Will Meg Whitman be more like Steve Jobs, or Carol Bartz?


The media has enjoyed a field day last week amidst the ouster of Leo Apotheker as Hewlett Packard’s CEO and appointments of former Oracle executive Ray Lane as Executive Chairman and former eBay CEO Meg Whitman as CEO.  There have been plenty of jabs at the Board, which apparently hired Mr. Apotheker without everyone even meeting him (New York Times), and plenty of complaining about HP’s deteriorating performance and stock price.  But the big question is, will Meg Whitman be able to turn around HP?

Ms. Whitman is the 7th HP CEO in a mere 12 years.  Of those CEOs, the only one pointed to with any attraction was Mark Hurd.  He did not take any strategic actions, but merely slashed costs – which immediately improved the profit line and drove up the short-term stock price.  Actions taken at the expense of R&D, new product development and creating new markets, leaving HP short on a future strategy when he was summarily let go by the Baord that hired Apotheker. 

And that indicates the strategy problem at HP – which is pretty much a lack of strategy.

HP was once a highly innovative company. We all can thank HP for a world of color.  Before HP brought us the low-priced ink-jet printer all office printing was black.  HP unleashed the color in desktop publishing, and was critical to the growth of office and home printing, as well as faxing with their all-in-one, integrated devices. 

But then someone – largely Ms. Fiorina – had the idea to expand on the HP presence in desktop publishing by expanding into PC manufacturing and sales, even though there was no HP innovation in that market.  Mr. Hurd expanded that direction by buying a service organization to support field-based PCs. 

This approach of expanding on HPs “core” printer business, almost all by acquisition, cost HP a lot of money.  Further, supply chain and retail program investments to sell largely undifferentiated products and services in a hotly contested PC market sucked all the money out of new products development.  Every year HP was spending more to grow sales of products becoming increasingly generic, while falling farther behind in any sort of new market creation.

Into that innovation void jumped Apple, Google and Amazon.  They pushed new mobile solutions to market in smartphones and tablets.  And now PCs, and the printers they used, are seeing declining growth.  All future projections show an increase in mobile devices, and a sales cliff emerging for PCs and their supporting devices.  Simultaneously as mobile devices have become more popular the trend away from printing has grown, with users in business and consumer markets finding digital devices less costly, more user friendly and more adaptable than printed material (just compare Kindle sales and printed book sales – or the volume of tablet newspaper and magazine subscriptions to printed subscriptions.)  HP invested heavily in PC products, and now that market is dying. 

Now HP is in big trouble.  There are plenty of skeptics that think Ms. Whitman is not right for the job. What should HP under Ms. Whitman do next?  Keep doubling down on investments in existing markets?  That direction looks pretty dangerous.  IBM jumped out years ago, selling its laptop line to Lenovo for a tidy profit before sales slackened.  With all the growth in smartphones and tablets, it’s hard to imagine that strategy would work.  Even Mr. Apotheker took action to deal with the market shift by redirecting HP away from PCs with his announced intention to spin off that business while buying an ERP (enterprise ressource planning) software company to take HP into a new direction.  But that backfired on him, and investors.

Mr. Apotheker and Carol Bartz, recently fired CEO of Yahoo, made similar mistakes.  They relied heavily on their personal past when taking leadership of a struggling enterprise. They looked to their personal success formulas – what had worked for them in the past – when setting their plans for their new companies.  Unfortunately, what worked in the past rarely works in the future, because markets shift.  And both of these companies suffered dramatically as the new CEO efforts took them further from market trends. 

The job Ms. Whitman is entering at HP is wildly different from her job at eBay.  eBay was a small company taking advantage of the internet explosion.  It was an early leader in capitalizing on web networking and the capability of low-cost on-line transactions.  At eBay Ms. Whitman needed to keep the company focused on investing in new solutions that transformed PC and internet connectivity into value for users.  As long as the number of users on the internet, and the time they spent on the web, grew eBay could capitalize on that trend for its own growth.  eBay was in the right place at the right time, and Ms. Whitman helped guide the company’s product development so that it helped users enjoy their on-line experience.  The trends supported eBay’s early direction, and growth was built opon making on-line selling better, faster and easier.

The situation could not be more different at HP.  It’s products are almost all out of the trend.  If Ms. Whitman does what she did at eBay, trying to promote more, better and faster PCs, printers and traditional IT services things will not go well.  That was Mr. Hurd’s strategy.  “Been there, done that” as people like to say.  That strategy ran its course, and more cost-cutting will not save HP.

In 2020 if we are to discuss HP the way we now discuss Apple’s dramatic turnaround from the brink of failure, Ms. Whitman will have to behave very differently than her past – and from what her predecessor and Ms. Bartz did.  She has to refocus HP on future markets.  She has to identify triggers for market change – like Steve Jobs did when he recognized that the growing trend to mobility would explode once WiFi services reached 50% of users – and push HP toward developing solutions which take advantage of those market shifts.

HP has under-invested in new market development for years.  It’s acquisition of Palm was supposed to somehow rectify that problem, only Palm was a failing company with a failing platform when HP bought it.  And the HP tablet launch with its own proprietary solution was far too late (years too late) in a market that requires thousands of developers and a hundred thousand apps if it is to succeed.  The investment in Palm and WebOS was too late, and based on trying to be a “me too” in a market where competitors are rapidly advancing new solutions. 

There are a world of market opportunities out there that HP can develop.  To reach them Ms. Whitman must take some quick actions:

  1. Develop future scenarios that define the direction of HP.  Not necessarily a “vision” of HP in 2020, but certainly an identification of the big trends that will guide HP’s future direction for product and market development.  Globalization (like IBM’s “smarter planet”) or mobility are starts – but HP will have to go beyond the obvious to identify opportunities requiring the resources of a company with HP’s revenue and resources.  HP desperately needs a pathway to future markets.  It needs to be developing for the emerging trends.
  2. A recognition of how HP will compete.  What is the market gap that HP will fulfill – like Apple did in mobility?  And how will it fulfill it?  Google and Facebook are emerging giants in software, offering a host of new capabilities every day to better network users and make them more productive.  HP must find a way to compete that is not toe-to-toe with existing leaders like Apple that have more market knowledge and extensive resoureces.
  3. HP needs to dramatically up the ante in new product development.  Innovation has been sorely lacking, and the hierarchical structure at HP needs to be changed.  White Space projects designed to identify opportunities in market trends need to be created that have permission to rapidly develop new solutions and take them to market – regardless of HP historical strengths.  Resources need to shift – rapidly – from supporting the aging, and growth challenged, historical product lines to new opportunities that show greater growth promise.

Apple and IBM were once given almost no chance of survival.  But new leadership recognized that there were growth markets, and those leaders altered the resource allocation toward things that could grow.  Investments in the old strategy were dropped as money was pushed to new solutions that built on market trends and headed toward future scenarios.  HP is not doomed to failure, but Ms. Whitman has to start acting quickly to redirect resources or it could easily be the next Sun Microsystems, Digital Equipment, Wang, Lanier or Cray

Where Bartz Blew It, and What Yahoo! Needs To Do Now


Carol Bartz was unceremoniously fired as CEO by Yahoo’s Board last week.  Fearing their decision might leak, the Chairman called Ms. Bartz and fired her over the phone.  Expeditious, but not too tactful.  Ms. Bartz then informed the company employees of this action via an email from her smartphone – and the next day called the Board of Directors a bunch of doofusses in a media interview.  Salacious fodder for the news media, but a distraction from fixing the real problems affecting Yahoo!

Unfortunately, the Yahoo Board seems to have no idea what to do now.  A small executive committee is running the company – which assures no bold actions.  And a pair of investment banks have been hired to provide advice – which can only lead to recommendations for selling all, or pieces, of the company.  Most people seem to think Yahoo’s value is worth more sold off in chunks than it is as an operating company.  Wow – what went so wrong?  Can Yahoo not be “fixed”?

There was a time, a decade or so back, when Yahoo was the #1 home page for browsers.  Yahoo! was the #1 internet location for reading news, and for doing internet searches.  And, it pioneered the model of selling internet ads to support the content aggregation and search functions.  Yahoo was early in the market, and was a tremendous success.

Like most companies, Yahoo kept doing more of the same as its market shifted.  Alta Vista, Microsoft and others made runs at Yahoo’s business, but it was Google primarily that changed the game on Yahoo!  Google invested heavily in technology to create superior searches, offered a superior user experience for visitors, gave unique content (Google Maps as an example) and created a tremendously superior engine for advertisers to place their ads on searches – or web pages. 

Google was run by technologists who used technology to dramatically improve what Yahoo started – seeing a future which would take advantage of an explosion in users and advertisers as well as web pages and internet use.  Yahoo had been run by advertising folks who missed the technology upgrades.  Yahoo’s leadership was locked-in to what it new (advertising) and they were slow with new solutions and products, falling further behind Google every year.

