by Adam Hartung | Apr 24, 2009 | Disruptions, In the Rapids, Innovation, Leadership, Lifecycle, Openness
Everybody should have White Space projects. More than one. Because you never know if which project will work out, and which might not. Nobody has a crystal ball. To create growth you have to not only open White Space, but you have to know when to get out — by closing or selling.
Today GE announced "Safran to buy 81% stake in GE Homeland Protection" according to Marketwatch, effectively taking GE out of the airport security business. According to Securityinfowatch.com the sale will give the French company complimentary technology for its markets around the globe, as well as GE's U.S. sales force and market access. Thus it was willing to pay-up for the business unit. For GE, the sale gets the company out of a business heading in a different direction than originally planned.
Many people thought that airport security technology would be rampant in U.S. airports following the changes after September, 2001. And GE was one of several companies that developed scenarios justifying investment in new products to innovate new solutions and take them to market. Scenarios for big spending on airport security seemed sensible. But, a few years later, reality is that nobody wants to pay for the new techology. The airlines are broke and have no money to pay for better customer satisfaction during check-in, where they can blame the TSA for unhappiness. The cities that own the airports have no money to pay for more equipment to upgrade the systems. Most have their hands out for federal dollars due to tax shortfalls. And customers refuse to pay higher ticket taxes to cover the security investments. What looked like a great market turned out to be a slow-grower with extensive downward pricing pressure. So far the market has concluded it will just let people wait in line.
So, hand it to GE. They sold the business. By GE standards the $580million received for the sale isn't a lot of money. But it shows that when you have White Space projects, you have to manage them for results, not just let them run. To now make this business worthwhile in the massive corporation, GE would need to make big acquisitions. But the growth wasn't really there to make the market all that interesting. Because GE was participating in the market, they learned what was happening and could see that the desired scenario wasn't the actual scenario. So GE needed to dial-back its investments. When the airport security business failed to take off, it made more sense to sell it than keep investing in product development for a market growing slower than expected. Rather than simply let the business string along and see declining returns, GE sold the business to someone who has a different scenario for the future – willing to pay for GE's R&D investments. Before the business looked bad to everyone, GE sold its interest at a good price so it had the money to invest in something else. When the shift went a different direction than GE planned, GE got out. That's smart.
You can't expect to read all market shifts completely accurately. Rarely does everything quickly work out all right, or all wrong. So you have to develop your scenarios, and invest based upon what's most likely to happen. You need several options. Then, track the market versus your scenarios. If things don't go the way you thought they might, you have to be willing to stop. If you're smart, you can get out without losing your investment – possibly even make some money – especially if you're first to escape.
Back in the early days of mainframe computers the 3 big players were IBM, GE and RCA. Behomoths that used the products as well as saw the market growing. But GE quickly realized that in mainframes, IBM's share allowed them to manipulate pricing so that GE and RCA would never make much money – and never gain much share. So the head of GE's computer business called up RCA and offered to sell RCA the business. He offered to let RCA "synergize" the combination so it could "compete stronger" against IBM. RCA took him up on the deal. GE made a big profit on the sale. The head of the computer business got tagged for his savvy move, and soon was made Chairman and CEO. And RCA ended up losing a fortune before learning IBM had the market sewn up and RCA couldn't make any money – eventually getting out via a shut down. That write-off spelled the beginning of the end for RCA.
White Space is really important. But it's not a playground for madcap innovators to do whatever they want. White Space should be based on scenarios. And the business should report results based upon the scenario expectations. If the White Space project can't meet expected results, you have to be just as willing to get out as you were to get in. You have to compete ferociously, to win, but don't be ego-involved and foolish like RCA was in mainframes. Be committed, but be smart. If you don't get the results you planned on, understand why. Keep your eyes on the market. Get in, work hard, and be prepared to possibly get out.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 22, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Lock-in
Yesterday I discussed how Sun Microsystems nailed its coffin shut in the mid-1990s when it committed itself to hardware instead of following the market into software. Even though Sun was the then leader in Unix operating systems (Solaris) and internet application development (Java), the company chose to only offer its software on its own hardware (Solaris) – or give it away (Java). Had Sun recognized the market shift to valuing software rather than "systems" the company could have transitioned itself and avoided being gobbled up by Oracle – which is sure to close Sun's R&D facility and discontinue hardware sales.
Now we hear that the New York Times company behaved very similarly at almost the same time, putting itself at unnecessary risk that has destroyed huge value for shareholders and cost thousands of jobs. In 1995 NYT was worth between $1.5B and $2B. The Boston Globe recently reported in "What Went Wrong?" that same year the founder of Monster offered to sell a chunk of his new company to the Globe (which is owned by NYT) for $1million. And Monster would start cooperating with the Globe to offer help-wanted ads on-line as well as in the newspaper. At the time, help wanted ads alone was a $100million business at the Globe. For 1% of just one segment of the Globe's revenue – and a far lesser fraction of NYT sales and equity value – the company could have been part of the great migration to the web.
