Microsoft needed a great Christmas season. After years of product stagnation, and a big market shift toward mobile devices from PCs, Microsoft's future relied on the company seeing customers demonstrate they were ready to jump in heavily for Windows8 products – including the new Surface tablet.
Looking deeper, for the 4th quarter PC sales declined by almost 5% according to Gartner research, and by almost 6.5% according to IDC. Both groups no longer expect a rebound in PC shipments, as they believe homes will no longer have more than 1 PC due to the mobile device penetration – the market where Surface and Win8 phones have failed to make any significant impact or move beyond a tiny market share. Users increasingly see the complexity of shifting to Win8 as not worth the effort; and if a switch is to be made consumer and businesses now favor iOS and Android.
These trends mean nothing short of the ruin of Microsoft. Microsoft makes more than 75% of its profits from Windows and Office. Less than 25% comes from its vaunted servers and tools. And Microsoft makes nothing from its xBox/Kinect entertainment division, while losing vast sums on-line (negative $350M-$750M/quarter). No matter how much anyone likes the non-Windows Microsoft products, without the historical Windows/Office sales and profits Microsoft is not sustainable.
So what can we expect at Microsoft:
Ballmer has committed to fight to the death in his effort to defend & extend Windows. So expect death as resources are poured into the unwinnable battle to convert users from iOS and Android.
As resources are poured out of the company in the Quixotic effort to prolong Windows/Office, any hope of future dividends falls to zero.
Expect enormous layoffs over the next 3 years. Something like 50-60%, or more, of employees will go away.
Expect closure of the long-suffering on-line division in order to conserve resources.
The entertainment division will be spun off, sold to someone like Sony or even Barnes & Noble, or dramatically reduced in size. Unable to make a profit it will increasingly be seen as a distraction to the battle for saving Windows – and Microsoft leadership has long shown they have no idea how to profitably grow this business unit.
As more and more of the market shifts to competitive cloud businesses Apple, Amazon and others will grow significantly. Microsoft, losing its user base, will demonstrate its inability to build a new business in the cloud, mimicking its historical experiences with Zune (mobile music) and Microsoft mobile phones. Microsoft server and tool sales will suffer, creating a much more difficult profit environment for the sole remaining profitable division.
Missing the market shift to mobile has already forever tarnished the Microsoft brand. No longer is Microsoft seen as a leader, and instead it is rapidly losing market relevancy as people look to Apple, Google, Amazon, Samsung, Facebook and others for leadership. The declining sales, and lack of customer interest will lead to a tailspin at Microsoft not unlike what happened to RIM. Cash will be burned in what Microsoft will consider an "epic" struggle to save the "core of the company."
But failure is already inevitable. At this stage, not even a new CEO can save Microsoft. Steve Ballmer played "Bet the Company" on the long-delayed release of Win8, losing the chance to refocus Microsoft on other growing divisions with greater chance of success. Unfortunately, the other players already had enough chips to simply bid Microsoft out of the mobile game – and Microsoft's ante is now long gone – without holding a hand even remotely able to turn around the product situation.
Game over. Ballmer loses. And if you keep your money invested in Microsoft it will disappear along with the company.
Newspaper readership peaked around 2000. Since then printed media has declined, as readers shifted on-line. Magazines have folded, and newspapers have disappeared, quit printing, dramatically cut page numbers and even more dramatically cut staff.
Amazingly, almost no major print publisher prepared for this, even though the trend was becoming clear in the late 1990s.
Newspapers are no longer a viable business. While industry revenue grew for
almost 2 centuries, it collapsed in a mere decade.
This market shift created clear winners, and losers. On-line news sites like Marketwatch and HuffingtonPost were clear winners. Losers were traditional newspaper companies such as Tribune Corporation, Gannett, McClatchey, Dow Jones and even the New York Times Company. And investors in these companies either saw their values soar, or practically disintegrate.
In 2012 it is equally clear that television is on the brink of a major transition. Fewer people are content to have their entertainment programmed for them when they can program it themselves on-line. Even though the number of television channels has exploded with pervasive cable access, the time spent watching television is not growing. While simultaneously the amount of time people spend looking at mobile internet displays (tablets, smartphones and laptops) is growing at double digit rates.
It would be easy to act like newspaper defenders and pretend that television as we've known it will not change. But that would be, at best, naive. Just look around at broadband access, the use of mobile devices, the convenience of mobile and the number of people that don't even watch traditional TV any more (especially younger people) and the trend is clear. One-way preprogrammed advertising laden television is not a sustainable business.
So, now is the time to prepare. And change your business to align with impending new realities.
Losers, and winners, will be varied – and not entirely obvious. Firstly, a look at those trying to maintain the status quo, and likely to lose the most.
Giant consumer goods and retail companies benefitted from the domination of television. Only huge companies like P&G, Kraft, GM and Target could afford to lay out billions of dollars for television ads to build, and defend, a brand. But what advantage will they have when TV budgets no longer control brand building? They will become extremely vulnerable to more innovative companies that have better products and move on fast lifecycles. Their size, hierarchy and arcane business practices will lead to huge problems. Imagine a raft of new Hostess Brands experiences.
Even as the trends have started changing these companies have continued pumping billions into the traditional TV networks as they spend to defend their brand position. This has driven up the value of companies like CBS, Comcast (owns NBC) and Disney (owns ABC) over the last 3 years substantially. But don't expect that to last forever. Or even a few more years.
Just like newspaper ad spending fell off a cliff when it was clear the eyeballs were no longer there, expect the same for television ad spending. As giant advertisers find the cost of television harder and harder to justify their outlays will eventually take the kind of cliff dive observed in the chart (above) for newspaper advertising. Already some consumer goods and ad agency executives are alluding to the fact that the rate of return on traditional TV is becoming sketchy.
So far, we've seen little at the companies which own TV networks to demonstrate they are prepared for the floor to fall out of their revenue stream. While some have positions in a few internet production and delivery companies, most are clearly still doing their best to defend & extend the old business – just like newspaper owners did. Just as newspapers never found a way to replace the print ad dollars, these television companies look very much like businesses that have no apparent solution for future growth. I would not want my 401K invested in any major network company.
And there will be winners.
