by Adam Hartung | Feb 9, 2009 | Current Affairs, Food and Drink, In the Swamp, Leadership
The second step in following The Phoenix Principle to achieve superior returns is to study competitors. Better, obsess about them. Why? So you can learn from them and position your products, services and skill sets in a way to be a leader. We would hope that studying competitors would not lead a company to take on battles it's almost assured of not winning. Too bad nobody told that to Mr. Schultz at Starbucks, who seems intent on killing Starbucks since his return as CEO.
Starbucks become an icon by offering coffee shops where people could meet, talk and share a coffee – while possibly reading, or checking their email. One of the most famous situation comedies of recent past was "Friends", a show in which people regularly met in a coffee shop not unlike Starbucks. People could order a wide range of different coffee drinks, and the ambience was intended to reflect a more European environment for meeting to drink and discuss. This combination of product and service found mass appeal, and rapid growth. Meanwhile, the previous CEO rapidly moved to seize the value of this appeal by stretching the brand into grocery store sales, coffee on airlines, liquor products, music sales, various retail items, some food (prepared sandwiches and high-end snacks, mostly), artist representation and even movie making. He knew there was a limit to store expansion, and he kept opening White Space to find new business opportunities.
But then Mr. Schultz, considered the "founding CEO" (even though he wasn't the founder) came roaring back – firing the previous expansion-oriented CEO. He claimed these expansion opportunities caused Starbucks to "lose focus". So he quickly set to work cutting back offerings. This led to layoffs. Which led to closing stores. Which led to more layoffs. The company fast went into a tailspin while he "refocused."
Meanwhile competitors started having a field day. Dunkin Donuts launched a campaign lampooning the drink options and the special language of Starbucks, appealing for old customers to return for a donut – and get a latte too. And McDonald's, after years of study, finally decided to roll out a company-wide "McCafe" in which McDonald's could offer specialty coffee drinks as well. While Starbuck's CEO was rolling backward, competitors were rolling forward – and in the case of McDonald's rolling like a Panzer tank.
Now, with a big recession in force, McDonald's is making hay by siezing on its long-held position as a low cost place. Like Wal-Mart, McDonald's is in the right place for people who want to seek out brands that represent "cheap." With sales up in this recession, the company is now launching a new program to highlight its McCafe concept directly aimed at trying to steal Starbucks customers (readarticle here).
So, here's Starbucks that has "repositioned" itself back as strictly a "coffee company". And the company has been spiraling downward for over a year. And the world's largest restaurant company has its sites set right on you. What should you do? Starbucks has decided to launch a "value meal" (read article here). Starbucks is going to go head-to-head with McDonald's. Uh, talk about walking in front of a truck.
Far too often company leadership thinks the right thing to do is "focus, focus, focus" then define battles with competitors and enter into a gladiator style war to the death. And that is just plain foolish. Why would anyone take on a fight with Goliath if you can avoid it? At the very least, shouldn't you study competitors so you compete with them in ways they can't? You wouldn't choose to go toe-to-toe when you can redefine competition to your benefit.
But that is exactly what Starbuck's has done. Starbucks spent its longevity building a brand that stood for being somewhat "upmarket." You may not be able to afford a Porsche, but you could afford a good coffee in a great environment. Sure, you might cut back when the purse is slim, but you still know where the place is that gave you the great, good-inside feeling you always got when buying their product or visiting their store. Now the CEO of that company has taken to comparing the product, and the stores, to the place where kids are jumping around in the play pit – and you can smell $1.00 hamburgers cooking in the background. He's decided to offer values which compare his store, where you remember the cozy stuffed chairs and the sounds of light jazz and the smell of chocolate – with the place where you sit in plastic, unmovable benches at plastic, unmovable tables while listening to canned music bouncing off the tile (or porcelain) walls where you can wipe down everything with a mop.
You study competitors so you can be fleet-of-foot. You want to avoid the bloody battles, and learn where you can use strengths to win. Instead, Starbucks' CEO is doing the opposite. He has chosen to go head-to-head in a battle that can only serve to worsen the impression of his business among virtually all customers, while tacitly acknowledging that a far more successful (at this time) and better financed competitor is coming into his market. His desire to Defend his old business is causing him to take actions that are sure to diminish its value.
Let's see, does this possibly remind you of — let's see — maybe Marc Andreeson's decision to have Netscape go head-to-head with Microsoft selling internet browsers? How'd that work out for him? His investors? His employees? His vendors?