In an effort to turn the tide, Yahoo hired what they thought was a technologist in Carol Bartz to run the company.  She had previously led AutoCad, which famously ran companies like IBM, Intergraph, DEC (Digital Equipment) and General Electric owned CALMA out of the CAD/CAM (computer aided design and manufacturing) business.  She had been the CEO of a big technology winner – so she looked to many like the salvation for Yahoo!

But Ms. Bartz really wasn’t familiar with how to turn an ad agency into a tech company – nor was she particularly skilled at new product development.  Her skills were mostly in operations, and developing next generation software.  AutoCad was one of the first PC-based CAD products, and over 2 decades AutoCad leveraged the increasing power of PCs to make its products better, faster and relatively cheaper.  This constant improvement, and close attention to cost control, made it possible for AutoCad on a PC to come closer and closer to doing what the $250,000 workstations had done.  Users switched to the cheaper AutoCad not because it suddenly changed the game, but because PC enhancements made the older, more costly technology obsolete.

Ms. Bartz was stuck on her success formula.  Constantly trying to improve.  At Yahoo she implemented cost controls, like at AutoCad.  But she didn’t create anything significantly new.  She didn’t pioneer any new platforms (software or hardware) nor any dramatically new advertising or search products.  She tried to do deals, such as with Bing, to somehow partner into better competitiveness, but each year Yahoo fell further behind Google.  In a real way, Ms. Bartz fell victim to Google just as DEC had fallen victim to AutoCad.  Trying to Defend & Extend Yahoo was insufficient to compete with the game changing Google.

The Board was right to fire Ms. Bartz.  She simply did what she knew how to do, and what she had done at AutoCad.  But it was not what Yahoo needed – nor what Yahoo needs now.  Cost cutting and improvements are not going to catch the ad markets now driven by Google (search and adwords) and Facebook (display ads.)  Yahoo is now out of the rapidly growing market – social media – that is driving the next big advertising wave.

Breaking up Yahoo is the easy answer.  If the Board can get enough money for the pieces, it fulfills its fiduciary responsibility.  The stock has traded near $15/share for 3 years, and the Board can likely obtain the $18B market value for investors.  But “another one bites the dust” as the song lyrics go – and Yahoo will follow DEC, Atari, Cray, Compaq, Silicon Graphics and Sun Microsystems into the technology history on Wikipedia.  And those Yahoo employees will have to find jobs elsewhere (oh yeah, that pesky jobs problem leading to 9%+ U.S. unemployment comes up again.)

A better answer would be to turn around Yahoo!  Yahoo isn’t in any worse condition than Apple was when Steve Jobs took over as CEO.  It’s in no worse condition than IBM was when Louis Gerstner took over as its CEO.  It can be done.  If done, as those examples have shown, the return for shareholders could be far higher than breaking Yahoo apart.  

So here’s what Yahoo needs to do now if it really wants to create shareholder value:

  1. Put in place a CEO that is future oriented.  Yahoo doesn’t need a superb cost-cutter.  It doesn’t need a hatchet wielder, like the old “Chainsaw Al Dunlap” that tore up Scott Paper.  Yahoo needs a leader that can understand trends, develop future scenarios and direct resources into developing new products that people want and need.  A CEO who knows that investing in innovation is critical.
  2. Quit trying to win the last war with Google.  That one is lost, and Google isn’t going to give up its position.  Specifically, the just announced Yahoo+AOL+Microsoft venture to sell ad remnants is NOT where Yahoo needs to spend its resources.  Every one of these 3 companies has its own problems dealing with market shifts (AOL with content management as dial-up revenues die, Microsoft with PC market declines and mobile device growth.)  None is good at competing against Google, and together its a bit like asking 3 losers in a 100 meter dash if they think by forming a relay team they could somehow suddenly become a “world class” group.  This project is doomed to failure, and a diversion Yahoo cannot afford now.
  3. In that same vein, quit trying to figure out if AOL or Microsoft will buy Yahoo.  Microsoft could probably afford it – but like I said – Microsoft has its hands full trying to deal with the shift from PCs to tablets and smartphones.  Buying Yahoo would be a resource sink that could possibly kill Microsoft – and it’s assured Microsoft would end up shutting down the company piecemeal (as it does all acquisitions.)  AOL has seen its value plummet because investors are unsure if it will turn the corner before it runs out of cash.  While there are new signs of life since buying Huffington Post, ongoing struggles like firing the head of TechCrunch keep AOL fully occupied fighting to find its future.  Any deal with either company should send investors quickly to the sell post, and probably escalate the Yahoo demise with the lowest possible value.
  4. Give business heads the permission to develop markets as they see fit.  Ms. Bartz was far too controlling of the business units, and many good ideas were not implemented.  Specifically, for example, Right Media should be given permission to really advance its technology base and go after customers unencumbered by the Yahoo brand and organization.  Right Media has a chance of being really valuable – that’s why people would ostensibly buy it – so give the leaders the chance to make it successful.  Maybe then the revolving door of execs at Right (and other Yahoo business units) would stop and something good would happen.  
  5. Hold existing business units “feet to the fire” on results.  Yahoo has notoriously not delivered on new ad platforms and other products – missing development targets and revenue goals.  Innovation does not succeed if those in leadership are not compelled to achieve results.  Being lax on performance has killed new product development – and those things that aren’t achieving results need to stop.  Specifically, it’s probably time to stop the APT platform that is now years behind, and because it’s targeted against Google unlikely to ever succeed.
  6. Invest in new solutions.  Take all that wonderful trend data that Yahoo has (maybe not as much as Google – but a lot more than most companies) and figure out what Yahoo needs to do next.  Rip off a page from Apple, which flattened spending on the Mac in order to invest in the iPod.  Learn from Amazon, which followed the trends in retail to new storefronts, expanded offerings, a mobile interface and Kindle launch.  Yahoo needs to quit trying to gladiator fight with Google – where it can’t win – and identify new markets and solutions where it can.  Yahoo must quit being a hostage to its history, and go do the next big thing! Create some white space in the company to invest in new solutions on the trends!

Of course, this is harder than just giving up and selling the company.  But the potential returns are much, much higher.  Yahoo’s predicament is tough, but it’s been a management failure that got it here.  If management changes course, and focuses on the future, Yahoo can once again become a market leading company.  Sure would like to see that kind of leadership.  It’s how America creates jobs.

Where did all the jobs go? 9 recommendations for Mr. Obama!


Friday we learned, as the New York Daily News headlined, “August 2011 Jobs Report: NO Net Jobs Created.”  U.S. unemployment, and underemployment, remain stubbornly stuck at very high levels.  This situation is unlikely to improve, as reported at 24×7 Wall Street in “August Lay-off Plans Up 47%” with the latest Challenger Gray report telling us 51,144 people are soon getting the axe.  No wonder we saw a dramatic decline of nearly 15 points, to 44.5, in the Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Index – near record-low levels. 

This has all the Presidential candidates talking about jobs, and President Obama signed up to deliver a jobs speech to Congress. 

The problem actually goes beyond just jobs.  Buried within consumer concerns lies the fact that for most people, their incomes are going nowhere.  Adjusted for inflation, almost everyone is making less now than they did when the millenium turned.  Generally speaking, about 15% less than 11 years ago!  Most family incomes are about where they were in 1998.  For the wealthiest, income since the mid-1960s has grown only about 1.5%/year on average. For everyone else the improvement has only been about .5%/year. And universally almost all of that increase occurred between 1992 and 2000 (for anyone who wonders about Bill Clinton’s resurgent popularity, just look at incomes during his Presidency compared to every other administration on this chart!)

Real income growth 1967-2010 from BI
Source: “U.S. Household Incomes: A 42 Year Perspective” Doug Short, BusinessInsider.com

But will anything the President, or the candidates, recommend make a difference?

So far, the politicos keep fighting the last war, and seem surprised that nothing is improving.  The recommendations for putting people back to work in factories, such as autos and heavy equipment, or  building roads simply defies the reality of work today.  America has not been a manufacturing-dominated jobs country for over 60 years!  All job creation has been in services!

Service v Mfg jobs 1939 to 2010 from SAI
Source:”Charting the Incredible Shift From Manufacturing to Services” Doug Short, BusinessInsider.com

For this entire period, productivity has been climbing.  Just 50 years ago most people spent 1/3 to 1/2 their income on food.  No longer.  Today, few spend more than 5 to 10%, and everyone can enjoy an automobile, telephone, television and computer – regardless of their income!  We have all the stuff anyone could want, and in many cases a lot more of some stuff than we need – or want! 

The old notion of “what’s good for G.M. (General Motors) is good for America” is simply no longer true!  As we recently witnessed, a multi-billion dollar bail-out of the largest American auto maker may have saved some unemployment – but it did not create an economic turn-around, or create a slew of jobs! 

