by Adam Hartung | Jul 10, 2013 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Television
Tribune Corporation finally emerged from a 4 year bankruptcy on the last day of 2012. Before the ink hardly dried on the documents, leadership has decided to triple company debt to double up the number of TV stations. Oh my, some people just never learn.
The media industry is now over a decade into a significant shift. Since the 1990s internet access has changed expectations for how fast, easily and flexibly we acquire entertainment and news. The result has been a dramatic decline in printed magazine and newspaper reading, while on-line reading has skyrocketed. Simultaneously, we're now seeing that on-line streaming is making a change in how people acquire what they listen to (formerly radio based) and watch (formerly television-based.)
Unfortunately, Tribune – like most media industry companies – consistently missed these shifts and underestimated both the speed of the shift and its impact. And leadership still seems unable to understand future scenarios that will be far different from today.
In 2000 newspaper people thought they had "moats" around their markets. The big newspaper in most towns controlled the market for classified ads for things like job postings and used car sales. Classified ads represented about a third of newspaper revenues, and 40% of profits. Simultaneously display advertising for newspapers was considered a cash cow. Every theatre would advertise their movies, every car dealer their cars and every realtor their home listings. Tribune leadership felt like this was "untouchable" profitability for the LA Times and Chicago Tribune that had no competition and unending revenue growth.
So in 2000 Tribune spent $8B to buy Times-Mirror, owner of the Los
Angeles Times. Unfortunately, this huge investment (75% over market
price at the time, by the way) was made just as people were preparing to
shift away from newspapers. Craigslist, eBay and other user sites killed the market for classified ads. Simultaneously movie companies, auto companies and realtors all realized they could reach more people, with more information, cheaper on-line than by paying for newspaper ads.
These web sites all existed before the acquisition, but Tribune leadership ignored the trend. As one company executive said to me "CraigsList!! You think that's competition for a newspaper? Craigslist is for hookers! Nobody would ever put a job listing on Craigslist." Like his compadres running newspapers nationwide, the new competitors and trends toward on-line were dismissed with simplistic statements and broad generalizations that things would never change.
The floor fell out from under advertising revenues in newspapers in the 2000s. There was no way Times-Mirror would ever be worth a fraction of what Tribune paid. Debt used to help pay for the acquisition limited the options for Tribune as cost cutting gutted the organization.
Then, in 2007 Sam Zell bailed out management by putting together a leveraged buyout to acquire Tribune company. Saying that he read 3 newspapers every day, he believed people would never stop reading newspapers. Like a lot of leaders, Mr. Zell had more money than understanding of trends and shifting markets. He added a few billion dollars more debt to Tribune. By the end of 2008 Tribune was unable to meet its debt obligations, and filed for bankruptcy.
Now, new leadership has control of Tribune. They are splitting the company in two, seperating the print and broadcast businesses. The hope is to sell the newspapers, for which they believe there are 40 potential buyers. Even though profits continued falling, from $156M to $89M, in just the last year. Why anyone would buy newspaper companies, which are clearly buggy whip manufacturers, is wholly unclear. But hope springs eternal!
The new stand-alone Tribune Broadcasting company has decided to go all-in on a deal to borrow $2.7B and buy 19 additional local television stations raising total under their control to 42.
Let's see, what's the market trend in entertainment and news? Where once we were limited to local radio and television stations for most content, now we can acquire almost anything we want – from music to TV, movies, documentaries or news – via the internet. Rather than being subjected to what some programming executive decides to give us, we can select what we want, when we want it, and simply stream it to our laptop, tablet, smartphone, or even our large-screen TV.
A long time ago content was controlled by distribution. There was no reason to create news stories or radio programs or video unless you had access to distribution. Obviously, that made distribution – owning newspapers, radio and TV stations – valuable.
But today distribution is free, and everywhere. Almost every American has access to all the news and entertainment they want from the internet. Either free, or for bite-size prices that aren't too high. Today the value is in the content, not distribution.
