The 5 Ways Chairman Lampert Destroyed Sears’ Value

The 5 Ways Chairman Lampert Destroyed Sears’ Value

USAToday alerted investors that when Sears Holdings reports results 2/25/16 they will be horrible.  Revenues down another 8.7% vs. last year. Same store sales down 7.1%. To deal with ongoing losses the company plans to close another 50 stores, and sell another $300million of assets.  For most investors, employees and suppliers this report could easily be confused with many others the last few years, as the story is always the same.  Back in January, 2014 CNBC headlined “Tracking the Slow Death of an Icon” as it listed all the things that went wrong for Sears in 2013 – and they have not changed two years later.  The brand is now so tarnished that Sears Holdings is writing down the value of the Sears name by another $200million – reducing intangible value from the $4B at origination in 2004 to under $2B.

This  has been quite the fall for Sears.  When Chairman Ed Lampert fashioned the deal that had formerly bankrupt Kmart buying Sears in November, 2004 the company was valued at $11billion and 3,500 stores.  Today the company is valued at $1.6billion (a decline of over 85%) and according to Reuters has just under 1,700 stores (a decline of 51%.) According to Bloomberg almost no analysts cover SHLD these days, but one who does (Greg Melich at Evercore ISI) says the company is no longer a viable business, and expects bankruptcy.  Long-term Sears investors have suffered a horrible loss.

When I started business school in 1980 finance Professor Bill Fruhan introduced me to a concept that had never before occurred to me.  Value Destruction.  Through case analysis the good professor taught us that leadership could make decisions that increased company valuation.  Or, they could make decisions that destroyed shareholder value.  As obvious as this seems, at the time I could not imagine CEOs and their teams destroying shareholder value.  It seemed anathema to the entire concept of business education.  Yet, he quickly made it clear how easily misguided leaders could create really bad outcomes that seriously damaged investors.

sears closingAs a case study in bad leadership, Sears under Chairman Lampert offers great lessons in Value Destruction that would serve Professor Fruhan’s teachings well:

1 – Micro-management in lieu of strategy.  Mr. Lampert has been merciless in his tenacity to manage every detail at Sears.  Daily morning phone calls with staff, and ridiculously tight controls that eliminate decision making by anyone other than the top officers.  Additionally, every decision by the officers was questioned again and again.  Explanations took precedent over action as micro-management ate up management’s time, rather than trying to run a successful company.  While store employees and low- to mid-level managers could see competition – both traditional and on-line – eating away at Sears customers and core sales, they were helpless to do anything about it.  Instead they were forced to follow orders given by people completely out of touch with retail trends and customer needs.  Whatever chance Sears and Kmart had to grow the chain against intense competition it was lost by the Chairman’s need to micro-manage.

2 – Manage-by-the-numbers rather than trends.  Mr. Lampert was a finance expert and former analyst turned hedge fund manager and investor.  He truly believed that if he had enough numbers, and he studied them long enough, company success would ensue.  Unfortunately, trends often are not reflected in “the numbers” until it is far, far too late to react. The trend to stores that were cleaner, and more hip with classier goods goes back before Lampert’s era, but he completely missed the trend that drove up sales at Target, H&M and even Kohl’s because he could not see that trend reflected in category sales or cost ratios.  Merchandising – from buying to store layout and shelf positioning – are skills that go beyond numerical analysis but are critical to retail success.  Additionally, the trend to on-line shopping goes back 20 years, but the direct impact on store sales was not obvious until customers had long ago converted.  By focusing on numbers, rather than trends, Sears was constantly reacting rather than being proactive, and thus constantly retreating, cutting stores and cutting product lines.