Studying competitors is incredibly important. It can help you to avoid bone-crushing competition. It can identify new ways to compete that leads to advantage. It can help you maneuver around better funded competitors so you can win – like Domino's building a successful pizza business by focusing on delivery while Pizza Hut focused on its eat-in pizzerias. But you have to be smart enough to realize not to try going headlong into battle with competitors that can crush you.
by Adam Hartung | Feb 8, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Leadership
General Electric's (chart here) future earnings and valuation were recently lowered by an analyst at J.P. Morgan (read article here). Reviewing the difficulties facing GE he commented, "Former [Chief Executive Jack] Welch built a culture of earnings management that was unsustainable." One of the few times I've ever heard an analyst make excuses for management. Unfortunately, he could not be more wrong. Investors have every reason to expect GE's earnings growth to continue.
There is no doubt that the real estate bust has led to lower consumer spending, as well as big troubles for banks struggling with reserve requirements as they mark down loans. There is a "wall of worry" among consumer and business spenders alike. Yet, GE's task is to find ways to grow – even in the face of market challenges. When companies fall into a growth stall they have only a 7% chance of ever again growing at a mere 2%.
At GE we're seeing first stages of a growth stall. Why? Despite the very aggressive culture at GE, when Mr. Immelt replaced Mr. Welch he did not maintain the level of Disruption and White Space that his predecessor maintained. For whatever good reasons he had, Mr. Immelt steered GE on a course that was more predictable – and far less likely to make hard turns and hold leaders accountable. GE was very strong, and the company could continue to build on past strengths. And doing so, Mr. Immelt sustained GE largely by Defending & Extending historical practices. Along the way, acquisitions and divestitures were very predictable actions – not openings into new markets that could develop a new Success Formula.
Then the markets shifted. Very hard. And a long-term GE business called GE Capital was suddenly in a lot of trouble. This was not entirely unpredictable – but GE Capital had fallen into Defending & Extending its old business rather than really assessing what might happen. They had real estate investments, and complex hedging products that made real estate losses worse. GE Capital's reserves began disappearing overnight. Simultaneously, NBC was seeing declining revenue as ad demand fell through the floor. Again, not unpredictable given the inroads Google was making in the ad market since 2002. But NBC had fallen into believeing it could Defend & Extend its traditional business, rather than use scenarios to point out the potential shift of advertisers to the web. Even though Mr. Buffet at Berkshire Hathaway jumped in with financing, the reality was that GE had not prepared for the scenario unfolding. By slowing its Disruptions and White Space, GE fell into the same problems many of its other big company brethren fell into. Something the company had avoided under "Neutron Jack" who kept the company eyes firmly on the future while avoiding complacency in existing businesses.
Part of what made GE the incredible earnings machine it was under Mr. Welch was its extensive scenario planning which led the company to get out of businesses, and get into new ones. Under Mr. Welch GE implemented Disruptive techniques like focusing on market share (#1 or #2 was one Disruptive technique) or implementing Destroy-Your-Business.com teams to prepare for internet-based competition. But under Mr. Immelt GE did far less changing of its businesses. GE remained largely in industrial businesses, it's financial business and traditional media. Although it had extensive business interests in India, GE itself was not deeply involved in new internet-based or information-based businesses. It spun out its biggest IT business (GENPAC), reaping a huge reward which the company mostly invested in additional industrial businesses - like water production.
GE is a great company. It's the only company to be on the Dow Jones Industrial Average since the index was created. But not even GE can escape market shifts. GE was one of the first to pick up on the shift to globalization and was an early investor in offshore operations. But the last few years GE's fortunes have stymied as the company spent more energy Defending & Extending its old businesses instead of doing more in new markets. No company, of any size or age, can afford to depend on its old businesses. All businesses must prepare to compete in the future, on the requirements of future customers and against future competitors willing to maximally leverage current and developing opportunities for improvement via technology, business model or any other factor.
GE has a lot of resources, and a long-term culture of Disruption and using White Space. GE has the built-in skills to attack its old Lock-ins, find competitive opportunities and rapidly gear itself in the direction of growth. And that's what GE needs to do. Some analysts are worried that GE may have to reduce its dividend – and well GE should!!! When markets shift as rapidly as has happened this last year, its more important to develop new market opportunities than Defend a dividend payout. GE needs to move quickly to re-establish itself in growth markets for products and services that can push GE into the Rapids and pull the company out of this growth stall. Right now, investors should be demanding that Mr. Immelt act more like Mr. Welch, and push hard for Disruptions that open new White Space projects. That Mr. Immelt is on Mr. Obama's new business economic team (read article here) is not important to investors, employees and suppliers. Right now, all hands and minds need to be focused on finding new markets to regain growth for GE.