Globe and NYT management said no. And for the rest of the decade advertising growth remained on a tear, driving the value of NYT up to about $6.5 to $7billion by 2000. And even though the recession came in 2001, NYT's value remained in that range until 2004. But then, in 2004, early market shifts started to become pronounced. Like the proverbial snowball rolling downhill, internet usage had become a big market and advertisers were looking for lower cost and more capable options. Advertisers from auto companies to movie studies started moving ad dollars to the web – as did companies advertising for help. The value of NYT started to drop, and hasn't stopped yet. In 5 years more than $6billion of that value has evaporated – leaving the whole of NYT – including not only the Globe but the venerable New York Times worth a mere $700million (see 5year chart here). Value is dropping precipitously as losses mount ("New York Times loss widens; shares fall 16%" was headline on Marketwatch yesterday), and the company leverages its Manhattan real estate to try preserving its now unprofitable Success Formula.
When business was good NYT had the opportunity to Disrupt itself and invest in some White Space to help understand the direction of future markets. Instead, management clung to the old Success Formula and ignored impending market shifts. While the company racked up profits it eschewed investing in new projects, because there were no Disruptions causing it to consider White Space. And now that the market has shifted it very likely is too late to save the company (investor Rupert Murdoch with investments across all media, including the web, is licking his chops for the opportunity to take over these influential journals with which he has long tangled politically. Even if only to watch them decline and remove a thorn in his side.) Because of decisions made in 1995, when business was good, the nails were being driven into the coffin. Management failed to recognize how deadly those decisions were, because they were focused on Defending & Extending the past rather than exploring how markets might change.
The Sun and NYT story emphasize how easy it is to remain Locked-in. Profits during good times – often right at the peak of the business – become an excuse to do more of the same. But what we see over and over is that long-term success requires Disruptions during these best times. Companies that make the transitions don't wait for the crisis. When times are good they invest in new market opportunities, so they can learn what works and how to compete. They Disrupt their old model so they pay attention to market shifts, and invest in White Space where they learn and inform the entire organization about what's coming. Lock-in is very dangerous because it is so easy to ignore. But if you want to survive market shifts you must create an organization that can evolve with new markets. That requires you manage Lock-in by constantly Disrupting and keeping White Space alive.
PS – a note of thanks to reader Tejune Kang for pointing me to the Globe article about Monster. I encourage all readers to forward me your insights to companies Locked-in and at risk, as well as those practicing The Phoenix Principle.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 21, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
"With Oracle, Sun avoids becoming another Yahoo," headlines Marketwatch.com today. As talks broke down because IBM was unwilling to up its price for Sun Microsystems, Oracle Systems swept in and made a counter-offer that looks sure to acquire the company. Unlike Yahoo – Sun will now disappear. The shareholders will get about 5% of the value Sun was worth a decade ago at its peak. That's a pretty serious value destruction, in any book. And if you don't think this is bad news for the employees and vendors just wait a year and see how many remain part of Oracle. A sale to IBM would have fared no better for investors, employees or vendors.
It was clear Sun wasn't able to survive several years ago. That's why I wrote about the company in my book Create Marketplace Disruption. Because the company was unwilling to allow any internal Disruptions to its Success Formula and any White Space to exist which might transform the company. In the fast paced world of information products, no company can survive if it isn't willing to build an organization that can identify market shifts and change with them.
I was at a Sun analyst conference in 1995 where Chairman McNealy told the analysts "have you seen the explosive growth over at Cisco System? I ask myself, how did we miss that?" And that's when it was clear Sun was in for big, big trouble. He was admitting then that Sun was so focused on its business, so focused on its core, that there was very little effort being expended on evaluating market shifts – which meant opportunities were being missed and Sun would be in big trouble when its "core" business slowed – as happens to all IT product companies. Sun had built its Success Formula selling hardware. Even though the real value Sun created shifted more and more to the software that drove its hardware, which became more and more generic (and less competitive) every year, Sun wouldn't change its strategy or tactics – which supported its identity as a hardware company – its Success Formula. Even though Sun became a leader in Unix operating systems, extensions for networking and accessing lots of data, as well as the creator and developer of Java for network applications because software was incompatible with the Success Formula, the company could not maintain independent software sales and the company failed.
Sort of like Xerox inventing the GUI (graphical user interface), mouse, local area network to connect a PC to a printer, and the laser printer but never capturing any of the PC, printer or desktop publishing market. Just because Xerox (and Sun) invented a lot of what became future growth markets did not insure success, because the slavish dedication to the old Success Formula (in Xerox's case big copiers) kept the company from moving forward with the marketplace.