Today’s jobs are all in information – the accumulation, assimilation, analysis and use of information.  Few “managers” actually manage people any more – most manage a data set, or a computer program, or some sort of analysis.  The vast majority of “managers” have no direct reports at all!  The jobs – and incomes – are all in information.  Job growth is in places like Facebook, Google, Linked-in, Groupon, Amazon and Apple (the latter of which outsources all its manufacturing.)

No President or economist can manufacture jobs today.  As we’ve seen, interest rates are at unprecedent low levels – yet nobody wants to take a loan to hire a new employee!  In fact, business productivity is at record high levels as business keeps accomplishing more and more with fewer and fewer workers!

Profits per worker 2001-2011
Source: “Corporate Efficiency is Getting AbsurdBusinessInsider.com

Public companies aren’t going broke, by and large.  Most have cash balances at record levels.   Only they keep using the money to buy back their own stock!  Every month sees a wave of new stock buy back commitments, as 24×7 Wall Street reported “August’s New Massive Stock Buybacks… Over $30 Billion!”  Business leaders find it less risky to buy back their own stock (supporting their own bonuses, by the way) than invest in any sort of growth program – something that might create jobs.

So what’s the President to do?

We need to radically jack up the investment in innovation! Think about that last period of very low unemployment and growing incomes – in the 1990s.  We had the explosion in technology as people began using PCs, the internet, mobile phones, etc.  New technology introduced new business ideas (mostly services) and created a rash of growth!  And that created new jobs – and higher incomes.  Innovation is the jobs engine – not trying to save another tired manufacturing company, or pave another highway or extend another bridge!  Today those projects simply do not employ very many people, and the “trickle down” affect of a highway project creating more jobs has disappeared!

Bloomberg/BusinessWeek reported in “Failing at Innovation? Bank On It

  • Government spending on higher education has been declining since the 1970s reducing the number of graduate students and innovation projects
  • Federal share of R&D has been less than 1% since 1992 – all while corporate R&D spending has declined dramatically!  The days of spending “to put a man on the moon” has disappeared, as we fairly quietly mothballed the space program and commence to dismantle NASA
  • The number of entrepreneurs is actually declining!  There were fewer startups with 1 or more employees in 2007 (before the financial collapse and ensuing economic mayhem) than in 1990
  • New companies are not employing people.  In the 1990s the average startup employed 7.5 people, but now the number is 4.9
  • Meanwhile “infrastructure” spending today is the same as it was in 1968! 

We’ve done a great job of cutting taxes, but we’ve simultaneoously gutted our investment in R&D, innovation and doing anything new!  If you wonder where the jobs went it wasn’t oversees, it was into higher corporate cash levels, more stock buybacks, increased bank reserves and dramatically higher executive compensation! 

We don’t need more tax cuts – because nobody is investing in any new projects!  We don’t need more unemployment insurance, because that – at best – delays the day of reconning without a solution.

Here’s what we do need today:

  1. Implement a tax on corporate stock buybacks.  At least as great as the tax on corporate dividends.  Buybacks simply drain the economy of investment funds, with no benefit.  At least dividends give returns back to shareholders – who might invest in a new company!  And if buybacks are taxed, executives might start investing in projects again!
  2. Quit giving such large depreciation allowances for physical assets.  We don’t need more buildings – we’re overbuilt as we are right now!  Again, it’s not “things” that make up our economy, it’s services!
  3. Re-introduce R&D credits!  Give businesses a $3 tax break for every dollar spent in R&D and new product development!  Prior to President Reagan this was considered normal.  It’s not a new idea, just one that’s been forgotten.  If we can give credits for oil and gas drilling, which creates almost no jobs, why not innovation?
  4. Cut payroll taxes on the self-employed and small business.  Today self-employed pay 2x the payroll taxes, so it’s a big dis-incentive to entrepreneurship.  Give start-ups a break by lowering employment taxes on small employers – say less than 50 employees.
  5. Allow investors in start-ups to write off up to 2x their losses.  It takes away a lot of the risk if you can get most of your money back from a tax break should your investment fail.  And for all those corporations that abhore taxes this would incent them to invest in small enterprises that have new ideas they’d like to see developed.
  6. Remember the Small Business Administration (SBA)?  Re-activate it by giving it $100B (maybe $200B) to guarantee bank loans of small businesses.  Bank lending has ground to a halt as banks eliminate risk – so let’s get them back into their primary business again.  In WWII the government guaranteed every loan for the construction of the Liberty Ships – and behold business built 2,751 of the things in 4 years!  
  7. Increase funding for higher education.  Increase the grants for science, engineering and new product research at America’s universities.  Increase grants for students in science and engineering, and allow students to deduct out-of-pocket educational expenses from their taxes.  Allow corporations to deduct all the expense of employee education – uncapped!  Allow corporations to deduct the university grants they make!
  8. Invest in today’s digital infrastructure.  Once we paid to send men to the moon – and a flood of innovation (from microwave ovens to powdered drinks and frozen food) followed.  Today we should invest in a nationwide WiFi network that’s everywhere from rural forests to city buildings – and make it all FREE.  Digital networks are the highways we need today – not concrete ribbons.  Create tax deductions for people to buy smartphones, tablets and other products that drive innovation, and make it easy for innovators to network for solutions to emerging needs.
  9. Streamline the process for small companies to test and sell new bio-engineered products.  The existing complicated process is a legacy of big companies and traditional pharmaceutical research.  Make it easy for entrepreneurs to test and launch the next wave of medical technology based on the new bio-sciences.  Offer federal-backed safety insurance to protect small businesses that show efficacy in new solutions.

These are just 9 ideas.  I’m sure readers can think up 90 more (in fact, I challenge you to offer them as comments to this blog.) If we invest in innovation, we can create a lot of jobs.  But we need to start NOW!

Why a Bad CEO is a Company Killer – Sell Hewlett Packard


“You’ve got to be kidding me” was the line tennis great John McEnroe made famous.  He would yell it at officials when he thought they made a bad decision.  I can’t think of a better line to yell at Leo Apotheker after last week’s announcements to shut down the tablet/WebOS business, spin-off (or sell) the PC business and buy Autonomy for $10.2B.  Really.  You’ve got to be kidding me.

HP has suffered mightily from a string of 3 really lousy CEOs.  And, in a real way, they all have the same failing.  They were wedded to their history and old-fashioned business notions, drove the company looking in the rear view mirror and were unable to direct HP along major trends toward future markets where the company could profitably grow! 

Being fair, Mr. Apotheker inherited a bad situation at HP.  His predecessors did a pretty good job of screwing up the company before he arrived.  He’s just managing to follow the new HP tradition, and make the company worse.

HP was once an excellent market sensing company that invested in R&D and new product development, creating highly profitable market leading products.  HP was one of the first “Silicon Valley” companies, creating enormous  shareholder value by making and selling equipment (oscilliscopes for example) for the soon-to-explode computer industry.  It was a leader in patent applications, new product launches and being first with products that engineers needed, and wanted.

Then Carly Fiorina decided the smart move in 2001 was to buy Compaq for $25B.  Compaq was getting creamed by Dell, so Carly hoped to merge it with HP’s retail PC business and let “scale” create profits.  Only, the PC business had long been a commodity industry with competitors competing on cost, and the profits largely going to Intel and Microsoft!  The “synergistic” profits didn’t happen, and Carly got fired.

But she paved the way for HPs downfall.  She was the first to cut R&D and new product development in favor of seeking market share in largely undifferentiated products.  Why file 3,500 patents a year – especially when you were largely becoming a piece-assembly company of other people’s technology?  To get the cash for acquisitions, supply chain investments and retail discounts Carly started a whole new tradition of doing less innovation, and spending a lot being a copy-cat.  

But in an information economy, where almost all competitors have market access and can achieve highly efficient supply chains at low cost, there was no profit to the volume Carly sought.  HP became HPQ – but the price paid was an internal shift away from investing in new markets and innovation, and heading straight toward commoditization and volume!  The most valuable liquid in all creation – HP ink – was able to fund a lot of the company’s efforts, but it was rapidly becoming the “golden goose” receiving a paltry amount of feed.  And itself entirely off the trend as people kept moving away from printed documents!

Mark Hurd replaced Carly,  And he was willing to go her one better.  If she was willing to reduce R&D and product development – well he was ready to outright slash it!  And all the better, so he could buy other worn out companies with limited profits, declining share and management mis-aligned with market trends – like his 2008 $13.9B acquisition of EDS!  Once a great services company, offshore outsourcing and rabid price competition had driven EDS nearly to the point of bankruptcy.  It had gone through its own cost slashing, and was a break-even company with almost no growth prospects – leading many analysts to pan the acquisition idea.  But Mr. Hurd believed in the old success formula of selling services (gee, it worked 20 years before for IBM, could it work again?) and volume.  He simply believed that if he kept adding revenue and cutting cost, surely somewhere in there he’d find a pony!

