JCPenney's board fired the company CEO 18 months ago. Frustrated with weak performance, they replaced him with the most famous person in retail at the time. Ron Johnson was running Apple's stores, which had the highest profit per square foot of any retail chain in America. Sure he would bring the Midas touch to JC Penney they gave him a $50M sign-on bonus and complete latitude to do as he wished.
Things didn't work out so well. Sales fell some 25%. The stock dropped 50%. So about 2 weeks ago the Board fired Ron Johnson.
The first mistake: Ron Johnson didn't try solving the real problem at JC Penney. He spent lavishly trying to remake the brand. He modernized the logo, upped the TV ad spend, spruced up stores and implemented a more consistent pricing strategy. But that all was designed to help JC Penney compete in traditional brick-and-mortar retail. Against traditional companies like Wal-Mart, Kohl's, Sears, etc. But that wasn't (and isn't) JC Penney's problem.
The problem in all of traditional retail is the growth of on-line. In a small margin business with high fixed costs, like traditional retail, even a small revenue loss has a big impact on net profit. For every 5% revenue decline 50-90% of that lost cash comes directly off the bottom line – because costs don't fall with revenues. And these days every quarter – every month – more and more customers are buying more and more stuff from Amazon.com and its on-line brethren rather than brick and mortar stores. It is these lost revenues that are destroying revenues and profits at Sears and JC Penney, and stagnating nearly everyone else including Wal-Mart.
Coming from the tech world, you would have expected CEO Johnson to recognize this problem and radically change the strategy, rather than messing with tactics. He should have looked to close stores to lower fixed costs, developed a powerful on-line presence and marketed hard to grab more customers showrooming or shopping from home. He should have targeted to grow JCP on-line, stealing revenues from other traditional retailers, while making the company more of a hybrid retailer that profitably met customer needs in stores, or on-line, as suits them. He should have used on-line retail to take customers from locked-in competitors unable to deal with "cannibalization."
No wonder the results tanked, and CEO Johnson was fired. Doing more of the tired, old strategies in a shifting market never works. In Apple parlance, he needed to be focused on an iPad strategy, when instead he kept trying to sell more Macs.
What was that old description of insanity? Something about repeating yourself…..
Expectedly, Penney's stock dropped another 10% after announcing the old CEO would return. Investors are smart enough to recognize the retail market has shifted. That newsapaper coupons, circulars and traditional advertising is not enough to compete with on-line merchants which have lower fixed costs, faster inventory turns and wider product selection.
It certainly appears Mr. Johnson was not the right person to grow JC Penney. All the more reason JCP needs to accelerate its strategy toward the on-line retail trend. Going backward will only worsen an already terrible situation.
Interestingly, this study is based wholly on statistical performance, rather than customer input. The academics utilize on-time flight performance, denied passenger boardings, mishandled bags and complaints filed with the Department of Transportation. It does not even begin to explore surveying customers about their satisfaction. Anyone who flies regularly can well imagine those results. Oh my.
So how would you expect an innovative, adaptive growth-oriented company (think like Amazon, Apple, Samsung, Virgin, Neimann-Marcus, Lulu Lemon) to react to declining customer performance metrics? They might actually change the product, to make it more desirable by customers. They might hire more customer service representatives to identify customer issues and fix problems quicker. They might adjust their processes to achieve higher customer satisfaction. They might train their employees to be more customer-oriented.
But, United decidedly is not an innovative, adaptive organization. So it responded by denying the situation. Claiming things are getting better. And talking about how it is spending more money on its long-term strategy.
United doesn't care about customers – and really never has. United is focused on "operational excellence" (using the word excellence very loosely) as Messrs. Treacy and Wiersema called this strategy in their mega-popular book "The Discipline of Market Leaders" from 1995. United's strategy, like many, many businesses, is to constantly strive for better execution of an old strategy (in their case, hub-and-spoke flight operations) by hammering away at cutting costs.
Locked in to this strategy, United invests in more airplanes and gates (including making acquisitions like Continental) believing that being bigger will lead to more cost cutting opportunities (code named "synergies".) They beat up on employees, fight with unions, remove anything unessential (like food) invent ways to create charges (like checked bags or change fees), fiddle with fuel costs, ignore customers and constantly try to engineer minute enhancements to operations in efforts to save pennies.
Like many companies, United is fixated on this strategy, even if it can't make any money. Even if this strategy once drove it to bankruptcy. Even if its employees are miserable. Even if quality metrics decline. Even if every year customers are less and less happy with the product. All of that be darned! United just keeps doing what it has always done, for over 3 decades, hoping that somehow – magically – results will improve.
Today people have choices. More choices than ever. That's true for transportation as well. As customers have become less happy, they simply won't pay as much to fly. The impact of all this operational focus, but let the customer be danged, management is price degradation to the point that United, like all the airlines, barely (or doesn't – like American) cover costs. And because of all the competition each airline constantly chases the other to the bottom of customer satisfaction – each lowering its price as it mimics the others with cost cuts.
Success today – everywhere, not just airlines – requires more than operational focus. Constantly cutting costs ruins the brand, customer satisfaction, eliminates investment in new products and inevitably kills profitability. The litany of failed airlines demonstrates just how ineffective this strategy has become. Because operational improvements are so easily matched by competitors, and ignores alternatives (like trains, buses and automobiles for airlines) it leads to price wars, lower profits and bankruptcy.