For smaller businesses, there has never been a better time to compete. A company as small as Tesla or Fisker can now create a brand on-line at a fraction of the old cost. And that brand can be as powerful as Ford, and potentially a lot more trendy. There are very low entry barriers for on-line brand building using not only ad words and web page display ads, but also using social media to build loyal followers who use and promote a brand. What was once considered a niche can become well known almost overnight simply by applying the new dynamics of reaching customers on-line, and increasingly via mobile. Look at the success of Toms Shoes.
Zappos and Amazon have shown that with almost no television ads they can create powerhouse retail brands. The new retailers do not compete just on price, but are able to offer selection, availability and customer service at levels unachievable by traditional brick-and-mortar retailers. They can suggest products and prices of things you're likely to need, even before you realize you need them. They can educate better, and faster, than most retail store employees. And they can offer great prices due to less overhead, along with the convenience of shipping the product right into your home.
And as people quit watching preprogrammed TV, where will they go for content? Anybody streaming will have an advantage – so think Netflix (which recently contracted for all the Disney content,) Amazon, Pandora, Spotify and even AOL. But, this will also benefit those companies providing content access such as Apple TV, Google TV, YouTube (owned by Google) to offer content channels and the increasingly omnipresent Facebook will deliver up not only friends, but content — and ads.
As for content creation, the deep pockets of traditional TV production companies will likely disappear along with their ability to control distribution. That means fewer big-budget productions as risk goes up without revenue assurances.
But that means even more ability for newer, smaller companies to create competitive content seeking audiences. Where once a very clever, hard working Seth McFarlane (creator of Family Guy) had to hardscrabble with networks to achieve distribution, and live in fear of a single person controlling his destiny, in the future these creative people will be able to own their content and capture the value directly as they build a direct audience. A phenomenon like George Lucas will be more achievable than ever before as what might look like chaos during transition will migrate to a much more competitive world where audiences, rather than network executives, will decide what content wins – and loses.
So, with due respects to Don McLean, will today be the day TV Died? We will only know in historical context. Nobody predicted newspapers had peaked in 2000, but it was clear the internet was changing news consumption behavior. And we don't know if TV viewership will begin its rapid decline in 2013, or in a couple more years. But the inevitable change is clear – we just don't know exactly when.
So it would be foolish to not think that the industry is going to change dramatically. And the impact on advertising will be even more profound, much more profound, than it was in print. And that will have an even more profound impact on American society – and how business is done.
The web lit up yesterday when people started sharing a Fortune quote from Marissa Mayer, CEO of Yahoo, "We are literally moving the company from BlackBerrys to smartphones." Why was this a big deal? Because, in just a few words, Ms. Mayer pointed out that Research In Motion is no longer relevant. The company may have created the smartphone market, but now its products are so irrelevant that it isn't even considered a market participant.
Ouch. But, more importantly, this drove home that no matter how good RIM thinks Blackberry 10 may be, nobody cares. And when nobody cares, nobody buys. And if you weren't convinced RIM was headed for lousy returns and bankruptcy before, you certainly should be now.
But wait, this is certainly a good bit of the pot being derogatory toward the kettle. Because, other than the highly personalized news about Yahoo's new CEO, very few people care about Yahoo these days as well. After being thoroughly trounced in ad placement and search by Google, it is wholly unclear how Yahoo will create its own relevancy. It may likely be soon when a major advertiser says "When placing our major internet ad program we are focused on the split between Google and Facebook," demonstrating that nobody really cares about Yahoo anymore, either.
And how long will Yahoo survive?
The slip into irrelevancy is the inflection point into failure. Very few companies ever return. Once you are no longer relevant, customer quickly stop paying attention to practically anything you do. Even if you were once great, it doesn't take long before the slide into no-growth, cost cutting and lousy financial performance happens.
Consider:
Garmin once led the market for navigation devices. Now practically everyone uses their mobile phone for navigation. The big story is Apple's blunder with maps, while Google dominates the marketplace. You probably even forgot Garmin exists.
Radio Shack once was a consumer electronics powerhouse. They ran superbowl ads, and had major actresses parlaying with professional sports celebrities in major network ads. When was the last time you even thought about Radio Shack, much less visited a store?
Sears was once America's premier, #1 retailer. The place where everyone shopped for brands like Craftsman, DieHard and Kenmore. But when did you last go into a Sears? Or even consider going into one? Do you even know where one is located?
Kodak invented amateur photography. But when that market went digital nobody cared about film any more. Now Kodak is in bankruptcy. Do you care?
Motorola Razr phones dominated the last wave of traditional cell phones. As sales plummeted they flirted with bankruptcy, until Motorola split into 2 pieces and the money losing phone business became Google – and nobody even noticed.
When was the last time you thought about "building your body 12 ways" with Wonder bread? Right. Nobody else did either. Now Hostess is liquidating.
Being relevant is incredibly important, because markets shift quickly today. As they shift, either you are part of the trend going forward – or you are part of the "who cares" past. If you are the former, you are focused on new products that customers want to evaluate. If you are the latter, you can disappear a whole lot faster than anyone expected as customers simply ignore you.
So now take a look at a few other easy-to-spot companies losing relevancy:
HP headlines are dominated by write offs of its investments in services and software, causing people to doubt the viability of its CEO, Meg Whitman. Who wants to buy products from a company that would spend billions on Palm, business services and Autonomy ERP software only to decide they overspent and can never make any money on those investments? Once a great market leader, HP is rapidly becoming a company nobody cares about; except for what appears to be a bloody train wreck in the making. In tech – lose customesr and you have a short half-life.
Similarly Dell. A leader in supply chain management, what Dell product now excites you? As you think about the money you will spend this holiday, or in 2013, on tech products you're thinking about mobile devices — and where is Dell?
Best Buy was the big winner when Circuit City went bankrupt. But Best Guy didn't change, and now margins have cratered as people showroom Amazon while in their store to negotiate prices. How long can Best Buy survive when all TVs are the same, and price is all that matters? And you download all your music and movies?
Wal-Mart has built a huge on-line business. Did you know that? Do you care? Regardless of Wal-mart's on-line efforts, the company is known for cheap looking stores with cheap merchandise and customers that can't maintain credit cards. When you look at trends in retailing, is Wal-Mart ever the leader – in anything – anymore? If not, Wal-mart becomes a "default" store location when all you care about is price, and you can't wait for an on-line delivery. Unless you decide to go to the even cheaper Dollar General or Aldi.