by Adam Hartung | Feb 5, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lock-in, Quotes, Web/Tech
Dell had a tough day Thursday when J.P.Morgan downgraded the stock to the equivalent of a sell (read article here). The stock continues its relentless slide – despite the return of Mr. Dell as CEO (chart here). Some quotes:
- "Our downgrade … focuses squarely on the potential that Dell's PC exposure..could force the company to seek revenue offsets" interpretation – revenues should go down
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"looking for revenue from other sources, Dell could face new costst and competition that could destabilize margins and cause the company to dip into its cash reserves." interpretation – entering new markets isn't free, and new competitors will make the road tough so expect Dell to go cash negative
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"Dell gets around 60% of its total revenue from PC sales, which is an example of how exposed the company is to a market that is widely expected to shrink this year…PC unit shiptmets to fall this year by 13.5% from 2008" interpretation – this is primarily a one product company and that product is not going to grow
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"the enterprise replacement cycle … could be deferred to next year … Dell will be hard-pressed to maintain its profit margins this year as the company faces more-entrenched consumer-market competitors in Acer and Hewlett-Packard" interpretation – Dell sells mostly to companies, who are not replacing PCs, and in the consumer market Dell will find tough sledding competing with Acer and HP
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"Dell is on track with its plan to cut $3billion in costs by 2011" interpretation – Dell is cutting costs, not growing revenue
To steal from an old Kentucky Fried Chicken ad "Dell did one thing, and did it right." Dell's Success Formula worked really well, and the company grew fantastically well as it improved execution while the corporate PC market was growing. But the market shifted. Dell had not developed any White Space to enter new markets, so it was unprepared to keep growing. When revenue growth slackened, the company did not Disrupt its Success Formula, but instead kept trying to do more, better, faster, cheaper. And lacking revenue growth opportunities, the company is slashing costs in its effort to Defend its bottom line and old business model. And all that has resulted in another downgrade – and a company worth a lot less than it was worth before. Just as you would expect for a company that fell out of the Rapids and into the Swamp.
by Adam Hartung | Feb 4, 2009 | Uncategorized
About a year or so ago the conventional wisdom was that we were headed for a recession (the government wasn't yet saying we were in a recession already). Building on that theme, advisors were recommending investors should buy stocks like Kraft (chart here) and Sara Lee (chart here). After all, these companies make basic foodstuffs, and even in a recession people have to eat! So investors should be thrilled to own stock in companies with brands like Velveeta, Mac-N-Cheese, Oscar Meyer, Maxwell House and Jimmy Dean.
Once again, conventional wisdom didn't quite work out. Today Kraft (the world's #2 food manufacturer) announced a 72% profit plunge (read article here). Sara Lee profits fell to a loss – so you could say they fell 100%+ (read article here).
Both companies were in trouble back when the conventional wisdom said "buy." Sara Lee has been in a freefall ever since it changed CEOs five years ago. Back then the new CEO decided to "refocus" Sara Lee by selling its apparel business (Hanes and Champion) along with other assets. That effort continues, as the company recently sold its foodservice coffee business and some international businesses. The CEO was successful selling assets, but the money is now gone and all investors have is a smaller and less profitable Sara Lee. Her effort at "focus" did a good job of "focusing" Sara Lee right down the Swamp toward the Whirlpool. What was once a great consumer products company is now a mere industry afterthought that nobody pays attention to, and has wiped out 2/3 of investor value along the way.
Kraft was formerly a division of Altria (which used to be called Phillip-Morris – you know – cigarettes). During the early- and middle-2000s management sold growth busineses (like Altoids) in order to "focus on core products" like Velveeta. The CEO said that he saw no reason to spend money on risky new products, when he could maximize value by spending more money on Velveeta ads. If there was ever an example of a process designed to yield a specific result, any analysis that gave preference to Velveeta ads over new products was one clearly designed to Defend & Extend the past.
After spinning out on its own, analysts were all aglow about how a new Kraft CEO would take this venerable company into dramatic profit growth. But that hasn't quite worked. Rather, lacking any new product launches Kraft profits have been stagnant. Last year, the blame was placed on escalating commodity prices eating into margins. Now, with profits bouncing off the floor, the claim is that because the company raised prices last year to reclaim cost increases it has driven down sales! Of course we don't know exactly how bad things are at Kraft, because the company decided to claim substantial "restructuring costs" this quarter hiding the true business margins. We just know things are pretty bad.
Conventional wisdom is based on, at worst, myth – and, at best, what worked in the past, although no one is sure why. Following conventional wisdom can be successful only so long as current conditions are like past conditions.
But, this economic downturn isn't like any previous downturn. There have been dramatic shifts in global competitiveness and the value of resources. And, the companies being discussed are dramatically different than they were in previous recessions. Both Kraft and Sara Lee are companies that systematically shed all their growth businesses to raise cash in an effort to Defend & Extend old businesses. Both company's leadership manipulated the financial statements to make the company look better in past quarters (and years) thus reducing opportunities to now hide those ongoing weaknesses. Simply, things aren't like they used to be in the marketplace, or in the competitiveness of these companies. No one should be expecting them to have improved results. As the old markets weaken and shift, these companies become even weaker.