Nobody looks to airlines as a model of management. But many companies still believe operational excellence will lead to success. They need to look at the long-term implications of this strategy, and recognize that without innovation, new products and highly satisfied new customers no business will thrive – or even survive.
The iPad is now 3 years old. Hard to believe we've only had tablets such a short time, given how common they have become. It's easy to forget that when launched almost all analysts thought the iPad was a toy that would be lucky to sell a few million units. Apple blew away that prediction in just a few months, as people demonstrated their lust for mobility. To date the iPad has sold 121million units – with an ongoing sales rate of nearly 20million per quarter.
Following very successful launches of the iPod (which transformed music from CDs to MP3) and iPhone (which turned everyone into smartphone users,) the iPad's transformation of personal technology made Apple look like an impenetrable juggernaut – practically untouchable by any competitor! The stock soared from $200/share to over $700/share, and Apple became the most valuable publicly traded company on any American exchange!
But things look very different now. Despite huge ongoing sales (iPad sales exceed Windows sales,) and a phenomenal $30B cash hoard ($100B if you include receivables) Apple's value has declined by 40%!
In the tech world, people tend to think competition is all about the product. Feature and functionality comparisons abound. And by that metric, no one has impacted Apple. After 3 years in development, Microsoft's much anticipated Surface has been a bust – selling only about 1.5million units in the first 6 months. Nobody has created a product capable of outright dethroning the i product series. Quite simply, there have been no "game changer" products that dramatically outperform Apple's.
But, any professor of introductory marketing will tell you that there are 4 P's in marketing: Product, Price, Place and Promotion. And understanding that simple lesson was the basis for the successful onslaught Samsung has waged upon Apple in 2012 and 2013.
Samsung did not change the game with technology or product. It has used the same Android starting point as most competitors for phones and tablets. It's products are comparable to Apple's – but not dramatically superior. And while they are cheaper, in most instances that has not been the reason people switched. Instead, Samsung changed the game by focusing on distribution and advertising!
The remarkable insight from this chart is that Samsung is spending almost 4.5 times Apple – and $1B more than perennial consumer goods brand leader Coca-Cola on advertising! Simultaneously, Samsung has set up kiosks and stores in malls and retail locations all over America.
Can you imagine having the following conversation in your company in 2010?:
"As Vice President of Marketing I propose we take on the market leader not by having a superior product. We will change the game from features and function comparisons to availability and awareness. I intend to spend more than anyone in our industry on advertising – even more than Coke. And I will open so many information and sales locations that our products will be as available as Coke. We'll be everywhere. Our products may not be better, but they will be everywhere and everyone will know about them."
Samsung found Apple's Achilles heel. As Apple's revenues rose it did not keep its marketing growing. SG&A (Selling, General and Administrative) expense declined from 14% of revenues in 2006 to 5% in 2012; of course aiding its skyrocketing profits. And Apple continued to sell through its fairly limited distribution of Apple stores and network providers. Apple started to "milk" its hard won brand position, rather than intensify it.
Samsung took advantage of Apple's oversight. Samsung maintained its SG&A budget at 15% of revenues – even growing it to 24% for a brief time in 2009, before returning to 15%. As its revenues grew, advertising and distribution grew. Instead of looking back at its old ad budget in dollars, and maintaining that budget, Samsung allowed the budget to grow (to a huge number!) along with revenues.
And that's how Samsung changed the game on Apple. Once America's untouchable brand, the Apple brand has faltered. People now question Apple's sustainability. Some now recognize Apple is vulnerable, and think its best times are behind it. And it's all because Samsung ignored the industry lock-in to constantly focusing on product, and instead changed the game on Apple.
Something Microsoft should have thought about – but didn't.
Of course, Apple's profits are far, far higher than Samsung's. And Apple is still a great company, and a well regarded brand, with tremendous sales. There are ongoing rumors of a new iOS 7 operating system, an updated format for iPads, potentially a dramatically new iPhone and even an iTV. And Apple is not without great engineers, and a HUGE war chest which it could use on advertising and distribution to go heads up with Samsung.
But, at least for now, Samsung has demonstrated how a competitor can change the game on a market leader. Even a leader as successful and powerful as Apple. And Samsung's leaders deserve a lot of credit for seeing the opportunity – and seizing it!
Marissa Mayer created a firestorm this week by issuing an email requiring all employees who work from home to begin daily commuting to Yahoo offices. Some folks are saying this is going to be a blow to long-term employees, hamper productivity and will harm the company. Others are saying this will improve communications and cooperation, thin out unproductive employees and help Yahoo.
While there are arguments to be made on both sides, the issue is far simpler than many people make it out to be – and the implications for shareholders are downright scary.
Yahoo has been a strugging company for several years. And the reason has nothing to do with its work from home policy. Yahoo has lacked an effective strategy for a decade – and changing its work from home policy does nothing to fix that problem.
In the late 1990s almost every computer browser had Yahoo as its home page. But Yahoo long ago lost its leadership position in content aggregation, search and ad placement. Now, Yahoo is irrelevant. It has no technology advantage, no product advantage and no market advantage. It is so weak in all markets that its only value has been as a second competitor that keeps the market leader from being attacked as a monopolist!
A series of CEOs have been unable to develop a new strategy for Yahoo to make it more like Amazon or Apple and less like – well, Yahoo. With much fanfare Ms. Mayer was brought into the flailing company from Google, which is a market leader, to turn around Yahoo. Only she's been on the job 7 months, and there still is no apparent strategy to return Yahoo to greatness.
