by Adam Hartung | Oct 4, 2012 | Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lifecycle, Web/Tech
If you're still an investor in Hewlett Packard you must be new to this blog. But for those who remain optimistic, it is worth reveiwing why Ms. Whitman's forecast for HP yesterday won't happen. There are sound reasons why the company has lost 35% of its value since she took over as CEO, over 75% since just 2010 – and over $90B of value from its peak.
HP was dying before Whitman arrived
I recall my father pointing to a large elm tree when I was a boy and saying "that tree will be dead in under 2 years, we might as well cut it down now." "But it's huge, and has leaves" I said. "It doesn't look dead." "It's not dead yet, but the environmental wind damage has cost it too many branches, the changing creek direction created standing water rotting its roots, and neighboring trees have grown taking away its sunshine. That tree simply won't survive. I know it's more than 3 stories tall, with a giant trunk, and you can't tell it now – but it is already dead."
To teach me the lesson, he decided not to cut the tree. And the following spring it barely leafed out. By fall, it was clearly losing bark, and well into demise. We cut it for firewood.
Such is the situation at HP. Before she became CEO (but while she was a Director – so she doesn't escape culpability for the situation) previous leaders made bad decisions that pushed HP in the wrong direction:
- Carly Fiorina, alone, probably killed HP with the single decision to buy Compaq and gut the HP R&D budget to implement a cost-based, generic strategy for competing in Windows-based PCs. She sucked most of the money out of the wildly profitable printer business to subsidize the transition, and destroy any long-term HP value.
- Mark Hurd furthered this disaster by further investing in cost-cutting to promote "scale efficiencies" and price reductions in PCs. Instead of converting software products and data centers into profitable support products for clients shifting to software-as-a-service (SAAS) or cloud services he closed them – to "focus" on the stagnating, profit-eroding PC business.
- His ill-conceived notion of buying EDS to compete in traditional IT services long after the market had demonstrated a major shift offshore, and declining margins, created an $8B write-off last year; almost 60% of the purchase price. Giving HP another big, uncompetitive business unit in a lousy market.
- His purchase of Palm for $1.2B was a ridiculous price for a business that was once an early leader, but had nothing left to offer customers (sort of like RIM today.) HP used Palm to bring out a Touchpad tablet, but it was so late and lacking apps that the product was recalled from retailers after only 49 days. Another write-off.
- Leo Apotheker bought a small Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software company – only more than a decade after monster competitors Oracle, SAP and IBM had encircled the market. Further, customers are now looking past ERP for alternatives to the inflexible "enterprise apps" which hinder their ability to adjust quickly in today's rapidly changing marektplace. The ERP business is sure to shrink, not grow.
Whitman's "Turnaround Plan" simply won't work
Meg is projecting a classic "hockey stick" performance. She plans for revenues and profits to decline for another year or two, then magically start growing again in 3 years. There's a reason "hockey stick" projections don't happen. They imply the company is going to get a lot better, and competitors won't. And that's not how the world works.
Let's see, what will likely happen over the next 3 years from technology advances by industry leaders Apple, Android and others? They aren't standing still, and there's no reason to believe HP will suddenly develop some fantastic mojo to become a new product innovator, leapfrogging them for new markets.
- Meg's first action is cost cutting – to "fix" HP. Cutting 29,000 additional jobs won't fix anything. It just eliminates a bunch of potentially good idea generators who would like to grow the company. When Meg says this is sure to reduce the number of products, revenues and profits in 2013 we can believe that projection fully.
- Adding features like scanning and copying to printers will make no difference to sales. The proliferation of smart devices increasingly means people don't print. Just like we don't carry newspapers or magazines, we don't want to carry memos or presentations. The world is going digital (duh) and printing demand is not going to grow as we read things on smartphones and tablets instead of paper.
- HP is not going to chase the smartphone business. Although it is growing rapidly. Given how late HP is to market, this is probably not a bad idea. But it begs the question of how HP plans to grow.