In the last 2 years the number of homes without a classical TV connection (the cable) has doubled. Sure, it's only 5% of homes now. But the trend is pretty clear. Even homes that have cable are increasingly not watching it as they turn to more and more streaming video. Instead of watching a 30 minute program once per week, people are starting to watch 8 or 10 half hour episodes back to back. And when they want to watch those episodes, where they want to watch them.
While it might be easy for Tribune to ignore Hulu, Netflix and Amazon, the trend is very clear. The need for broadcast stations like NBC or WGN or Food Network to create content is declining as we access content more directly, from more sources. And the need to have content delivered to our home by a local affiliate station is becoming, well, an anachronism.
Yet, Tribune's new TV-oriented leadership is doubling down on its bet for local TV's future. Ignoring all the trends, they are borrowing more money to buy more assets that show all signs of becoming about as valuable whaling ships. It's a big, dumb bet. Similar to overpaying for Times-Mirror. Some leaders just seem destined to never learn.
by Adam Hartung | Jan 29, 2013 | Current Affairs, Disruptions, In the Rapids, Innovation, Leadership, Television, Web/Tech
Last week's earning's announcements gave us some big news. Looking around the tech industry, a number of companies reported about as expected, and their stocks didn't move a lot. Apple had robust sales and earnings, but missed analyst targets and fell out of bed! But without a doubt, the big winner was Netflix, which beat expectations and had an enormous ~50% jump in valuation!
My what a difference 18 months makes (see chart.) For anyone who thinks the stock market is efficient the value of Netflix should make one wonder. In July, 2011 the stock ended a meteoric run-up to $300/share, only to fall 80% to $60/share by year's end. After whipsawing between $50 and $130, but spending most of 2012 near the lower number, the stock is now up 3-fold to $160! Nothing scares investors more than volatility – and this kind of volatility would scare away almost anyone but a day trader!
Yet, through all of this I have been – and I remain – bullish on Netflix. During its run-up in 2010 I wrote "Why You Should Love Netflix," then when the stock crashed in late 2011 I wrote "The Case for Buying Netflix" and last January I predicted Netflix to be "the turnaround story of 2012." It would be logical to ask why I would remain bullish through all the ups and downs of this cycle – especially since Netflix is still only about half of its value at its high-point.
Simply put, Netflix has 2 things going for it that portend a successful future:
- Netflix is in a very, very fast growing market. Streaming entertainment. People have what appears to be an insatiable desire for entertainment, and the market not only has grown at a breathtaking rate, but it will continue to grow extremely fast for several more quarters. It is unclear where the growth rate may tap out for content delivery – putting Netflix in a market that offers enormous growth for all participants.
- Netflix leadership has shown a penchant for having the right strategy to remain a market leader – even when harshly criticized for taking fast action to deal with market shifts. Specifically, choosing to rapidly cannibalize its own DVD business by aggressively promoting streaming – even at lower margins – meant Netflix chose growth over defensiveness.
In 2011 CEO Reed Hastings was given "CEO of the Year 2010" honors by Fortune magazine. But in 2011, as he split Netflix into 2 businesses – DVD and streaming – and allowed them to price independently and compete with each other for customer business he was trounced as the "dunce" of tech CEOs.
His actions led to a price increase of 60% for anyone who decided to buy both Netflix products, and many customers chose to drop one. Analysts predicted this to be the end of Netflix.
But in retrospect we can see the brilliance of this decision. CEO Hastings actually did what textbooks tell us to do – he began milking the installed, but outdated, DVD business. He did not kill it, but he began pulling profits and cash out of it to pay for building the faster growing, but lower margin, streaming business. This allowed Netflix to actually grow revenue, and grow profits, while making the market transition from one platform (DVD) to another (streaming.)
Almost no company pulls off this kind of transition. Most companies try to defend and extend the company's "core" product far too long, missing the market transition. But now Netflix is adding around 2 million new streaming customers/quarter, while losing 400,000 DVD subscribers. And with the price changes, this has allowed the company to add content and expand internationally — and increase profits!!