Instead, Ms. Mayer has delivered to investors a series of tactical decisions, such as changing the home page layout and now the work from home policy. If tactical decisions alone could fix Yahoo Carol Bartz would have been a hero – instead of being pushed out by the Board in disgrace.
Many leading pundits are enthused with CEO Mayer's decision to force all employees into offices. They are saying she is "making the tough decisions" to "cut the corporate cost structure" and "push people to be more productive." Underlying this lies thinking that the employees are lazy and to blame for Yahoo's failure.
Balderdash. It's not employees' fault Yahoo, and Ms. Mayer, lack an effective strategy to earn a high return on their efforts.
It isn't hard for a new CEO to change policies that make it harder for people to do their jobs – by cutting hours out of their day via commuting. Or lowering productivity as they are forced into endless meetings that "enhance communication and cooperation." Or forcing them out of the company entirely with arcane work rules in a misguided effort to lower operating costs or overhead. Any strategy-free CEO can do those sorts of things.
The the fact that some Yahoo employees work from home has nothing to do with the lack of strategy, innovation and growth at Yahoo. That failure is due to leadership. Bringing these employees into offices will only hurt morale, increase real estate costs and push out several valuable workers who have been diligently keeping afloat a severely damaged Yahoo ship. These employees, whether in an office or working at home, will not create a new strategy for Yahoo. And bringing them into offices will not improve the strategy development or innovation processes.
Regardless of anyone's personal opinions about working from home, it has been the trend for over a decade. Work has changed dramatically the last 30 years, and increasingly productivity relies on having time, alone, to think and produce charts, graphs, documents, lines of code, letters, etc. Technologies, from PCs to mobile devices and the software used on them (including communications applications like WebEx, Skype and other conferencing tools) make it possible for people to be as productive remotely as in person. Usually more productive removed from interruptions.
Taking advantage of this trend helps any company to hire better, and be more productive. Going against this trend is simply foolish – regardless the intellectual arguments made to support such a decision. Apple fought the trend to PCs and almost failed. When it wholesale adopted the trend to mobile, seriously reducing its commitment to PC markets, Apple flourished. It is ALWAYS easier to succeed when you work with, and augment trends. Fighting trends ALWAYS fails.
Yahoo investors have plenty to be worried about. Yahoo doesn't need a "tough" CEO. Yahoo needs a CEO with the insight to create, and implement, a new strategy. And a series of tactical actions do not sum to a new strategy. As importantly, the new strategy – and its implementation – needs to augment trends. Not go against trends while demonstrating the clout of a new CEO.
If you've been waiting to figure out if Ms. Mayer is the CEO that can make Yahoo a great company again, the answer is becoming clear. She increasingly appears very unlikely to have what it takes.
Forbes republished its annual "Most Miserable Cities" list. It looks at employment/unemployment, inflation, incomes and cost of living, crime, weather, commute times – a pretty good overview of things tied to living somewhere. Detroit ranked first, as the most miserable city, with Flint, MI second. And my home-sweet-home Chicago came in fourth. Ouch!
There is an important lesson here for every city – and for our country.
Detroit was a thriving city during the industrial revolution. Innovation in all things mechanical led to the modern automobile; a marvelous innovation which, literally, everyone wanted. As demand skyrocketed, Henry Ford's management team developed the modern assembly line which allowed production volumes to skyrocket as well. Detroit was a hotbed of industrial innovation.
This fueled growth in jobs, which led to massive immigration to Detroit. With growth the tax base expanded, and quickly Detroit was a leading city with all the best things people could want. In the 1950s and 1960s Detroit reaped the benefits of the local auto companies, and their suppliers, as ongoing innovations drove better cars, more sales, more revenue taxes, higher property values and higher property taxes. It was a glorious virtuous circle.
But things changed.
Offshore competitors came into the market creating different kinds of autos appealing to different customers. Initially they had lower costs, and less expensive designs. Their cars weren't as good as GM, Ford or Chrysler – but they were cheap. And when gasoline prices took off in the 1970s people suddenly realized these cars were also more fuel efficient and cheaper to maintain. As these offshore competitors gained more sales they invested in making better cars, until they had quality as good as the Detroit companies, plus better fuel efficiency.
But the Detroit companies had become stuck in their processes that worked in earlier days. Even though the market shifted, they didn't. What passed for innovations were increasingly simple appearance changes as bottom-line focus reduced willingness to do new things, and offered fewer new things to do. GM and its brethren didn't shift with the market, and by the 1980s the seeds of big problems already were showing. By the 1990s profits were increasingly variable and elusive.
The formerly weak and small competitors now were more competitive in a changed market favoring smaller cars with more, and better, technology. The market had changed, but the big American auto companies had not. They kept doing more of the same – hopefully better, faster and striving for cheaper. But they were falling further behind. By the 2000s decade failure had become the viable option, with both Chrysler and GM going bankrupt.
As this cycle played out, the impact on Detroit was clear. Less success in the business base meant fewer revenue tax dollars from less profitable companies. Cost reductions meant employment stagnated, then started falling. Incomes stagnated, and people left Detroit to find better paying jobs. Property values began to fall. Income and property taxes declined. Governments had to borrow more, and cut costs, leading to declines in services. What had been a virtuous circle became a violently destructive whirlpool.