- HP is going not going to exit PCs. Too bad. Maybe Lenovo or Dell would pay up for this dying business. Holding onto it will do HP no good, costing even more money when HP tries to remain competitive as sales fall and margins evaporate due to overcapacity leading to price wars.
- HP will launch a Windows8 tablet in January targeted at "enterprises." Given the success of the iPad, Samsung Galaxy and Amazon Kindle products exactly how HP will differentiate for enterprise success is far from clear. And entering the market so late, with an unproven operating system platform is betting the market on Microsoft making it a success. That is far, far from a low-risk bet. We could well see this new tablet about as successful as the ill-fated Touchpad.
- Ms. Whitman is betting HP's future (remember, 3 years from now) on "cloud" computing. Oh boy. That is sort of like when WalMart told us their future growth would be "China." She did not describe what HP was going to do differently, or far superior, to unseat companies already providing a raft of successful, growing, profitable cloud services. "Cloud" is not an untapped market, with companies like Oracle, IBM, VMWare, Salesforce.com, NetApp and EMC (not to mention Apple and Amazon) already well entrenched, investing heavily, launching new products and gathering customers.
HPs problems are far deeper than who is CEO
Ms. Whitman said that the biggest problem at HP has been executive turnover. That is not quite right. The problem is HP has had a string of really TERRIBLE CEOs that have moved the company in the wrong direction, invested horribly in outdated strategies, ignored market shifts and assumed that size alone would keep HP successful. In a bygone era all of them – from Carly Fiorina to Mark Hurd to Leo Apotheker – would have been flogged in the Palo Alto public center then placed in stocks so employees (former and current) could hurl fruit and vegetables, or shout obscenities, at them!
Unfortately, Ms. Whitman is sure to join this ignominious list. Her hockey stick projection will not occur; cannot given her strategy.
HP's only hope is to sell the PC business, radically de-invest in printers and move rapidly into entirely new markets. Like Steve Jobs did a dozen years ago when he cut Mac spending to invest in mobile technologies and transform Apple. Meg's faith in operational improvement, commitment to existing "enterprise" markets and Microsoft technology assures HP, and its investors, a decidedly unpleasant future.
by Adam Hartung | May 25, 2012 | Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Web/Tech
Things are bad at HP these days. CEO and Board changes have confused the management team and investors alike. Despite a heritage based on innovation, the company is now mired in low-growth PC markets with little differentiation. Investors have dumped the stock, dropping company value some 60% over two years, from $52/share to $22 – a loss of about $60billion.
Reacting to the lousy revenue growth prospects as customers shift from PCs to tablets and smartphones, CEO Meg Whitman announced plans to eliminate 27,000 jobs; about 8% of the workforce. This is supposedly the first step in a turnaround of the company that has flailed ever since buying Compaq and changing the company course into head-to-head PC competition a decade ago. But, will it work?
Not a chance.
Fixing HP requires understanding what went wrong at HP. Simply, Carly Fiorina took a company long on innovation and new product development and turned it into the most industrial-era sort of company. Rather than having HP pursue new technologies and products in the development of new markets, like the company had done since its founding creating the market for electronic testing equipment, she plunged HP into a generic manufacturing war.
Pursuing the PC business Ms. Fiorina gave up R&D in favor of adopting the R&D of Microsoft, Intel and others while spending management resources, and money, on cost management. PCs offered no differentiation, and HP was plunged into a gladiator war with Dell, Lenovo and others to make ever cheaper, undifferentiated machines. The strategy was entirely based upon obtaining volume to make money, at a time when anyone could buy manufacturing scale with a phone call to a plethora of Asian suppliers.
Quickly the Board realized this was a cutthroat business primarily requiring supply chain skills, so they dumped Ms. Fiorina in favor of Mr. Hurd. He was relentless in his ability to apply industrial-era tactics at HP, drastically cutting R&D, new product development, marketing and sales as well as fixating on matching the supply chain savings of companies like Dell in manufacturing, and WalMart in retail distribution.