And, the best for last, is Microsoft. Steve Ballmer announced that Microsoft phone sales quadrupled! Only, at 4 million units last quarter that is about 10% of Apple or Android. Truth is, despite 3 years of development, a huge amount of pre-release PR and ad spending, nobody much cares about Win8, Surface or new Microsoft-based mobile phones. People want an iPhone or Samsung product.
After its "lost decade" when Microsoft simply missed every major technology shift, people now don't really care about Microsoft. Yes, it has a few stores – but they dwarfed in number and customers by the Apple stores. Yes, the shifting tiles and touch screen PCs are new – but nobody real talks about them; other than to say they take a lot of new training. When it comes to "game changers" that are pushing trends, nobody is putting Microsoft in that category.
So the bad news about a $6 billion write-down of aQuantive adds to the sense of "the gang that can't shoot straight" after the string of failures like Zune, Vista and early Microsoft phones and tablets. Not to mention the lack of interest in Skype, while Internet Explorer falls to #2 in browser market share behind Chrome.
When a company is seen as never able to take the lead amidst changing
trends, investors see accquisitions like $1.2B for Yammer as a likely future write down. Customers lose interest and simply spend money elsewhere.
As investors we often hear about companies that were once great brands, but selling at low multiples, and therefore "value plays." But the truth is these are death traps that wipe out returns. Why? These companies have lost relevancy, and that puts them one short step from failure.
As company managers, where are you investing? Are you struggling to be relevant as other competitors – maybe "fringe" companies that use "voodoo solutions" you don't consider "enterprise ready" or understand – are obtaining a lot more interest and media excitment? You can work all you want to defend & extend your past glory, but as markets shift it is amazingly easy to lose relevancy. And it's a very, very tough job to play catch- up.
Just look at the money being spent trying at RIM, Microsoft, HP, Dell, Yahoo…………
In 1978 Dan White killed San Francisco's mayor George Moscone and city supervisor Harvey Milk. The press labeled his defense the "Twinkie Defense" because he claimed eating sugary junk food – like Twinkies – caused diminished capacity. Amazingly the jury bought it, and convicted him of manslaughter instead of murder saying he really wasn't responsible for his own actions. An outraged city rioted.
Nobody is rioting, but management's claim that unions caused Hostess failure is just as outrageous.
Founded in 1930 as Interstate Bakeries Co. (IBC) the company did fine for years. But changing consumer tastes, including nutrition desires, changed how much Wonder Bread, Twinkies, HoHos and Honey Buns people would buy — and most especially affected the price – which was wholly unable to keep up with inflation. This trend was clear in the early 1980s, as prices were stagnant and margins kept declining due to higher costs for grain and petroleum to fuel the country's largest truck fleet delivering daily baked goods to grocers.
IBC kept focusing on operating improvements and better fleet optimization to control rising costs, but the company was unwilling to do anything about the product line. To keep funding lower margins the company added debt, piling on $450M by 2004 when forced to file bankruptcy due to its inability to pay bills. For 5 years financial engineers from consultancies and investment banks worked to find a way out of bankruptcy, and settled on adding even MORE debt, so that – perversely – in 2009 the renamed Hostess had $670M of debt – at least 2/3 the total asset value!
Since then, still trying to sell the same products, margins continued declining. Hostess lost a combined $250M over the last 3 years.
The obvious problem is leadership kept trying to sell the same products, using roughly the same business model, long, long, long after the products had become irrelevant. "Demand was never an issue" a company spokesman said. Yes, people bought Twinkies but NOT at a price which would cover costs (including debt service) and return a profit.
In a last, desperate effort to keep the outdated model alive management decided the answer was another bankruptcy filing, and to take draconian cuts to wages and benefits. This is tanatamount to management saying to those who sell wheat they expect to buy flour at 2/3 the market price – or to petroleum companies they expect to buy gasoline for $2.25/gallon. Labor, like other suppliers, has a "market rate." That management was unable to run a company which could pay the market rate for its labor is not the fault of the union.
By constantly trying to defend and extend its old business, leadership at Hostess killed the company. But not realizing changing trends in foods made their products irrelevant – if not obsolete – and not changing Hostess leaders allowed margins to disintegrate. Rather than developing new products which would be more marketable, priced for higher margin and provide growth that covered all costs Hostess leadership kept trying to financial engineer a solution to make their horse and buggy competitive with automobiles.
And when they failed, management decided to scapegoat someone else. Maybe eating too many Twinkies made the do it. It's a Wonder the Ding Dongs running the company kept this Honey Bun alive by convincing HoHos to loan it money! Blaming the unions is simply an inability of management to take responsibility for a complete failure to understand the marketplace, trends and the absolute requirement for new products.
We see this Twinkie Defense of businesses everywhere. Sears has 23 consecutive quarters of declining same-store sales – but leadership blames everyone but themselves for not recognizing the shifting retail market and adjusting effectively. McDonald's returns to declining sales – a situation they were in 9 years ago – as the long-term trend to healthier eating in more stylish locations progresses; but the blame is not on management for missing the trend while constantly working to defend and extend the old business with actions like taking a slice of cheese off the 99cent burger. Tribune completey misses the shift to on-line news as it tries to defend & extend its print business, but leadership, before and afater Mr. Zell invested, refuses to say they simply missed the trend and let competitors make Tribune obsolete and unable to cover costs.
Businesses can adapt to trends. It is possible to stop the never-ending chase for lower costs and better efficiency and instead invest in new products that meet emerging needs at higher margins. Like the famous turnarounds at IBM and Apple, it is possible for leadership to change the company.
But for too many leadership teams, it's a lot easier to blame it on the Twinkies. Unfortunately, when that happens everyone loses.
This is an exciting time of year for tech users – which is now all of us. The biggest show is the battle between smartphone and tablet leader Apple – which has announced new products with the iPhone 5 and iPad Mini – and the now flailing, old industry leader Microsoft which is trying to re-ignite its sales with a new tablet, operating system and office productivity suite.