3 – Seeking confirmation rather than disagreement. Mr. Lampert had no time for staff who did not see things his way.  Mr. Lampert wanted his management team to agree with him – to confirm his Beliefs, Interpretations, Assumptions and Strategies — to believe his BIAS.  By seeking managers who would confirm his views, and execute, rather than disagree Mr. Lampert had no one offering alternative data, interpretations, strategies or tactics.  And, as Mr. Lampert’s plans kept faltering it led to a revolving door of managers.  Leaders came and went in a year or two, blamed for failures that originated at the Chairman’s doorstep.  By forcing agreement, rather than disagreement and dialogue, Sears lacked options or alternatives, and the company had no chance of turning around.

4 – Holding assets too long. In 2004 Sears had a LOT of assets.  Many that could likely be redeployed at a gain for shareholders.  Sears had many owned and leased store locations that were highly valuable with real estate prices climbing from then through 2008.  But Mr. Lampert did not spin out that real estate in a REIT, capturing the value for SHLD shareholders while the timing was good.  Instead he held those assets as real estate in general plummeted, and as retail real estate fell even further as more revenue shifted to e-commerce.  By the time he was ready to sell his REIT much of the value was depleted.

Additionally, Sears had great brands in 2004.  DieHard batteries, Craftsman tools, Kenmore appliances and Lands End apparel were just 4 household brands that still had high customer appeal and tremendous value.  Mr. Lampert could have sold those brands to another retailer (such as selling DieHard to WalMart, for example) as their house brands, capturing that value.  Or he could have mass marketd the brand beyond the Sears store to increase sales and value.  Or he could have taken one or more brands on-line as a product leader and “category killer” for ecommerce customers.  But he did not act on those options, and as Sears and Kmart stores faded, so did these brands – which largely no longer have any value.  Had he sold when value was high there were profits to be made for investors.

5 – Hubris – unfailingly believing in oneself regardless the outcomes.  In May, 2012 I wrote that Mr. Lampert was the 2nd worst CEO in America and should fire himself. This was not a comment made in jest.  His initial plans had all panned out very badly, and he had no strategy for a turnaround.  All results, from all programs implemented during his reign as Chairman had ended badly.  Yet, despite these terrible numbers Mr. Lampert refused to recognize he was the wrong person in the wrong job.  While it wasn’t clear if anyone could turn around the problems at Sears at such a late date, it was clear Mr. Lampert was not the person to do it.  If Mr. Lampert had been as self-analytical as he was critical of others he would have long before replaced himself as the leader at Sears.  But hubris would not allow him to do this, he remained blind to his own failings and the terrible outcome of a failed company was pretty much sealed.

From $11B valuation and a $92/share stock price at time of merging KMart and Sears, to a $1.6B valuation and a $15/share stock price.  A loss of $9.4B (that’s BILLION DOLLARS).  That is amazing value destruction. In a world where employees are fired every day for making mistakes that cost $1,000, $100 or even $10 it is a staggering loss created by Mr. Lampert.  At the very least we should learn from his mistakes in order to educate better, value creating leaders.

Disrupting Markets – Why PayPal Is Worth More Than Ebay

Disrupting Markets – Why PayPal Is Worth More Than Ebay

eBay was once a game changer.  When the internet was very young, and few businesses provided ecommerce, eBay was a pioneer.  From humble beginnings selling Pez dispensers, eBay grew into a powerhouse.  Things we used to sell via garage sale we could now list on eBay.  Small businesses could create stores on eBay to sell goods to customers they otherwise would never reach.  And collectors as well as designers suddenly discovered all kinds of products they formerly could not find.  eBay sales exploded, as traditional retail started it slide downward.

To augment growth eBay realized those selling needed a simple way to collect money from people who lacked a credit card.  Many customers simply had no card, or didn’t trust giving out the information across the web.  So eBay bought fledgling PayPal for $1.5B in 2002, in order to grease the wheels for faster ecommerce growth.  And it worked marvelously.

But times have surely changed.  Now eBay and Paypal have roughly the same revenue.  About $8B/year each.  eBay has run into stiff competition, as CraigsList has grown to take over the “garage sale” and small local business ecommerce.  Simultaneously, powerhouse Amazon has developed its storefront business to a level of sophistication, and ease of use, that makes it viable for businesses from smallest to largest to sell products on-line.  And far more companies have learned they can go it alone with internet sales, using search engine optimization (SEO) techniques as well as social media to drive traffic directly to their stores, bypassing storefronts entirely.