Unfortunately, this strategy was out of date before Ms. Fiorina ever set it in motion. And all Mr. Hurd accomplished was short-term cuts that shored up immediate earnings while sacrificing any opportunities for creating long-term profitable new market development. By the time he was forced out HP had no growth direction. It's PC business fortunes are controlled by its suppliers, and the PC-based printer business is dying. Both primary markets are the victim of a major market shift away from PC use toward mobile devices, where HP has nothing.
HPs commitment to an outdated industrial era supply-side manufacturing strategy can be seen in its acquisitions. What was once the world's leading IT services company, EDS, was bought in 2008 after falling into financial disarray as that market shifted offshore. After HP spent nearly $14B on the purchase, HP used that business to try defending and extending PC product sales, but to little avail. The services group has been downsized regularly as growth evaporated in the face of global trends toward services offshoring and mobile use.
In 2009 HP spent almost $3B on networking gear manufacturer 3Com. But this was after the market had already started shifting to mobile devices and common carriers, leaving a very tough business that even market-leading Cisco has struggled to maintain. Growth again stagnated, and profits evaporated as HP was unable to bring any innovation to the solution set and unable to create any new markets.
In 2010 HP spent $1B on the company that created the hand-held PDA (personal digital assistant) market – the forerunner of our wirelessly connected smartphones – Palm. But that became an enormous fiasco as its WebOS products were late to market, didn't work well and were wholly uncompetitive with superior solutions from Apple and Android suppliers. Again, the industrial-era strategy left HP short on innovation, long on supply chain, and resulted in big write-offs.
Clearly what HP needs is a new strategy. One aligned with the information era in which we live. Think like Apple, which instead of chasing Macs a decade ago shifted into new markets. By creating new products that enhanced mobility Apple came back from the brink of complete failure to spectacular highs. HP needs to learn from this, and pursue an entirely new direction.
But, Meg Whitman is certainly no Steve Jobs. Her career at eBay was far from that of an innovator. eBay rode the growth of internet retailing, but was not Amazon. Rather, instead of focusing on buyers, and what they want, eBay focused on sellers – a classic industrial-era approach. eBay has not been a leader in launching any new technologies (such as Kindle or Fire at Amazon) and has not even been a leader in mobile applications or mobile retail.
While CEO at eBay Ms. Whitman purchased PayPal. But rather than build that platform into the next generation transaction system for web or mobile use, Paypal was used to defend and extend the eBay seller platform. Even though PayPal was the first leader in on-line payments, the market is now crowded with solutions like Google Wallets (Google,) Square (from a Twitter co-founder,) GoPayment (Intuit) and Isis (collection of mobile companies.)
Had Ms. Whitman applied an information-era strategy Paypal could have been a global platform changing the way payment processing is handled. Instead its use and growth has been limited to supporting an historical on-line retail platform. This does not bode well for the future of HP.
HP cannot save its way to prosperity. That never works. Try to think of one turnaround where it did – GM? Tribune Corp? Circuit City? Sears? Best Buy? Kodak? To successfully turn around HP must move – FAST – to innovate new solutions and enter new markets. It must change its strategy to behave a lot more like the company that created the oscilliscope and usher in the electronics age, and a lot less like the industrial-era company it has become – destroying shareholder value along the way.
Is HP so cheap that it's a safe bet. Not hardly. HP is on the same road as DEC, Wang, Lanier, Gateway Computers, Sun Microsystems and Silicon Graphics right now. And that's lousy for investors and employees alike.
by Adam Hartung | Aug 24, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
“You’ve got to be kidding me” was the line tennis great John McEnroe made famous. He would yell it at officials when he thought they made a bad decision. I can’t think of a better line to yell at Leo Apotheker after last week’s announcements to shut down the tablet/WebOS business, spin-off (or sell) the PC business and buy Autonomy for $10.2B. Really. You’ve got to be kidding me.
HP has suffered mightily from a string of 3 really lousy CEOs. And, in a real way, they all have the same failing. They were wedded to their history and old-fashioned business notions, drove the company looking in the rear view mirror and were unable to direct HP along major trends toward future markets where the company could profitably grow!