Both could take a different course. They could revitalize their futures by stopping Defend & Extend practices designed to over-invest in outdated brands and products. They could obsess about competitors to identify new growth opportunites. They could Disrupt old practices and procedures to allow new innovations to flourish. And they could open White Space where managers are given permission to do things new and different and given the resources to develop a new Success Formula. Both companies could be successful. But first they have to stop believing in the past, in their conventional wisdom, and focus again on future growth.
by Adam Hartung | Feb 3, 2009 | Uncategorized
Do you remember when Merck (chart here) got clobbered? Merck was a high-flying pharmaceutical company, but in 2004 we heard that one of its "blockbuster" products, Vioxx, which was for arthritis relief, was causing heart attacks. The stock dropped more than 50%. But then, over the next couple of years, the stock slowly recovered. And a year ago the company took a nearly $500M accounting charge related to the Vioxx problems. But today, Merck announced it was profitable again and shareholders should feel better (see article here).
I think most investors can see through this. The huge write off last year was a classic financial machination designed to create profits this year – regardless of the real results. The company essentially "pulled forward" the accounting for a wide range of costs into a single quarter in order to keep those costs from appearing in future quarters. Thus, the current quarter is without those costs – making it a "slam dunk" to beat the previous results.
Merck's leaders would like investors to believe the company is profitable, thus a safe investment. But reality is that Merck missed the biologics business just as Pfizer did. It's blockbuster products are off or coming off patent, and despite enormous R&D expenditures there aren't any replacements at hand. Sales of highly promoted products (Zetia, Vytorin and Gardasil) are down 16% to 26%. Profits, highly manipulated by accounting rules, do not tell the story of a company that is badly stuck in the Swamp trying to do what it has always done – but producing declining results. Merck hit a growth stall, and like 93% of companies falling into this trap there is no sign the company will grow even at a consistent 2% again.
On the other hand, Amazon (see chart here) shows much smarter management sense. The New York Times reported early in 2009 that book sales last year fell 8% (article here). If Amazon had acted like Merck, it would be announcing a big write-off, and resturcturing, to deal with the horrible decline in book sales! But the decline in the old product (books) doesn't mean people don't have a thirst for information (just like people don't have a desire for better disease management in Merck's market). Google searches and articles read on the internet have skyrocketed. Increasingly, it appears people simply don't want to pay for a printed book. The want to read things on on their computer, or phone, or listen to them on the treadmill while working out or commuting. The demand is still there, but the format or medium is changing.
And that is where Amazon appears to be doing something very special. After launching the digital Kindle book reader in December, 2007, it appears the company may have sold upwards of 500,000 units in 2008 (read article here). According to the article, that would be 32% more units than iPod sold in its first year! Apparently, Kindle units sold out in both holiday seasons.
This is an example of a company creating a growth strategy in what appears to be a declining market. Amazon could remain stuck in the world of traditional books. And, Kindle is probably just a technology footnote on the road to more advanced and popular digital reading (or listening). But Kindle is in the market, and in pretty big numbers. If a small company had launched Kindle to those kinds of numbers, it would be a NASDAQ darling!! Amazon is in the market, learning, selling and making money. If the market keeps transitioning, Amazon is well positioned to succeed.
Smart management teams don't ride their business model too long. They launch new solutions before the demand is clear, and before the solution is clear. Before profits go to heck, and financial machinations become the norm, they make changes trying to get back into the Rapids. The set up White Space with new projects to learn, and regain growth. Merck leaders could take a lesson from Amazon – and quickly get into the solutions that will drive growth in the next 10 years.
by Adam Hartung | Feb 2, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, Leadership, Lock-in
The U.S. banks are asking for more bailout money – and Congress is resisting (read article here.) Most people don't understand why banks are failing, and lots of them are ready to say "let them fail." But why they are failing is important – because the solution has to be linked to the diagnosis, don't you think?
Back in the old days of hyper-inflation (think 1970s) corporations developed a perverse problem. They had buildings on their balance sheet for $1million, but inflation had made the land, buildings and other assets worth $10million (or $20million). The corporations weren't allowed to mark up their assets to market value. So the banks couldn't lend them more money. As a result, fellows like T. Boone Pickens created a new business opportunity. They simply went to banks and borrowed money based on the real value of the underlying assets, and bought the corporations. Having no desire to run these companies, they often sold off the assets to pay off debt and kept the profits and the companies (and their employees) went away. They were called corporate raiders. And their existence could be traced to accounting.
When banks lend money they are required to have reserves which back up the loans. Banks can lend multiples of their reserves. They have leverage, because every dollar of reserves can create several dolalrs of new loans. As the reserves go up, they can loan more money. If they raise reserves by $1, they can loan out, say, $6.