And patent applications just kept falling.  By the end of his cost-cutting reign, the once great R&D department at HP was a ghost of its former self.  From 9%+ of revenues on new products, expenditures were down to under 2%! And patent applications had fallen by 2/3rds

HP_Patent_Applications_Per_Year
Chart Source: AllThingsD.comIs Innovation Dead at HP?

The patent decline continued under Mr. Apotheker.  The latest CEO intent on implementing an outdated, industrial success formula.  But wait, he has committed to going even further!  Now, HP will completely evacuate the PC business.  Seems the easy answer is to say that consumer businesses simply aren’t profitable (MediaPost.comLow Margin Consumers Do It Again, This Time to HP“) so HP has to shift its business entirely into the B-2-B realm.  Wow, that worked so well for Sun Microsystems.

I guess somebody forgot to tell consumer produccts lacked profits to Apple, Amazon and NetFlix. 

There’s no doubt Palm was a dumb acquisition by Mr. Hurd (pay attention Google.)  Palm was a leader in PDAs (personal digital assistants,) at one time having over 80% market share!  Palm was once as prevalent as RIM Blackberries (ahem.)   But Palm did not invest sufficiently in the market shifts to smartphones, and even though it had technology and patents the market shifted away from its “core” and left Palm with outdated technology, products and limited market growth.  By the time HP bought Palm it had lost its user base, its techology lead and its relevancy.  Mr. Hurd’s ideas that somehow the technology had value without market relevance was another out-of-date industrial thought. 

The only mistake Mr. Apotheker made regarding Palm was allowing  the Touchpad to go to market at all – he wasted a lot of money and the HP brand by not killing it immediately!

It is pretty clear that the PC business is a waning giant.  The remaining question is whether HP can find a buyer!  As an investor, who would want a huge business that has marginal profits, declining sales, an extraordinarily dim future, expensive and lethargic suppliers and robust competitors rapidly obsoleting the entire technology? Getting out of PCs isn’t escaping the “consumer” business, because the consumer business is shifting to smartphones and tablets.  Those who maintain hope for PCs all think it is the B-2-B market that will keep it alive.  Getting out is simply because HP finally realized there just isn’t any profit there.

But, is the answer is to beef up the low-profit “services” business, and move into ERP software sales with a third-tier competitor?

I called Apotheker’s selection as CEO bad in this blog on 5 October, 2010 (HP and Nokia’s Bad CEO Selections).  Because it was clear his history as CEO of SAP was not the right background to turn around HP.  Today ERP (enterprise resource planning) applications like SAP are being seen for the locked-in, monolithic, buraucracy creating, innovation killing systems they really are.  Their intent has always been, and remains, to force companies, functions and employees to replicate previous decisions.  Not to learn and do anything new.  They are designed to create rigidity, and assist cost cutting – and are antithetical to flexibility, market responsiveness and growth.

But following in the new HP tradition, Mr. Apotheker is reshuffling assets – closing the WebOS business, getting rid of all “consumer” businesses, and buying an ERP company!  Imagine that!  The former head of SAP is buying an SAP application! Regardless of what creates value in highly dynamic, global markets Mr. Apotheker is implementing what he knows how to do – operate an ERP company that sells “business solutions” while leaving everything else.  He just can’t wait to get into the gladiator battle of pitting HP against SAP, Oracle, J.D. Edwards and the slew of other ERP competitors!  Even if that market is over-supplied by extremely well funded competitors that have massive investments and enormously large installed client bases!

What HP desperately needs is to connect to the evolving marketplace.  Quit looking at the past, and give customers solutions that fit where the market is headed.    Customers aren’t moving toward where Apotheker is taking the company. 

All 3 of HP’s CEOs have been a testament to just how bad things can go when the CEO is more convinced it is important to do what worked in the past, rather than doing what the market needs.  When the CEO is locked-in to old thinking, old market dynamics and old solutions – rather than fixated on understanding trends, future scenarios and the solutions people want and need bad things happen.

There are a raft of unmet needs in the marketplace.  For a decade HP has ignored them.  Its CEOs have spent their time trying to figure out how to make old solutions work better, faster and cheaper.  And in the process they have built large, but not very profitable businesses that are now uninteresting at best and largely at the precipice of failure.  They have ignored market shifts in favor of doing more of the same. And the value of HP keeps declining – down 50% this year.  For HP to change direction, to increase value, it needs a CEO and leadership team that can understand important trends, fulfill unmet needs and migrate customers to new solutions.  HP needs to rediscover innovation. 

 

 

From the Frying Pan into the Fire – Google’s Motorola Problem


The business world was surprised this week when Google announced it was acquiring Motorola Mobility for $12.5B – a 63% premium to its trading price (Crain’s Chicago Business).  Surprised for 3 reasons:

  1. because few software companies move into hardware
  2. effectively Google will now compete with its customers like Samsung and HTC that offer Android-based phones and tablets,  and
  3. because Motorola Mobility had pretty much been written off as a viable long-term competitor in the mobile marketplace.  With less than 9% share, Motorola is the last place finisher – behind even crashing RIM.

Truth is, Google had a hard choice.  Android doesn’t make much money.  Android was launched, and priced for free, as a way for Google to try holding onto search revenues as people migrated from PCs to cloud devices.  Android was envisioned as a way to defend the search business, rather than as a profitable growth opportunity.  Unfortunately, Google didn’t really think through the ramifications of the product, or its business model, before taking it to market.  Sort of like Sun Microsystems giving away Java as a way to defend its Unix server business. Oops.

In early August, Google was slammed when the German courts held that the Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 could not be sold – putting a stop to all sales in Europe (Phandroid.comSamsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 Sales Now Blocked in Europe Thanks to Apple.”) Clearly, Android’s future in Europe was now in serious jeapardy – and the same could be true in the USA.

This wasn’t really a surprise.  The legal battles had been on for some time, and Tab had already been blocked in Australia.  Apple has a well established patent thicket, and after losing its initial Macintosh Graphical User Interface lead to Windows 25 years ago Apple plans on better defending its busiensses these days.  It was also well known that Microsoft was on the prowl to buy a set of patents, or licenses, to protect its new Windows Phone O/S planned for launch soon. 

Google had to either acquire some patents, or licenses, or serously consider dropping Android (as it did Wave, Google PowerMeter and a number of other products.)  It was clear Google had severe intellectual property problems, and would incur big legal expenses trying to keep Android in the market.  And it still might well fail if it did not come up with a patent portfolio – and before Microsoft!

So, Google leadership clearly decided “in for penny, in for a pound” and bought Motorola. The acquisition now gives Google some 16-17,000 patents.  With that kind of I.P. war chest, it is able to defend Android in the internicine wars of intellectual property courts – where license trading dominates resolutions between behemoth competitors.

Only, what is Google going to do with Motorola (and Android) now?  This acquisition doesn’t really fix the business model problem.  Android still isn’t making any money for Google.  And Motorola’s flat Android product sales don’t make any money either. 

Motorola rev and profits thru Q2 11
Source: Business Insider.com

In fact, the Android manufacturers as a group don’t make much money – especially compared to industry leader Apple:

IOS v Android operating profit mobile companies july-2011
Source: Business Insider.com

There was a lot of speculation that Google would sell the manufacturing business and keep the patents.  Only – who would want it?  Nobody needs to buy the industry laggard.  Regardless of what the McKinsey-styled strategists might like to offer as options, Google really has no choice but to try running Motorola, and figuring out how to make both Android and Motorola profitable.

And that’s where the big problem happens for Google.  Already locked into battles to maintain search revenue against Bing and others, Google recently launched Google+ in an all-out war to take on the market-leading Facebook.  In cloud computing it has to support Chrome, where it is up against Microsoft, and again Apple.  Oh my, but Google is now in some enormously large competitive situations, on multiple fronts, against very well-heeled competitors.

As mentioned before, what will Samsung and HTC do now that Google is making its own phones?  Will this push them toward Microsoft’s Windows offering?  That would dampen enthusiasm for Android, while breathing life into a currently non-competitor in Microsoft.  Late to the game, Microsoft has ample resources to pour into the market, making competition very, very expensive for Google.  It shows all the signs of two gladiators willing to fight to the loss-amassing death.

And Google will be going into this battle with less-than-stellar resources.  Motorola is the market also ran.  Its products are not as good as competitors, and its years of turmoil – and near failure – leading to the split-up of Motorola has left its talent ranks decimated – even though it still has 19,000 employees Google must figure out how to manage (“Motorola Bought a Dysfunctional Company and the Worst Android Handset Maker, says Insider“).  