Instead, Sun Microsystems kept trying to Defend & Extend its old, original Success Formula to the end. Even after several years struggling to sell hardware, Sun refused to change into the software company it needed to become. To unleash this value, Sun had to be acquired by another software company, Oracle, willing to let the hardware go and keep the software – according to the MercuryNews.com "With Oracle's acquisition of Sun, Larry Ellison's empire grows." Scott McNealy wouldn't Disrupt Sun and use White Space to change Sun, so its value deteriorated until it was a cheap buy for someone who could use the software pieces to greater value in another company.
Compare this with Steve Jobs. When Jobs left Apple in disrepute he founded NeXt to be another hardware company – something like a cross between Apple and Sun. But he found the Unix box business tough sledding. So he changed focus to a top application for high powered workstations – graphics – intending to compete with Silicon Graphics (SGI). But as he learned about the market, he realized he was better off developing application software, and he took over leadership of Pixar. He let NeXt die as he focused on high end graphics software at Pixar, only to learn that people weren't as interesed in buying his software as he thought they would be. So he transitioned Pixar into a movie production company making animated full-length features as well as commercials and short subjects. Mr. Jobs went through 3 Success Formulas getting the business right – using Disruptions and White Space to move from a box company to a software company to a movie studio (that also supplied software to box companies). By focusing on future scenarios, obsessing about competitors and Disrupting his approach he kept pushing into White Space. Instead of letting Lock-in keep him pushing a bad idea until it failed, he let White Space evolve the business into something of high value for the marketplace. As a result, Pixar is a viable competitor today – while SGI and Sun Microsystems have failed within a few months of each other.
It's incredibly easy to Defend & Extend your Success Formula, even after the business starts failing. It's easy to remain Locked-in to the original Success Formula and keep working harder and faster to make it a little better or cheaper. But when markets shift, you will fail if you don't realize that longevity requires you change the Success Formula. Where Unix boxes were once what the market wanted (in high volume), shifts in competitive hardware (PC) and software (Linux) products kept sucking the value out of that original Success Formula.
Sun needed to Disrupt its Lock-ins – attack them – in order to open White Space where it could build value for its software products. Where it could learn to sell them instead of force-bundling them with hardware, or giving them away (like Java.) And this is a lesson all companies need to take to heart. If Sun had made these moves it could have preserved much more of its value – even if acquired by someone else. Or it might have been able to survive as a different kind of company. Instead, Sun has failed costing its investors, employees and vendors billions.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 20, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, Film, General, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lock-in, Television
How do you pick a movie to see – whether at the theatre or at home? The movie studios think you pick movies by what you see on TV ads, according to the Los Angeles Times "Studios struggle to rein in marketing costs."
I remember the old days when my friends and I grabbed a newspaper and shopped the ads looking for a flick to go see. And we were influenced by television ads as well. But, as time went by, we started asking each other, "Is that movie any good, or are all the best parts in the ad?" (Admit it, you've asked that question too.) Then we found out we could get sneak peaks from shows like "Siskel & Ebert at the movies," so one of us would try to watch that and see if we liked the longer scenes. And we didn't ever agree with the critics, but we could listen to hear if they described a movie we would like. Now, not only myself but my sons follow the same routine. Only we go to the internet looking for a YouTube! clip, and for reviews from all kinds of people – not just critics. Mostly when we see a TV ad we hit the mute button.
Everywhere, businesses are still wasting money on old business notions. For movie studios, they keep trying to get people to watch a big budget by advertising the thing. (To death. Until nobody watches the ad any more because they have it memorized. And get angry that the ad keeps showing.) But even the above article admits that studios know this isn't the best way any more. With the internet around, we all listen less to advertisements, and gain access to more real input. From web sites, or Twitter, or friends on Facebook, or colleagues on Linked-in. We watch a lot less TV, and what we watch is more targeted to our interest and available on cable. Or we download our TV from the web using Hulu.com. Yet, the studios are so Locked-in to their outdated Success Formula that they keep spending money on TV ads – even though they know the value isn't there any more.
So why do the studios spend so much on advertising? Because they always have. That's Lock-in. Lacking a better idea, a better plan, a better approach that would really reach out to potential viewers they keep doing what they know how to do, even as they question whether or not they should do it! The industrial era concept was "I spent a fortune making this movie, and distributing it into theatres, so I better not stop now. Keep spending money to advertise it, create awareness, and get people into the theatres." The studios see movie making as an industrial enterprise, where those who spend the most have the greatest chance of winning. Spend a lot to make, spend to distribute, spend to advertise. To industrial era thinkers, all this spending creates entry barriers that defends their business.