I’m reminded of an old joke. Steve the trucker drives with his pal Alex. Someone at the diner says “Steve, imagine you’re going 60 miles an hour when you start down a hill. You keep gaining speed, nearing 90. Then you realize your brakes are out. Now, you see one quarter mile ahead a turn in the road, because there’s a barricade and beyond that a monster cliff. What do you do?”
Steve smiles and says “Well, I wake up Alex.”
“What? Why?” asks the questioner.
“Because Alex has never seen a wreck like the one we’re about to have.”
Microsoft has played “bet the company” on its Windows 8 launch, updated office suite and accompanied Surface tablet. (More on why it didn’t have to do this later.) Now Microsoft has to do something almost never done in business. The company has to overcome a 3 year lateness to market and upend a multi-billion dollar revenue and brand leader. It must overcome two very successful market pioneers, both of which have massive sales, high growth, very good margins, great cash flow and enormous war chests (Apple has over $100B cash.)
Just on the face of it, the daunting task sounds unlikely to succeed.
But there is far more reason to be skeptical. Apple created these markets with new products about which people had few, if any conceptions. But today customers have strong viewpoints on both what a smartphone and tablet should be like to use – and what they expect from Microsoft. And these two viewpoints are almost diametrically opposed.
Since the initial product viewing, almost all professional reviewers have said the Surface is neat, but not fantastically so. It is different from iOS and Google’s Android products, but not superior. It has generated very little enthusiasm.
Tests by average users have shown the products to be non-intuitive. Especially when told they are Microsoft products. So the Apple-based interface intuition doesn’t come through for easy use, nor does historical Microsoft experience. Average users have been confused, and realize they now must learn a 3rd interface – the iOS or Android they have, the old Microsoft they have, and now this new thing. It might as well be Linux for all its similarity to Microsoft.
For those who were excited about having native office products on a tablet, the products aren’t the same as before – in feel or function. And the question becomes, if you really want the office suite do you really want a tablet or should you be using a laptop? The very issue of trying to use Office on the Surface easily makes people rethink the question, and start to realize that they may have said they wanted this, but it really isn’t the big deal they thought it would be. The tablet and laptop have different uses, and between Surface and Win8 they are seeing learning curve cost maybe isn’t worth it.
The new Win8 – especially on the tablet – does not support a lot of the “professional” applications written on older Windows versions. Those developers now have to redevelop their code for a new platform – and many won’t work on the new tablet processors.
Many have been banking on Microsoft winning the “enterprise” market. Selling to CIOs who want to preserve legacy code by offering a Microsoft solution. But they run into two problems. (1) Users now have to learn this 3rd, new interface. If they have a Galaxy tab or iPad they will have to carry another device, and learn how to use it. Do not expect happy employees, or executives, who expressly desire avoiding both these ideas. (2) Not all those old applications (drivers, code, etc) will port to the new platform so easily. This is not a “drop in” solution. It will take IT time and money – while CEOs keep asking “why aren’t you doing this for my iPad?”
All of this adds up to a new product set that is very late to market, yet doesn’t offer anything really new. By trying to defend and extend its Windows and Office history, Microsoft missed the market shift. It has spent several billion dollars trying to come up with something that will excite people. But instead of offering something new to change the market, it has given people something old in a new package. Microsoft they pretty much missed the market altogether.
Everyone knows that PC sales are going to decline. Unfortunately, this launch may well accelerate that decline. Remember how slowly people were willing to switch to Vista? How slowly they adopted Microsoft 7 and Office 2010? There are still millions of users running XP – and even Office XP (Office Professional 2003.) These new products may convince customers that the time and effort to “upgrade” simply means its time to switch.
Microsoft has fallen into a classic problem the Dean of innovation Clayton Christensen discusses. Microsoft long ago overshot the user need for PCs and office automation tools. But instead of focusing on developing new solutions – like Apple did by introducing greater mobility with its i products – Microsoft has diligently, for a decade, continued to dump money into overshooting the user needs for its basic products. They can’t admit to themselves that very, very, very few people are looking for a new spreadsheet or word processing application update. Or a new operating system for their laptop.
These new Microsoft products will NOT cause people to quit the trend to mobile devices. They will not change the trend of corporate users supplying their own devices for work (there’s now even an IT acronym for this movement [BYOD,] and a Wikipedia page.) It will not find a ready, excited market of people wanting to learn yet another interface, especially to use old applications they thought they already new!
Long-term, there is yet another great battle to be fought. What will be the role of monitors, scattered in homes and bars, and in train stations, lobbies and everywhere else? Who will control the access to monitors which will be used for everything from entertainment (video/music,) to research and gaming. The tablet and smartphones may well die, or mutate dramatically, as the ability to connect via monitors located nearly everywhere using —- xBox?
But, this week all discussion of the new xBox Live and music applications were overshadowed by the CEO’s determination to promote the dying product line around Windows8.
This was simply stupid. Ballmer should be fired.Â
The PC products should be managed for a cash hoarding transition into a smaller market. Investments should be maximized into the new products that support the next market transition. xBox and Kinect should be held up as game changers, and Microsoft should be repositioned as a leader in the family and conference room; an indespensible product line in an ever-more-connected world.
But that didn’t happen this week. And the CEO keeps heading straight for the cliff. Maybe when he takes the truck over the guard rail he’ll finally be replaced. Investors can only wake up and watch – and hope it happens sooner, rather than later.
UPDATE 16 April, 2019 – Android TV is a new emerging tech that could have a big impact on the overall marketplace. Read more about Android TV here.
If you're still an investor in Hewlett Packard you must be new to this blog. But for those who remain optimistic, it is worth reveiwing why Ms. Whitman's forecast for HP yesterday won't happen. There are sound reasons why the company has lost 35% of its value since she took over as CEO, over 75% since just 2010 – and over $90B of value from its peak.
HP was dying before Whitman arrived
I recall my father pointing to a large elm tree when I was a boy and saying "that tree will be dead in under 2 years, we might as well cut it down now." "But it's huge, and has leaves" I said. "It doesn't look dead." "It's not dead yet, but the environmental wind damage has cost it too many branches, the changing creek direction created standing water rotting its roots, and neighboring trees have grown taking away its sunshine. That tree simply won't survive. I know it's more than 3 stories tall, with a giant trunk, and you can't tell it now – but it is already dead."
