by Adam Hartung | Jan 12, 2010 | Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in
Do all good ideas originate outside the organization? Of course not. Motorola understood all the critical technologies for smart phones, and taught Apple how to use them in a joint development project that created the ROKR. That's just one example of a company that had the idea for growth, but didn't move forward effectively. In this case Apple captured the value of new technology and a market shift.
On the Harvard Business Review blog site one of consulting firm Innosight's leaders, Mark Johnson, covers two stories of companies that had all the technology and capability to lead their markets, but got Locked-in to old practices. In "Have You Already Killed Your Next Big Thing" Mr. Johnson talks about Xerox and Kodak – two stories profiled in my 2008 book "Create Marketplace Disruption." Both companies developed the technology that replaced their early products (Xerox developed desktop publishing and Kodak developed the amateur digital camera.) But Lock-in kept them doing what they did rather than exploiting their own innovation.
One of the causes is a fascination with metrics. Again on the Harvard Business Review blog site Roger Martin, Dean of the Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto, tells us in "Why Good Spreadsheets Make Bad Strategies" that you can't measure everything. And often the most important information about markets and what you must do to succeed is beyond measuring – at least in the short term.
Measurements are good control tools. Measurements can help force a focus on short term improvements. But measurements, and the concomitant focus, reduces an organization's ability to look laterally. They lose sight of information from lost customers, from small customers, from fringe customers and fringe competitors. Measurement often leads to obsession, and a deepening of Defend & Extend behavior. It's not accidental that doctors often find anorexia patients measure everything in (liquids and solids) and everything out (liquids and solids).
Measurements are created when a business is doing well. In the Rapids. Like Kodak during the 1960s and Xerox in the 1970s. Measurements are structural Lock-ins that help "institutionalize" the behavior which makes the Success Formula operate most effectively. And they help growth. But they do nothing for recognizing a market shift, and when new technology comes along, they stand in the way. That's why a powerful Six Sigma or Total Quality Management (TQM) or Lean Manufacturing project can help reduce costs short term, but become an enormous barrier to innovation over time when markets shift. These institutionalized efforts keep people doing what they measure, even if it doesn't really add much incremental value any longer.
To overcome measurement Lock-ins we all have to use scenario planning. Scenarios can help us see that in a future marketplace, a changed marketplace, measuring what we've been doing won't aid success. And because we don't yet know what the future market will really look like, we can't just swap out existing metrics for something different. As we proceed to do new things, in White Space, it's about learning what the right metrics are – about getting into the growth Rapids – before we tie ourselves up in metrics.
Note: To all readers of my Forbes article last week – there has been an update. The very professional and polite leadership at Tribune Corporation took the time to educate me about the LBO transition. As a result I learned that what I previously read, and reported in my column as well as on this blog, as being an investment of employee retirement funds into the LBO was inaccurate. Although Tribune is in hard times right now, the very good news is that the employee retirement funds were NOT wiped out by the bankruptcy. The Forbes article has been corrected, and I am thankful to the Tribune Corporation for helping me report accurately on that issue.
by Adam Hartung | Jul 5, 2009 | Web/Tech
“Burns Succeeds Mulcahy at Xerox in First Big Woman-to-Woman CEO Transition” is the Forbes headline. It’s only too bad that this headline took until 2009 to happen. It’s also too bad that gender issues, such as women CEOs, are worth headlines. But the truth is that the CEO job is still dramatically dominated by men, even though women are half the workforce and been in managerial positions for at least 30 years. Just goes to show it takes a long time for to change old Success Formulas – and its been true that Boards of Directors, and CEOs, tend to replace an outgoing executive with one much like themselves.
“Ursula Burns: An Historic Succession at Xerox” was the Businessweek headline. And not just because the new CEO is a woman. She’s also African American. African Americans have achieved much in the USA, including prominent political positions – such as America’s Presidency. But even though African Americans comprise about 10-15% of the U.S. population, it’s been a very long and arduous climb from the depths of slavery to the CEO suite. Again, old Success Formulas are repeated again and again and again – and for decades that blocked many women and African Americans from achieving the top job in America’s biggest companies.
