Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Hobby Lobby and against the U.S. government in a case revolving around health care for employees. I’m a business person, not a lawyer, so to me it was key to understand from a business viewpoint exactly what Hobby Lobby “won.”
It appears Hobby Lobby’s leaders “won” the right to refuse to provide certain kinds of health care to their employees as had been mandated by the Affordable Care Act. The justification primarily being that such health care (all associated with female birth control) violated religious beliefs of the company owners.
As a business person I wondered what the outcome would be if the next case is brought to the court by a business owner who happens to be a Christian Scientist. Would this next company be allowed to eliminate offering vaccines – or maybe health care altogether – because the owners don’t believe in modern medical treatments?
This may sound extreme, and missing the point revolving around the controversy over birth control. But not really. Because the point of business is to legally create solutions for customer needs at a profit. Doing this requires doing a lot of things right in order to attract and retain the right employees, the right suppliers and customers by making all of them extremely happy. I don’t recall Adam Smith, Milton Friedman, Peter Drucker, Edward Demming, John Galbraith or any other historically noted business writer saying the point of business to set the moral compass of its customers, suppliers or employees.
I’m not sure where enforcing the historical religious beliefs of founders or owners plays a role in business. At all. Even if they have the legal right to do so, is it smart business leadership?
Hobby Lobby Store
Hobby Lobby competes in the extraordinarily tough retail market. The ground is littered with failures, and formerly great companies which are struggling such as Sears, KMart, JCPenney, Best Buy, etc. And recently the industry has been rocked with security breaches, reducing customer faith in stalwarts like Target. And profits are being challenged across all brick-and-mortar traditional retailers by on-line companies led by Amazon, who have much lower cost structures.
All the trends in retail bode poorly for Hobby Lobby. Hobby Lobby does almost no business on-line, and even closes its stores on Sunday. Given consumer desires to have what they want, when they want it, unfettered by time or location, a traditional retailer like Hobby Lobby already has its hands full just figuring out how to keep competitors at bay. Customers don’t need much encouragement to skip any particular store in search of easily available products and instant price information across retailers.
Social trends are also very clear in the USA. The great majority of Americans support health care for everyone. Including offering birth control, and all other forms of women’s health needs. This has nothing to do with the Affordable Care Act. Health care, and women’s rights to manage their individual reproductiveness, is something that is clearly a majority viewpoint – and most people think it should be covered by health insurance.
So, given the customer options available, is it smart for any retailer to brag that they are unwilling to offer employees health care? Although not tied to any specific social issues, Wal-Mart has long dealt with customer and employee defections due to policies which reduce employee benefits, such as health care. Is this an issue which is likely to help Hobby Lobby grow?
Is it smart, as Hobby Lobby competes for merchandise from suppliers, negotiates on leases with landlords, seeks new store permits from local governments, recruits employees as buyers, merchandisers, store managers and clerks, and seeks customers who can shop on-line or at competitors to brandish the sword of intolerance on a specific issue which upsets the company owner? And one where this owner is on the opposite side of public opinion?
Long ago a group of retired U.S. military Generals told me that in Vietnam America won every battle, but lost the war. Through overwhelming firepower and manpower, there was no way we would not win any combat mission. But that missed the point. As a result of focusing on the combat, America’s leaders missed the opportunity win “the hearts and minds” of most Vietnamese. In the end America left Vietnam in a rushed abandonment of Saigon, and the North Vietnamese took over all of South Vietnam. Although we did what leaders believed was “right,” and fought each battle to a win, in the end America lost the objective of maintaining a free, independent and democratic Vietnam.
The leaders of Hobby Lobby won this battle. But is this good for the customers, suppliers, communities where stores are located, and employees of Hobby Lobby? Will these constituents continue to support Hobby Lobby, or will they possibly choose alternatives? If in its actions, including legal arguing at the Supreme Court, Hobby Lobby may have preserved what its leaders think is an important legal precedent. But, have their strengthened their business competitiveness so they will be a long-term success?
Perhaps Hobby Lobby might want to listen to the CEO of Chick-fil-A, which suffered a serious media firestorm when it became public their owners donated money to anti-gay organizations. CEO Cathy decided it was best to “just shut up and go sell chicken.” Business is tough enough, loaded with plenty of battles, without looking for fights that are against trends.