To teach me the lesson, he decided not to cut the tree. And the following spring it barely leafed out. By fall, it was clearly losing bark, and well into demise. We cut it for firewood.
Carly Fiorina, alone, probably killed HP with the single decision to buy Compaq and gut the HP R&D budget to implement a cost-based, generic strategy for competing in Windows-based PCs. She sucked most of the money out of the wildly profitable printer business to subsidize the transition, and destroy any long-term HP value.
Mark Hurd furthered this disaster by further investing in cost-cutting to promote "scale efficiencies" and price reductions in PCs. Instead of converting software products and data centers into profitable support products for clients shifting to software-as-a-service (SAAS) or cloud services he closed them – to "focus" on the stagnating, profit-eroding PC business.
His ill-conceived notion of buying EDS to compete in traditional IT services long after the market had demonstrated a major shift offshore, and declining margins, created an $8B write-off last year; almost 60% of the purchase price. Giving HP another big, uncompetitive business unit in a lousy market.
His purchase of Palm for $1.2B was a ridiculous price for a business that was once an early leader, but had nothing left to offer customers (sort of like RIM today.) HP used Palm to bring out a Touchpad tablet, but it was so late and lacking apps that the product was recalled from retailers after only 49 days. Another write-off.
Leo Apotheker bought a small Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software company – only more than a decade after monster competitors Oracle, SAP and IBM had encircled the market. Further, customers are now looking past ERP for alternatives to the inflexible "enterprise apps" which hinder their ability to adjust quickly in today's rapidly changing marektplace. The ERP business is sure to shrink, not grow.
Let's see, what will likely happen over the next 3 years from technology advances by industry leaders Apple, Android and others? They aren't standing still, and there's no reason to believe HP will suddenly develop some fantastic mojo to become a new product innovator, leapfrogging them for new markets.
Meg's first action is cost cutting – to "fix" HP. Cutting 29,000 additional jobs won't fix anything. It just eliminates a bunch of potentially good idea generators who would like to grow the company. When Meg says this is sure to reduce the number of products, revenues and profits in 2013 we can believe that projection fully.
Adding features like scanning and copying to printers will make no difference to sales. The proliferation of smart devices increasingly means people don't print. Just like we don't carry newspapers or magazines, we don't want to carry memos or presentations. The world is going digital (duh) and printing demand is not going to grow as we read things on smartphones and tablets instead of paper.
HP is not going to chase the smartphone business. Although it is growing rapidly. Given how late HP is to market, this is probably not a bad idea. But it begs the question of how HP plans to grow.
HP is going not going to exit PCs. Too bad. Maybe Lenovo or Dell would pay up for this dying business. Holding onto it will do HP no good, costing even more money when HP tries to remain competitive as sales fall and margins evaporate due to overcapacity leading to price wars.
HP will launch a Windows8 tablet in January targeted at "enterprises." Given the success of the iPad, Samsung Galaxy and Amazon Kindle products exactly how HP will differentiate for enterprise success is far from clear. And entering the market so late, with an unproven operating system platform is betting the market on Microsoft making it a success. That is far, far from a low-risk bet. We could well see this new tablet about as successful as the ill-fated Touchpad.
Ms. Whitman is betting HP's future (remember, 3 years from now) on "cloud" computing. Oh boy. That is sort of like when WalMart told us their future growth would be "China." She did not describe what HP was going to do differently, or far superior, to unseat companies already providing a raft of successful, growing, profitable cloud services. "Cloud" is not an untapped market, with companies like Oracle, IBM, VMWare, Salesforce.com, NetApp and EMC (not to mention Apple and Amazon) already well entrenched, investing heavily, launching new products and gathering customers.
HPs problems are far deeper than who is CEO
Ms. Whitman said that the biggest problem at HP has been executive turnover. That is not quite right. The problem is HP has had a string of really TERRIBLE CEOs that have moved the company in the wrong direction, invested horribly in outdated strategies, ignored market shifts and assumed that size alone would keep HP successful. In a bygone era all of them – from Carly Fiorina to Mark Hurd to Leo Apotheker – would have been flogged in the Palo Alto public center then placed in stocks so employees (former and current) could hurl fruit and vegetables, or shout obscenities, at them!
Unfortately, Ms. Whitman is sure to join this ignominious list. Her hockey stick projection will not occur; cannot given her strategy.
HP's only hope is to sell the PC business, radically de-invest in printers and move rapidly into entirely new markets. Like Steve Jobs did a dozen years ago when he cut Mac spending to invest in mobile technologies and transform Apple. Meg's faith in operational improvement, commitment to existing "enterprise" markets and Microsoft technology assures HP, and its investors, a decidedly unpleasant future.
We care a lot about Apple, largely because the company has made us all so productive. Instead of chained to PCs with their weight and processor-centric architecture (not to mention problems crashing and corrupting files) while simultaneously carrying limited function cell phones, we all now feel easily interconnected 24×7 from lightweight, always-on smart devices. We feel more productive as we access our work colleagues, work tools, social media or favorite internet sites with ease. We are entertained by music, videos and games at our leisure. And we enjoy the benefits of rapid problem solving – everything from navigation to time management and enterprise demands – with easy to use apps utilizing cloud-based data.
In short, what was a tired, nearly bankrupt Macintosh company has become the leading marketer of innovation that makes our lives remarkably better. So we care – a lot – about the products Apple offers, how it sells them and how much they cost. We want to know how we can apply them to solve even more problems for ourselves, colleagues, customers and suppliers.
Amidst all this hoopla, as you figure out how fast you can buy an iPhone 5 and what to do with your older phone, you very likely forgot that Kraft will be splitting itself into 2 parts in about 2 weeks (October 1). And, most likely, you don't really care.
And you can't imagine why I would even compare Kraft with Apple.
Kraft was once an innovation leader. Velveeta, a much maligned product today, gave Americans a fast, easy solution to cheese sauces that were difficult to make. Instant Mac & Cheese was a meal-in-a-box for people on the run, and at a low budget. Cheeze Whiz offered a ready-to-eat spread for canape's. Individually wrapped American cheese slices solved the problem of sticky product for homemakers putting together lunch sandwiches for school children. Miracle Whip added spice to boring sandwiches. Philadelphia brand cream cheese was a tasty, less fattening alternative to butter while also a great product for sauces.