Marketwatch headlined that "Naysayers Must Feel Foolish." But truthfully, they were just looking at the wrong numbers. They were fixated on the shrinking installed base of DVD subscribers. But by pushing these customers to make a fast decision, Netflix was able to convert most of them to its new streaming business before they went out and bought the service from a competitor.
Aggressive cannibalization actually was the BEST strategy given how fast tablet and smartphone sales were growing and driving up demand for streaming entertainment. Capturing the growth market was far, far more valuable than trying to defend the business destined for obsolescence.
Netflix simply did its planning looking out the windshield, at what the market was going to look like in 3 years, rather than trying to protect what it saw in the rear view mirror. The market was going to change – really fast. Faster than most people expected. Competitors like Hulu and Amazon and even Comcast wanted to grab those customers. The Netflix goal had to be to go headlong into the cold, but fast moving, water of the new streaming market as aggressively as possible. Or it would end up like Blockbuster that tried renting DVDs from its stores too long – and wound up in bankruptcy court.
There are people who still doubt that Netflix can compete against other streaming players. And this has been the knock on Netflix since 2005. That Amazon, Walmart or Comcast would crush the smaller company. But what these analysts missed was that Amazon and Walmart are in a war for the future of retail – not entertainment – and their efforts in streaming were more to protect a flank in their retail strategy, not win in streaming entertainment. Likewise, Comcast and its brethren are out to defend cable TV, not really win at anytime, anywhere streaming entertainment. Their defensive behavior would never allow them to lead in a fast-growing new marketplace. Thus the market was left for Netflix to capture – if it had the courage to rapidly cannibalize its base and commit to the new marketplace.
Hulu and Redbox are also competitors. And they very likely will do very well for several years. Because the market is growing very fast and can support multiple players. But Netflix benefits from being first, and being biggest. It has the most cash flow to invest in additional growth. It has the largest subscriber base to attract content providers earlier, and offer them the most money. By maintaining its #1 position – even by cannibalizing itself to do so – Netflix is able to keep the other competitors at bay; reinforcing its leadership position.
There are some good lessons here for everyone:
- Think long-term, not short-term. A king can become a goat only to become a king again if he haa the right strategy. You probably aren't as good as the press says when they like you, nor as bad as they say when hated. Don't let yourself be goaded into giving up the long-term win for short-term benefits.
- Growth covers a multitude of sins! The way Netflix launched its 2-division campaign in 2011 was a disaster. But when a market is growing at 100%+ you can rapidly recover. Netflix grew its streaming user base by more than 50% last year – and that fixes a lot of mistakes. Anytime you have a choice, go for the fast growing market!!
- Follow the trend! Never fight the trend! Tablet sales were growing at an amazing clip, while DVD players had no sales gains. With tablet and smartphone sales eclipsing DVD player sales, the smart move was to go where the trend was headed. Being first on the trend has high payoff. Moving slowly is death. Kodak failed to aggressively convert film camera customers to its own digital cameras, and it filed bankruptcy in 2012.
- Dont' forget to be profitable! Even if it means raising prices on dated solutions that will eventually become obsolete – to customer howls. You must maximize the profits of an outdated product line as fast as possible. Don't try to defend and extend it. Those tactics use up cash and resources rather than contributing to future success.
- Cannibalizing your installed base is smart when markets shift. Regardless the margin concerns. Newspapers said they could not replace "print ad dollars" with "on-line ad dimes" so many went bankrupt defending the paper as the market shifted. Move fast. Force the cannibalization early so you can convert existing customers to your solution, and keep them, before they go to an emerging competitor.
- When you need to move into a new market set up a new division to attack it. And give them permission to do whatever it takes. Even if their actions aggravate existing customers and industry participants. Push them to learn fast, and grow fast – and even to attack old sacred cows (like bundled pricing.)
There were a lot of people who thought my call that Netflix would be the turnaround tech story of 2012 was simply bizarre. But they didn't realize the implications of the massive trend to tablets and smartphones. The impact is far-reaching – affecting not only computer companies but television, content delivery and content creation. Netflix positioned itself to be a winner, and implemented the tactics to make that strategy work despite widespread skepticism.