Being fair, Mr. Apotheker inherited a bad situation at HP. His predecessors did a pretty good job of screwing up the company before he arrived. He’s just managing to follow the new HP tradition, and make the company worse.
HP was once an excellent market sensing company that invested in R&D and new product development, creating highly profitable market leading products. HP was one of the first “Silicon Valley” companies, creating enormous shareholder value by making and selling equipment (oscilliscopes for example) for the soon-to-explode computer industry. It was a leader in patent applications, new product launches and being first with products that engineers needed, and wanted.
Then Carly Fiorina decided the smart move in 2001 was to buy Compaq for $25B. Compaq was getting creamed by Dell, so Carly hoped to merge it with HP’s retail PC business and let “scale” create profits. Only, the PC business had long been a commodity industry with competitors competing on cost, and the profits largely going to Intel and Microsoft! The “synergistic” profits didn’t happen, and Carly got fired.
But she paved the way for HPs downfall. She was the first to cut R&D and new product development in favor of seeking market share in largely undifferentiated products. Why file 3,500 patents a year – especially when you were largely becoming a piece-assembly company of other people’s technology? To get the cash for acquisitions, supply chain investments and retail discounts Carly started a whole new tradition of doing less innovation, and spending a lot being a copy-cat.
But in an information economy, where almost all competitors have market access and can achieve highly efficient supply chains at low cost, there was no profit to the volume Carly sought. HP became HPQ – but the price paid was an internal shift away from investing in new markets and innovation, and heading straight toward commoditization and volume! The most valuable liquid in all creation – HP ink – was able to fund a lot of the company’s efforts, but it was rapidly becoming the “golden goose” receiving a paltry amount of feed. And itself entirely off the trend as people kept moving away from printed documents!
Mark Hurd replaced Carly, And he was willing to go her one better. If she was willing to reduce R&D and product development – well he was ready to outright slash it! And all the better, so he could buy other worn out companies with limited profits, declining share and management mis-aligned with market trends – like his 2008 $13.9B acquisition of EDS! Once a great services company, offshore outsourcing and rabid price competition had driven EDS nearly to the point of bankruptcy. It had gone through its own cost slashing, and was a break-even company with almost no growth prospects – leading many analysts to pan the acquisition idea. But Mr. Hurd believed in the old success formula of selling services (gee, it worked 20 years before for IBM, could it work again?) and volume. He simply believed that if he kept adding revenue and cutting cost, surely somewhere in there he’d find a pony!
And patent applications just kept falling. By the end of his cost-cutting reign, the once great R&D department at HP was a ghost of its former self. From 9%+ of revenues on new products, expenditures were down to under 2%! And patent applications had fallen by 2/3rds
Chart Source: AllThingsD.com “Is Innovation Dead at HP?“
The patent decline continued under Mr. Apotheker. The latest CEO intent on implementing an outdated, industrial success formula. But wait, he has committed to going even further! Now, HP will completely evacuate the PC business. Seems the easy answer is to say that consumer businesses simply aren’t profitable (MediaPost.com “Low Margin Consumers Do It Again, This Time to HP“) so HP has to shift its business entirely into the B-2-B realm. Wow, that worked so well for Sun Microsystems.
I guess somebody forgot to tell consumer produccts lacked profits to Apple, Amazon and NetFlix.
There’s no doubt Palm was a dumb acquisition by Mr. Hurd (pay attention Google.) Palm was a leader in PDAs (personal digital assistants,) at one time having over 80% market share! Palm was once as prevalent as RIM Blackberries (ahem.) But Palm did not invest sufficiently in the market shifts to smartphones, and even though it had technology and patents the market shifted away from its “core” and left Palm with outdated technology, products and limited market growth. By the time HP bought Palm it had lost its user base, its techology lead and its relevancy. Mr. Hurd’s ideas that somehow the technology had value without market relevance was another out-of-date industrial thought.
The only mistake Mr. Apotheker made regarding Palm was allowing the Touchpad to go to market at all – he wasted a lot of money and the HP brand by not killing it immediately!