Detroit's business leaders failed to invest in programs to drive more new jobs in non-auto, non-industrial, business development. As competitors hurt the local industry, Detroit (and Michigan's) leaders kept trying to invest in saving the historical business, while the economy was shifting from an industrial base to an information one. It wasn't just autos that were less valuable as companies, but everything industrial. Yet, leaders failed at attracting new technology companies. The economic shift – the market shift – was unaddressed, and now Detroit is bankrupt.
Much as I like living in Chicago, unfortunately the story is far too similar in my town. Long an industrial hub, Chicago (and Illinois) enjoyed the benefits of growing companies, employment and taxes during the heyday of industrialism. This led to well paid, and very well pensioned, government employees providing services. The suburbs around Chicago exploded as people migrated to the Windy City for jobs – despite the brutal winters.
But Chicago has been dramatically affected by the shift to an information economy. The old machine shops, tool and dye makers and myriad parts manufacturers were decimated as that work often went offshore to cheaper manufacturers. Large manufacturers like Western Electric and International Harvester (renamed Navistar) failed. Big retailers like Montgomery Wards disappeared, and even Sears has diminished to a ghost of its former self. All businesses killed by market shifts.
And as a result, people quit moving to Chicago – and actually started leaving. There are now fewer jobs in Illinois than in the year 2000, and as a result people have left town. They've gone to cities (and states) where they could find jobs in growth industries allowing for more opportunity, and rising incomes.
Just like Detroit, Chicago shows early signs of big problems. Crime is up, with an unpleasantly large increase in murders. Insufficient income and property tax revenues led to budget crises across the board. Dramatic actions like selling city parking meters to shore up finances has led to Chicago having the most expensive parking in the country – despite far from the highest incomes. Property taxes in suburbs have escalated, with taxes in collar Lake county higher than Los Angeles! Yet the state pension system is bankrupt, causing the legislature to put in place a 50% state income tax increase! Meanwhile the infrastructure is showing signs of needing desperate work, but there is no money.
Like Detroit, Chicago's businesses (and governments) have invested insufficiently in innovation. Recent Chicago Tribune columns on local consumer goods behemoth Kraft emphasized (and typified) the lack of new product development and stalled revenue growth. Where Bay Area tech companies expect 50% of revenues (or more) from new products (or variations), Kraft has admitted it has relied on stalwarts like Velveeta and Mac & Cheese so much that fewer than 10% of revenues come from anything new.
Culturally, too many decisions in the executive suites of both the companies, and the governments, are focused on what worked in the past rather than investing in innovation. Even though the vaunted University of Illinois has one of the world's top 5 engineering schools, the majority of graduates find they leave the state for better paying jobs. And a dearth of angel or venture funding means that start-ups simply are forced coastal if they hope to succeed.
And this reaches to our national policies as well. Plenty of arguments abound for cutting costs – but are we effectively investing in innovation? Do our tax policies, as well as our expenditures, drive innovation – or constrict it? It was government programs which unleashed nuclear power and gave us a rash of innovations from putting a man on the moon. Yet, today, we seem obsessed with cutting budgets, cutting costs and doing less – not even more – of the same.
Growth is a wonderful thing. But growth does not happen without investment in innovation. When companies, or industries, stop investing in innovation growth slows – and eventually stops. Communities, states and even nations cannot thrive unless there is a robust program of investing for, and implementing, innovation.
With innovation you create renewal. Without it you create Detroit.
Michael Dell has put together a hedge fund, one of his largest suppliers and some debt money to take his company, Dell, Inc. private. There are large investors threatening to sue, claiming the price isn't high enough. While they are wrangling, small investors should consider this privatization manna from heaven, take the new, higher price and run to invest elsewhere – thankful you're getting more than the company is worth.
In the 1990s everybody thought Dell was an incredible company. With literally no innovation a young fellow built an enormously large, profitable company using other people's money, and technology. Dell jumped into the PC business as it was born. Suppliers were making the important bits, and looking for "partners" to build boxes. Dell realized he could let other people invest in microprocessor, memory, disk drive, operating system and application software development. All he had to do was put the pieces together.
Dell was the rare example of a company that was built on nothing more than execution. By marketing hard, selling hard, buying smart and building cheap Dell could produce a product for which demand was skyrocketing. Every year brought out new advancements from suppliers Dell could package up and sell as the latest, greatest model. All Dell had to do was stay focused on its "core" PC market, avoid distractions, and win at execution. Heck, everyone was going to make money building and selling PCs. How much you made boiled down to how hard you worked. It wasn't about strategy or innovation – just execution.
Dell's business worked for one simple reason. Everybody wanted PCs. More than one. And everybody wanted bigger, more powerful PCs as they came available. Market demand exploded as the PC became part of everything companies, and people, do. As long as demand was growing, Dell was growing. And with clever execution – primarily focused on speed (sell, build, deliver, get the cash before the supplier has to be paid) – Dell became a multi-billion dollar company, and its founder a billionaire with no college degree, and no claim to being a technology genius.
But, the market shifted. As this column has pointed out many times, demand for PCs went flat – never to return to previous growth rates. Users have moved to mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets, while corporate IT is transitioning from PC servers to cloud services. iPad sales now nearly match all of Dell's sales. Dell might well be the world's best PC maker, but when people don't want PCs that doesn't matter any more.
Market watchers knew this. That's why Dell's stock took a long ride from its lofty value on the rapids of growth to the recent distinctly low value as it slipped into the whirlpool of failure.