Hats off to Netflix leadership. A rare breed. That's why long-term investors should own the stock.
by Adam Hartung | Dec 10, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lifecycle, Television
Remember when almost everyone read a daily newspaper?
Newspaper readership peaked around 2000. Since then printed media has declined, as readers shifted on-line. Magazines have folded, and newspapers have disappeared, quit printing, dramatically cut page numbers and even more dramatically cut staff.
Amazingly, almost no major print publisher prepared for this, even though the trend was becoming clear in the late 1990s.
Newspapers are no longer a viable business. While industry revenue grew for
almost 2 centuries, it collapsed in a mere decade.
Chart Source: BusinessInsider.com
This market shift created clear winners, and losers. On-line news sites like Marketwatch and HuffingtonPost were clear winners. Losers were traditional newspaper companies such as Tribune Corporation, Gannett, McClatchey, Dow Jones and even the New York Times Company. And investors in these companies either saw their values soar, or practically disintegrate.
In 2012 it is equally clear that television is on the brink of a major transition. Fewer people are content to have their entertainment programmed for them when they can program it themselves on-line. Even though the number of television channels has exploded with pervasive cable access, the time spent watching television is not growing. While simultaneously the amount of time people spend looking at mobile internet displays (tablets, smartphones and laptops) is growing at double digit rates.
Chart Source: Silicone Alley Insider Chart of the Day 12/5/12
It would be easy to act like newspaper defenders and pretend that television as we've known it will not change. But that would be, at best, naive. Just look around at broadband access, the use of mobile devices, the convenience of mobile and the number of people that don't even watch traditional TV any more (especially younger people) and the trend is clear. One-way preprogrammed advertising laden television is not a sustainable business.
So, now is the time to prepare. And change your business to align with impending new realities.
Losers, and winners, will be varied – and not entirely obvious. Firstly, a look at those trying to maintain the status quo, and likely to lose the most.
Giant consumer goods and retail companies benefitted from the domination of television. Only huge companies like P&G, Kraft, GM and Target could afford to lay out billions of dollars for television ads to build, and defend, a brand. But what advantage will they have when TV budgets no longer control brand building? They will become extremely vulnerable to more innovative companies that have better products and move on fast lifecycles. Their size, hierarchy and arcane business practices will lead to huge problems. Imagine a raft of new Hostess Brands experiences.
Even as the trends have started changing these companies have continued pumping billions into the traditional TV networks as they spend to defend their brand position. This has driven up the value of companies like CBS, Comcast (owns NBC) and Disney (owns ABC) over the last 3 years substantially. But don't expect that to last forever. Or even a few more years.
Just like newspaper ad spending fell off a cliff when it was clear the eyeballs were no longer there, expect the same for television ad spending. As giant advertisers find the cost of television harder and harder to justify their outlays will eventually take the kind of cliff dive observed in the chart (above) for newspaper advertising. Already some consumer goods and ad agency executives are alluding to the fact that the rate of return on traditional TV is becoming sketchy.
So far, we've seen little at the companies which own TV networks to demonstrate they are prepared for the floor to fall out of their revenue stream. While some have positions in a few internet production and delivery companies, most are clearly still doing their best to defend & extend the old business – just like newspaper owners did. Just as newspapers never found a way to replace the print ad dollars, these television companies look very much like businesses that have no apparent solution for future growth. I would not want my 401K invested in any major network company.
And there will be winners.
For smaller businesses, there has never been a better time to compete. A company as small as Tesla or Fisker can now create a brand on-line at a fraction of the old cost. And that brand can be as powerful as Ford, and potentially a lot more trendy. There are very low entry barriers for on-line brand building using not only ad words and web page display ads, but also using social media to build loyal followers who use and promote a brand. What was once considered a niche can become well known almost overnight simply by applying the new dynamics of reaching customers on-line, and increasingly via mobile. Look at the success of Toms Shoes.
Zappos and Amazon have shown that with almost no television ads they can create powerhouse retail brands. The new retailers do not compete just on price, but are able to offer selection, availability and customer service at levels unachievable by traditional brick-and-mortar retailers. They can suggest products and prices of things you're likely to need, even before you realize you need them. They can educate better, and faster, than most retail store employees. And they can offer great prices due to less overhead, along with the convenience of shipping the product right into your home.