So kudos to Xerox for building a culture that achieves parity in reviews. They’ve allowed the best and brightest in their organization to rise to the top, unencumbered by old notions about gender and race. And that is a fantastic accomplishment. We should deservedly praise the executives and Board at Xerox for adapting their human resource policies so that promotions are both gender and color blind.
But that doesn’t fix the problem at Xerox. And unfortunately, promoting another insider is likely to be the end of this once great company.
Xerox almost single-handedly killed the small offset lithography business. In the 1960s every major company had several printing presses in the basement. And print shops were everywhere to support the need for duplicate documents. Small offset press manufacturers, and support products like plates, were a huge growth industry. Until Xerox came along with a better technology, and a better pricing scheme. Xerox sold “clicks”, or paper passes through the machine, rather than the machine itself. And this allowed companies to buy far more copiers than they ever imagined. In the 1970s Xerox was THE model sales organization; itself duplicated wherever companies wanted to achieve tremendous growth.
But desktop printing spelled the end of growth for large copiers. Xerox actually had a major impact on the invention of desktop printing, with researchers at Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) creating many of the pieces critical for product viability. But Xerox Locked-in on its copier business, and in the 1980s when the market started shifting Xerox didn’t. By the 1990s, instead of selling millions of small printers, Xerox turned to selling complex copy centers that cost over $100,000 each and took training to operate. While personal printers popped up in offices like popcorn, the large copiers were replaced by smaller and simpler machines on each hall, or went away entirely. Xerox sales started slipping, and by century’s end Xerox was in real danger of disappearing.
The 30 year employee that stopped a complete failure was Ms. Mulcahy. She stopped the cash bleeding, and dealt with the huge debt. Xerox did not go into bankruptcy, but the company saw its revenue drop dramatically and new product launches shriveled up – or were ignored by customers looking for different solutions. Ms. Mulcahy was like the captain on a damaged submarine. She was able to plug the leaks and batten down the hatches so some of the crew survived. But in doing so the submarine kept falling further and further toward the bottom of the ocean. Xerox may be “settled in” on the ocean floor, but how is it supposed to survive? How is it supposed to grow? How is it supposed to accomplish its mission of generating high rates of return year after year?
The market for copiers is not growing, and competition in that marketplace is intense – with machines from Japanese manufacturers such as IBM, Canon and Sharp dominating the market today. Xerox cannot consider its lack of collapse a big win, because in the process it watched the market shift to a raft of new products in both desktop printing and copying where Xerox does not even compete. Competitors have launched machines that are more cost effective to use, and often have better capability. While Xerox was cutting cost, these competitors were gaining share and developing new products. These shifts have left Xerox far removed from competitive viability, even if it is less in debt and cash flow is better.
We commonly see this sort of behavior in companies after a growth stall. They appear on the brink of collapse. But then a smart leader takes dramatic action to stop the bloodletting and “firm up the balance sheet.” The company goes from huge losses to small profits, aided by financial engineering that brings forward costs to pad later P&Ls. Employees and investors breath a sigh of relief, figuring the badness is behind them and everyone can return to the good old days of making money. But these respites are short-lived. Fast enough the company comes face-to-face with customers that demand the new technology and more productive solutions. Rapidly managers realize competitors have made inroads to previously loyal customers, and price erosion is a constant fact of life. In short order, profits again turn to losses and more cutbacks happen as insufficient resources are available for funding new product development and new product launches. What looked for a bit like a big improvement in the business is quickly forgotten as the company falters again.
Americans are an optimistic lot, but there’s nothing in this executive transition that should lead us to be optimistic about the future of Xerox. Ms. Mulcahy was a long-term company veteran who did not change, or even Disrupt, the Xerox Success Formula at all during her tenure. She followed traditional practices of a company in the Swamp, taking draconian actions to delay failure. But she didn’t “fix” the revenue or new product problems. The new CEO is also a 30 year company veteran, and one even less likely to attack the old Success Formula. Where Ms. Mulcahy was from sales, and we might have expected her to undertake a market-focused set of actions, Ms. Burns is from operations and gained her success as someone who looks internally for improvement rather than toward the marketplace.