But today, the bank loans already on the books (not new loans) - especially real estate loans – are going down in value (it's more complicated than this because of various bond offerings and insurance products on the mortgages, but the idea is pretty close). There is an accounting rule which says if a loan goes down in value, the bank has to estimate the new value of the loan and mark the loan down to market value (mark-to-market accounting). So, as real estate tumbles, the loan value tumbles. Every dollar of loan value comes straight out of reserves. This is called reverse leverage. Because if a loan goes down in value by $1, and $1 comes out of reserves, suddenly the bank has to reduce its total loan portfolio by $6 – get that? Instead of one loan being affected, suddenly a lot of loans are affected. Because one loan has to be marked down, in order to cover its reserve requirements, the bank may have to call up the local retailer and ask her to cut her inventory loan by 30% – because the bank no longer has sufficient reserves to cover all her debt. Ouch!!! One bad apple sort of starts spoiling the barrel – to use an old expression.
Suddenly, the reverse of the T. Boone Pickens opportunity happens. A few write-offs eliminate the reserves, making new lending impossible and actually (because real estate has cratered so badly) causing banks to call in perfectly good loans to cover their reserve requirements. (By the way, miss your reserve requirement and, by law, you go into default and the regulators take over your bank.) "But," you might say, "this means perfectly good debts are being called, and perfectly good loan opportunities are being ignored, just because of an accounting convention." And you would be right.
How far would you like the economy to stagnate because of an accounting convention? Sure, there was good reason for this rule. It was intended to keep banks from making questionable loans. But not many banks – not many economists – and not many accountants – expected real estate to drop 20% in value across the U.S.A.
The Japanese came across this problem in the middle-1990s. Their economy exploded in the 1980s. Real estate in Tokyo became the most expensive in the world. Ginza retail property was worth $1M per square foot! And middle-class Japanese discovered homes they had purchased for $80,000 were worth $1M! Young Japanese families buying new homes spent the $1M, and went deeply into debt. Then, the Japanese economy cooled. And real estate values tumbled.
But Japanese regulators would not let the banks write off these loans. They said "either this loan is repaid, in full, or you must write down your reserves." Banks quit lending. The Japanese economy nosedived into recession. And it has still not recovered. Stock prices, real estate prices, prices of everything have remained stuck. And the economy has not grown. After more than 12 years, the Japanese are still in a recession. You may not care, after all you don't live in Japan. But if you live in Japan you've struggled for a raise, you've struggled to pay bills, and if young you've struggled to find a job for 12 years. There are thousands of stories of highly qualified young Japanese college graduates who have never been able to find a job, thus never married – effectively never started their adult lives. Stuck. Families stuck by an extended recession as old debts are slowly, painfully slowly, repaid.
So what should America now do? Should we stick with the old accounting rules? Should we mark down loans, creating bank reserve problems? We know this means banks will ask for bailout funds – to get reserves back up. But we don't want to cover those reserve requirements – for fear the money will be spent on private jets and big bonuses. Maybe, just maybe, we should change the accounting rule.
By the way, I'm not the first with this idea by a long shot. Steve Forbes, a noted conservative, is one of the leaders for this change. He spoke to it on Meet the Press yesterday. This isn't really a hard question, is it? Why would anyone extend a recession, or create a depression, when an accounting rule is very close to the center of the problem? Something as easy to change as an accounting rule.
The issue is Lock-in. Our old enemy of the stuck corporation. Lock-in to past practices that causes the company to keep doing what it always did – even though everyone agrees there has to be change. Lock-in keeps the company on a path to sure destruction. The old accounting rules were based upon what used to be true. Thirty years ago, it was rampant inflation that gripped the U.S. economy. Double digit inflation screwed up everything business leaders and regulators had ever been taught. At one point, in 1978, President Carter went through 3 heads of the Federal Reserve (that's Bernanke's job) in under 1 year! Old accounting conventions were turning business upside down, and destroying healthy corporations. And mark-to-market (rather than acquisition cost), which allowed companies (and banks) to bring assets to "current value" was critical to a healthy economy and the management of healthy businesses.
But who's more Locked-in than economists and accountants? Not exactly known as a "progressive" group of people. Yet, the future for America is totally clear if we keep doing what's been done in the past. The government and industry forecasters have a trend that's very predictable. Without change, liquidity remains hampered, the economy remains on a downward tilt, layoffs continue and problems worsen. Something fundamentally needs to change.
So, using The Phoenix Principle, we know what's needed. Firstly, we can learn from our competitors. The Japanese situation has been studied to death, and the results are well documented. Universally, economists have demonstrated that Lock-in to old practices has hampered the Japanese economy dramatically. As the other developed countries struggle with falling real estate, the first to take action will come out the big winner. The first to find a way to move forward gets an advantage.