If you think adding debt to Dell will save it from the market shift, just look at how well that strategy worked for fixing Tribune Corporation. A Sam Zell led LBO took over the company claiming he had plans for a new future, as advertisers shifted away from newspapers. Bankruptcy came soon enough, employee pensions were wiped out, massive layoffs undertaken and 4 years of legal fighting followed to see if there was any plan that would keep the company afloat. Debt never fixes a failing company, and Dell knows that. Dell has no answer to changing market demand away from PCs.
Now the buzzards are circling. HP has been caught in a rush to destruction ever since CEO Fiorina decided to buy Compaq and gut the HP R&D in an effort to follow Dell's wild revenue ride. Only massive cost cutting by the following CEO Hurd kept HP alive, wiping out any remnants of innovation. Now HP has a dismal future. But it hopes that as the PC market shrinks the elimination of one competitor, Dell, will give newest CEO Whitman more time to somehow find something HP can do besides follow Dell into bankruptcy court.
Watching as its execution-oriented ecosystem manufacturers are struggling, supplier Microsoft is pulling out its wallet to try and extend the timeline. Plundering its $85B war chest, Microsoft keeps adding features, with acquisitions such as Skype, that consume cash while offering no returns – or even strong reasons for people to stop the transition to tablets.
Additionally it keeps putting up money for companies that it hopes will build end-user products on its software, such as its $500M investment in Barnes & Noble's Nook and now putting $2B into Dell. $85B is a lot of money, but how much more will Microsoft have to spend to keep HP alive – or money losing Acer – or Lenovo? A billion here, a billion there and pretty soon it adds up to a lot of money! Not counting losses in its own entertainmnet and on-line divisions. The transition to mobile devices is permanent and Microsoft has arrived at the game incredibly late – and with products that simply cannot obtain better than mixed reviews.
The lesson to learn is that management, and investors, take a big risk when they focus on execution. Without innovation, organizations become reliant on vendors who may, or may not, stay ahead of market transitions. When an organization fails to be an innovator, someone who creates its own game changers, and instead tries to succeed by being the best at execution eventually market shifts will kill it. It is not a question of if, but when.
Being the world's best PC maker is no better than being the world's best maker of white bread (Hostess) or the world's best maker of photographic film (Kodak) or the world's best 5 and dime retailer (Woolworth's) or the world's best manufacturer of bicycles (Schwinn) or cold rolled steel (Bethlehem Steel.) Being able to execute – even execute really, really well – is not a long-term viable strategy. Eventually, innovation will create market shifts that will kill you.
Last week's earning's announcements gave us some big news. Looking around the tech industry, a number of companies reported about as expected, and their stocks didn't move a lot. Apple had robust sales and earnings, but missed analyst targets and fell out of bed! But without a doubt, the big winner was Netflix, which beat expectations and had an enormous ~50% jump in valuation!
My what a difference 18 months makes (see chart.) For anyone who thinks the stock market is efficient the value of Netflix should make one wonder. In July, 2011 the stock ended a meteoric run-up to $300/share, only to fall 80% to $60/share by year's end. After whipsawing between $50 and $130, but spending most of 2012 near the lower number, the stock is now up 3-fold to $160! Nothing scares investors more than volatility – and this kind of volatility would scare away almost anyone but a day trader!
Yet, through all of this I have been – and I remain – bullish on Netflix. During its run-up in 2010 I wrote "Why You Should Love Netflix," then when the stock crashed in late 2011 I wrote "The Case for Buying Netflix" and last January I predicted Netflix to be "the turnaround story of 2012." It would be logical to ask why I would remain bullish through all the ups and downs of this cycle – especially since Netflix is still only about half of its value at its high-point.
Simply put, Netflix has 2 things going for it that portend a successful future:
Netflix is in a very, very fast growing market. Streaming entertainment. People have what appears to be an insatiable desire for entertainment, and the market not only has grown at a breathtaking rate, but it will continue to grow extremely fast for several more quarters. It is unclear where the growth rate may tap out for content delivery – putting Netflix in a market that offers enormous growth for all participants.
Netflix leadership has shown a penchant for having the right strategy to remain a market leader – even when harshly criticized for taking fast action to deal with market shifts. Specifically, choosing to rapidly cannibalize its own DVD business by aggressively promoting streaming – even at lower margins – meant Netflix chose growth over defensiveness.
In 2011 CEOReed Hastings was given "CEO of the Year 2010" honors by Fortune magazine. But in 2011, as he split Netflix into 2 businesses – DVD and streaming – and allowed them to price independently and compete with each other for customer business he was trounced as the "dunce" of tech CEOs.
His actions led to a price increase of 60% for anyone who decided to buy both Netflix products, and many customers chose to drop one. Analysts predicted this to be the end of Netflix.
But in retrospect we can see the brilliance of this decision. CEO Hastings actually did what textbooks tell us to do – he began milking the installed, but outdated, DVD business. He did not kill it, but he began pulling profits and cash out of it to pay for building the faster growing, but lower margin, streaming business. This allowed Netflix to actually grow revenue, and grow profits, while making the market transition from one platform (DVD) to another (streaming.)
Almost no company pulls off this kind of transition. Most companies try to defend and extend the company's "core" product far too long, missing the market transition. But now Netflix is adding around 2 million new streaming customers/quarter, while losing 400,000 DVD subscribers. And with the price changes, this has allowed the company to add content and expand internationally — and increase profits!!
