen wrote The Innovator's Dilemma he said academics like to talk about the tech industry because the product life cycles are so short. Actually, he would have been equally accurate to say their company life cycles were so short. For business academics, looking at tech companies is like cancer researchers looking at white lab mice. Their lifespan is so short you can rapidly see the impact of business decisions – almost like having a business lab.
What we see at these companies was an inability to shift with changes in their markets. They all Locked-in on some assumptions, and when the market shifted these companies stayed with their old assumptions – not shifting with market needs. Like Jim Collins' proverbial "hedgehog" they claimed to be the world's best at something, only to learn that the world put less and less value in what they claimed as #1. Either the technology shifted, or the application, or the user requirements. In the end, we can look back and their lives are like a short roller coaster – up and then crashing down. Lots of money put in, lots spent, not much left for investors, vendors or employees at the end. They were #1, very good (in fact, exceptional), and met a market need. Yet they were unable to thrive and even survive – because a market shift emerged which they did not follow, did not meet and eventually made them obsolete.
Today we can see the same problem emerging in some of the even larger tech companies we've grown to admire. Dell taught everyone how to operate the world's best supply chain. Yet, they've been copied and are seeing their market weaken to new products supplied by different channels. Microsoft monopolized the "desktop", but today less and less computing is done on desktops. Computing today is moving from the extremes of your hand (in your telephone) to "clouds" accessed so serrendipituously that you aren't even sure where the computing cycles are, much less how they are supplied. And software is provided in distributed ways between devices and servers such that an internet search engine provider (Google) is beginning to provide operating systems (Android) for new platforms where there is no "desktop." As behemoth as these two companies became, as invincible as they looked, they are equally vulnerable to the fate of those mentioned at the beginning of this blog.
Of course, their fate is not sealed. Apple and IBM both are tech companies that came perilously close to the Whirlpool before finding their way back into the Rapids. When businesses decide their best future is to Defend & Extend past strengths they get themselves into trouble. To break out of this rut they have to spend less time thinking about their strengths, and more about market needs. Instead of looking at similar competitors and figuring out how to be better, they have to look at fringe competitors and figure out how to change with emerging market requirements. And just like they disrupted the marketplace once with their excellence, they must be willing to disrupt their internal processes in order to find White Space where they can create new market disruptions.
Today, with change affecting all companies, it is important that leaders look at the "lab results" from tech. It's important to recognize past Lock-ins, and assumptions about continuation (or return to) past markets. Markets are changing, and only those that take the lead with customers will quickly return to profitability and emerge market leaders. It's those new leading companies that will get the economy growing again, so waiting is really not an option.
by Adam Hartung | Mar 23, 2009 | Current Affairs, General, Leadership, Lock-in, Television
Jon Friedman's Media Web Blog got it right today in it's article "How Fox Business and Bloomberg Can Gain Ground." Business news coverage was in the spotlight when Jon Stewart's The Daily Show on Comedy Central started attacking CNBC for being too business/executive friendly (see the running debate clips in the "on the Tape" section of the Daily Show homepage.) Whether Stewart was right or not, it didn't help CNBC to have some of it's spotlight personnel being trashed daily by a popular comentator, especially using their own tapes.
One would expect that financial news viewership is down, just because the recession has lessened interest in investing. But that doesn't mean CNBC is losing position. For that to happen, it's competitors – which are much smaller in share of market – have to do something to take advantage of the Stewart attacks. If everyone keeps doing what they always did, CNBC probably won't suffer much damage when the investing marketplace recovers.
So Mr. Friedman recommends that Fox Business News and Bloomberg news need to be the "anti-CNBC." I'm not sure what he means by that. But the idea is right. CNBC has been the market leader for several years, and it's Success Formula is Locked-in. It's viewer surveys have been with people who already watched CNBC, so its coverage has remained almost the same. And as more and more corporations and investment firms put CNBC on those flat-screen TVs in their lobbies, CNBC kept touting the market pitch that seemed to win them over as viewers and advertisers. As CNBC became apologists for these big advertisers, they reinforced their Lock-in to the Success Formula, and even as they Defended corporate titans and executive pay they extended their Success Formula onto the web with information that largely copied the television.
Suddenly, CNBC has been Challenged by a market shift. Like most market shifts, it didn't surface where CNBC expected, or how CNBC would have expected. CNBC was blindsided by the appeal of Stewart's attacks to mainstream television viewers, and many reporters who don't cover "the business beat." Like any good Locked-in organization, the CNBC reaction was to Defend itself, and do even more of what it always did claiming to be better and faster than the competition at reporting from Wall Street and the executive suites.
But right now CNBC is vulnerable. If Fox Business News and Bloomberg have been obsessing about the competition, now is the time to take advantage of its weakness. But to do that means attacking the Lock-in on which CNBC is built – it's very pro-Wall Street, pro-big company, pro-deregulation, pro-executive (and often pro-Republican party) positioning on practically every issue. Being a similar CNBC won't help the competition – even when CNBC is under attack. Because the attack is from a market shift, and the competition will win by moving to where the market moved.