Michael Dell has put together a hedge fund, one of his largest suppliers and some debt money to take his company, Dell, Inc. private. There are large investors threatening to sue, claiming the price isn't high enough. While they are wrangling, small investors should consider this privatization manna from heaven, take the new, higher price and run to invest elsewhere – thankful you're getting more than the company is worth.
In the 1990s everybody thought Dell was an incredible company. With literally no innovation a young fellow built an enormously large, profitable company using other people's money, and technology. Dell jumped into the PC business as it was born. Suppliers were making the important bits, and looking for "partners" to build boxes. Dell realized he could let other people invest in microprocessor, memory, disk drive, operating system and application software development. All he had to do was put the pieces together.
Dell was the rare example of a company that was built on nothing more than execution. By marketing hard, selling hard, buying smart and building cheap Dell could produce a product for which demand was skyrocketing. Every year brought out new advancements from suppliers Dell could package up and sell as the latest, greatest model. All Dell had to do was stay focused on its "core" PC market, avoid distractions, and win at execution. Heck, everyone was going to make money building and selling PCs. How much you made boiled down to how hard you worked. It wasn't about strategy or innovation – just execution.
Dell's business worked for one simple reason. Everybody wanted PCs. More than one. And everybody wanted bigger, more powerful PCs as they came available. Market demand exploded as the PC became part of everything companies, and people, do. As long as demand was growing, Dell was growing. And with clever execution – primarily focused on speed (sell, build, deliver, get the cash before the supplier has to be paid) – Dell became a multi-billion dollar company, and its founder a billionaire with no college degree, and no claim to being a technology genius.
But, the market shifted. As this column has pointed out many times, demand for PCs went flat – never to return to previous growth rates. Users have moved to mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets, while corporate IT is transitioning from PC servers to cloud services. iPad sales now nearly match all of Dell's sales. Dell might well be the world's best PC maker, but when people don't want PCs that doesn't matter any more.
Market watchers knew this. That's why Dell's stock took a long ride from its lofty value on the rapids of growth to the recent distinctly low value as it slipped into the whirlpool of failure.
If you think adding debt to Dell will save it from the market shift, just look at how well that strategy worked for fixing Tribune Corporation. A Sam Zell led LBO took over the company claiming he had plans for a new future, as advertisers shifted away from newspapers. Bankruptcy came soon enough, employee pensions were wiped out, massive layoffs undertaken and 4 years of legal fighting followed to see if there was any plan that would keep the company afloat. Debt never fixes a failing company, and Dell knows that. Dell has no answer to changing market demand away from PCs.
Now the buzzards are circling. HP has been caught in a rush to destruction ever since CEO Fiorina decided to buy Compaq and gut the HP R&D in an effort to follow Dell's wild revenue ride. Only massive cost cutting by the following CEO Hurd kept HP alive, wiping out any remnants of innovation. Now HP has a dismal future. But it hopes that as the PC market shrinks the elimination of one competitor, Dell, will give newest CEO Whitman more time to somehow find something HP can do besides follow Dell into bankruptcy court.
Watching as its execution-oriented ecosystem manufacturers are struggling, supplier Microsoft is pulling out its wallet to try and extend the timeline. Plundering its $85B war chest, Microsoft keeps adding features, with acquisitions such as Skype, that consume cash while offering no returns – or even strong reasons for people to stop the transition to tablets.
Additionally it keeps putting up money for companies that it hopes will build end-user products on its software, such as its $500M investment in Barnes & Noble's Nook and now putting $2B into Dell. $85B is a lot of money, but how much more will Microsoft have to spend to keep HP alive – or money losing Acer – or Lenovo? A billion here, a billion there and pretty soon it adds up to a lot of money! Not counting losses in its own entertainmnet and on-line divisions. The transition to mobile devices is permanent and Microsoft has arrived at the game incredibly late – and with products that simply cannot obtain better than mixed reviews.
The lesson to learn is that management, and investors, take a big risk when they focus on execution. Without innovation, organizations become reliant on vendors who may, or may not, stay ahead of market transitions. When an organization fails to be an innovator, someone who creates its own game changers, and instead tries to succeed by being the best at execution eventually market shifts will kill it. It is not a question of if, but when.