And that's why movie studios struggle. It's unclear how well those ideas ever worked for filmmaking – because we all saw our share of blockbuster bombs and remember the "American Graffiti" or "Blair Witch Project" that was cheap and good. But for sure we all know the world has now permanently shifted. Today, small budget movies like "Slum Dog Millionaire" can be made (offshore in that case – but not necessarily) quite well. The pool of new actors, writers, directors, cinematographers and editors keeps growing – driving production quality up and cost down. And distribution can be via DVD – or web download – between low cost and free. A movie doesn't even have to be shown in a theatre for it to be commercially successful any more. And any filmmaker can promote her product on the internet, building a word of mouth driving popularity and sales.
From filmmaking to recordings to short programs to books, the market has shifted. Things don't have to be big budget to be good. The old status quo police, like Mr. Goldwyn or Mr. Meyer, simply have far less role. Digitization and globalization means that you don't need film for movies – or paper for books. Thus, democratizing the production, as well as sales, of "media" products. Thus the old media companies are struggling (publishers, filmmakers, magazines, newspapers and recording studios) because they no longer have the "entry barriers" they can Defend to allow their old Success Formulas to produce above average returns. And they never will again. The world has changed, and the market has permanently shifted.
Is your business still spending money on things that don't matter? Does your approach to the market, your Success Formula dictate spending on advertising, salespeople, PR, external analysts, paid reviewers or others that really don't make nearly as much difference any more? When will you change your approach? The movie studios are preparing to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on summer ad promotions for new movies. Is this necessary, given that the downturn has increased the demand for escapist entertainment? Is your business doing the same?
If you want to cut your cost, you shouldn't cut 5% or 10% across the board. That won't help your Success Formula meet market needs better. Instead, you need to understand market shifts and cut 90% from things that no longer matter – or that have diminishing value. Quit doing the things you do because you always did them, and make sure you do the things you need to do. You want to be the next "Slumdog Millionaire" not the next "Ishtar." You want to be Apple, not Motorola. You want to be Google, not Tribune Corporation. Spend money on what pays off, not what you've always spent it on.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 20, 2009 | Current Affairs, Food and Drink, General, In the Rapids, Leadership, Openness
"PepsiCo bids to buy its bottlers for $6billion," is the Marketwatch headline today. Another big Disruption, this time at the industry level, orchestrated by PepsiCo's Chairperson/CEO Indra Nooyi. Now that changes are being made with the product line, packaging and brands this latest move will allow Pepsi's beverage division to much more quickly implement changes to align with market needs. While Coke is doing little, Pepsi is disrupting the industry organization changing the marketplace and placing serious challenges onto all competitors. And without waiting for the recession to end.
Many leadership teams should pay close attention to what's going on at PepsiCo. By moving fast to align with future market needs they are catching competitors unwilling to take action due to recessionary concerns. Their Disruptions are creating changes that will help Pepsi return to the "muscle building" organization created in the days of former Chairman Andrall Pearson. And the changes coming out of White Space are helping Pepsi to develop a stronger Success Formula for competing in the post-industrial age.
Investors, employees and vendors should be encouraged by Pepsi. Competitors had better be worried. And all leadership teams can learn from the action being taken to gain share during this period of uncertainty. As companies hit growth stalls the tendency is to "wait and see". But winners react quickly to Disrupt and use White Space where they overtake delaying competitors – returning to the Rapids of growth and gaining share.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 16, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, Food and Drink, General, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
All of America may have learned the jingle "America spells cheese K*R*A*F*T", but that doesn't mean Kraft is a good investment. When the recession first began, investors were excited about buying companies that had well known brands – especially in food. The idea was that everyone has to eat, so food companies won't get hammered like an industrial company (think Caterpillar or General Electric) when the economy shrinks. Second, people will eat out less and in more so food might actually see an uptick in growth. Third, people will want well known brands because it well help them feel good during the depressing downturn. So, Kraft was to be a good, safe investment. After all, even though it's only been spun out of cigarrette company Altria a few months, this thinking was powerful enough for the Dow editors to replace failed AIG with Kraft on the (in)famous Dow Jones Industrial Average.
Too bad things didn't work out that way (see chart here). Although the stock held up through the summer near it's spin-out high at 35, Kraft's value fell out of the proverbial bed since then. Down about 40%. What's worse, as several companies have "bounced back" during the recent stock market rebound Kraft shares have gone nowhere. And now Crain's Chicago Business reports "Analyst downgrades Kraft on volume risk." This UBS analyst has noted that instead of going up, or sideways, sales (and volume) at Kraft have declined. While he might have expected a potential 1% decline, instead he's seeing drops of more like 2.5%. In light of this poor performance, he thinks the best Kraft can do for the next 12 months is a meager improvement – or more likely sideways performance.