And as people quit watching preprogrammed TV, where will they go for content? Anybody streaming will have an advantage – so think Netflix (which recently contracted for all the Disney content,) Amazon, Pandora, Spotify and even AOL. But, this will also benefit those companies providing content access such as Apple TV, Google TV, YouTube (owned by Google) to offer content channels and the increasingly omnipresent Facebook will deliver up not only friends, but content — and ads.
As for content creation, the deep pockets of traditional TV production companies will likely disappear along with their ability to control distribution. That means fewer big-budget productions as risk goes up without revenue assurances.
But that means even more ability for newer, smaller companies to create competitive content seeking audiences. Where once a very clever, hard working Seth McFarlane (creator of Family Guy) had to hardscrabble with networks to achieve distribution, and live in fear of a single person controlling his destiny, in the future these creative people will be able to own their content and capture the value directly as they build a direct audience. A phenomenon like George Lucas will be more achievable than ever before as what might look like chaos during transition will migrate to a much more competitive world where audiences, rather than network executives, will decide what content wins – and loses.
So, with due respects to Don McLean, will today be the day TV Died? We will only know in historical context. Nobody predicted newspapers had peaked in 2000, but it was clear the internet was changing news consumption behavior. And we don't know if TV viewership will begin its rapid decline in 2013, or in a couple more years. But the inevitable change is clear – we just don't know exactly when.
So it would be foolish to not think that the industry is going to change dramatically. And the impact on advertising will be even more profound, much more profound, than it was in print. And that will have an even more profound impact on American society – and how business is done.
What are you doing to prepare?
by Adam Hartung | Jun 1, 2012 | Current Affairs, In the Rapids, Innovation, Leadership, Television, Web/Tech
On May 18 Facebook went public with an opening price of $38/share. Now, after just 2 weeks, it's more like $28. Ouch – a 25%+ drop in such a short time makes nobody happy. Except buyers. And if you are interested in capturing a high rate of return with little risk, this is your lucky break!
The values of publicly traded companies change, often dramatically, based upon changes in performance and investor expectations about the future. Trying to profit off fast price changes is the world of traders – and the vast majority of them lose fortunes rather than create them. Knowing how to ignore whipsaw events, and invest in good companies when they are out of favor is important to long-term wealth creation.
Investors make money by understanding product markets and the companies supplying them, then investing in companies that build upon trends to create revenue growth with high rates of return over several years. In the forgettable 1999 movie "Blast from the Past" (Brendan Fraser, Christopher Walken, Sissy Spacek) a family moves into its nuclear blast shelter in 1960 during a panic, and doesn't come out for 35 years. Fortunately, the father had bought shares of AT&T and other companies aligned with 1960 trends, and the family discovers upon re-emergence it is quite wealthy.
Creating investment wealth means acting like them, buying shares in companies building on trends so you can hold shares for years without much worry.
If ever there was a company aligned with trends, it is Facebook. The company did not create 900million users in 8 years by being lucky. Facebook is the ultimate information era company. Facebook is not a fad – any more than television or telephones were fads in 1960. Just like they provided fundamental new ways of acquiring and disseminating information Facebook is the newest, most efficient and effective way for connecting and communicating in 2012.
When television appeared the mass population said "why?" There was radio, which was cheap, and older users said TV reduced the use of imagination. And television was not available many hours per day. But it didn't take long for CBS and its brethren to prove it could attract eyeballs, and soon Proctor & Gamble started paying for programming so it could promote its soaps (remember "soap operas?") Soon other companies developed programs strictly so they could promote their products. The "Ted Mack Amateur Hour" was sponsored by Geritol, and viewers were reminded of that over and over for 30 minutes every week. Eventually the TV ad model changed, but the lesson is clear - when you can attract eyeballs it has value and there will be businesses creative enough to take advantage.