We now need to Disrupt! Someone has to help us stop and realize that more of the same has a clear future – and that future is not pleasant. Something has to change. Then we need to create White Space. Instead of changing the rules for all banks, we need to carve out some healthy but jeapardized banks in which to test the practice. We need to allow them to change their accounting, and watch the results. If it works, we can learn and replicate. Don't test on Citibank and Bank of America, which are huge and possibly unable to survive. Test where we can learn what works, and FAST.
Nobody wants another depression. And most people don't want to keep putting tax dollars into banks shoring up reserves. So maybe, just maybe, we should try something new. Like changing the accounting rule. Let's give it a shot, test it with some banks that are strong but struggling, and see if we can't figure out how to apply changes in a way that can get the economy going again!
by Adam Hartung | Jan 29, 2009 | Uncategorized
In the late 1990s Dell's value exploded (see chart here). From a share-adjusted price of $2.00, value exploded 30X in the internet boom from 1997 to 2000. People loved Dell because it had a Success Formula completely aligned with market conditions at the time. Dell had eschewed R&D, offering products which were combinations of off-the-shelf components. Offering a huge variety of a limited product line – PCs and laptops – Dell focused on how to take orders fast and deliver the product fast. While other companies put energy into product development, Dell put its resources into supply chain optimization at a time when internet use was exploding and the technology was becoming pretty much generic.
Since peaking, Dell's value has declined 8 3% -from about $100/share to $10. On the slippery slope of decline, value fell more than 60% since September. Dell was so focused on executing its Success Formula it missed some important market shifts. First, competitors were able to copy Dell's early advantages and provide customers lower prices. Second, customers moved away from wanting the highest growing PC products (servers) on the Dell technology standard products from Microsoft – moving increasingly to Linux solutions. And third, customers simply quit buying PCs and laptops at old growth rates. They are much more willing to keep products longer, rather than switch every year or so, and focus has moved to Blackberries and other mobile products – away from the products Microsoft offered. As a result of these market shifts, Dell's relentless focus on execution provided continuously declining marginal returns. Doing more of what it always did led to declining value at Dell.
Now the rumor is Dell will be launching a mobile phone (read article here). But a quick look shows there has been no change in the Dell Success Formula. The company is still trying to sell a product with no technology added by Dell – using instead off-the-shelf technology from Google and (surprise) Microsoft. Like it did in PCs, Dell looks to copy leading competitive products – this time targeting the Apple iPhone. It appears Dell thinks it can use its now long-in-the-tooth supply chain "strength" (which looks a lot less competitive advantaged than before) to take "me too" products to market in hopes customers will jump at their "standardized" distribution approach.
Only now isn't the 1990s, and mobile phones aren't anything like PCs and laptops. There are many low cost distribution avenues for mobile phones that get products into customers hands really, really cheap and really, really fast. And customers aren't looking for "standard" products, instead showing a very high affinity for new gadgets and bells (just ask Motorola that hung onto its market leading RAZR too long instead of bringing out new products). And thirdly, supply chain issues were important in PCs and laptops largely because most were bought by corporations – not individuals. But mobile phones are not a corporate IT purchase. Individuals by mobile phones.
In a different environment, isn't it surprising Dell would think its old Success Formula could produce good results? When things change, doing more of what you used to do well isn't likely to bring back old returns. Businesses have to change their Success Formulas to meet new and emerging market needs. Dell has to dramatically change its Success Formula if it hopes to regain competitiveness – not just put another me-too product into its old Locked-in processes. Even if Mr. Dell has returned as the CEO.
by Adam Hartung | Jan 28, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
In a recent presentation I told the audience that they had quit printing newspapers in Detroit during the week. The audience said they weren't surprised, and didn't much care. The other day I asked a room full of college students when the last time was they looked at a newspaper (not read, just looked) – and not a single person could remember the last time. In Houston I asked two groups for the headline of the day that morning – not a single person had looked at the newspaper, and none in the group subscribed to a newspaper. Even my wife, who used to demand a Wednesday newspaper so she could receive the grocery ads, asked me why we bother to subscribe any more because she now gets the ads in the mail. This wholly unscientific representation was pretty clear. People simply don't care much about newspapers any more.
So, if you had $100 bucks to invest, and you had the following options, would you invest it in
- A professional baseball team (like the Boston Red Sox or Chicago Cubs)?
- A manhattan skyscraper?
- A newspaper?
That is exactly the question which is facing the New York Times Company (see chart here), and their decision is to invest in a newspaper. In fact, they are selling their interest in the Boston Red Sox and 19 floors in their Manhattan headquarters so they can prop up the newspaper business which saw ad revenue declines of greater than 16% – and classified ad declines of a whopping 29% (read article here). (Classified ads are for cars, lawn mowers, and jobs – you know, the things you now go to find on Craigslist.com, ebay.com, vehix.com and Monster.com and aren't likely to ever spend money on with a newspaper.)