Kraft has been in a growth stall for a long time. Since well before spinning out of Altria. The company stopped launching new products years ago. Instead, it has been trying to increase sales with line extensions of its existing products – things like 100 calorie packs of Oreos. There hasn't been a real new product at Kraft since DiGiorno pizza and Boboli crust some 10 years ago. Simultaneously, the company sold some of its high growth businesses, like Altoids, in order to "focus on core brands". All of which meant that while cash flow has been stable, there's been no growth. Turns out folks may be eating at home more, but they aren't paying up for worn-out brands like Velveeta, instead turning to store brands and generics. Shoppers are looking for new things to improve their meals during this recession – but Kraft simply doesn't have any.
Without innovation, Kraft has gone nowhere. For a decade the company has merely Defended & Extended its 1940s business model. It keeps trying to do more of the same, perhaps faster and better. It couldn't do cheaper because of rising commodity prices last year, so it actually raised prices. As a result, customers are quite happy to buy comparable, but cheaper, products setting Kraft up for price wars in almost all its product lines. And there's nothing Kraft can point to as a new product which will actually grow the top line. Just a hope in more advertising of its old products, doing more of the same.
When Kraft spun out the CEO was replaced in order for Kraft to revitalize its moribund organization. Good move. The previous CEO was so in love with D&E management that he bragged about his "strategy" of spending more on Velveeta and older brands – in other words he was wedded to the outdated Success Formula and had no plans to change it.
So he was replaced by a competent executive named Irene Rosenfeld. This was touted as a big move, by bringing in the Chairman of PepsiCo's Frito-Lay Division. PepsiCo is noted for its fairly Disruptive environment, instituted during the reign of Chairman Andrall Pearson who aggressively moved people around (and out) in his effort to "muscle build" the organization. But reality was that Dr. Rosenfeld had worked at Kraft for many years before going to PepsiCo, and was returning (according to her bio on the Kraft web site). And her leadership has been, well, more of the same. There have been no Disruptions at Kraft – no White Space – and no new products. So the growth stall that began during the Altria ownership has continued unabated.
Despite Kraft's lack of performance – and you could say poor performance given that sales and volume are down, as well as profits since she took the top job – Dr. Rosenfeld's salary was increased at the end of March (according to Marketwatch.com "Compensation rose for Kraft Foods' CEO in 2008"). It seems the Board of Directors was concerned that the stock options she was awarded in early February had fallen in value (because the share price dropped dramatically – hurting all investors) so they felt they had to raise her base pay. Since the "at risk" pay didn't pan out, well they felt compelled to make her compensation less risky. Then they invented some excuses to make themselves feel better, like they want the CEO to be paid comparably with other CEOs.
(I guess they don't care about the 20 other senior execs who have seen their base pay frozen. Say, do you suppose I could appeal to my publisher that I want pay like other authors? Like Barack Obama who got almost $3million in royalties last year? Or do you suppose the publisher might tell me if I want that much money I should sell more books – looking at my results to determine how much I should get? I rather like this "comparable pay" idea – sounds sort of like union language for CEO contracts.)
Kraft is going nowhere, and Dr. Rosenfeld is the wrong person in the Chairman/CEO job. Kraft is stalled, and investors as well as employees are suffering. Kraft desperately needs leaders that will Disrupt the organization, refocus it externally on market needs, become obsessive about improving versus competitors in base businesses while identifying fringe competitors changing the market landscape. And above all introduce some White Space where Kraft can innovate new products and services that will get the company growing again! Kraft has enormous resources, but the company is frittering them away Defending & Extending a 60+ year old Success Formula that has no growth left in it. More than ever in Kraft's long history, the company needs to overcome it's Lock-in to innovate – and the Board needs to realize that requires a change in leadership.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 14, 2009 | Books, Current Affairs, Disruptions, General, In the Rapids, Innovation, Leadership, Lifecycle
Last week I blogged about how Segway and GM were taking all the wrong steps in launching the PUMA. Today let me explain why Amazon is the mirror image – doing the launch of Kindle correctly. Kindle is the new "electronic book" from Amazon which allows people to download whole books, or parts of books, onto a very small, light and thin device where they can read the material, notate it and even convert it to audio. Even Marketwatch.com is bullish in its overview of the product "Amazon's Kindle, e-books are future of reading."
Firstly, Amazon recognized it had a Disruptive innovation and didn't pretend this was a small variation on printed material. Perhaps "over the top" a bit with the PR, Mr. Bezos called Kindle the biggest revolution in reading since Gutenberg invented the printing press. This bold claim causes people to realize that Kindle is something very different than anything prior. Which it is. Kindle is not like reading on a PC, nor is it like reading a book, nor is it like reading a magazine or newspaper (should you download those). It's different, and it requires buyers change their habits. By highlighting the uniqueness of the product Amazon doesn't undersell the fact that users really do have to change to enjoy the product.