Marketwatch headlined that "Naysayers Must Feel Foolish." But truthfully, they were just looking at the wrong numbers. They were fixated on the shrinking installed base of DVD subscribers. But by pushing these customers to make a fast decision, Netflix was able to convert most of them to its new streaming business before they went out and bought the service from a competitor.
Aggressive cannibalization actually was the BEST strategy given how fast tablet and smartphone sales were growing and driving up demand for streaming entertainment. Capturing the growth market was far, far more valuable than trying to defend the business destined for obsolescence.
Netflix simply did its planning looking out the windshield, at what the market was going to look like in 3 years, rather than trying to protect what it saw in the rear view mirror. The market was going to change – really fast. Faster than most people expected. Competitors like Hulu and Amazon and even Comcast wanted to grab those customers. The Netflix goal had to be to go headlong into the cold, but fast moving, water of the new streaming market as aggressively as possible. Or it would end up like Blockbuster that tried renting DVDs from its stores too long – and wound up in bankruptcy court.
There are people who still doubt that Netflix can compete against other streaming players. And this has been the knock on Netflix since 2005. That Amazon, Walmart or Comcast would crush the smaller company. But what these analysts missed was that Amazon and Walmart are in a war for the future of retail – not entertainment – and their efforts in streaming were more to protect a flank in their retail strategy, not win in streaming entertainment. Likewise, Comcast and its brethren are out to defend cable TV, not really win at anytime, anywhere streaming entertainment. Their defensive behavior would never allow them to lead in a fast-growing new marketplace. Thus the market was left for Netflix to capture – if it had the courage to rapidly cannibalize its base and commit to the new marketplace.
Hulu and Redbox are also competitors. And they very likely will do very well for several years. Because the market is growing very fast and can support multiple players. But Netflix benefits from being first, and being biggest. It has the most cash flow to invest in additional growth. It has the largest subscriber base to attract content providers earlier, and offer them the most money. By maintaining its #1 position – even by cannibalizing itself to do so – Netflix is able to keep the other competitors at bay; reinforcing its leadership position.
There are some good lessons here for everyone:
Think long-term, not short-term. A king can become a goat only to become a king again if he haa the right strategy. You probably aren't as good as the press says when they like you, nor as bad as they say when hated. Don't let yourself be goaded into giving up the long-term win for short-term benefits.
Growth covers a multitude of sins! The way Netflix launched its 2-division campaign in 2011 was a disaster. But when a market is growing at 100%+ you can rapidly recover. Netflix grew its streaming user base by more than 50% last year – and that fixes a lot of mistakes. Anytime you have a choice, go for the fast growing market!!
Follow the trend! Never fight the trend! Tablet sales were growing at an amazing clip, while DVD players had no sales gains. With tablet and smartphone sales eclipsing DVD player sales, the smart move was to go where the trend was headed. Being first on the trend has high payoff. Moving slowly is death. Kodak failed to aggressively convert film camera customers to its own digital cameras, and it filed bankruptcy in 2012.
Dont' forget to be profitable! Even if it means raising prices on dated solutions that will eventually become obsolete – to customer howls. You must maximize the profits of an outdated product line as fast as possible. Don't try to defend and extend it. Those tactics use up cash and resources rather than contributing to future success.
Cannibalizing your installed base is smart when markets shift. Regardless the margin concerns. Newspapers said they could not replace "print ad dollars" with "on-line ad dimes" so many went bankrupt defending the paper as the market shifted. Move fast. Force the cannibalization early so you can convert existing customers to your solution, and keep them, before they go to an emerging competitor.
When you need to move into a new market set up a new division to attack it. And give them permission to do whatever it takes. Even if their actions aggravate existing customers and industry participants. Push them to learn fast, and grow fast – and even to attack old sacred cows (like bundled pricing.)
There were a lot of people who thought my call that Netflix would be the turnaround tech story of 2012 was simply bizarre. But they didn't realize the implications of the massive trend to tablets and smartphones. The impact is far-reaching – affecting not only computer companies but television, content delivery and content creation. Netflix positioned itself to be a winner, and implemented the tactics to make that strategy work despite widespread skepticism.
Hats off to Netflix leadership. A rare breed. That's why long-term investors should own the stock.
Microsoft needed a great Christmas season. After years of product stagnation, and a big market shift toward mobile devices from PCs, Microsoft's future relied on the company seeing customers demonstrate they were ready to jump in heavily for Windows8 products – including the new Surface tablet.
Looking deeper, for the 4th quarter PC sales declined by almost 5% according to Gartner research, and by almost 6.5% according to IDC. Both groups no longer expect a rebound in PC shipments, as they believe homes will no longer have more than 1 PC due to the mobile device penetration – the market where Surface and Win8 phones have failed to make any significant impact or move beyond a tiny market share. Users increasingly see the complexity of shifting to Win8 as not worth the effort; and if a switch is to be made consumer and businesses now favor iOS and Android.
These trends mean nothing short of the ruin of Microsoft. Microsoft makes more than 75% of its profits from Windows and Office. Less than 25% comes from its vaunted servers and tools. And Microsoft makes nothing from its xBox/Kinect entertainment division, while losing vast sums on-line (negative $350M-$750M/quarter). No matter how much anyone likes the non-Windows Microsoft products, without the historical Windows/Office sales and profits Microsoft is not sustainable.