Growth Stall primary slideeBay was a game changer, but now is stuck in practices that have become far less relevant.  The result has been 2 consecutive quarters of declining revenue.  By definition that puts eBay in a growth stall, and fewer than 7% of companies ever recover from a growth stall to consistently increase revenue by a mere 2%/year.  Why not?  Because once in a growth stall the company has already missed the market shift, and competition is taking customers quickly in new directions.  The old leader, like eBay, keeps setting aggressive targets for its business, and tells everyone it will find new customers in remote geographies or vertical markets.  But it almost never happens – because the market shift is making their offering obsolete.

On the other hand, Paypal has blossomed into a game changer in its own right.  Not only does it support cash and credit card transactions for the growing legions of on-line shoppers, but it is providing full payment systems for providers like Uber and AirBnB.  It’s tools support enterprise transactions in all currencies, including emerging bitcoin, and even provides international financial transactions as well as working capital for businesses.

Paypal is increasingly becoming a threat to traditional banks.  Today most folks use a bank for depositing a pay check, and making payments.  There are loans, but frequently that is shopped around irrespective of where you bank.  Much like your credit cards, which most people acquire for their benefits rather than a relationship with the issuing bank.  If customers increasingly make payments via Paypal, and borrow money via operations like Quicken Loans (a division of Intuit,) why do you need a bank?  Discover Services, which now does offer cash deposits and loans on top of credit card services, has found that it can grow substantially by displacing traditional banks.

Paypal is today at the forefront of digital payments processing.  It is a fast growing market, which will displace many traditional banks.  And emerging competitors like Apple Pay and Google Wallet will surely change the market further – while aiding its growth.  How it will shake out is unclear.  But it is clear that Paypal is growing its revenue at 60% or greater since 2012, and at over 100%/quarter the last 2 quarters.

Paypal is now valued at about $47B.  That is roughly the same as the #5 bank in America (according to assets) Bank of New York Mellon, and number 8 massive credit card issuer Capital One, as well as #9 PNC Bank – and over 50% higher valuation than #10 State Street.  It is also about 50% higher than Intuit and Discover.  Based on its current market leadership and position as likely game changer for the banking sector, Paypall is selling for about 8 times revenue.  If its revenue continues to grow at 100%/quarter, however, revenues will reach over $38B in a year making the Price/Revenue multiple of today only 1.25.

Meanwhile, eBay is valued at about $34B.  Given that all which is left in eBay is an outdated on-line ecommerce conglomerator, stuck in a growth stall, that valuation is far harder to justify.  It is selling at about 4.25x revenue.  But if revenues continue declining, as they have for 2 consecutive quarters, this multiple will expand.  And values will be harder and harder to justify as investors rely on hope of a turnaround.

eBay was a game changer.  But leadership became complacent, and now it is very likely overvalued.  Just as Yahoo became when its value relied on its holdings of Alibaba rather as its organic business shrank.  Meanwhile Paypal is the leader in a rapidly growing market that is likely to change the face of not just how we pay, but how we do personal and business finance.  There is no doubt which is more valuable today, and likely to be in the future.

How HR “best practices” Kill Innovation

How HR “best practices” Kill Innovation

Did you ever notice that Human Resource (HR) practices are designed to lock-in the past rather than grow?  A quick tour of what HR does and you quickly see they like to lock-in processes and procedures, insuring consistency but offering no hope of doing something new.  And when it comes to hiring, HR is all about finding people that are like existing employees – same school, same degrees, same industry, same background.  And HR tries its very hardest to insure conformity amongst employees to historical standard – especially regarding culture.

Several years ago I was leading an innovation workshop for leaders in a company that made nail guns, screw guns, nails and screws.  Once a market leader, sales were struggling and profits were nearly nonexistent due to the emergence of competitors from Asia.  Some of their biggest distributors were threatening to drop this company’s line altogether unless there were more concessions – which would insure losses.