It is pretty clear that the PC business is a waning giant. The remaining question is whether HP can find a buyer! As an investor, who would want a huge business that has marginal profits, declining sales, an extraordinarily dim future, expensive and lethargic suppliers and robust competitors rapidly obsoleting the entire technology? Getting out of PCs isn’t escaping the “consumer” business, because the consumer business is shifting to smartphones and tablets. Those who maintain hope for PCs all think it is the B-2-B market that will keep it alive. Getting out is simply because HP finally realized there just isn’t any profit there.
But, is the answer is to beef up the low-profit “services” business, and move into ERP software sales with a third-tier competitor?
I called Apotheker’s selection as CEO bad in this blog on 5 October, 2010 (HP and Nokia’s Bad CEO Selections). Because it was clear his history as CEO of SAP was not the right background to turn around HP. Today ERP (enterprise resource planning) applications like SAP are being seen for the locked-in, monolithic, buraucracy creating, innovation killing systems they really are. Their intent has always been, and remains, to force companies, functions and employees to replicate previous decisions. Not to learn and do anything new. They are designed to create rigidity, and assist cost cutting – and are antithetical to flexibility, market responsiveness and growth.
But following in the new HP tradition, Mr. Apotheker is reshuffling assets – closing the WebOS business, getting rid of all “consumer” businesses, and buying an ERP company! Imagine that! The former head of SAP is buying an SAP application! Regardless of what creates value in highly dynamic, global markets Mr. Apotheker is implementing what he knows how to do – operate an ERP company that sells “business solutions” while leaving everything else. He just can’t wait to get into the gladiator battle of pitting HP against SAP, Oracle, J.D. Edwards and the slew of other ERP competitors! Even if that market is over-supplied by extremely well funded competitors that have massive investments and enormously large installed client bases!
What HP desperately needs is to connect to the evolving marketplace. Quit looking at the past, and give customers solutions that fit where the market is headed. Customers aren’t moving toward where Apotheker is taking the company.
All 3 of HP’s CEOs have been a testament to just how bad things can go when the CEO is more convinced it is important to do what worked in the past, rather than doing what the market needs. When the CEO is locked-in to old thinking, old market dynamics and old solutions – rather than fixated on understanding trends, future scenarios and the solutions people want and need bad things happen.
There are a raft of unmet needs in the marketplace. For a decade HP has ignored them. Its CEOs have spent their time trying to figure out how to make old solutions work better, faster and cheaper. And in the process they have built large, but not very profitable businesses that are now uninteresting at best and largely at the precipice of failure. They have ignored market shifts in favor of doing more of the same. And the value of HP keeps declining – down 50% this year. For HP to change direction, to increase value, it needs a CEO and leadership team that can understand important trends, fulfill unmet needs and migrate customers to new solutions. HP needs to rediscover innovation.
by Adam Hartung | Mar 9, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, eBooks, Food and Drink, In the Swamp, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Openness
Summary:
- McDonald's relies on operational improvements to raise profits, these are short-lived and give no growth
- McDonald's growth cycles, and investors forget long-term it isn't growing much at all
- You can't depend on recurring recessions to make your business look good
- Apple has shown how to create long-term revenue growth, and greater investor wealth, by developing new markets and solutions
- Investors in McDonald's are likely to be less pleased than investors in Apple
Subway is now #1 in size, as "McDonald's Loses World's Biggest Title to Subway" according to Crain's Chicago Business. The transition wasn't hard to predict, since Subway has been much larger in the USA for several years. Now Subway has gained on McDonald's internationally. What's striking about this is that McDonald's could see it coming, and really did nothing about it. While Subway keeps focused on growth, McDonald's has focused on preserving its historical business. And that bodes poorly for long-term investor performance.
For more than a decade McDonald's size has swung back and forth as it opened stores, then closed hundreds in an "operational improvement program," before opening another round of stores – to then repeat the cycle. McDonald's has not shown any US store growth for a long time, and has relied on expanding its traditional business offshore.