Secondly, the product isn't being run through some high volume distribution that will struggle with the uniqueness and potentially low initial volumes. Amazon isn't trying to sell the product today at Best Buy or Wal-Mart, which would demand instant volume in the millions supported by huge ad spending. Something which would not only be expensive, but probably would not meet those retail expectations. Instead, Amazon is selling the product itself and closely monitoring volumes.
Thirdly, Amazon isn't pushing Kindle as a product for everybody. At least not yet. Amazon isn't offering Kindle for $20, losing a huge amount of money, and saying everyone needs one – which would likely lead to many people buying a Kindle, deciding its not for them, and then throwing it away to wait a very long time before a repurchase – with lots of negative comments. Instead, Amazon prices Kindle at $359 and targets the product at early users who will really benefit. Like the heavy volume book reader. This allows Amazon to build a base of initial users who will use the product and provide feedback to Amazon about how to modify the product to make it even more valuable. Amazon can cycle through the learning experience with users to adapt and develop the product for a future mass market.
Fourthly, the Kindle doesn't come with 30 options to test. It has just a few. This allows Amazon to learn what works. And add functionality in a way that tests the product. Amazon can add features, but it can also drop them.
Will Kindle be the next MP3 device. Probably. How long will it take? Probably not as long as people think. Because Amazon is introducing this innovation correctly. Publishers, authors, book readers and other application users are all learning together. And while traditional paper publishers (from books to newspapers) are waiting to see, Amazon is preparing its new products to "jump the curve" on these old publishers. It's not hard to imagine in 3 or 4 years how authors might go straight to Amazon with their writing, for publication as a Kindle-only product. This would be incredibly cheap, and open the market for many more authors (books or periodicals) than have access today. Since the cost of reading drops precipitiously (due to no paper) the pricing of these new books and periodicals may well be a few dollars, or even less than a dollar. Thus exploding the market for books the way the internet has exploded the market for short-form blog writers.
Even in a recession, people look for new solutions. But capturing those new customers takes careful understanding of how to reach them. You can't act like Segway and dump a strange new product onto users with mass distribution and a PR highlight reel. You have to recognize that Disruptive innovations take better planning. You have to find early customers who will enter White Space with you to test new products, and provide feedback so you both can learn. You have to be honest about your Disruptive approach, and use it to figure out what the big value is – not guess. And you have to be willing to take a few months (or years) to get it right before declaring your readiness for mass market techniques.
Amazon did this when it launched on-line book selling. It didn't sell all books initially, it mostly sold things not on retailers shelves. It didn't sell to everyone, just those looking for certain books. And it learned what people wanted, as well as how to supply, on its journey to Disrupt book retailling – later about all retailing – and build itself in to the model for on-line mass retail. Following that same approach is serving Amazon well, and portends very good things for Kindle's success.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 9, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lifecycle, Lock-in, Web/Tech
$193billion dollars. An amount that seems only viable for governments to discuss. But that is how much the value of Sun Microsystems declined in less than one decade (see chart here). At the height of its dominance as a supplier to telecom companies in the 1990s Sun was worth over $200billion. Recently IBM made an offer at just under $8billion. But Sun has rejected the IBM bid, which was more than double its recent market value, and Sun is now worth only about 60% of the bid. An amazing loss of value for a company that never paid a dividend. And the failure can be tied to a single problem.
Forbes magazine is having a field day with the leadership at Sun these days. "Sun May Be Pulling a Yahoo!" the magazine exclamed on Monday when Sun said it was turning down the IBM offer. The similarity is that both companies turned down values at above market price, but both probably won't receive offers from anyone else. The difference, however, is that Yahoo! has a chance to compete with Google, and Microsoft would have suffocated those chances. Sun, on the other hand, won't survive and the only way investors will get any value is if Sun agrees to the buyout.
Reinforcing the thinking that Sun won't make it on its own, Forbes today led with "Sun's Six Biggest Mistakes" which decries recent (last 4 years) tactical failings of the company. But in truth, Sun was destined to fail 8 years ago – as I argued clearly in my book Create Marketplace Disruption (buy a copy from my blog or at Amazon.com.) The company never overcame Lock-in to its initial Success Formula, and when its market shifted in 2000 the company went into a nosedive from which no tactical changes could save it.
Scott McNealy was the patriarch of Sun Microsystems. Son of an auto executive, he had a love for "big iron" as he called the large, robust American cars of the 50s, 60s and 70s. And when he started Sun Microsystems he imbued it with an identity for "big iron." Mr. McNealy wasn't interested in creating a software company, he wanted to sell hardware – like the days when computing was all about big mainframe machines. His might be smaller and cheaper than mainframes, but the identity of Sun was clearly tied to selling boxes that were powerful, and expensive.