Again, congratulations to Xerox for being gender and race neutral in selecting its CEOs. But don’t expect a dramatic improvement in the fortunes at Xerox. Xerox is in big, big trouble. It needs to be in new markets it has long ignored, and it needs products the company has long eschewed. The brand has become tainted due to expensive pricing and declining sales. Xerox is so far into the Whirlpool that it is almost infeasible to think of the company becoming “great” again. It would take incredible Disruption and results from very rapid White Space. But Xerox is not skilled in these capabilities, and it doesn’t show the depth of market savvy or product innovation that would be required to make the company a leading competitor. Unfortunately, even though Xerox has successfully changed captains, it is highly unlikely the new CEO will save the ship.
by Adam Hartung | Jun 15, 2009 | Defend & Extend, General, Leadership, Lifecycle
Harvard Publishing recently posted an article from a professor at the London Business School, Freek Vermeulen "Can we please stop saying the market is efficient?" The good professor's point of view was that he observed a lot of companies that were efficient which didn't survive, and several not all that efficient that did survive. He even took time to point out where some Harvard professors had identified that companies who implement ISO 9000 often see their innovation decline!
Unfortunately, the good professor is all too correct. If markets were efficient, we'd see performance move in a straight line. But any follower of equities, for example, can show you where the stock of a company may have gone up, then declined 20%, then gone back to a new high, maybe to even fall back more than the original 20%, only to then climb to even greater highs. If the market for that equity were efficient, it would never have these sorts of wild price gyrations.
Likewise, the market for products, things like copiers, aren't all that efficient. A case I describe pretty deeply in Create Marketplace Disruption. When Xerox brought out the 914 copier it changed the world of office copies. But it didn't take off. Instead, for years companies maintained their duplicating shop in the basement, using small lithographic offset presses. This went on for years, and usually the basement shop was closed when (a) the operator retired, (b) the printing press simply gave up the ghost and was ready for the scrap heap, or (c) when the company realized it had so many copiers the basement would be better served to house copiers instead of the printing press. The fact is that marginal economics – the very low cost of continuing to operate an alread-paid-for-press meant that it was easy to simply keep using presses long after they had any economic advantage. Not to mention all kinds of kinks in the decision apparatus that funded things like a print shop just because the budget "always had." But eventually, as the retirees and metal scrappers started accumulating, the market shifted. What had been a "mixed market" of presses and Xerox copiers suddenly shifted to almost all copiers. Xerox exploded, and the small offset press makers disappeared.
That wasn't efficient. There was a huge lag between when the benefits of copiers were well known and the demise of print shops. In the end, those who had debts or equity in printing press companies suffered huge losses as the business "fell off a cliff." There was no "orderly migration" out of the marketplace. In a very short time, the market shifted from one solution to another.
As recently as 2007 almost every home in America had a newspaper delivered. By 2009 the market had begun to disappear with subscriptions down over 60% in some markets. For advertisers, the purchasing of print ads dropped by over 50% in just 24 months. Yet, the growth of web usage and internet ads had been growing for almost a decade. In an efficient market there would have been a smooth transition between the two, with say 5% of ads shifting every year. Again, the economists' "orderly transition" would have applied. There doesn't seem anything orderly if you're in a market where the newspaper has disappeared, filed for bankruptcy, or cut its pages 40% – and you're wondering how to get the local news or even the TV listings you once found in the newspaper.
Market shifts are sudden, and big. In the later half of the 1980s the PC market shifted from 60% Macintosh to 80% Wintel in just 5 years – while growth for PCs exploded. It didn't feel very efficient to people at Apple, the suppliers of apps for Macs or the user base. Thousands of people in corporations were told "surrender your Mac and get a new PC next week" with no discussion, explanation or concern.
Companies that fall victim to market shifts aren't without strategists, planners or quality programs. Many have robust TQM or Six Sigma projects. But these are all about optimizing performance against past performance – not necessarily what the market wants. When you optimize agains the past you depend on minimal change. When markets shift, these "efficiency" programs can cause you to be the last to know – and the last to react.