Acquisitions that “work” are  ones where the acquirer buys a leader (technology, products, market) usually in a high growth area – then gives that acquisition the permission and resources to keep adapting and growing – what I call White Space.  That’s what went right in Google’s acquisitions of YouTube and DoubleClick, for example.  With Motorola, the business is so bad that simply giving it permssion and resources will lead to greater losses.  It’s hard to disaagree with 24/7 Wall Street.com when divulging “S&P Gives Big Downgrade on Google-Moto Deal.”

Some would like to think of Google as creating some transformative future for mobility and copmuting.  Sort of like Apple. 

Yea, right.

Google is now stuck defending & extending its old businesses – search, Chrome O/S for laptops, Google+ for mail and social media, and Android for mobility products.  And, as is true with all D&E management, its costs are escalating dramatically.  In every market except search Google has entered into gladiator battles late against very well resourced competitors with products that are, at best, very similar – lacking game-changing characteristics. Despite Mr. Page’s potentially grand vision, he has mis-positioned Google in almost all markets, taken on market-leading and well funded competition, and set Google up for a diasaster as it burns through resources flailing in efforts to find success.

If you weren’t convinced of selling Google before, strongly consider it now.  The upcoming battles will be very, very expensive.  This acquisition is just so much chum in the water – confusing but not beneficial.

And if you still don’t own Apple – why not?  Nothing in this move threatens the technology, product and market leader which continues bringing game-changers to market every few months.

Baffle ’em with Bulls**t – Forget Kraft


"If you can't dazzle 'em with brilliance – Baffle 'em with Bulls**t" – W. C. Fields

Just 18 months ago Kraft CEO Irene Rosenfeld was working very hard to convince investors she needed to grow Kraft with a $19B acquisition of Cadbury.  This was after her expensive acquisition of Lu Biscuits from Danone. Part of her justification for the massive expenditure was an out-of-date industrial manufacturing adage, "Scale is a source of great competitive advantage. " How these acquisitions provided scale advantage was never explained.

Now she wants to convince investors Kraft needs to be split into two companies, saying the acquisition trail has left her with "different portfolios."  (Quotes from the Wall Street Journal, "Activists Pressed for Kraft Spinoff") For some reason, scale is now less important than portfolio focus.  And the scale advantages that justified the acquisition premiums are now – unimportant?

If Ms. Rosenfeld was a politician, she might be accused of being a "flip-flopper." Remember John Kerry?

Ms. Rosenfeld would like to break Kraft into 2 parts.  Some brands would be in a new "grocery," or "domestic" business (Oscar Mayer, Cool Whip, Maxwell House, Jell-O, Philadelphia Cream Cheese, Kool Aid, Miracle Whip is a partial list.)  The rest of the company would be a "snack" or "international" business.  Although the latter would still include the North American snacks and confectionary brands.  (More detail in the Wall Street Journal "Kraft: Breaking Down the Breakup.")

We will ignore the obvious questions about why the acquisitions if your strategy was to split up the company.  Instead, looking forward, the critical questions to have answered would be "How will this break-up help Kraft grow? And what is the benefit for investors, employees and shareholders of this massive, and costly, change?" 

Kraft was split off from Altria at the end of 2006, with Ms. Rosenfeld at the helm.  At its rebirth, Kraft became a Dow Jones Industrial member.  Rich in revenues and resources, at the time, Kraft was valued at about $35/share.  Now, 5 years and all the M&A machinations later, Kraft is valued (with optimism about the breakup value) at about $35/share!  Between the two dates the company's value was almost always lower.  So investors have gained nothing for their 5 years of waiting for Ms. Rosenfeld to "transform" Kraft.

The big winners at Kraft have been their investment bankers.  They received enormous multi-million dollar fees for helping Ms. Rosenfeld buy and sell businesses.  And they will receive massive additional fees if the company is split in two.  In fact, given her focus on M&A as opposed to actually growing Kraft, one could well assess Ms. Rosenfeld's tenure as more investment banker than Chief Executive Officer.  She didn't really do anything to improve Kraft.  She just moved around the pieces, and swapped some.

Kraft has had no growth, other than from the expensive purchased acquisition revenues.  Despite its massive $50B revenue stream, what new innovation – what exciting new product – can you recall Kraft introducing?  Go ahead, take your time.  We can wait. 

What's that – you can't think of any.  Nor can anybody else. 

In Kraft's historical businesses, volume declined 1.5% over the last couple of years.  The company has been shrinking.  According to Crain's Chicago Business in "Kraft's Rosenfeld's About Face Spurred by Dwindling Options," the only reason revenues grew in the base business was due to rising commodity prices, which were passed along, with a premium added, in retail price increases to consumers!  A business doesn't have a sparkling future when it keeps selling less, and raising prices, on products that consumers largely could care less about. 

When was the last time you asked for a Velveeta sandwich?  Interestly, Tang now seems to have outlived even NASA and the American space program.  Have you enjoyed that sugar-laden breakfast delight lately?  Or when did you last look for that special opportunity to use artificial ice-cream (Cool Whip) in your desert?

BusinessInsider.com tried valiantly to make the case "The Kraft Foods Split is the Grand Finale of an Epic Transformation." But as the author takes readers through the myriad re-organizations, in the end we realize that all these changes did nothing to actually improve the business – and managed to tick off Kraft's largest investor, Warren Buffet of Berkshire Hathaway, who has been selling shares!

The argument that Kraft has 2 portfolios as a justification for splitting the company makes no sense.  Every investor is taught to have a wide portfolio in order to maximize returns at lowest risk.  That Kraft has multiple product lines is a benefit to investors, not a negative! 

Unless the leaders have no idea how to use the resources from these businesses to innovate, and bring out new products building on market trends and creating growth!  And that's the one thing most lacking at Kraft.  It's not a portfolio issue – it's a complete lack of innovation issue! As Burt Flickingerof Strategic Resources Group pointed out, Kraft has been losing .5% to 1% market share every year for the last decade in its "core" business, and he understatedly commente that Kraft has "very little innovation."

Markets have shifted dramatically the last 5 years, and food is no exception.  People want fewer carbs, and fewer fats.  They want easily prepared foods, but without additives like sugar (or high fructose corn syrup,) salt and oil that have negative long-term health implications for blood pressure, heart disease and diabetes.  Also, they don't want hidden calories that make ease of preparation a trade-off with their wastelines!  Further, most families have changed from the traditional 3 times per day standard meals to more grazing habits, and from large portions to smaller portions with greater variety. 

But Kraft addressed none of these shifts with new products.  Instead, it kept pouring advertising dollars into the traditional foodstuffs, even as these were finding less and less fit with 2011 dietary needs – or consumer interest! When the most exciting thing anyone can say about a Kraft launch the last 5 years was the re-orientation of the Triscuit line (did you catch that, or did you somehow miss it?) then it's pretty clear innovation has been on the back burner.  Or maybe stuck in the shelf with the Cheez Whiz.

It is clear that Ms. Rosenfeld offered no brilliance as Kraft's leader.  Uninspiring to consumers, investors and employees.  She made very expensive acquisitions to create the illusion of revenue growth; financial machinations that hid declines in the traditional business which suffered from no innovation investment. After all that money was thrown around, and facing very little prospect of any growth, it was time for the biggest baffling bulls**t of all – split the company up so nobody can trace the value destruction!

Andrew Lazar at Barclay's Capital Plc gave a pretty good insight in another Crain's Chicago Business article ("Kraft Jettisons U. S. Brands so Global Snack Biz Can Fly Higher.")  He said Kraft (aka Ms. Rosenfeld) is "Taking action before it ever has to potentially disappoint investors in a struggle to reach overly optimistic sales growth targets."

Yes, I think Mr. Fields had it pretty right when it comes to describing the leadership of Ms. Rosenfeld and her team at Kraft.  They have been unable to dazzle us with any brilliance.  The question is whether we'll be foolish enough to let them baffle us with their ongoing bulls**t.   What Kraft needs is not a break-up.  What Kraft needs is new leadership that understands how to move beyond the past, tie investments to market needs, and start Kraft growing again!! 

This week most people don't really care about Kraft.  After the U.S. debt ceiling "crisis," followed by the Friday night announcement of the U.S. debt downgrade, the news has been dominated by mostly economic, rather than company, items.  The collapse of the DJIA has been a lot more important than a non-value-adding split-up of a single component.  And that is unfortunate, because the leadership of Kraft have been playing chess games with company pieces, rather than actually doing what it takes to help a company grow.  With the right leadership, Kraft could be creating the jobs everyone so desperately wants.

Grow like (the) Amazon to Succeed – Invest outside your “core”


“It’s easier to succeed in the Amazon than on the polar tundra” Bruce Henderson, famed founder of The Boston Consulting Group, once told me.  “In the arctic resources are few, and there aren’t many ways to compete.  You are constantly depleting resources in life-or-death struggles with competitors.  Contrarily, in the Amazon there are multiple opportunities to grow, and multiple ways to compete, dramatically increasing your chances for success.  You don’t have to fight a battle of survival every day, so you can really grow.”