Now television watching is declining. Instead, people are spending more time on the internet – including via mobile devices. And the location attracting the most people, and by far for the most minutes per day, is Facebook. Facebook's access to so many people, so often, creates an audience many businesses and non-profits want to tap.
Further, in the networked world Facebook not only has eyeballs, it delivers up to those eyeballs some 9 million apps, and knows what everyone wants, where they come from and where they go next. Beyond the industrial-era business of selling ads (like Google,) Facebook's information business has significant value for anyone trying to promote or sell a solution. Facebook is a repository of information about people, and their behavior, never before seen, understood or developed for use.
Around the IPO, General Motors decided to drop its Facebook advertising. That freaked some investors. Cries arose that social media is somehow broken, and unable to develop a business model.
Let's keep in mind who we're talking about here – GM. Not the most innovative, forward thinking company, to put it mildly. GM, like a lot of other plodding, but big spending, large companies has approached social media like it is just television on the web – and would prefer to simply put up a television ad on a Facebook like link. Whoa! That would be akin to a 1960s TV ad that was simply the text from a newspaper ad. Nobody would read it, and it simply wouldn't work.
Television required a new kind of communication to reach customers – and social media does as well. TV required the ad be entertaining, with movement, product use demonstrations, and video plus audio to go with the words. Connecting with users was harder, but the message (and connection) could be far more robust. And that is what advertisers are being forced to learn about Facebook/Social. It has new requirements, but once understood companies can be remarkably successful at connecting with potential customers – far more than the traditional one-way approach of historical advertising.
Paid promotion on Facebook is just the tip of the iceberg – a one-way approach to advertising sure to create short-term revenue but not terribly robust. Beyond that, social media changes everything. Retail, for example, is fast shifting from pushing inventory to being all about understanding the customer and offering them what they need in an anticipatory way (think Amazon rather than Best Buy.) And nowhere can you better understand customer needs than by social media participation. By being an information company, rather than an industrial company, FB is remarkably well positioned to create growth – for everybody that figures out how to use this remarkable platform.
As Facebook's shares kept falling this week, more attention was paid to whether traditional advertisers would buy FB. And much was made about whether the "metrics" were there to justify social media investments. This micro-management approach clearly misses the main point. People are already on Facebook, their numbers are growing, their uses are growing, their time on the site is growing, and the benefits of using Facebook are growing. Trying to measure Facebook use the way you would measure a print ad – or even a Google Adword buy – is simply using the wrong tool.
When P&G first started producing television "soaps" their competition sat back and said "look at what television advertising costs, compared to print and compared to pushing products into the local stores. What is the return for each of those television shows? Can it be justified? I think it is smarter to keep doing what we've done while P&G throws money at ads you can't measure." By moving beyond the historically myopic view of trying to find returns at the micro level P&G quickly became (at the time) the world's largest consumer goods company. Early TV advertisers followed the trend, knowing their participation would create returns far in excess of doing more of the old thing. And that is the direction of social media.
There was a lot of anticipatory excitement for the Facebook IPO. Lots of people wanted shares, and couldn't buy them in advance. The public, and the Morgan Stanley investment bankers, clearly thought the shares would go up. Oops. But that's a lucky thing for investors. Especially small investors, usually unable to participate in a "hot" IPO. Now anybody can buy FB shares at a 25% discount to the offering price – a better deal than the institutional buyers that usually get the "sweet" deal little guys never see.
If you are an employee, short term you might be unhappy. But if you are an investor, be happy that worries about Greece, the Euro's future, domestic politics, a lousy jobs report and simple myths like "sell in May and go away" have been a drag on equities this month – and diminished interest in Facebook.
Buy FB shares, then forget about them for a while. What you care about isn't the value of FB shares in 4 days, 4 weeks or 4 months – you care about 4 years. If you missed the chance to buy Microsoft in 1986, or Amazon in 1997, or Apple in 2000, or Google in 2004 then don't miss this one. There will be volatility, but the trends are all in your favor.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 20, 2012 | Current Affairs, In the Swamp, Lifecycle, Lock-in, Television, Web/Tech
Who can forget what a great company Sony was, and the enormous impact it had on our lives? With its heritage, it is hard to believe that Sony hasn't made a profit in 4 consecutive years, just recently announced it will double its expected loss for this year to $6.4 billion, has only 15% of its capital left as equity (debt/equity ration of 5.67x) and is only worth 1/4 of its value 10 years ago!