They liked to call themselves a “fastener company,” which has long been the trend with companies that like to make it sound as if they do more than they actually do.

I asked the simple question “where is the growth in fasteners?”  The leaders jumped right in with sales numbers on all their major lines.  They were sure that growth was in auto-loading screwguns, and they were hard at work extending this product line.  To a person, these folks were sure they new where growth existed.

But I had prepared prior to the meeting.  There actually was much higher growth in adhesives.  Chemical attachment was more than twice the growth rate of anything in the old nail and screw business.  Even loop-and-hook fasteners [popularly referred to by the tradename Velcro(c)] was seeing much greater growth than the old-line mechanical products.

They looked at me blank-faced.  “What does that have to do with us?” the head of sales finally asked.  The CEO and everyone else nodded in agreement.

I pointed out to them they said they were in the fastener business.  Not the nail and screw business.  The nail and screw business had become a bloody fight, and it was not going to get any better.  Why not move into faster growing, less competitive products?

Competitors were making lots of battery powered and air powered tools beyond nail guns and screw guns, and their much deeper product lines gave them much higher favorability with retail merchandisers and professional tool distributors.  Plus, competitor R&D into batteries was already showing they could produce more powerful and longer-lasting tools than my client.  In a few major retailers competitors already had earned the position of “category leader” recommending the shelf space and layout for ALL competitors, giving them a distinct advantage.

This company had become myopic, and did not even realize it.  The people were so much alike that they could finish each others sentences.  They liked working together, and had built a tightly knit culture.  The HR head was very proud of his ability to keep the company so harmonious.

Only, it was about to go bankrupt.  Lacking diversity in background, they were unable to see beyond their locked-in business model.  And there sure wasn’t anyone who would “rock the boat” by admitting competitors were outflanking them, or bringing up “wild ideas”  for new markets or products.

According to the New York Times 80% of hiring is done based on “cultural fit.”  Which means we hire people we want to hang out with. Which almost always means people that are a lot like ourselves.  Regardless of what we really need in our company.  Thus companies end up looking, thinking and acting very homogenously.

It is common amongst management authors and keynote speakers to talk about creating “high-performance teams.” The vaunted Jim Collins in “Good to Great” uses the metaphor of a company as a bus.  Every company should have a “core” and every employee should be single-mindedly driving that “core.” He says that it is the role of good leaders to get everyone on the bus to “core.”  Anyone who isn’t 100% aligned – well, throw them off the bus (literally, fire them.)

We see this phenomenon in nepotism.  Where a founder, CEO or Chairperson who succeeds uses their leadership position to promote relatives into high positions.

Wal-Mart’s Board of Directors, for example, recently elected the former Chairman’s son-in-law to the position of Chairman.  He appears accomplished, but today Wal-Mart’s problem is Amazon and other on-line retail. Wal-Mart desperately needs outside thinking so it can move beyond its traditional brick-and-mortar business model, not someone who’s indoctrinated in the past.

The Reputation Institute just completed its survey of the most reputable retailers in the USA.  Top of the list was Amazon, for the third straight year.  Wal-Mart wasn’t even in the top 10, despite being the largest U.S. retailer by a considerable margin.  Wal-Mart needs someone at the top much more like Jeff Bezos than someone who comes from the family.

malcolm-forbes-publisher-diversity-the-art-of-thinking-independentlyDespite what HR often says, it is incredibly important to have high levels of diversity.  It’s the only way to avoid becoming myopic, and finding yourself with “best practices” that don’t matter as competitors overwhelm your market.

Ever wonder why so many CEOs turn to layoffs when competitors cause sales and/or profits to stall?  They are trying to preserve the business model, and everyone reporting to them is doing the same thing.  Instead of looking for creative ways to grow the business – often requiring a very different business model – everyone is stuck in roles, processes and culture tied to the old model.  As everyone talks to each other there is no “outsider” able to point out obvious problems and the need for change.