But, the world changed and these innovations have grown a lot less interesting. Frozen food replaced homemade sauces and boxed solutions. Simultaneously, cooking skills improved. Better options for appetizers emerged than stuffed celery or something on a cracker. School lunches changed, and sandwich alternatives flourished. Across Kraft's product lines, demand changed as new technologies were developed that better fit customers' needs leading to revenue stagnation, margin erosion and an increasing irrelevancy of Kraft in the marketplace – despite its enormous size.
Apple turned itself around by focusing on innovation, becoming the most valuable American publicly traded company. Kraft eschewed innovation for cost cutting, doing more of the same trying to defend its "core," leaving investors with virtually no returns. Meanwhile thousands of Kraft employees have lost their jobs, even though revenues per employee at Kraft are 1/6th those at Apple. And supplier margins are a never-ending cycle of forced reductions as Kraft tries to capture their margin for itself.
Apple's value went up because it's revenues went up. In 2007 Apple had #24B in revenues, while Kraft was 150% bigger at $37B. Ending 2011 Apple's revenues, all from organic growth, were up 4x (400%) at $108B. But Kraft's 2011 revenues were only $54B, including roughly $10B of purchased revenues from its Cadbury acquisition, meaning comparative Kraft revenues were $44B; a growth of (ho-hum) 3.5%/year.
Lacking innovation Kraft could not grow the topline, and simply could not grow its value. And paying a premium price for someone else's revenues has led to…. splitting the company in 2 in only 2 years, mystifying everyone as to what sort of strategy the company ever had to grow!
Apple spends nearly nothing on advertising. But it does spend on innovation. Innovation adds value. Advertising aging products that solve no new needs does not.
Companies that innovate change markets and reap the rewards. By delivering on trends they excite customers who flock to their solutions. Companies that focus on defending and extending their past, especially in times of market shifts, end up failing. Failure may not happen overnight, but it is inevitable.
This happens one day after the Board of Directors fired the CEO at Supervalu, parent company of such large grocery chains as Albertson's, Jewel-Osco, ACME, Shaw's and Star Markets. Apparently this pleased most everyone, since the company has lost 85% of its equity value since he was brought in from Wal-Mart while simultaneously killing bonuses and even free employee coffee. Even though just last week he was paid a retention bonus by the same Board to remain in his job!
And even thought the Chairman at Wal-Mart was clearly in the thick of bribing Mexican officials to open stores south of the border, there is no sign of any changes expected in Wal-Mart's leadership team.
What is sparking such bizarre behavior in retail? Quite simply, industry leadership that is so stuck in the past it has no idea how to grow or make money in a dramatically changed marketplace. They keep trying to do more of the same, while growth goes elsewhere.
Everyone, and I mean everyone, outside of retail knows that the game has changed – permanently. Since 2000 on-line sales of everything, and I mean everything, has increased. Sure, there were some collosal flops in early on-line retail (remember Pets.com?) But every year sales of products on-line increase at double digit rates. It's rare to walk through a store – and I mean any store – and not see at least one customer comparison shopping the product on the shelf with an on-line vendor.
What 15 years ago was a niche seller of non-stock books, Amazon.com, has become the industry vanguard selling everything from apple juice to zombie memorabilia. Even though most industry analysts don't clump it as a direct competitor to Best Buy, Sears, and Wal-Mart – holding it aside in its own "internet retail" category – everyone knows Amazon is growing and changing shopping habits, and reducing demand in traditional stores.
The signs of this shift are everywhere. From the complete collapse of Circuit City and Sharper Image to the flat sales, reduced number of U.S. outlets and falling per-store numbers at Wal-Mart.
Across America drivers are accustomed to seeing retail outlets boarded up, and strip malls full of empty window space. You don't have to be a fancy analyst to notice how many malls would be knocked down entirely if they weren't being converted to low-cost office space for lawyers, tax preparers, dentists, veterinarians and emergency clinics – demonstrably non-retail businesses. Or to recognize an old Sears or superstore location converted into an evangelical nondenominational church.
It is not impossible to make money in retail. But you can't do it the way it was done in the past. The answer isn't as simple as "location, location, location;" or even inventory. As the new, and struggling, CEO at JC Penney has learned the hard way, it's not about "every day low price." Or even low price at all, as the former WalMart exec just fired at Supervalu learned – along with all their employees.
Today traditional retail store success requires you have unique products, unique merchandising, sales assistance that meets immediacy needs, strong trend connectivity and effective pricing. Just look at IKEA, Lululemon, Sephora, Whole Foods, Trader Joe's and PetSmart – for example.
Of course there will be grocery stores. Traditional retail will not disappear. But that doesn't mean it will be profitable. And trying to chase profits by constantly beating down costs gets you – well – Circuit City, Toys R Us, Drug Emporium, Pay N Save, Crazy Eddie, Egghead Software, Bradlee's, Korvette's, TG&Y, Wickes, Skagg's, Payless Cashways, Musicland — and Supervalu. There is more to business than price, something the vast, vast majority of retailers keep forgetting.
Fifty years ago if you wanted a TV you went to a television store where they not only sold you a TV, they repaired it! You selected from tube-based machines made by Zenith, RCA, Philco and Magnavox. The TV shop owner made some money on the TV, but he also made money on the service. And if you wanted a washer or refrigerator you went to an "appliance store" for the same reason. But the world changed, and the need for those stores disappeared. Almost none changed to what people wanted – they simply failed.
Now the world has changed again. The customer value proposition in retail is shifting from location and inventory to information. And it is extremely hard to have salespeople – or shelf tags – with comparable information to a web page, which have not only product and price info but competitive comparisons on everything. There simply isn't enough profit in a TV, stereo, PC, CD or DVD to cover the overhead of salespeople, check-out clerks, on-hand inventory and the building.
And that's why Best Buy had to shutter 50 stores in March. On its way to the same ending as Polk Brothers, Grant's Appliance and Circuit City.