After World War II Sony was the company that took the transistor technology invented by Texas Instruments (TI) and made the popular, soon to become ubiquitous, transistor radio. Under co-founder Akio Morita Sony kept looking for advances in technology, and its leadership spent countless hours innovatively thinking about how to apply these advances to improve lives. With a passion for creating new markets, Sony was an early creator, and dominator, of what we now call "consumer electronics:"
- Sony improved solid state transistor radios until they surpassed the quality of tubes, making good quality sound available very reliably, and inexpensively
- Sony developed the solid state television, replacing tubes to make TVs more reliable, better working and use less energy
- Sony developed the Triniton television tube, which dramatically improved the quality of color (yes Virginia, once TV was all in black & white) and enticed an entire generation to switch. Sony also expanded the size of Trinitron to make larger sets that better fit larger homes.
- Sony was an early developer of videotape technology, pioneering the market with Betamax before losing a battle with JVC to be the standard (yes Virginia, we once watched movies on tape)
- Sony pioneered the development of camcorders, for the first time turning parents – and everyone – into home movie creators
- Sony pioneered the development of independent mobile entertainment by creating the Walkman, which allowed – for the first time – people to take their own recorded music with them, via cassette tapes
- Sony pioneered the development of compact discs for music, and developed the Walkman CD for portable use
- Sony gave us the Playstation, which went far beyond Nintendo in creating the products that excited users and made "home gaming" a market.
Very few companies could ever boast a string of such successful products. Stories about Sony management meetings revealed a company where executives spent 85% of their time on technology, products and new applications/markets, 10% on human resource issues and 5% on finance. To Mr. Morita financial results were just that – results – of doing a good job developing new products and markets. If Sony did the first part right, the results would be good. And they were.
By the middle 1980s, America was panicked over the absolute domination of companies like Sony in product manufacturing. Not only consumer electronics, but automobiles, motorcycles, kitchen electronics and a growing number of markets. Politicians referred to Japanese competitors, like the wildly successful Sony, as "Japan Inc." – and discussed how the powerful Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) effectively shuttled resources around to "beat" American manufacturers. Even as rising petroleum costs seemed to cripple U.S. companies, Japanese manufacturers were able to turn innovations (often American) into very successful low-cost products growing sales and profits.
So what went wrong for Sony?
Firstly was the national obsession with industrial economics. W. Edward Deming in 1950s Japan institutionalized manufacturing quality and optimization. Using a combination of process improvements and arithmetic, Deming convinced Japanese leaders to focus, focus, focus on making things better, faster and cheaper. Taking advantage of Japanese post war dependence on foreign capital, and foreign markets, this U.S. citizen directed Japanese industry into an obsession with industrialization as practiced in the 1940s — and was credited for creating the rapid massive military equipment build-up that allowed the U.S. to defeat Japan.
Unfortunately, this narrow obsession left Japanese business leaders, buy and large, with little skill set for developing and implementing R&D, or innovation, in any other area. As time passed, Sony fell victim to developing products for manufacturing, rather than pioneering new markets.
The Vaio, as good as it was, had little technology for which Sony could take credit. Sony ended up in a cost/price/manufacturing war with Dell, HP, Lenovo and others to make cheap PCs – rather than exciting products. Sony's evolved a distinctly Industrial strategy, focused on manufacturing and volume, rather than trying to develop uniquely new products that were head-and-shoulders better than competitors.
In mobile phones Sony hooked up with, and eventually acquired, Ericsson. Again, no new technology or effort to make a wildly superior mobile device (like Apple did.) Instead Sony sought to build volume in order to manufacture more phones and compete on price/features/functions against Nokia, Motorola and Samsung. Lacking any product or technology advantage, Samsung clobbered Sony's Industrial strategy with lower cost via non-Japanese manufacturing.