Everything about the company's development linked to this identity (see the book for details). The company strategy was tied to being a leader in selling hardware systems. First powerful desktop systems but increasingly powerful network servers. Iron that would replace mainframes and extend computing power to challenge supercomputers. All tactics, from R&D to manufacturing and sales tied to this Identity. And because the products were good, and met a market need in the 80s and 90s, this Success Formula flourished and reinforced the Identity.
A lot of new products came out of Sun Microsystems. They were an early leader in RISC chips to drive faster processing. And faster memory schemes and disk array technology. These reinforced the sale of hardware systems. The company also extended the capabilities of Unix software, but of course you could only buy this enhanced system if you bought one of their computers. Sun even invented Java, a major advancement for internet applications. But then they gave away this software because it didn't reinforce the sale of their hardware. Sun felt that if everyone used Java it would generally grow internet ue, which would grow server demand, which would help them sell more server hardware – so don't even bother trying to build a software sales capability. That did not reinforce the Identity, so it wasn't part of the Success Formula. Everything leadership and the company did was focused on its core – Defending and Extending the sales of Unix Workstations and Servers. It's hedgehog concept was to be the world's best at this, and it was. Sun intended to Defend & Extend that Identity and its Success Formula at all costs.
But then the market shifted. The telecom companies over-invested in infrastructure, and their demand for Sun hardware fell dramatically. Workstations based on PC technology caught up with Sun hardware for many applications, rendering the Sun workstations overpriced. Makers of PC servers developed advancements making their servers faster, and considerably cheaper, meaning Sun servers weren't required or were overpriced for company applications. Within 2 years, the market had shifted away from needing all those Sun boxes, causing Sun sales and market value to collapse.
Sun made one mistake. It never addressed the potential for a market shift that could obsolete its Success Formula. Sun never challenged its Identity. Sun leaders never developed scenarios that envisioned solutions other than an extended Sun leadership position. They only looked at competitors they met originally (such as DEC and SGI) and when they beat those competitors leadership quit obsessing about new comers, causing them to miss the shift to lower price platforms. Although Scott McNealy was an outrageous sort of character, he created lots of disturbance in Sun without creating any Disruption. People felt the heat of his presence, but there was no tolerance for anyone who would shed light on market changes (especially after Ed Zander was installed as COO). Nobody challenged the Success Formula. Nobody in leadership was allowed to consider Sun doing something different – like selling software profitably. And thus, there was no White Space in Sun. No place to with permission to do new things, and no resources to do anything but promote "big iron."
When any company remains tied to its Identity and its Lock-in failure will eventually happen. Markets shift. Then, all the tactical efforts in the world are insufficient. It takes a new Success Formula – maybe even an entirely new identity. Like Virgin becoming an airline rather than a record company. Or Singer a defense contractor rather than a sewing machine company. Or maybe something as simple as GE becoming something besides a light bulb and electric generation company – getting into locomotives and jet engines. The one big mistake made by Sun can be made by anyone. To remain Locked-in too long and let market shifts destroy your value.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 7, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, General, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Science
"GM, Segway unveil Puma urban vehicle" headlines Marketwatch.com. The Puma is an enlarged Segway that can hold 2 people in a sitting position. Both companies are hoping this promotion will create excitement for the not-yet-released product, thus generating a more positive opinion of both companies and establish early demand. Unfortunately, the product isn't anything at all like the iPod and the comparison is way off the mark.
The iPod when released with the iTunes was a disruptive innovation which allowed customers to completely change how they acquired, maintained and managed their access to music. Instead of purchasing entire CDs, people could acquire one song at a time. You no longer needed special media readers, because the tunes could be heard on any MP3 device. And your access was immediate, from the download, without going to a store or waiting for physical delivery. People that had not been music collectors could become collectors far cheaper, and acquire only exactly what they wanted, and listen to the music in their own designed order, or choose random delivery. The source of music changed, the acquisition process changed, the collection management changed, the storage of a collection changed – it changed just about everything about how you acquired and interacted with music. It was not a sustaining innovation, it was disruptive, and it commercialized a movement which had already achieved high interest via Napster. The iPod/iTunes business put Apple into the lead in an industry long dominated by other companies (such as Sony) by bringing in new users and building a loyal following.
Unfortunately, increasing the size of a product that has not yet demonstrated customer efficacy, economic viability or developed a strong following and trying to sell it through an existing distribution system that has long been decried as uneconomic and displeasing to customers is not an iPod experience. And that is what this GM/Segway announcement is trying to do.
Despite all the publicity when it was first announced, the Segway has not developed a strong following. After 7 years of intense marketing, and lots of looks, Segway has sold only 60,000 units globally – a fraction of competitive product such as bicycles, motorized scooters, motorcycles and mass transit. Segway has not "jumped into the lead" in any segment of transportation. It has yet to develop a single dominant application, or a loyal group of followers. The product achieves a smattering of sales, but the vast majority of observers simply say "why?" and comment on the high price. Segway has never come close to achieving the goals of its inventor or its investors.