In 2011, while he was still CEO, I wrote a column titled “Why Steve Jobs Couldn’t Find a Job Today.” The premise was pretty simple. Steve Jobs was not obsessed with “cultural fit,” nor was he a person who shied away from conflict.  He obsessed about results.  But no HR person would consider a young Steve Jobs as a manager in their company.  He would be considered too much trouble.

Yet, Steve Jobs was able to take a nearly dead Macintosh company and turn it into a leader in mobile products.  Clearly, a person very talented in market sensing and identifying new solutions that fit trends.  And a person willing to move toward the trend, rather than obsess about defending and extending the past.

Quotation-W-Somerset-Maugham-trouble-men-charm-ideas-Meetville-Quotes-97641Does your organization’s HR insure you would seek out, recruit and hire Steve Jobs, or Jeff Bezos?  Or are you looking for good “cultural fit” and someone who knows “how to operate within that role.”  Do you look for those who spot and respond to trends, or those with a history related to how your industry or business has always operated?  Do you seek people who ask uncomfortable questions, and propose uncomfortable solutions – or seek people who won’t make waves?

Too many organizations suffer failure simply because they lack diversity.  They lack diversity in geographic sales, markets, products and services – and when competition shifts sales stall and they fall into a slow death spiral.

And this all starts with insufficient diversity amongst the people.  Too much “cultural fit” and not enough focus on what’s really needed to keep the organization aligned with customers in a fast-changing world. If you don’t have the right people around you, in the discussion, then you’re highly unlikely to develop the right solution for any problem.  In fact, you’re highly unlikely to even ask the right question.

Two Lessons For Us All from Crumbled Crumbs Bake Shop

Two Lessons For Us All from Crumbled Crumbs Bake Shop

Crumbs Bake Shop – a small chain of cupcake shops, almost totally unknown outside of New York City and Washington, DC – announced it was going out of business today.  Normally, this would not be newsworthy.  Even though NASDAQ traded, Crumbs small revenues, losses and rapidly shrinking equity made it economically meaningless.  But, it is receiving a lot of attention because this minor event signals to many people the end of the “cupcake trend” which apparently was started by cable TV show “Sex and the City.”

However, there are actually 2 very important lessons all of us can learn from the rise, and fall, of Crumbs Bake Shop:

crumbs cupcake

1 – Don’t believe in the myth of passion when it comes to business

Many management gurus, and entrepreneurs, will tell you to go into business following something about which you are passionate.  The theory goes that if you have passion you will be very committed to success, and you will find your way to success with diligence, perseverance, hard work and insight driven by your passion.  Passion will lead to excellence, which will lead to success.

And this is hogwash.

Customers don’t care about your passion.  Customers care about their needs.  Rather than being a benefit, passion is a negative because it will cause you to over-invest in your passion.  You will “never say die” as you keep trying to make success out of an idea that has no chance.  Rather than investing your resources into something that fulfills people’s needs, you are likely to invest in your passion until you burn through all your resources.  Like Crumbs.

The founders of Crumbs had a passion for cupcakes.  But, they had no way to control an onslaught of competitors who could make different variations of the product.  All those competitors, whether isolated cupcake shops or cupcakes offered via kiosks or in other shops, meant Crumbs was in a very tough fight to maintain sales and make money.  It’s not you (and your passion) that controls your business destiny.  Nor is your customers.  Rather, it is your competition.

When there are lots of competitors, all capable of matching your product, and of offering countless variations of your product, then it is unlikely you can sustain revenues – or profits.  There are many industries where cutthroat competition means profits are fleeting, or downright elusive.  Airlines come to mind.  Magazines. And many retail segments.  It doesn’t matter how much passion you have, when there are too many competitors it’s a lousy business.

2 – Trends really do matter

Cupcakes were a hot product for a while.  And that’s great.  But it wasn’t hard to imagine that the trend would shift, and cupcakes would be displaced by something else.  Whatever profits you might have when you sit on a trend, those profits evaporate fast when the trend shifts and all competitors are fighting for sales in a declining market.