The value of New York Times Company has dropped 90% in the last 5 years – from $50 to $5. The decline in advertising is not a new phenomenon, nor is it related to the financial crisis. People simply quit reading newspapers several years ago, and that trend has continued. Simultaneously, competition for ads grew tremendously – such as the classified ads described above. Corporate advertisers discovered they could reach a lot more readers a lot cheaper if they put ads on the internet using services from Google and Yahoo! There was no surprise in the demise of the newspaper business.
At NYT, the smart thing to do would be to sell, or maybe close, the newspaper and maximize the value of investments in About.com and other web projects (which today are only 12% of revenue) as well as Boston Sports (owner of the Red Sox) and hang on to that Manhattan property until real estate turns around in 5 years (more or less). Why sell the most valuable things you own, and put the money into a product that has seen double-digit demand and revenue declines for several years?
Of course, Tribune Company isn't showing any greater business intelligence. Management borrowed far, far more than the newspaper is worth 2 years ago through an employee stock ownership plan (can you understand "good-bye pension"?). So last week they sold the Chicago Cubs. For $900million. Tribune bought the Cubs, including Wrigley Field, 28 years ago for $20million. That's a 14.5% annualized rate of return for 28 consecutive years. Not even Peter Lynch, the famed mutual fund manager, can claim that kind of record!
Through adroit management and good marketing, they modernized the Wrigley Field assets and the Cubs team – and without ever winning the World Series drove the value straight up. As fast as people quit reading the Chicago Tribune newspaper they went to Cubs games. Who cares if the team doesn't win, there's always next year. And unlike newspapers, there aren't going to be any more professional baseball teams in Chicago (there are already two for those who don't know - Chicago's White Sox won the World Series in 2005). And they aren't building any additional arenas in downtown Chicago to compete with Wrigley Field. Here's a business with monopoly-like characteristics and unlimited value creation potential. But management sold it in order to pay off the debt they took on to take the newspaper private.
Defending the original business gets Locked-in at companies. Long after its value has declined, uneconomic decisions are made to try keeping it alive. Smart competitors don't sell good assets to invest in bad businesses. They follow the capitalistic system and direct investments where their value can grow. The New York Times may be a good newspaper – but who cares if people would rather get their news from TV and the internet – and they don't read newspapers "for fun?" When people don't read, and advertisers can get better return from media vehicles that don't have the printing and distribution costs of newspapers, what difference does it make if the outdated product is "good?" If you think the New York Times Company is cheap at $5.00 a share, you'll think it's really cheap in bankruptcy court. Just ask the employee shareholders at Tribune Company.
by Adam Hartung | Jan 27, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lifecycle, Web/Tech
Last week was quite a contrast in tech results. Google announced it had hired 99 new employees in the fourth quarter, but was planning to lay off 100. Not good news, but a veritable growth binge compared to Microsoft - that announced it was laying off 5,000 from its Windows business. To put it bluntly, people aren't buying PCs and that's the focus of all Microsoft sales. As the PC business stagnates – not hard to predict given the shift to newer products like netbooks, Blackberry's and iPhones - revenues at Microsoft have stagnated as well.
So now the pundits are predicting that Microsoft's weakness indicates an acquisition of Yahoo! is in the offing (read article here). The story goes that with things weak, Microsoft will buy Yahoo! to defend its survivability. Not dissimilar to the logic behind Pfizer's acquisition of Wyeth.
But does this really make sense? Microsoft is fully Locked-in to a completely outdated Success Formula. Mr. Ballmer has shown no ability to do anything beyond execute the old monopolistic model of controlling the desktop. Only a massive Disruption by founder Bill Gates kept Microsoft from falling victim to Netscape in the 1990s. But there hasn't been any White Space at Microsoft, and year after year Microsoft is falling further behind in the technology marketplace. Now the growth is gone in their technology. It's just a "cash cow" that is producing less cash every year. Microsoft is a boring company with boring management that has no idea how to compete against Google. They would strip out whatever market intelligence Yahoo! has left in an effort to turn the company into Microsoft. There would be nothing left of value, and a lot of cash burned up in the process.
Why shouldn't Yahoo! buy Microsoft? Google is the leader in search and on-line ad sales. The closest competitor is Yahoo!, which is so far behind it needs massive cash and engineering resources to develop a competitive attack. Yahoo! has a new CEO with the smarts and brass to Disrupt things and create a new Success Formula. Yahoo! could take advantage of the cash flow from Microsoft to develop new products, possibly products we've not thought of yet, that could create some viable competition for Google. We don't need another Microsoft, but we do need another Google! Why shouldn't Yahoo! take over the engineers and technical knowledge at Microsoft, as well as distribution, and use that to develop new solutions for web applications from possibly search to who knows what! Maybe something that moves beyond the iPhone and Blackberry!