So what can we expect at Microsoft:
Ballmer has committed to fight to the death in his effort to defend & extend Windows. So expect death as resources are poured into the unwinnable battle to convert users from iOS and Android.
As resources are poured out of the company in the Quixotic effort to prolong Windows/Office, any hope of future dividends falls to zero.
Expect enormous layoffs over the next 3 years. Something like 50-60%, or more, of employees will go away.
Expect closure of the long-suffering on-line division in order to conserve resources.
The entertainment division will be spun off, sold to someone like Sony or even Barnes & Noble, or dramatically reduced in size. Unable to make a profit it will increasingly be seen as a distraction to the battle for saving Windows – and Microsoft leadership has long shown they have no idea how to profitably grow this business unit.
As more and more of the market shifts to competitive cloud businesses Apple, Amazon and others will grow significantly. Microsoft, losing its user base, will demonstrate its inability to build a new business in the cloud, mimicking its historical experiences with Zune (mobile music) and Microsoft mobile phones. Microsoft server and tool sales will suffer, creating a much more difficult profit environment for the sole remaining profitable division.
Missing the market shift to mobile has already forever tarnished the Microsoft brand. No longer is Microsoft seen as a leader, and instead it is rapidly losing market relevancy as people look to Apple, Google, Amazon, Samsung, Facebook and others for leadership. The declining sales, and lack of customer interest will lead to a tailspin at Microsoft not unlike what happened to RIM. Cash will be burned in what Microsoft will consider an "epic" struggle to save the "core of the company."
But failure is already inevitable. At this stage, not even a new CEO can save Microsoft. Steve Ballmer played "Bet the Company" on the long-delayed release of Win8, losing the chance to refocus Microsoft on other growing divisions with greater chance of success. Unfortunately, the other players already had enough chips to simply bid Microsoft out of the mobile game – and Microsoft's ante is now long gone – without holding a hand even remotely able to turn around the product situation.
Game over. Ballmer loses. And if you keep your money invested in Microsoft it will disappear along with the company.
The Harvard Business Review recently published its list of the 100 Best Performing CEOs. This list is better than most because it looks at long-term performance of the CEO during his or her time in the job – with many on the list in service more than a decade.
#1 was Steve Jobs. #2 is Jeff Bezos – making him the greatest living CEO. It is startling just how well these two CEOs performed. During Jobs' tenure Apple investors achieved a return of 66.8 times their money. During Mr. Bezos' tenure shareholders achieved a remarkable 124.3 times return on their money. In an era when most of us are happy to earn 5-10%/year – which equates to doubling your money about once a decade – these CEOs exceeded expectations 30-60 fold!
Both of these CEOs achieved greatness by transforming an industry. We all know the Apple story. From near bankruptcy as the Mac company Mr. Jobs led Apple into the mobile devices business, and created a transformation from Walkmen, Razrs and PCs to iPods, iPhones and iPads – to the detriment of Sony, Motorola, Nokia, Microsoft, HP and Dell.
The Amazon story is all the more remarkable because it has been written in the far more mundane world of retail – not known for being nearly as fast-changing at tech.
Lest we forget, Amazon started as an on-line seller of books frequently unavailable at your local bookstore. "What's a local bookstore?" you may now ask, because through continuous upgrading of its capability to build on the advances in internet usage – across machines, browsers, wi-fi and mobile – Amazon drove into bankruptcy such large booksellers as B.Dalton and Borders – leaving Barnes & Noble a mere shell of its former self and on tenous footing. And the number of small bookshops has dropped dramatically.
But Amazon's industry transformation has gone far beyond bookselling. Amazon was one of the first, and by most users considered the best, at offering a complete on-line storefront for any retailer who wants to sell goods through Amazon's site. You can set up your inventory, display products, provide user information, manage a shopping cart and handle check out all through Amazon – with minimal technical skill. This allowed Amazon to bring vastly more products to customers; and without adding all the inventory or warehousing cost.
As digital uses grew, Amazon moved beyond the slow-paced publishers to launch the Kindle and give us eReaders displacing paper books and periodicals. But this was just the first salvo in the effort to promote additional on-line buying, as Amazon next launched Kindle Fire which at remarkably low cost gave people a tablet already set up for doing retail shopping at Amazon.
As Amazon launched its book downloads and on-line services, it built its own cloud services business to aid businesses and people in using tablets, and doing more things on-line; which further reinforced the digital retail world in which Amazon dominates.
And make no doubt about it, Kindle Fire – and the use of all other tablets – is the WalMart and other traditional brick-and-mortar retail killer. Amazon is now a player in all pieces of the transition which is happening in retail, from traditional shopping to on-line.
Demand for retail space in the USA began declining in 2009 and has not stopped. Most analysts blamed it on the great recession. But in retrospect we can now see it was the watershed year for customers to begin looking more, and buying more, on-line. Now each year growth in on-line retail continues, while demand at traditional stores wanes.
Just look at this last holiday season. To (hopefully) drive revenue stores were opening on Thanksgiving, and doing 24 and 48 hours of non-stop staffing and promotions to drive sales. But it was mostly in vain, as traditional retail saw almost no gains. Despite doing more and more of what they've always done – trying to be better, faster and cheaper – they simply could not change the trend away from shopping on-line and back into the stores.