Being the world's best PC maker is no better than being the world's best maker of white bread (Hostess) or the world's best maker of photographic film (Kodak) or the world's best 5 and dime retailer (Woolworth's) or the world's best manufacturer of bicycles (Schwinn) or cold rolled steel (Bethlehem Steel.) Being able to execute – even execute really, really well – is not a long-term viable strategy. Eventually, innovation will create market shifts that will kill you.
In 1978 Dan White killed San Francisco's mayor George Moscone and city supervisor Harvey Milk. The press labeled his defense the "Twinkie Defense" because he claimed eating sugary junk food – like Twinkies – caused diminished capacity. Amazingly the jury bought it, and convicted him of manslaughter instead of murder saying he really wasn't responsible for his own actions. An outraged city rioted.
Nobody is rioting, but management's claim that unions caused Hostess failure is just as outrageous.
Founded in 1930 as Interstate Bakeries Co. (IBC) the company did fine for years. But changing consumer tastes, including nutrition desires, changed how much Wonder Bread, Twinkies, HoHos and Honey Buns people would buy — and most especially affected the price – which was wholly unable to keep up with inflation. This trend was clear in the early 1980s, as prices were stagnant and margins kept declining due to higher costs for grain and petroleum to fuel the country's largest truck fleet delivering daily baked goods to grocers.
IBC kept focusing on operating improvements and better fleet optimization to control rising costs, but the company was unwilling to do anything about the product line. To keep funding lower margins the company added debt, piling on $450M by 2004 when forced to file bankruptcy due to its inability to pay bills. For 5 years financial engineers from consultancies and investment banks worked to find a way out of bankruptcy, and settled on adding even MORE debt, so that – perversely – in 2009 the renamed Hostess had $670M of debt – at least 2/3 the total asset value!
Since then, still trying to sell the same products, margins continued declining. Hostess lost a combined $250M over the last 3 years.
The obvious problem is leadership kept trying to sell the same products, using roughly the same business model, long, long, long after the products had become irrelevant. "Demand was never an issue" a company spokesman said. Yes, people bought Twinkies but NOT at a price which would cover costs (including debt service) and return a profit.
In a last, desperate effort to keep the outdated model alive management decided the answer was another bankruptcy filing, and to take draconian cuts to wages and benefits. This is tanatamount to management saying to those who sell wheat they expect to buy flour at 2/3 the market price – or to petroleum companies they expect to buy gasoline for $2.25/gallon. Labor, like other suppliers, has a "market rate." That management was unable to run a company which could pay the market rate for its labor is not the fault of the union.
By constantly trying to defend and extend its old business, leadership at Hostess killed the company. But not realizing changing trends in foods made their products irrelevant – if not obsolete – and not changing Hostess leaders allowed margins to disintegrate. Rather than developing new products which would be more marketable, priced for higher margin and provide growth that covered all costs Hostess leadership kept trying to financial engineer a solution to make their horse and buggy competitive with automobiles.
And when they failed, management decided to scapegoat someone else. Maybe eating too many Twinkies made the do it. It's a Wonder the Ding Dongs running the company kept this Honey Bun alive by convincing HoHos to loan it money! Blaming the unions is simply an inability of management to take responsibility for a complete failure to understand the marketplace, trends and the absolute requirement for new products.
We see this Twinkie Defense of businesses everywhere. Sears has 23 consecutive quarters of declining same-store sales – but leadership blames everyone but themselves for not recognizing the shifting retail market and adjusting effectively. McDonald's returns to declining sales – a situation they were in 9 years ago – as the long-term trend to healthier eating in more stylish locations progresses; but the blame is not on management for missing the trend while constantly working to defend and extend the old business with actions like taking a slice of cheese off the 99cent burger. Tribune completey misses the shift to on-line news as it tries to defend & extend its print business, but leadership, before and afater Mr. Zell invested, refuses to say they simply missed the trend and let competitors make Tribune obsolete and unable to cover costs.
Businesses can adapt to trends. It is possible to stop the never-ending chase for lower costs and better efficiency and instead invest in new products that meet emerging needs at higher margins. Like the famous turnarounds at IBM and Apple, it is possible for leadership to change the company.
But for too many leadership teams, it's a lot easier to blame it on the Twinkies. Unfortunately, when that happens everyone loses.