Even the menu remains almost unchanged, dominated by burgers, fries and soft drinks. "New" product rollouts have largely been repeats of decades old products, like McRib, which cycle on and off the menu. And the most "strategic" decision we hear about was executives spending countless hours, along with thousands of franchisees, trying to figure out whether or not to reduce the amount of cheese on a cheeseburger (which they did, saving billions of dollars.) Even though it spent almost a decade figuring out how to launch McCafe, the whole idea gets little atttention or promotion. There just isn't much energy put into innovation, or growth at McDonald's. Or even trying to be a leader in new marketing tools like social media, where chains like Papa John's have done much better.
Most people have forgotten that McDonald's acquired and funded the growth of Chipotle's, one of the fastest growing quick food chains. But in 2006 McDonald's leadership sold Chipotle's to raise cash to fund another one of those operational improvement rounds. The business that showed the most promise, that has much more growth opportunity than the tiring McDonald's brand, was sold off in order to Defend and Extend the known, but not so great, McDonald's.
Sort of like selling your patents in order to pay for maintenance and upgrades on the worn out plant tooling.
Soon after Chipotle's sale the "Great Recession" started. And people quit dining out – or went downmarket. Thousands of restaurants closed, and chains like Bennigan's declared bankruptcy. As people started eating a bit more frequently in McDonald's investors cheered. But, this was really more akin to the old phrase "even a stopped clock is right twice a day." McDonald's was the benefactor of an unanticipated economic event. And as the economy has improved McDonald's has cheered its improved oprations and higher profits. But, where is future growth? What will create long-term growth into 2015 and 2020? (To be honest, I'm not sure where this will be for Subway, either.)
This cycle of bust and repair – which will lead to another bust when a competitor or other external event challenges McDonald's unaltered success formula – is very different from what's happened at Apple. Rather than raising money to defend its historical business (the Macintosh business) Apple actually cut back its Mac products to fund development of new businesses – the big winner being iPod and iTunes. Then Apple focused on additional new markets, transforming smart phone growth with the iPhone and altering the direction of computing with the iPad. Rather than trying to Defend its past and Extend into new markets (like McDonald's international efforts) Apple has created, and led, new markets.
Performance at Apple has been much better than McDonald's. As we can see, only during the clock-stopped period at the height of the recession did investors lose faith in Apple's growth, while defaulting to defensiveness at McDonald's.
Chart source: Yahoo Finance
Steve Toback at bNet.com gives us insight into how Apple has driven its growth in "10 Ways to Think Different – Inside Apple's Cult-like Culture." These 10 points look nothing like the McDonald culture – or hardly any company that has growth problems. A quick scan gives insight to how any company can identify, develop and grow with new solutions in new markets:
- Empower employees to make a difference.
- Value what's important, not minutiae
- Love and cherish the innovators
- Do everything important internally
- Get marketing
- Control the message
- Little things make a big difference
- Don't make people do things, make them better at doing things
- When you find something that works, keep doing it
- Think different
What's most worrisome is that the protectionist culture we see at McDonald's, and frankly most U.S. companies, is the kind that led General Motors to years of faultering results and eventual bankruptcy. Recall that GM once bought Hughes Aircraft and EDS as growth devices (around 1980,) and opened the greenfield Saturn division to learn how to compete with offshore auto makers head-on. But the first two were sold, just like McDonald's sold Chipotle, to raise funds for propping up the poorly performing auto business. Saturn was gutted of its uniqueness in cost-saving programs to "align" it with the other auto divisions, and closed in the recent bankruptcy. (Read more detail on The Fall of GM in this short eBook.)