When Sony updated its competition in home movies by introducing Blue Ray, the strategy was again an Industrial one – about how to sell Blue Ray recorders and players. Sony didn't sell the Blue Ray software technology in hopes people would use it. Instead it kept it proprietary so only Sony could make and sell Blue Ray products (hardware). Just as it did in MP3, creating a proprietary version usable only on Sony devices. In an information economy, this approach didn't fly with consumers, and Blue Ray was a money loser largely irrelevant to the market – as is the now-gone Sony MP3 product line.
We see this across practically all the Sony businesses. In televisions, for example, Sony has lost the technological advantage it had with Trinitron cathode ray tubes. In flat screens Sony has applied a predictable, but money losing Industrial strategy trying to compete on volume and cost. Up against competitors sourcing from lower cost labor, and capital, countries Sony has now lost over $10B over the last 8 years in televisions. Yet, Sony won't give up and intends to stay with its Industrial strategy even as it loses more money.
Why did Sony's management go along with this? As mentioned, Akio Morita was an innovator and new market creator. But, Mr. Morita lived through WWII, and developed his business approach before Deming. Under Mr. Morita, Sony used the industrial knowledge Deming and his American peers offered to make Sony's products highly competitive against older technologies. The products led, with industrial-era tactics used to lower cost.
But after Mr. Morita other leaders were trained, like American-minted MBAs, to implement Industrial strategies. Their minds put products, and new markets, second. First was a commitment to volume and production – regardless of the products or the technology. The fundamental belief was that if you had enough volume, and you cut costs low enough, you would eventually succeed.
By 2005 Sony reached the pinnacle of this strategic approach by installing a non-Japanese to run the company. Sir Howard Stringer made his fame running Sony's American business, where he exemplified Industrial strategy by cutting 9,000 of 30,000 U.S. jobs (almost a full third.) To Mr. Stringer, strategy was not about innovation, technology, products or new markets.
Mr. Stringer's Industrial strategy was to be obsessive about costs. Where Mr. Morita's meetings were 85% about innovation and market application, Mr. Stringer brought a "modern" MBA approach to the Sony business, where numbers – especially financial projections – came first. The leadership, and management, at Sony became a model of MBA training post-1960. Focus on a narrow product set to increase volume, eschew costly development of new technologies in favor of seeking high-volume manufacturing of someone else's technology, reduce product introductions in order to extend product life, tooling amortization and run lengths, and constantly look for new ways to cut costs. Be zealous about cost cutting, and reward it in meetings and with bonuses.
Thus, during his brief tenure running Sony Mr. Stringer will not be known for new products. Rather, he will be remembered for initiating 2 waves of layoffs in what was historically a lifetime employment company (and country.) And now, in a nod to Chairman Stringer the new CEO at Sony has indicated he will react to ongoing losses by – you guessed it – another round of layoffs. This time it is estimated to be another 10,000 workers, or 6% of the employment. The new CEO, Mr. Hirai, trained at the hand of Mr. Stringer, demonstrates as he announces ever greater losses that Sony hopes to – somehow – save its way to prosperity with an Industrial strategy.
Japanese equity laws are very different that the USA. Companies often have much higher debt levels. And companies can even operate with negative equity values – which would be technical bankruptcy almost everywhere else. So it is not likely Sony will fill bankruptcy any time soon.
But should you invest in Sony? After 4 years of losses, and entrenched Industrial strategy with MBA-style leadership focused on "numbers" rather than markets, there is no reason to think the trajectory of sales or profits will change any time soon.
As an employee, facing ongoing layoffs why would you wish to work at Sony? A "me too" product strategy with little technical innovation that puts all attention on cost reduction would not be a fun place. And offers little promotional growth.
And for suppliers, it is assured that each and every meeting will be about how to lower price – over, and over, and over.
Every company today can learn from the Sony experience. Sony was once a company to watch. It was an innovative leader, that pioneered new markets. Not unlike Apple today. But with its Industrial strategy and MBA numbers- focused leadership it is now time to say, sayonara. Sell Sony, there are more interesting companies to watch and more profitable places to invest.