Don't expect a 70 year old retailer to understand what retail markets will look like in 2020. Or anyone trained in traditional retail at Wal-Mart. Or anyone who thinks they can save a traditional "retail brand" like Sears. The world has already shifted – and those are stories from last decade (or long before.)
If you are interested in retail go where the growth is – and that is all about on-line leadership. Sell Best Buy and put your money in Amazon. You'll sleep better.
We've become so used to reading about reorganizations, layoffs and cost cutting that most people just accept such leadership decisions as "best practice." No matter the company, or industry, it has become conventional wisdom to believe cost cutting is a good thing.
As a reporter recently asked me regarding about layoffs at Yahoo, "Isn't it always smart to cut heads when your profits fall?" Of course not. Have the layoffs at Yahoo in any way made it a better, more successful company able to compete with Google, Microsoft, Facebook and Apple? Given the radical need for innovation, layoffs have only hurt Yahoo more – and made it more likely to end up like RIM (Research in Motion.)
But like believing in a flat world, blood letting to cure disease and that meteorites are spit up out of the ground – this is just another conventional wisdom that is untrue; and desperately needs to be challenged. Cost reductions are killing most companies, not helping them.
Take for example Sara Lee. Sara Lee was once a great, growing company. Its consumer brands were well known, considered premium products and commanded a price premium at retail.
The death spiral at Sara Lee began in 2006. "Professional managers" from top-ranked MBA schools started "improving earnings" with an ongoing program of reorganizations and cost reductions. Largely under the leadership of the much-vaunted Brenda Barnes, none of these cost reductions improved revenues. And the stock price went nowhere.
With each passing year Sara Lee sold parts of the business, such as Hanes, under the disguise of "seeking focus." With each sale a one-time gain was booked, and more people were laid off as the reorganizations continued. Profits remained OK, but the company was actually shrinking – rather than growing.
To prop up the stock price all avaiable cash was used to buy back stock, which helped maximize executive compensation but really did nothing for investors. R&D was eliminated, as was new product development and any new product launches. Instead Sara Lee kept selling more businesses, reorganizing, cutting costs — and buying its own shares. Until finally, after Ms. Barnes left due to an unfortunate stroke, Sara Lee was so small it had nothing left to sell.
So the company decided to split into two parts! Magically, it's like pushing the reset button. What was Sara Lee is now an even smaller Hillshire Brands. All that poor track record of sales, profits and equity value goes POOF as the symbol SLE disappears, and investors are left following HSH – which has only traded for about 2 days! No more looking at that long history of bad performance, it isn't on Bloomberg or Marketwatch or Yahoo. Like the name Sara Lee, the history vanishes.
Well, "if you can't dazzle 'em with brilliance you baffle 'em with bull**it" W.C. Fields once said.
Cost cuts don't work because they don't compound. If I lay off the head of Brand Marketing this year I promise to save $300,000 and improve the Profit & Loss Statement (P&L) by that amount. So a one time improvement. Now – ignoring the fact that the head of branding probably did a number of things to grow revenue – the problem becomes, what do you do the next year? You can't lay off the Brand V.P. again to save that $300,000 twice. Further, if you want to improve the P&L by $450,000 this time you actually have to find 2 Directors to lay off!
Shooting your own troops in order to manage a smaller army rarely wins battles.
Cost cuts are one-time, and are impossible to duplicate. Following this route leads any company toward being much smaller. Like Sara Lee. From a once great company with revenues in the $10s of billions, the new Hillshire Brands isn't even an S&P 500 company (it was replaced by Monster Beverage.) And how can any investor obtain a great return on investment from a company that's shrinking?
What does create a great company? Growth! Unlike cost cutting, if a company launches a new product it can sell $300,000 the first year. If it meets unmet needs, and is a more effective solution, then the product can attract new customers and sell $600,000 the second year. And then $900,000 or maybe $1.2M the third year. (And even add jobs!)
If you are very good at creating and launching products that meet needs, you can create billions of dollars in new revenue. Like Apple with the iPhone and iPad. Or Facebook. Or Groupon. These companies are growing revenues extremely fast because they have products that meet needs. They aren't trying to "save the P&L."
And revenue growth creates "compound returns." Unlike the cost savings which are one time, each dollar of revenue produces cash flow which can be invested in more sales and delivery which can generate even more cash flow. So if growth is 20% and you invest $1,000 in year one, that can become $1,200 in year two, then $1,440 in year three, $1,728 in year four and $2,070 in year five. Each year you receive 20% not only on the $1,000 you invested, but on returns from the previous years!
By compounding year after year, at20% investor money doubles in 5 years. That's why the most important term for investing is CAGR – Compound Annual Growth Rate. Even a small improvement in this number, from say 9% to 11%, has very important meaning. Because it "compounds" year after year. You don't have to add to your investment – merely allowing it to support growth produces very, very handsome returns. The higher the CAGR the better.
Something no cost cutting program can possibly due. Ever.
So, what is the future of Hillshire Brands? According to the CEO, interviewed Sunday for the Chicago Tribune, the company's historically poor performance could be blamed on —– wait —– insufficient focus. Alas, Sara Lee's problem was obviously too much sales! Well, good thing they've been solving that problem.
Of course, having too many brands led to too much lateral thinking and not enough really deep focus on meat. So now that all they need to think about is meat, he expects innovation will be much improved. Right. Now that HSH is a "meat focused meals" company, and the objective is to add innovation to meat, they are considering such radical dietary improvements for our fat-laden, overcaloried American society as adding curry powder to the frozen meatloaf.
Not exactly the iPhone.
To create future growth the first act the new CEO took to push growth was —- wait —– cutting staff by $100million over the next 3 years. Really. He will solve the "analysis paralysis" which seems to concern him as head of this much smaller company because there won't be anyone around to do the analysis, nor to discuss it and certainly not to disagree with the CEO's decisions. Perhaps meat loaf egg rolls will be next.
All reorganizations and cost reductions point to leadership's failure to create growth. Every time. Staff reductions say to investors, employees, suppliers and customers "I have no idea how to add profitable revenue to this company. I really have no clue how to put these people to work productively – even if they are really good people. I have no choice but to cut these jobs, because we desperately need to make the profits look better in order to prop up the stock price short term; even if it kills our chances of developing new products, creating new markets and making superior rates of return for investors long term."