Remember Mrs. Field’s cookies?  In the 1980s an attractive cook and her investment banker husband built a business on soft, chewy, warm cookies sold in malls and retail streets across America.  It seemed nobody could get enough of those chocolate chip cookies.

But then, one day, we did.  We’d collectively had enough cookies, and we simply quit buying them.  Mrs. Fields (and other cookie brand) stores were rapidly replaced with pretzels and other foodstuffs.

Or look at Krispy Kreme donuts.  In the 1990s people went crazy for them, often lining up at stores waiting for the neon sign to come on saying “hot donuts”.  The company exploded into 400 stores as the stock flew like a kite.  But then, in a very short time, people had enough donuts.  There were a lot more donut shops than necessary, and Krispy Kreme went bankrupt.

So it wasn’t hard to predict that shifting food tastes would eventually put an end to cupcake sales growth.  Yet, Crumbs really didn’t prepare for trends to change.  Despite revenue and profit problems, the leadership did not admit that cupcake sales had peaked, the market was going to decline, competition would become even more intense and Crumbs would need to find another business if it was to survive.

Few trends move as fast as tastes in sweets.  But, trends do affect all businesses.  Once we bought cameras (and film,) but now we use phones – too bad for Kodak.  Once we used copiers, now we use email – too bad for Xerox.  Once we watched TV, now we download from Netflix or Amazon – too bad for NBC, ABC, CBS and Comcast. Once we went to stores, now we order on-line – too bad for Sears. Once we used PCs, now we use mobile devices – too bad for Microsoft.  These trends did not affect these companies as fast as shifting tastes affected Crumbs, but the importance of understanding trends and preparing for change is a constant part of leadership.

So Crumbs Bake Shop failure was one which could have been avoided.  Leadership needed to overcome its passion for cupcakes and taken a much larger look at customer needs to find alternative products.  It wasn’t hard to identify that some diversification was going to be necessary.  And that would have been much easier if they had put in place a system to track trends, observing (and admitting) that their “core” market was stalled and they needed to move into a new trend category.

Will Steve Ballmer Be a Good LA Clippers Leader?

Will Steve Ballmer Be a Good LA Clippers Leader?

Anyone who reads my column knows I’ve been no fan of Steve Ballmer as CEO of Microsoft.  On multiple occasions I chastised him for bad decisions around investing corporate funds in products that are unlikely to succeed.  I even called him the worst CEO in America The Washington Post even had difficulty finding reputable folks to disagree with my argument.

Unfortunately, Microsoft suffered under Mr. Ballmer.  And Windows 8, as well as the Surface tablet, have come nowhere close to what was expected for their sales – and their ability to keep Microsoft relevant in a fast changing personal technology marketplace.  In almost all regards, Mr. Ballmer was simply a terrible leader, largely because he had no understanding of business/product lifecycles.

lifecycle slide  Microsoft was founded by Bill Gates, who did a remarkable job of taking a start-up company from the Wellspring of an idea into one of the fastest growing adolescents of any American company.

Under Mr. Gates leadership Microsoft single-handedly overtook the original PC innovator – Apple – and left it a niche company on the edge of bankruptcy in little over a decade.

Mr. Gates kept Microsoft’s growth constantly in the double digits by not only making superior operating system software, but by pushing the company into application software which dominated the desktop (MS Office.)  And when the internet came along he had the vision to be out front with Internet Explorer which crushed early innovator, and market maker, Netscape.

But then Mr. Gates turned the company over to Mr. Ballmer.  And Mr. Ballmer was a leader lacking vision, or innovation.  Instead of pushing Microsoft into new markets, as had Mr. Gates, he allowed the company to fixate on constant upgrades to the products which made it dominant – Windows and Office.  Instead of keeping Microsoft in the Rapids of growth, he offered up a leadership designed to simply keep the company from going backward.  He felt that Microsoft was a company that was “mature” and thus in need of ongoing enhancement, but not much in the way of real innovation.  He trusted the market to keep growing, indefinitely, if he merely kept improving the products handed him.