While McDonald's isn't at risk of immediate bankruptcy, investors need to understand that it's value is unlikely to rise much. Operational improvements are not the source of growth. They are short-term tactics to support historical behaviors which trade off short-term profit improvement for long-term new market development. In McDonald's case, this latest round of performance focus matched up with an economic downturn, unexpectedly benefitting McDonald's very quickly. But long-term value comes from creating new business opportunities that meet changing needs. And for that you need to not sell your innovations — instead, invest in them to drive growth.
by Adam Hartung | Dec 17, 2010 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Rapids, In the Swamp, Leadership, Web/Tech
Summary:
- Many people think it is OK for large companies to grow slowly
- Many people admire caretaker CEOs
- In dynamic markets, low-growth companies fail
- It is harder to generate $1B of new revenue, than grow a $100B company by $10B
- Large companies have vastly more resources, but they squander them badly
- We allow large company CEOs too much room for mediocrity and failure
- Good CEOs never lose a growth agenda, and everyone wins!
“I may just be your little rent collector Mr. Potter, but that George Bailey is making quite a bit happen in that new development of his. If he keeps going it may just be time for this smart young man to go asking George Bailey for a job.” From “It’s a Wonderful Life“ an employee of the biggest employer in mythical Beford Falls talks about the growth of a smaller competitor.
My last post gathered a lot of reads, and a lot of feedback. Most of it centered on how GE should not be compared to Facebook, largely because of size differences, and therefore how it was ridiculous to compare Jeff Immelt with Mark Zuckerberg. Many readers felt that I overstated the good qualities of Mr. Zuckerberg, while not giving Mr. Immelt enough credit for his skills managing “lower growth businesses” in a “tough economy.” Many viewed Mr. Immelt’s task as incomparably more difficult than that of managing a high growth, smaller tech company from nothing to several billion revenue in a few years. One frequent claim was that it is enough to maintain revenue in a giant company, growth was less important.
Why do so many people give the CEOs of big companies a break? Given that they make huge salaries and bonuses, have fantastic perquesites (private jets, etc.), phenominal benefits and pensions, and receive remarkable payouts whether they succeed or fail I would think we’d have very high standards for these leaders – and be incensed when their performance is sub-par.
Facebook started with almost no resources (as did Twitter and Groupon). Most leaders of start-ups fail. It is remarkably difficult to marshal resources – both enough of them and productively – to grow a company at double digit rates, produce higher revenue, generate cash flow (or loans) and keep employees happy. Growing to a billion dollars revenue from nothing is inexplicably harder than adding $10B to a $100B company. Compared to Facebook, GE has massive resources. Mr. Immelt entered the millenium with huge cash flow, huge revenues, and an army of very smart employees. Mr. Zuckerberg had to come out of the blocks from a standing start and create ALL his company’s momentum, while comparatively Mr. Immelt took on his job riding a bullet out of a gun! GE had huge momentum, a low cost of capital, and enough resources to do anything it wanted.
Yet somehow we should think that we don’t have as high expectations from Mr. Immelt as we do Mr. Zuckerberg? That would seem, at the least, distorted.
In business school I read the story of how American steel manufacturers were eclipsed by the Japanese. Ending WWII America had almost all the steel capacity. Manufacturers raked in the profits. Japanese and German companies that were destroyed had to rebuild, which they progressively did with more efficient assets. By the 1960s American companies were no longer competitive. Were we to believe that having their industrial capacity destroyed somehow was a good thing for the foreign competitors? That if you want to improve your competitiveness (say in autos) you should drop a nuclear bomb on the facilities (some may like that idea – but not many who live in Detroit I dare say.) In reality the American leaders simply refused to invest in new technologies and growth markets, allowing competitors to end-run them. The American leaders were busy acting as caretakers, and bragging about their success, instead of paying attention to market shifts and keeping their companies successful!
Big companies, like GE, are highly advantaged. They not only have brand, and market position, but cash, assets, employees and vendors in position to help them be even more successful! A smart CEO uses those resources to take the company into growth markets where it can grow revenues, and profits, faster than the marketplace. For example Steve Jobs at Apple, and Eric Schmidt at Google have found new markets, revenues and cash flow beyond their original “core” markets. That’s what Mr. Welch did as predecessor to Mr. Immelt. He didn’t so much take advantage of a growth economy as help create it! Unfortunately, far too many large company CEOs squander their resources on low rate of return projects, trying to defend their existing business rather than push forward.