This product announcement gives us more of the same from Segway. It's the same product, just bigger. We are given precious little information about why someone would own one, other than it supposedly travels 35 miles on $.35 of electricity. But how fast it goes, how long to recharge, how comfortable the ride, whether it can carry anything with you, how it behaves in foul weather, why you should choose it over a Nano from Tata or another small car, or a motorscooter or motorcycle — these are all open items not addressed.
And worse, the product isn't being launched in White Space to answer these questions and build a market. Instead, the announcement says it will be sold through GM dealers. This simply ignores answering why any GM dealer would ever want to sell the thing – given its likely price point, margin, use – why would a dealer want to sell Puma/Segways instead of more expensive, capable and higher margin cars?
Great White Space projects are created by looking into the future and identifying scenarios where this project – its use – can be a BIG winner that will attract large volumes of customers. Second, it addresses competitive lock-ins and creates advantages that don't currently exist and otherwise would not exist. Thirdly, it Disrupts the marketplace as a game changer by bringing in new users that otherwise are out of the market. And fourth it has permission to try anything and everything in the market to create a new Success Formula to which the company can migrate for rapid growth.
This project does none of that. It's use is as unclear as the original Segway, and the scenario in which this would ever be anything other than a novelty for perfect weather inner-city upscale locations is totally unclear. This product captures all the current Lock-ins of the companies involved – trying to Defend & Extend one's technology base and the other's distribution system – rather than build anything new. The product appears simply to be inferior in almost all regards to competitive products, with no description of why it is a game changer to other forms of transportation. And the project is starting with most important decisions pre-announced – rather than permission to try new things. And there is absolutely no statement of how this project will be resourced or funded – by two companies that are both in terrible financial shape.
The iPod and iTunes are brands that turned around Apple. They are role models for how to use Disruptive innovation to resurrect a troubled company. It's really unfortunate to see such wonderful brand names abused by two poorly performing companies without a clue of how to manage innovation. The biggest value of this announcement is it shows just how poorly managed Segway has been – given that it's partnering with a company that is destined to be the biggest bankruptcy ever in history, and known for its inability to understand customer needs and respond effectively.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 3, 2009 | Current Affairs, General, In the Rapids, Lifecycle, Openness, Science
Since before writing Create Marketplace Disruption I've been a fan of GE. The company is the only company to be on the Dow Jones Industrial Average since started 100 years ago. While so many other companies have soared and failed, GE has continued to adapt and grow. But it's been hard to be a GE proponent the last year. Even though GE continues to follow The Phoenix Principle, fears about the recession, GE's massive commercial real estate holdings, and risks in GE Capital drove the stock from $40 a year ago to $6.50!!! A whopping 84% decline!!!
I've also long been a fan of Intel. Intel transformed itself from a memory chip company facing horrible returns into a microprocessor company by maintaining a healthy paranoia about markets and competitors. The company has worked with Clayton Christensen over the years to not only keep up with sustaining innovations, but to implement Disruptive ones as well. But Intel was recession-slaughtered over the last year, losing half its value.
It's been enough to make an innovation lover cry. But, simultaneously, it's not clear that over the last year ever stock has been accurately priced for its long term value by the market. As we know, fears about bank and real estate failures have simultaneously destroyed investor confidence while pushing up cash needs. Don't forget that Warren Buffet made an insider deal to provide money to GE with warrants to buy the stock at $23 – about double the current value. So perhaps the bloodbath in these two companies went beyond what should have been expected?
Today there's more heartening news. "GE and Intel join forces on home health" is the FT.com headline.
GE and Intel both have identified that health care will be a growing market into the future, expecting the home health monitoring business alone to grow from $3B today to $7.7B by 2012. By keeping their eyes on the future, both companies are showing that they are investing based on future expectations, not just historical performance. And, both have identified opportunities that reside outside their existing health care markets, such as the medical imaging market where GE is currently strong. Thus, they are investing $250million into a new joint venture company to develop new markets.
This shows the earmarks of good White Space. It's focused on developing a growing future market, not trying to preserve an existing market position. It's outside the existing business manager's control, thus given permission to develop a new Success Formula rather than operate within existing constraints of existing businesses. And the project is given enough resources to succeed, not just get started.
Maybe now is a great time to buy stock in these companies? GE has gone out of its way recently to divulge information about its real estate and finance units to analysts in order to be more transparent. And the company is demonstrating a commitment to the behaviors, future-oriented planning and White Space, that have long helped the company grow.
Now, if we could just start seeing the kind of disruptive behavior out of Chairman Immelt that former Chairman "Neutron Jack" Welch demonstrated my comfort level could go up even more…..