For the last year the #1 trend in retailing has been "showrooming" where customers stand in a store with a smartphone comparison pricing on-line (most frequently Amazon) to the product on the shelf. Retailers were forced to match on-line prices, despite their higher overhead, or lose the business. And now Target has implemented a policy of price-matching Amazon for all of 2013 in hopes of slowing the trend to on-line purchasing.
Circuit City went bankrupt, which saved Best Buy as it picked up their lost business. But now Best Buy is close to failure. Same store sales at WalMart have been flat. JCPenney recruited Apple's retail store wizard as CEO – but he's learned when you have to compete with Amazon life simply sucks. Nobody in traditional retail has found a way to reverse the on-line shopping trend, which is still dominated by Amazon.
We all can learn from these two CEOs and the companies they built. First, and foremost, is understand trends and align with them. If you help people move in the direction they want to go life is easy, and growth can be phenomenal. Trying to slow, stop or reverse a trend doesn't work, and is expensive.
Second, don't ask customers what they want, instead give them what they need. Customers may be on a trend, but they will frame their requests in the old paradigm. By creating new trend-promoting products and solutions you can capture the customer and avoid head-to-head competition with the "old guard" titans selling the increasingly outdated solutions. Don't build better brick-and-mortar, make brick-and-mortar obsolete.
So, what's stopping you from growing your business like Apple or Amazon? What keeps you from being the next Steve Jobs, or Jeff Bezos? Can you spot trends and provide trend-supporting solutions for customers? Or are you stymied because you're spending too much time trying to defend and extend your old business in the face of game changing trends.
I nominate McDonald's for the 2012 Dickens' Award as the most Scrooge-est business behavior this season.
"Christmas is but an excuse for workers to pick their employer's pockets every 25th December" is I believe how Charles Dickens put it in "A Christmas Carol." Poor Bob Cratchet couldn't even have 1 day off per year. And in McDonald's case the company founder actually made it corporate policy to never be open on Thanksgiving or Christmas days so employees could be with family.
Bah! Humbug!
Now, there are a lot of trends McDonald's could legitimately cite when making a case for being open on Christmas – a case that could actually shed a positive light on the company:
The number of single people has risen over the last decade. This trend means that many more people now have a need for at least one meal not in a family setting on 25 December.
America has a large and storied Jewish community for whom 25 December does not have a special religious meaning. For these people enjoying their habitual norms such as eating at McDonald's would indicate an open-minded company supports all faiths.
America is a nation of immigrants. While the founders were European Christians, today America has a very diverse group of immigrants, especially from Asia and the Indian sub-continent, who follow Islam and other faiths for which 25 December has, again, no particular meaning. Offering them a place to eat on their day off could show a connection with their growing importance to America's future. An act of understanding to their impact on the country.
These are just 3, and there are likely more and better ones (please offer your thoughts in the comments section.) But truthfully, this is not why McDonald's is urging franchisees to toil on this national holiday. Instead, it is just to make a buck.
But then again, what trend has McDonald's successfully leveraged in the last… let's say 2 decades? Despite the rapid growth of high end coffee, the "McCafe" concept was a decade late, and so missed the mark that it has made no impact when competing against Caribou Coffee, Peet's or Starbucks. And it has had minimal benefit for McDonald's.
To understand the dearth of new products just go to McDonald's web site where you'll see an animated ad for the "101 reasons to eat a McRib" – that mystery meat product which is at least 30 years old and rotated on and off the menu in the guise of "something new."
McDonald's had a very rough last quarter. It's sales per store declined versus a year ago. The number of stores has stagnated, sales are stagnant, new products are non-existent. Even Ronald McDonald has aged, and apparently moved on to the nursing home. What can you think about that is exciting about McDonald's?
Desperate to do something, McDonald's fired the head of North America. But that doesn't fix the growth problem at McDonald's, it just demonstrates the company is internally fixated on blame rather understanding external market shifts and taking action. McDonald's keeps doing more of the same, year after year; such as opening more stores in emerging markets, staying open longer hours at existing locations and even opening on Thanksgiving and Christmas in the U.S.
McDonald's Ghost of Christmas past was its great strength, from its origin, of consistency. In the 1960s when people traveled away from home they could never be quite sure what a restaurant offered. McDonald's offered a consistent product, that people liked, at a consistent (and affordable) price. This success formula launched tremendous growth, and a revolution in America's restaurant industry, creating a great string of joyous past Christmases.
But the Ghost of Christmas present is far more bleak. 50 years have passed, and now people have a lot more options – and much higher expectations – regarding dining. But McDonald's really has failed to adapt. So now it is struggling to grow, struggling to meet goals, struggling to be a kind and gentle employer. Now asking its employees to work on Christmas – and ostensibly eat Big Macs.
What is the Ghost of Christmas Future for McDonald's? Not surprisingly, if it cannot adapt to changing markets things are likely to worsen. No company can hope to succeed by simply doing more of the same forever. Constantly focusing on efficiency, and beating on franchisees and employees to stay open longer, is a downward spiral. Eventually every business HAS to innovate; adapt to changing market conditions, or it will die. Just look at the tombstones – Kodak, Hostess, Circuit City, Bennigan's ….
Take time between now and 2013 to ask yourself, what is your Ghost of Christmas past upon which your business was built? How does that compare to the Ghost of Christmas present? If there's a negative gap, what should you expect your Ghost of Christmas Future to look like? Are you adapting to changing markets, or just hoping things will improve while you resist putting enough coal on the fire to keep everyone warm?