Most big companies over-invest in known markets, or technologies, that have low growth rates, rather than invest in growth markets, or technologies they don’t know as well. Think about how Motorola invented the smart phone technology, but kept investing in traditional cellular phones. Or Sears, the inventor of “at home shopping” with catalogues closed that division to chase real-estate based retail, allowing Amazon to take industry leadership and market growth. Circuit City ended up investing in its approach to retail until it went bankrupt in 2010 – even though it was a darling of “Good to Great.” Or Microsoft, which launched a tablet and a smart phone, under leader Ballmer re-focused on its “core” operating system and office automation markets letting Apple grab the growth markets with R&D investments 1/8th of Microsoft’s. These management decisions are not something we should accept as “natural.” Leaders of big companies have the ability to maintain, even accelerate, growth. Or not.
Why give leaders in big companies a break just because their historical markets have slower growth? Singer’s leadership realized women weren’t going to sew at home much longer, and converted the company into a defense contractor to maintain growth. Netflix converted from a physical product company (DVDs) into a streaming download company in order to remain vital and grow while Blockbuster filed bankruptcy. Apple transformed from a PC company into a multi-media company to create explosive growth generating enough cash to buy Dell outright – although who wants a distributor of yesterday’s technology (remember Circuit City.) Any company can move forward to be anything it wants to be. Excusing low growth due to industry, or economic, weakness merely gives the incumbent a pass. Good CEOs don’t sit in a foxhole waiting to see if they survive, blaming a tough battleground, they develop strategies to change the battle and win, taking on new ground while the competition is making excuses.
GM was the world’s largest auto company when it went broke. So how did size benefit GM? In the 1980s Roger Smith moved GM into aerospace by acquiring Hughes electronics, and IT services by purchasing EDS – two remarkable growth businesses. He “greenfielded” a new approach to auto manufucturing by opening the wildly successful Saturn division. For his foresight, he was widely chastised. But “caretaker” leadership sold off Hughes and EDS, then forced Saturn to “conform” to GM practices gutting the upstart division of its value. Where one leader recognized the need to advance the company, followers drove GM to bankruptcy by selling out of growth businesses to re-invest in “core” but highly unprofitable traditional auto manufacturing and sales. Meanwhile, as the giant failed, much smaller Kia, Tesla and Tata are reshaping the auto industry in ways most likely to make sure GM’s comeback is short-lived.
CEOs of big companies are paid a lot of money. A LOT of money. Much more than Mr. Zuckerberg at Facebook, or the leaders of Groupon and Netflix (for example). So shouldn’t we expect more from them? (Marketwatch.com “Top CEO Bonuses of 2010“) They control vast piles of cash and other resources, shouldn’t we expect them to be aggressively investing those resources in order to keep their companies growing, rather than blaming tax strategies for their unwillingness to invest? (Wall Street Journal “Obama Pushes CEOs on Job Creation“) It’s precisely because they are so large that we should have high expectations of big companies investing in growth – because they can afford to, and need to!
At the end of the day, everyone wins when CEOs push for growth. Investors obtain higher valuation (Apple is worth more than Microsoft, and almost more than 10x larger Exxon!,) employees receive more pay (see Google’s recent 10% across the board pay raise,) employees have more advancement opportunities as well as personal growth, suppliers have the opportunity to earn profits and bring forward new innovation – creating more jobs and their own growth – rather than constantly cutting price. Answering the Economist in “Why Do Firms Exist?” it is to deliver to people what they want. When companies do that, they grow. When they start looking inward, and try being caretakers of historical assets, products and markets then their value declines.
Can Mr. Zuckerberg run GE? Probably. I’d sure rather have him at the helm of GM, Chrysler, Kraft, Sara Lee, Motorola, AT&T or any of a host of other large companies that are going nowhere the caretaker CEOs currently making excuses for their lousy performance. Think what the world would be like if the aggressive leaders in those smaller companies were in such positions? Why, it might just be like having all of American business run the way Steve Jobs, Jeff Bezos and John Chambers have led their big companies. I struggle to see how that would be a bad thing.