What's the odds of this happening? Not good. That would defy conventional wisdom that the company with all the cash should win. But we all know that as investors we don't value cash in the bank, we value growth. So the company with growth opportunities, and the management to invest in new solutions, should be the one that "milks" the "cash cow." The growing company should be cutting the investment in old solutions that are near end-of-life (like Windows 7), and putting the money into growth programs that can generate much higher rates of return. By all logic of finance, and investing, Yahoo! should buy Microsoft. It's Ms. Bartz we need running a high tech company, shaking things up as the underdog ready to use White Space to develop new solutions that can generate growth. Like she did when beating Calma and DEC. Not the CEO best known for his on-stage monkey imitation and no idea how to generate growth because he's so committed to Defending & Extending the old cash business — completely missing every new technology innovation in the last decade.
Yahoo! has a chance of being a viable competitor. Yahoo! has a chance of competing against Google and pushing both companies to new solutions making the PC an obsolete icon of the past. But if Microsoft buys Yahoo!, it will do nobody any good.
by Adam Hartung | Jan 26, 2009 | Defend & Extend, General, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lock-in
Do you remember when Home Depot was a Wall Street – and customer – darling? Home Depot was only 20 years old when its incredible growth story vaulted it onto the Dow Jones Industrial Average 9 years ago, replacing Sears. Unfortunately, that youthful ascent turned out to be the company crescendo. Since peaking in value within a year, Home Depot has lost more than 2/3 of its value (see chart here). Things have not been good for the company that "changed the rules" on home do-it-yourself sales.
Along the way, Home Depot changed its CEO a couple of times. And it opened some White Space type of projects. But today, the company announced it was shutting down those projects (Expo Design Centers, YardBIRDs, HD Bath) cutting 5,000 jobs - and an additional 2,000 jobs in a "streamlining" efforts (read article here). In the process, it affirmed revenue will decline 8% this year while earnings per share will drop 24%.
Amidst this background, the stock rose 4.5%.
Home Depot is a company with a very strong Success Formula. That Success Formula met the market needs so well in the 1980s and 1990s that the company excelled beyond all expectations. But like most companies, Home Depot was a "one trick pony." It knew how to do one thing, one way. Then in the early 2000s, competitors started catching up. And Home Depot didn't have anything new to offer. The market started shifting to competitors with lower price – or competitors with even better customer service – leaving Home Depot "stuck in the middle" decent at both price and service not not best at either. And with nothing really knew to attract customers.
So Home Depot launched Expo Design Centers. It was leadership's effort to go further upmarket – to sell even higher priced home items. This was a failed effort from the start:
- Leadership did not tie its projects to any committed scenario of the future where Expo would create a leadership position. There was no scenario planning which showed a critical need for Home Depot to change.
- Expo did not learn from competitors, nor did it set any new standards that exceeded competitors. KDA and others had long been doing what Expo did – and even better! Rather than obsessing about competitors in order to realize where Home Depot was weak, and finding new ways to grow the market, Home Depot decided to launch its own idea without powerful competitive information.
- Thirdly, Home Depot did not Disrupt at all. Although Expo existed, it was never considered important to the company future. Leadership never said it needed to do anything different, nor that it felt these new projects were critical to company success. Instead, leadership let all the employees believe these projects were merely trial balloons with limited commitment.
- And, for sure, Expo and other projects did not meet the real criteria of White Space because they lacked the permission to violate Home Depot Lock-ins and the resources to really be successful.
Now, years later, with the company in even more trouble, Home Depot is closing these stores. It appears management is taking a page from Sears – the company they displaced on the DJIA – which closed its hardware and other store concepts to maintain its focus on traditional Sears. And we all know how that's worked out. Leadership is wiping out growth opportunities to save cost, in order to Defend its now poorly performing Success Formula, rather than using them to try developing a solution for declining revenues and profits. So easy to simply quit. Instead of re-orienting the projects along The Phoenix Principle to try and fix Home Depot, leadership is killing the growth potential to save cost with hopes that some miracle will return the world to the days when Home Depot grew and made above-average returns.
What do Home Depot leaders want employees, investors and vendors to anticipate will turn around this company? Even though Home Depot was a phenomenal success, once it hit a growth stall it fell amazingly fast. Not its historical growth rate, nor its size, nor its reputation was able to stop the ongoing decline that befell Home Depot once it hit a growth stall. (By the way, 93% of those companies that hit a growth stall follow the same spiraling downward path as Home Depot). As Sears has shown, a retailer cannot cost-cut its way to success. Refocusing on its "core business" will not return Home Depot to its halcyon days. And these cuts further assure ongoing company decline.