Today, Amazon(.com) is the place to be.  As the financial markets droop, fearful about the economy and America’s debt ceiling “crisis,” Amazon is achieving its highest valuation ever.  While the economy, and most companies, struggle to grow, Amazon is hitting record growth:

Amazon sales growth July 2011
Source: BusinessInsider.com

Sales are up 50% versus last year! The result of this impressive sales growth has been a remarkable valuation increase – comparable to Apple! 

  • Since 2009, valuation is up 5.5x
  • Over 5 years valuation is up 8x
  • Over the last decade Amazon’s value has risen 15x

How did Amazon do this?  Not by “sticking to its knitting” or being very careful to manage its “core.”  In 2001 Amazon was still largely an on-line book seller.

The company’s impressive growth has come by moving far from its “core” into new markets and new businesses – most far removed from its expertise.  Despite its “roots” and “DNA” being in U.S. books and retailing, the company has pioneered off-shore businesses and high-tech products that help customers take advantage of big trends.

Amazon’s earnings release provided insight to its fantastic growth.  Almost 50% of revenues lie outside the U.S.  Traditional retailers such as WalMart, Target, Kohl’s, Sears, etc. have struggled in foreign markets, and blamed poor performance on weak infrastructure and complex legal/tax issues.  But where competitors have seen obstacles, Amazon created opportunity to change the way customers buy, and change the industry using its game-changing technology and capabilities.  For its next move, according to Silicon Alley Insider, “Amazon is About to Invade India,” a huge retail market, in an economy growing at over 7%/year, with rising affluence and spendable income – but almost universally overlooked by most retailers due to weak infrastructure and complex distribution.

Amazon’s remarkable growth has occurred even though its “core” business of books has been declining – rather dramatically – the last decade.  Book readership declines have driven most independents, and large chains such as B. Dalton and more recently Borders, out of business. But rather than use this as an excuse for weak results, Amazon invested heavily in the trends toward digitization and mobility to launch the wildly successful Kindle e-Reader.  Today about half of all Amazon book sales are digital, creating growth where most competitors (hell-bent on trying to defend the old business) have dealt with stagnation and decline. 

Amazon did this without a background as a technology company, an electronics company, or a consumer goods company.  Additionally, Amazon invested in Kindle – and is now developing a tablet – even as these products cannibalized the historically “core” paper-based book sales.  And Amazon has pursued these market shifts, even though these new products create a significant threat to Amazon’s largest traditional suppliers – book publishers. 

Rather than trying to defend its old core business, Amazon has invested heavily in trends – even when these investments were in areas where Amazon had no history, capability or expertise!

Amazon has now followed the trends into a leading position delivering profitable “cloud” services.  Amazon Web Services (AWS) generated $500M revenue last year, is reportedly up 50% to $750M this year, and will likely hit $1B or more before next year.  In addition to simple data storage Amazon offers cloud-based Oracle database services, and even ERP (enterprise resource planning) solutions from SAP.  In cloud computing services Amazon now leads historically dominant IT services companies like Accenture, CSC, HP and Dell.  By offering solutions that fulfill the emerging trends, rather than competing head-to-head in traditional service areas, Amazon is growing dramatically and avoiding a gladiator war.  And capturing big sales and profits as the marketplace explodes.

Amazon created 5,300 U.S. jobs last quarter.  Organic revenue growth was 44%.  Cash flow increased 25%.  All because the company continued expanding into new markets, including not only new retail markets, and digital publishing, but video downloads and television streaming – including making a deal to deliver CBS shows and archive. 

Amazon’s willingness to go beyond conventional wisdom has been critical to its success.  GeekWire.com gives insight into how Amazon makes these critical resource decisions in “Jeff Bezos on Innovation” (taken from comments at a shareholder meeting June 7, 2011):

  • “you just have to place a bet.  If you place enough of those bets, and if you place them early enough, none of them are ever betting the company”
  • “By the time you are betting the company, it means you haven’t invented for too long”
  • “If you invent frequently and are willing to fail, then you never get to the point where you really need to bet the whole company”
  • “We are planting more seeds…everything we do will not work…I am never concerned about that”
  • “my mind never lets me get in a place where I think we can’t afford to take these bets”
  • “A big piece of the story we tell ourselves about who we are, is that we are willing to invent”

If you want to succeed, there are ample lessons at Amazon.  Be willing to enter new markets, be willing to experiment and learn, don’t play “bet the company” by waiting too long, and be willing to invest in trends – especially when existing competitors (and suppliers) are hesitant.

Why Dell Won’t Grow – SELL DELL


Dell is a dog.  From $25/share a decade ago the company rose to around $40/share around 2005, only to collapse.  The stock now trades around $15, rising from recent lows of about $10.  The company’s value is only $30B, only half revenues of $61B, instead of the revenue multiple obtained by most growth stocks. But then, revenues have been flat for the last 4 years — so maybe it’s time to say Dell isn’t a growth stock any longer. 

And that would be correct.

In the 1990s Dell was a darling.  The company could do no wrong as its revenues and valuation soared.  Founder and CEO Michael Dell was a highly desired speaker at fees of $100,000+.  Michael Dell was quick to tell people his success formula, which was pretty simple:

  • Do no R&D.  Outsource product development to key vendors (Intel and Microsoft).  Focus on price and cost.  Be operationally excellent!  Be the best, most focused manufacturer/assembler.
  • Genericize the product.  Make it easy to buy, thus cheap and easy to sell.
  • Sell direct rather than through distributors so you lower sales cost.
  • Use supply chain practices to drive down parts cost and inventory, making it possible to compete on price and collect your funds before paying vendors.

In short, focus on operational excellence to be really fast and cheap.  Faster and cheaper than anyone else. 

And this success formula worked!! As long as folks wanted personal computers, Dell was the game to beat.  And the company reaped the reward of PC market growth, expanding as the PC – especially the Wintel PC – market exploded.

Dell’s problems today aren’t the result of bad management.  Dell has been focused, diligent, hard working and very cost conscientuous.  Dell made no horrible decisions, and made no serious mistakes in its strategy or tactics.  Although for a while it was vilified for weaker support from outsourced vendors in India (again, a tactic used in all parts of Dell’s strategy) that was rectified.  Largely for 2 decades Dell has continued to perform better and better at its internal metrics – its success formula. 

Dell’s fall from grace was due to the market shifting.  Firstly, competitors figured out how to do what Dell did pretty much as good as Dell did it.  No operationally oriented strategy is immune from copy-cats, and Dell discovered other companies could do pretty much what they did. It becomes a dog-eat-dog world quickly when your discussions are all “price, delivery, service” and you can’t offer something truly unique.  It may not be obvious when markets are growing, and there’s plenty of business for everyone, but oh how quickly it shows up in declining margins when growth slows.

Secondly, and more importantly, the market shifted away from Dell’s primary products.  PC sales are now flat to declining, depending on marketplace, as customers shift from Wintel platforms to smartphones and tablets.  Despite big acquisitions in data storage and services (to the tune of $5B the last couple of years) Dell still has 70% of its revenues in PCs (55% hardware, 15% software and services.)  Most of that money was spent attempting to shore up the Dell success formula by extending its core offerings to core customers.  Now all future forecasts show the market will continue to move away from PCs and toward new platforms, making it impossible to create organic growth, and pinching margins in all sectors.

So, were Dell’s executives dumb, incompetent, lethargic or some combination of all 3?  Actually, none of those things – as CNNMoney.com points out in “Dell’s Dilemma“.  They were simply stuck.  Stuck with their own best practices, doing what they do really well, and continuing to do more of it. Unable to move forward, because most attention was focused on defending and extending the old core.

Nobody knows the Dell core better than Michael Dell.  His return spells only less likelihood of success for Dell.  As opportunities emerged in smartphones and other markets he found it simply easier, faster, cheaper and more consistent to wait on those markets while defending the core PC business.  Key vendors Intel and Microsoft, critical to historical success, were not offering new solutions for these markets, or promoting sales in them.  Key customers, the IT departments in government and corporate accounts, weren’t clamoring for these new products.  They wanted more PCs that were better, faster and cheaper.  Dell was looking for the divine light of perfect future understanding to change the company investments – and when it didn’t emerge he kept right on plunking money into the business headed for decline.

Inside consultants (Bain and Co. is well known to be the primary strategists and tacticians at Dell) and employee experts had never-ending opportunities to improve the Dell systems, in their efforts to defend the Dell sales against other PC competitors and seek out additional expansion opportunities in targeted offshore or niche markets.  Suppliers wanted Dell to keep building and promoting PCs.  And customers locked-in to old platforms were just experimenting with new solutions – far from adopting anything new in the volumes that would match historical PC sales.  “If just the economy comes around, I’m sure sales will return” it’s easy to imagine everyone at Dell saying.