So, what outlet reports on business news that isn't pro-Wall Street, pro-big company, pro-deregulation, pro-executive, pro-Republican? See what I mean – you can't really think of one. But are there people who invest in a 401K account, or a Roth IRA, or any IRA, or in their employer, or in their own home, who might be interested in a more "main street" and less "Wall Street" sort of positioning? Or a more balanced coverage of the pros and cons of America's biggest companies? Or those big company (and bank) executives? Or the issues related to debt, getting it and repaying it? Is there a market for business news that's been ignored, but Stewart has tapped into? Maybe call it the Suzie Orman approach to business news rather than the Larry Kudlow or "Fast Money" approach.
When companies obsess about competitors, they understand the competitors' Success Formulas and Lock-ins. And they prepare competitive actions that attack those Lock-ins. Entering a gladiator battle where everyone competes the same way just creates a lot of blood for spectators to watch, with no gain for the competitors. Phoenix Principle competitors don't attack where the competition is strong, but rather where the competitor is weak. Attack their Lock-in, so they can't react because they are stuck doing what they always did (and believe in it.). Right now is a good time for someone to attack CNBC and start stealing away viewers. To position themselves as a different kind of financial network that more people want to watch – especially when business news becomes less toxic and more interesting.
by Adam Hartung | Mar 20, 2009 | Current Affairs, General, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Travel, Web/Tech
"Xerox chops earnings outlook as sales slide" is the headline on Marketwatch.com. Do you remember when Xerox was considered the most powerful sales company on earth? In the 1970s and into the 1980s corporations marveled at the sales processes at Xerox – because those processes brought in quarter after quarter of increasing profitable revenue. Xerox practically wiped out competitors – the small printing press manufacturers – during this period, and "carbon paper" was quickly becoming a museum relic (if you are under 30 you'll have to ask someone older what carbon paper is – because it requires an explanation of something called a typewriter as well [lol]).
But today, do you care about Xerox? If you have a copier, you don't care who made it. It could be from Sharp, or Canon, or anybody. You don't care if it's Xerox unless you work in a "copy store" like Kinko's or run the copy center for the corporation – and possibly not even in those jobs. And because desktop printers have practically made copiers obsolete, you may not care about copiers at all. In short, even though Xerox invented the marketplace for widespread duplicating, because the company stayed in its old market of big copiers it has seen revenue declines and has largely become irrelevant.
"U.S. airline revenue plunges for another month" is another Marketwatch.com headline. And I ask again, do you care? The airlines were deregulated 30 years ago, and since then as a group they've never consistently made money (only 1 airline – Southwest – is the exception to this discussion.) The big players in the early days included TWA, Eastern, Braniff, PanAm – names long gone from the skies. They've been replaced by Delta, American and United – as we've watched the near collapse of US Airways, Northwest and Continental. But we've grown so used to the big airlines losing money, and going bankrupt, and screaming about unions and fuel costs, that we've pretty much quit caring. The only thing frequent travelers care about now is their "frequent flier miles" and how they can use them. The airline itself is irrelevant – just so long as I get those miles and get my status and they let me board early.
When you don't grow, you lose relevance. In the mid-1980s the battle raged between Apple's Macintosh and the PC (generically, from all manufacturers) as to which was going to be the dominant desktop computer. By the 1990s that question had been answered, and as Macintosh sales lagged Apple lost relevance. But then when the iPod, iTunes, iTouch and iPhone came along suddenly Apple gained a LOT of relevance. When companies grow, they demonstrate the ability to serve markets. They are relevant. When they don't grow, like GM and Citibank, they lose relevance. It's not about cash flow or even profitability. When you grow, like Amazon with its Kindle launch, you get attention because you demonstrate you are connected to where markets are headed.
Is your business obsessing about costs to the point it is hurting revenue? If so, you are at risk of losing relevance. Like Sara Lee in consumer goods, or Sears in retailing, even if the companies are able to make a profit – possibly even grow profits after some bad years – if you can't grow the top line you just aren't relevant. And if you aren't relevant, you can't get more customers interested in your products/services, and you can't encourage investors. People want to be part of Google, not Kodak.
To maintain (or regain) relevance today, you have to focus on growth. Cutting costs is not enough. If you lose relevance, you lose your customer base and financing, and you make it a whole lot easier for competitors to grow. While you're looking internally, or managing the bottom line, competitors are figuring out the market direction, and proving it by demonstrating growth. And that's why today, even more than before, it is so critical you focus planning on future markets for growth, obsess about competitors, use Disruptions to change behavior and implement White Space to experiment with new business opportunities. Because if you don't do those things you are far, far too likely to simply become irrelevant.
[note: Thanks for feedback that my spelling and grammar have gotten pretty sloppy lately. I'm going to allocate more time to review, as well as writing. And hopefully pick up some proofreading to see if this can improve. Sorry for the recent problems, and I appreciate your feedback on errors.]