Hillshire's CEO may do very well for himself, and his fellow executives. Assuredly they have compensation plans tied to stock price, and golden parachutes if they leave. HSH is now so small that it is a likely purchase by a more successful company. By further gutting the organization Hillshire's CEO can reduce staff to a minimum, making the acquisition appear easier for a large company. This would allow a premium payment upon acquisition, providing millions to the executives as options pay out and golden parachutes enact.
And it might give a return to the shareholders. If the ongoing slaughter finds a buyer. Otherwise investors will see the stock crater as it heads to bankruptcy. Like RIM and Yahoo. So flip a coin. But that's called gambling, not investing.
What investors need is CAGR. Not cost cutting and reorganizations. And as I've said since 2006 – you don't want to own Sara Lee; even if it's now called Hillshire Brands.
Game changers meet newly emerging, unmet needs, in new ways. People are usually happy enough, until they see the new product/solution and realize "hey, this helps me do something I couldn't do before" or "this helps me solve my problem a lot better." Game changers aren't a simple improvement, they allow customers to do something radically different. And although at first they may well appear to not work too well, or appear too expensive, they meet needs so uniquely, and better, that they cause people to change their behavior.
Motorola invented the smart phone. But Motorola thought it was too expensive to be a cell phone, and not powerful enough to be a PC. Believing it didn't fit existing markets well, Motorola shelved the product.
Apple realized people wanted to be mobile. Cell phones did talk and text OK – and RIM had pretty good email. But it was limited use. Laptops had great use, but were too big, heavy and cumbersome to be really mobile. So Apple figured out how to add apps to the phone, and use cloud services support, in order to make the smart phone fill some pretty useful needs – like navigation, being a flashlight, picking up tweets – and a few hundred thousand other things – like doctors checking x-rays or MRI results. Not as good as a PC, and somewhat on the expensive side for the device and the AT&T connection, but a whole lot more convenient. And that was a game changer.
The problem with trying to extend old products into new markets is it rarely works. Take for example Windows 7. It was designed to replace Windows Vista, which was quite unpopular as an upgrade from Windows XP. By most accounts, Windows 7 is a lot better. But, it didn't offer users anything that that made them excited to buy Windows 7. It didn't solve any unmet needs, or offer any radically better solutions. It was just Windows better and faster (some just said "fixed.")
Nothing wrong with that, except Windows 7 did not address the most critical issue in the personal technology marketplace. Windows 7 did not stop the transition from using PCs to using mobile devices. As a result, while sales of app-enabled smartphones and tablets exploded, sales of PCs stalled:
People are moving to the mobility provided by apps, cloud services and the really easy to use interface on modern mobile devices. Market leading cell phone maker, Nokia, decided it needed to enter smartphones, and did so by wholesale committing to Windows7. But now the CEO, Mr. Elop (formerly a Microsoft executive,) is admitting Windows phones simply don't sell well. Nobody cares about Microsoft, or Windows, now that the game has changed to mobility – and Windows 7 simply doesn't offer the solutions that Apple and Android does. Not even Nokia's massive brand image, distribution or ad spending can help when a product is late, and doesn't greatly exceed the market leader's performance. Just last week Nokia announced it was laying off another 10,000 employees.
Reviews of Win8 have been mixed. And that should not be surprising. Microsoft has made the mistake of trying to make Win8 something nobody really wants. On the one hand it has a new interface called Metro that is supposed to be more iOS/Android "like" by using tiles, touch screen, etc. But it's not a breakthrough, just an effort to be like the existing competition. Maybe a little better, but everyone believes the leaders will be better still with new updates soon. By definition, that is not game changing.
Simultaneously, with Win8 users can find their way into a more historical Windows inteface. But this is not obvious, or intuitive. And it has some pretty "clunky" features for those who like Windows. So it's not a "great" Windows solution that would attract developers today focused on other platforms.
Win8 tries to be the old, and the new, without being great at either, and without offering anything that solves new problems, or creates breakthroughs in simplicity or performance.
By focusing on playing catch up, and trying to defend & extend the Windows history, Microsoft missed what was most important about mobility – and that is the thousands of apps. The product line is years late to market, short on apps, short on app developers and short on giving anyone a reason to really create apps for Win8.
Some think it is good if Microsoft makes its own tablet – like it has done with xBox. But that really doesn't matter. What matters is whether Microsoft gives users and developers something that causes them to really, really want a new platform that is late and doesn't have the app base, or the app store, or the interfaces to social media or all the other great thinks they already have come to expect and like about their tablet (or smartphone.)
When iOS came out it was new, unique and had people flocking to buy it. Developers could only be mobile by joining with Apple, and users could only be mobile by buying Apple. That made it a game changer by leading the trend toward mobility.
Google soon joined the competition, built a very large, respectable following by chasing Apple and offering manufacturers an option for competing with Apple.
But Microsoft's new entry gives nobody a reason to develop for, or buy, a Win8 tablet – regardless of who manufactures it. Microsoft does not deliver a huge, untapped market. Microsoft doesn't solve some large, unmet need. Microsoft doesn't promise to change the game to some new, major trend that would drive early adopters to change platforms and bring along the rest of the market.
Microsoft is playing catch up. Catch up with the user interface. Catch up with the format. Catch up with the device size and portability. Catch up with the usability (apps). Just catch up.
Microsoft's problem is that it did not accept the PC market was going to stall back in 2008 or 2009. When it should have seen that mobility was a game changing trend, and required retooling the Microsoft solution suite. Microsoft dabbled with music mobility with Zune, but quickly dropped the effort as it refocused on its "core" Windows. Microsoft dabbled with mobile phones across different solutions including Kin – which it dropped along with Microsoft Mobility. Back again to focusing on operating systems. By maintaining its focus on Windows Microsoft hoped it could stop the trend, and refused to accept the market shift that was destined to stall its sales.
Microsoft stock has been flat for a decade. It's recent value improvement as Win8 approaches launch indicates that hope beats eternally in some investors' breasts for a return of Microsoft software dominance. But those days are long past. PC sales have stalled, and Windows is a product headed toward obsolescence as competitors make ever better, more powerful mobile platforms and ecosystems. If you haven't sold Microsoft yet, this may well be your last chance above $30. Ever.