Now Dell is in declining products, with an outdated strategy chasing a larger competitor as margins continue to remain squeezed.  Nobody wants to exit this business quickly, so prices are under ever greater pressure – especially since Android tablets are cheaper than laptops already – and smartphones can be had for free from the right wireless supplier. 

It’s too late for Dell.  The time to act was 5 years ago.  Then Dell could have set up a team to explore the market for new solutions.  Dell could have been the first to offer an Android phone or tablet – the company has plenty of smart folks who could experiment and figure it out.  They could have championed the Zune, and created a download store for the product to compete with iPods and iTunes (the Zune is no longer supported by Microsoft.)  But there were no resources, and no permission given to try changing the success formula.

As Chromebooks are launched (“The First Google Chromebooks are On Sale Now, Here’s Everything You Need to KnowBusinessInsider.com) Dell could have been the market leader, instead of Acer and Samsung.  There’s even a chance that Dell might have blunted the huge market lead Apple created since 2005 if management had just created a team with the opportunity to really discover what people would do with these new solutions.  There was a time a “strategic partnership” between Dell and Google could have been a big threat to Apple.  But no longer. 

Apple, which put its resources into pioneering new markets the last decade has seen its value explode many-fold.  It’s value is over 10x Dell.  Apple has enough cash to buy Dell outright.  But why would it?  Dell has become a niche player – and due to its lock-in to historical best practices and its old success formula has no opportunities to grow.

All companies risk becoming marginalized.  Focusing on your core products, core technology vendors and core customers leads to blindness about the possibility of market shifts.  You can work yourself to death, be focused and diligent, and remain dedicated to constant improvement — even excellence!  But when markets shift it’s easy to become obsolete, and fall into margin killing price wars as growth stagnates.  Just look at Dell.  From darling to dog in just 10 years.

If you still own DELL, the recent price rise makes this a great time to SELL.  Dell has no new products, and no idea how to move into new markets.  It’s commitment to its core is a death knell.  And without white space to do anything new, it can/t (and won’t) transform itself into a winner.

Why Apple is worth more than Wal-Mart – it’s about the future, not the past


Apple’s market value has struggled in 2011.  When I ask people why, the overwhelming top 3 responses are:

  • How can a company nearly bankrupt 10 years ago become the second most valuable company on the equity market?
  • Apple has had a long run, isn’t it about to end?
  • How can Apple be worth so much, when it has no “real” assets?

I’m struck by how these questions are based on looking backward, rather than looking into the future.

Firstly, it doesn’t matter where you start, but rather how well you run the race.  What happened in the past is just that, the past.  Changing technologies, products, solutions, customers, business practices, economic conditions and competitors cause markets to shift.  When they shift, competitor positions change.  The strong can remain strong, but it’s also possible for company’s fortunes to change drastically. Apple has taken advantage of market shifts – even created them – in order to change its fortunes.  What investors should care about is the future.

Which leads to the second question; and the answer that there’s no reason to think Apple’s growth run will end any time soon.  Perhaps Apple won’t maintain 100% annual growth forever, but it doesn’t have to grow at that rate to be a very valuable investment.  And worth a lot more than the current value.  That Apple can grow at 20% (or a lot more) for another several years is a very high probability bet:

  1. Apple’s growth markets are young, and the markets themselves are growing fast.  Apple is not in a gladiator war to maintain old customers, but instead is creating new customers for digital/mobile entertainment, smartphones and mobile tablets.  Because it is in high growth markets it’s odds of maintaining company growth are very good.  Just look at the recent performance of iPad tablet sales, a market most analysts predicted would struggle against cheaper netbooks.  Quarterly sales are blowing past early 2010 estimates of annual sales, and are 250% over last year (chart source Silicon Alley Insider): IPad Sales 2Q 2011
  2. Apple’s products continue to improve.  Apple is not resting upon its past success, but rather keeps adding new capability to its old offerings in order to migrate customers to its new platforms.  At the recent developer’s conference,for example, Apple described how it was adding Twitter integration for enhanced social media to its platforms and introducing its own messenger service, bypassing 3rd party services (like SMS) and replacing competitive products like RIM’s BBM. 
  3. Further, Apple is introducing new solutions like iCloud (TechStuffs.netApple iCloud Key Features and Price)  offering free wireless synching between Apple platforms, free and seamless back-ups, and the ability to operate without a PC (even Mac flavor) if you want to be mobile-only (“The 10 Huge Things Apple Just RevealedBusinessInsider.com).  These solutions keep expanding the market for Apple sales into new markets –  such as small businesses (Entrepreneur.comWhat Lion Means for Small Business“) as it solves unmet needs ignored by historically powerful solutions providers, or offered at far too high a price.

Thirdly, investors wonder how a company can be worth so much without much in the way of “real” assets.  The answer lies in understanding how the business world has shifted.  In an industrial economy real assets – like land, building, machinery – was greatly valued.  They were the means of production, and wealth generation.  But we have transitioned to the information economy.  Now the information around a business, and providing digital solutions, are worth considerably more than “real” assets. 

How many closed manufacturing plants, retail stores or restaurants have you seen?  How many real estate developers have shuttered?  Contrarily, what’s the value of customer lists and customer access at companies like Amazon.com, GroupOn, Linked-In, Twitter and Facebook in today’s information economy?  What’s the demand for printed books, and what’s the demand for ebooks (such as Kindle?)  “Real” asset values are tumbling because they are easy to obtain, and owning them produces precious little value, or profit, in today’s globally competitive economy. 

This same week that Apple announced a barrage of revenue-generating upgrades and new products asset rich Wal-Mart made an announcement as well.  After a decade in which Apple’s value skyrocketed to over $330B (More than Microsoft and Intel Combined by the way), Wal-Mart’s value has gone nowhere, mired around $185B. Wal-Mart’s answer is to buy back it’s shares.  The Board has authorized continuing and expanding a massive share buyback program of literally 1 million shares/day – 10% of all shares traded daily!  The amount allocated is 1/6th the entire market cap! At this rate 24x7WallStreet.com headlined “Wal-Mart’s Buyback Plan Grows & Grows.. Could Take Itself Private by 2025.” 

Share buybacks produce NO VALUE.  They don’t produce any revenue, or profit.  All they do is take company cash, and spend it to buy company shares.  The asset (cash) is spent (removed) in the process of buying shares, which are then removed from the company’s equity.  The company actually gets smaller, because it has less assets and less equity. (Compared to LInked-In, for example, that grew larger by selling shares and increasing its cash assets.)  Over time the cash disappears, and the equity disappears.  Eventually, you have no company left!  Stock buybacks are an end of lifecycle investment, and should trigger great fear in investors as they demonstrate management has lost the ability to identify high-yield growth opportunities.

Wal-Mart is steeped in assets. It has land, buildings, stores, shelves, warehouses, trucks, huge computer systems.  But these assets simply don’t produce a lot of profit, as competitors are squeezing margins every year.  And there’s not much growth, because doing more of what it always did isn’t really wanted by a lot more people.  So it has gobs of assets.  So what?  The assets simply aren’t worth a lot when the market doesn’t need any more retail stores; especially boring ones with limited product selection, limited imagination and nothing but “low price.” 

Assets aren’t the “store of value” analysts gave them in an industrial economy, and it’s time we realize investing in “assets” is fraught with risk.  Assets, like homes and autos have shown us, can go down in value even easier and faster than they can go up.  Global competitors can match the assets, and drive down prices using cheap labor and operating by less onerous standards. In today’s market, assets are as likely to be an anchor on value as an asset.

I started 2011 saying Apple was a screaming buy.  Today that’s even more true than it was then.  Apple’s revenues, profits and cash flow are up.  Sales in existing lines are still profitably growing at double (or triple) digit rates, and enhancements keep Apple in front of competitors.   Meanwhile Apple is entering new markets every quarter, with solutions meeting existing, unmet needs.  Because value has been stagnant, the value (price) to revenue, earnings and cash flow have all declined, making Apple cheaper than ever.  It’s time to invest based on looking to the future, and not the past.  Doing so means you buy Apple today, and start dumping asset intensive stocks like Wal-mart.

Update 12 June, 2011 – Chart from SeekingAlpha.com.  Apple’s cash hoard grows faster than its valuation.  When a company can grow cash flow and profits faster than revenues – and it’s doubling revenues – that’s a screaming buy!