As a result Microsoft stagnated.  A “Reinvention Gap” developed as Vista, Windows 7, then Windows 8 and one after another Office updates did nothing to develop new customers, or new markets.  Microsoft was resting on its old laurels – monopolistic control over desktop/laptop markets – without doing anything to create new markets which would keep it on the old growth trajectory of the Gates era.

Things didn’t look too bad for several years because people kept buying traditional PCs.  And Ballmer famously laughed at products like Linux or Unix – and then later at entertainment devices, smart phones and tablets – as Microsoft launched, but then abandoned products like Zune, Windows CE phones and its own tablet.  Ballmer kept thinking that all the market wanted was a faster, cheaper PC.  Not anything really new.

And he was dead wrong.  The Reinvention Gap emerged to the public when Apple came along with the iPod, iTunes, iPhone and iPad.  These changed the game on Microsoft, and no longer was it good enough to simply have a better edition of an outdated technology.  As PC sales began declining it was clear that Ballmer’s leadership had left the company in the Swamp, fighting off alligators and swatting at mosquitos with no strategy for how it would regain relevance against all these new competitors.

So the Board pushed him out, and demoted Gates off the Chairman’s throne.  A big move, but likely too late.  Fewer than 7% of companies that wander into the Swamp avoid the Whirlpool of demise.  Think Univac, Wang, Lanier, DEC, Cray, Sun Microsystems (or Circuit City, Montgomery Wards, Sears.)  The new CEO, Satya Nadella, has a much, much more difficult job than almost anyone thinks.  Changing the trajectory of Microsoft now, after more than a decade creating the Reinvention Gap, is a task rarely accomplished.  So rare we make heros of leaders who do it (Steve Jobs, Lou Gerstner, Lee Iacocca.)

So what will happen at the Clippers?

Critically, owning an NBA team is nothing like competing in the real business world.  It is a closed marketplace.  New competitors are not allowed, unless the current owners decide to bring in a new team.  Your revenues are not just dependent upon you, but are even shared amongst the other teams.  In fact your revenues aren’t even that closely tied to winning and losing.  Season tickets are bought in advance, and with so many games away from home a team can do quite poorly and still generate revenue – and profit – for the owner.  And this season the Indiana Pacers demonstrated that even while losing, fans will come to games.  And the Philadelphia 76ers drew crowds to see if they would set a new record for the most consecutive games lost.

In America the major sports only modestly overlap, so you have a clear season to appeal to fans.  And even if you don’t make it into the playoffs, you still share in the profits from games played by other teams.  As a business, a team doesn’t need to win a championship to generate revenue – or make a profit.  In fact, the opposite can be true as Wayne Huizenga learned owning the Championship winning Florida Marlins baseball team.  He payed so much for the top players that he lost money, and ended up busting up the team and selling the franchise!

In short, owning a sports franchise doesn’t require the owner to understand lifecycles. You don’t have to understand much about business, or about business competition. You are protected from competitors, and as one of a select few in the club everyone actually works together – in a wholly uncompetitive way – to insure that everyone makes as much money as possible.  You don’t even have to know anything about managing people, because you hire coaches to deal with players, and PR folks to deal with fans and media.  And as said before whether or not you win games really doesn’t have much to do with how much money you make.

Most sports franchise owners are known more for their idiosyncrasies than their business acumen.  They can be loud and obnoxious all they want (with very few limits.)  And now that Mr. Ballmer has no investors to deal with – or for that matter vendors or cooperative parties in a complex ecosystem like personal technology – he doesn’t have to fret about understanding where markets are headed or how to compete in the future.

When it comes to acting like a person who knows little about business, but has a huge ego, fiery temper and loves to be obnoxious there is no better job than being a sports franchise owner.  Mr. Ballmer should fit right in.