Apple Cash as Percent of Share Price

 

Status Quo Police – Innovation Killers


Nobody admits to being the innovation killer in a company.  But we know they exist.  Some these folks “dinosaurs that won’t change.”  Others blame “the nay-saying ‘Dr. No’ middle managers.”  But when you meet these people, they won’t admit to being innovation killers.  They believe, deep in their hearts as well as in their everyday actions, that they are doing the right thing for the business.  And that’s because they’ve been chosen, and reinforced, to be the Status Quo Police.

When a company starts it has no norms.  But as it succeeds, in order to grow quickly it develops a series of “key success factors” that help it continue growing.  In order to grow faster, managers – often in functional roles – are assigned the task of making sure the key success factors are unwaveringly supported.  Consistency becomes more important than creativity.  And these managers are reinforced, supported, even bonused for their ability to make sure they maintain the status quo.  Even if the market has shifted, they don’t shift.  They reinforce doing things according to the rules.  Just consider:

Quality – Who can argue with the need to have quality?  Total Quality Management (TQM,) Continuous Improvement (CI,) and Six Sigma programs all have been glorified by companies hoping to improve product or service quality.  If you’re trying to fix a broken product, or process, these work pretty well at helping everyone do their job better.

But these programs live with the mantra “if you can’t measure it, you can’t improve it.  Measure everything that’s important.”  If you’re innovating, what do you measure?  If you’re in a new technology, or manufacturing process, how do you know what you really need to do right?  If you’re in a new market, how do you know the key metric for sales success?  Is it number of customers called, time with customers, number of customer surveys, recommendation scores, lost sales reports?  When you’re trying to do something new, a lot of what you do is respond quickly to instant feedback – whether it’s good feedback or bad.

The key to success isn’t to have critical metrics and measure performance on a graph, but rather to learn from everything you do – and usually to change.  Quality people hate this, and can only stand in the way of trying anything new because you don’t know what to measure, or what constitutes a “good” measure.  Don’t ever forget that Motorola pretty much invented Six Sigma, and what happened to them in the mobile phone business they pioneered?

Finance.  All businesses exist to make money, so who can argue with “show me the numbers.  Give me a business plan that shows me how you’re going to make money.”  When your’e making an incremental investment to an existing asset or process, this is pretty good advice. 

But when you’re innovating, what you don’t know far exceeds what you know.  You don’t know how to meet unment needs.  You don’t know the market size, the price that people will pay, the first year’s volume (much less year 5,) the direct cost at various volumes, the indirect cost, the cost of marketing to obtain customer attention, the number of sales calls it will take to land a sale, how many solution revisions will be necessary to finally put out the “right” solution, or how sales will ramp up quarterly from nothing.  So to create a business plan, you have to guess. 

And, oh boy, then it gets ugly.  “Where did this number come from?  That one?  How did you determine that?”  It’s not long until the poor business plan writer is ridden out of the meeting on a rail.  He has no money to investigate the market, so he can’t obtain any “real” numbers, so the business plan process leads to ongoing investment in the old business, while innovation simply stalls.

Under Akia Morita Sony was a great innovator. But then an MBA skilled in finance took over the top spot.  What once was the #1 electronics innovator in the globe has become, well, let’s say they aren’t Apple.

Legal – No company wants to be sued, or take on unnecessary risk.  And when you’re selling something, lawyers are pretty good at evaluating the risk in that business, and lowering the risk.  While making sure that all the compliance issues are met in order to keep regulators – and other lawyers – out of the business.

But when you’re starting something new, everything looks risky.  Customers can sue you for any reason.  Suppliers can sue you for not taking product, or using it incorrectly.  The technology could fail, or have negative use repercussions.  Reguators can question your safety standards, or claims to customers. 

From a legal point of view, you’re best to never do anything new.  The less new things you do, the less likely you are to make a mistake.  So legal’s great at putting up roadblocks to make sure they protect the company from lawsuits, by making sure nothing really new happens.  The old General Motors had plenty of lawyers making sure their cars were never too risky – or interesting.

R&D or Product Development – Who doesn’t think it’s good to be a leader in a specific technology?  Technology advances have proven invaluable for companies in industries from computers to pharmaceuticals to tractors and even services like on-line banking.  Thus R&D and Product Development wants to make sure investments advance the state of the technology upon which the company was built.

But all technologies become obsolete.  Or, at least unprofitable.  Innovators are frequently on the front end of adopting new technologies.  But if they have to obtain buy-in from product development to obtain staffing or money they’ll be at the end of a never-ending line of projects to sustain the existing development trend.  You don’t have to look much further than Microsoft to find a company that is great at pouring money into the PC platform (some $9B, 16% of revenue in 2009,) while the market moves faster each year to mobile devices and entertainment (Apple spent 1/8th the Microsoft budget in 2009.)

Sales, Marketing & Distribution – When you want to protect sales to existing customers, or maybe increase them by 5%, then doing more of what you’ve always done is smart.  So money is spent to put more salespeople on key accounts, add more money to the advertising budget for the most successful (or most profitable) existing products.  There are more rules about using the brand than lighters at a smoker’s convention.  And it’s heresy to recommend endangering the distribution channel that has so successfully helped increase sales.

But innovators regularly need to behave differently.  They need to sell to different people – Xerox sold to secretaries while printing press manufacturers sold to printers.  The “brand” may well represent a bygone era, and be of no value to someone launching a new product; are you eager to buy a Zenith electronic device?  Sprucing up the brand, or even launching something new, may well be a requirement for a new solution to be taken seriously.

And often, to be successful, a new solution needs to cut through the old, high-cost distribution system directly to customers if it is to succeed.  Pre-Gerstner IBM kept adding key account sales people in hopes of keeping IT departments from switching out of mainframes to PCs.  Sears avoided the shift to on-line sales successfully – and revenue keeps dropping in the stores.

Information Technology – To make more money you automate more functions.  Computers are wonderful for reducing manpower in many tasks.  So IT implements and supports “standard solutions” that are cost effective for the historical business.  Likewise, they set up all kinds of user rules – like don’t go to Facebook or web sites from work – to keep people focused on productivity.  And to make sure historical data is secure and regulations are met.

But innovators don’t have a solution mapped out, and all that automated functionality is an enormously expensive headache.  When being creative, more time is spent looking for something new than trying to work faster, or harder, so access to more external information is required.  Since the solution isn’t developed, there’s precious little to worry about keeping secure.  Innovators need to use new tools, and have flexibility to discover advantageous ways to use them, that are far beyond the bounds of IT’s comfort zone.

Newspapers are loaded with automated systems to collect and edit news, to enter display ads, and to “Make up” the printed page fast and cheap.  They have automated systems for classified advertising sales and billing, and for display ad billing.  And systems to manage subscribers.  That technology isn’t very helpful now, however, as newspapers go bankrupt.  Now the most critical IT skills are pumping news to the internet in real-time, and managing on-line ads distributed to web users that don’t have subscriptions. 

Human Resources – Growth pushes companies toward tighter job descriptions with clear standards for “the kinds of people that succeed around here.”  When you want to hire people to be productive at an existing job, HR has the procedures to define the role, find the people and hire them at the most efficient cost.  And they can develop a systematic compensation plan that treats everyone “fairly” based upon perceived value to the historical business.

But innovators don’t know what kinds of people will be most successful. Often they need folks who think laterally, across lots fo tasks, rather than deeply about something narrow.  Often they need people who are from different backgrounds, that are closer to the emerging market than the historical business.  And pay has to be related to what these folks can get in the market, not what seems fair through the lens of the historical business.  HR is rarely keen to staff up a new business opportunity with a lot of misfits who don’t appreciate their compensation plan – or the rules so carefully created to circumscribe behavior around the old business.

B.Dalton was America’s largest retail book seller when Amazon.com was founded by Jeff Bezos.  Jeff knew nothing about books, but he knew the internet.  B.Dalton knew about books, and claimed it knew what book buyers wanted.  Two years later B.Dalton went bankrupt, and all those book experts became unemployed. Amazon.com now sells a lot more than books, as it ongoingly and rapidly expands its employee skill sets to enter new markets – like publishing and eReaders.

Innovation requires that leaders ATTACK the Status Quo Police.  Everything done to efficiently run the old business is irrelevant when it comes to innovation.  Functional folks need to be told they can’t force the innovatoirs to conform to old rules, because that’s exactly why the company needs innovation!  Only by attacking the old rules, and being willing to allow both diversity and disruption can the business innovate.

Instead of saying “this isn’t how we do things around here” it is critical leaders make sure functional folks are saying “how can I help you innovate?”  What was done in the name of “good business” looks backward – not forward.  Status Quo cops have to be removed from the scene – kept from stopping innovation dead in its tracks.  And if the internal folks can’t be supportive, that means keeping them out of the innovator’s way entirely.

Any company can innovate.  Doing so requires recognizing that the Status Quo Police are doing what they were hired to do.  Until you take away their clout, attack their role and stop them from forcing conformance to old dictums, the business can’t hope to innovate.