People like to think of evolution as sort of like Continuous Improvement. Get 5% better every year. Like a variety of mammal might lose 1/4" of tail each generation until it no longer has one. We now know that's not how it works. There are winners. They keep reproducing, get stronger and more of them every year. Like mammals with long tails. Meanwhile, an alternative develops – like a mammal with no tail. Then suddenly, without expectation, the environment changes. Tails become a big hindrance, and those with tails die off in a massive exodus. Those without tails suddenly find they are advantaged by the lack of tails, so they begin breeding fast and getting stronger. In short order, perhaps a single generation, the tailed mammals are gone and the no-tails become dominant. Not very efficient, or orderly. More like reactive to an environmental shift.
If you want to do good tomorrow, I mean one day from today, the odds are that you can accomplish that by being just slightly better at what you did yesterday. But if you want to be good in 5 years, you may well have to do something very different. If you wait for the market to tell you – well – you've waited too long. By the time you know you're out of date, the competitor has taken your position. You have no hope of survival.
We live with a lot of myths in business. The value of efficiency, and the belief in efficient markets, are just a couple of big ones. Kind of like the old myths about blood-letting. Before the USA, never before in history has anyone ever tried to establish a government of self-rule. And self-rule led America to a country dominated by businesspeople. No longer did the king determine winners, losers, prices and behavior. Now markets would do so. The people who would make these markets were the emerging business folks. But nobody knew anything about markets – except some theories about how they "should" work written by an Englishman who had grand thoughts about open-market behaviors. So most people accepted the earliest theory – with its ideas about "invisible hands" that would guide behavior.
Markets are dramatically inefficient. Just look at the prices of equities. Look at the bankruptcies all around us. GM, your local newspaper, Six Flags and your neighborhood furniture store. People who were often efficient, but didn't understand that markets shift quickly, and very inefficiently. They don't move in small increments – they change all at once. And if you want to survive, you have to
prepare for market shifts. Simply working harder, faster and cheaper won't save you when the market shifts. If you aren't ready to be part of the shift, you get left behind and won't survive.
Markets are shifting today faster than they ever have. Telecommunications, internet connections, massive amounts of computing power, television, jet airplanes – these things have made the clock speed on changes much faster. Market shifts that used to be seperated by decades are compressed into a few years. If you don't plan on market inefficiencies – on market changes – you simply can't survive.
Lots of people misunderstand Darwin. The prevailing view is that his study on the origination of species says that the strongest survive. In fact, his conclusion was quite the opposities. What he said was that it is not the strongest that survive, but the most adaptable.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 21, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
"With Oracle, Sun avoids becoming another Yahoo," headlines Marketwatch.com today. As talks broke down because IBM was unwilling to up its price for Sun Microsystems, Oracle Systems swept in and made a counter-offer that looks sure to acquire the company. Unlike Yahoo – Sun will now disappear. The shareholders will get about 5% of the value Sun was worth a decade ago at its peak. That's a pretty serious value destruction, in any book. And if you don't think this is bad news for the employees and vendors just wait a year and see how many remain part of Oracle. A sale to IBM would have fared no better for investors, employees or vendors.
It was clear Sun wasn't able to survive several years ago. That's why I wrote about the company in my book Create Marketplace Disruption. Because the company was unwilling to allow any internal Disruptions to its Success Formula and any White Space to exist which might transform the company. In the fast paced world of information products, no company can survive if it isn't willing to build an organization that can identify market shifts and change with them.
I was at a Sun analyst conference in 1995 where Chairman McNealy told the analysts "have you seen the explosive growth over at Cisco System? I ask myself, how did we miss that?" And that's when it was clear Sun was in for big, big trouble. He was admitting then that Sun was so focused on its business, so focused on its core, that there was very little effort being expended on evaluating market shifts – which meant opportunities were being missed and Sun would be in big trouble when its "core" business slowed – as happens to all IT product companies. Sun had built its Success Formula selling hardware. Even though the real value Sun created shifted more and more to the software that drove its hardware, which became more and more generic (and less competitive) every year, Sun wouldn't change its strategy or tactics – which supported its identity as a hardware company – its Success Formula. Even though Sun became a leader in Unix operating systems, extensions for networking and accessing lots of data, as well as the creator and developer of Java for network applications because software was incompatible with the Success Formula, the company could not maintain independent software sales and the company failed.
Sort of like Xerox inventing the GUI (graphical user interface), mouse, local area network to connect a PC to a printer, and the laser printer but never capturing any of the PC, printer or desktop publishing market. Just because Xerox (and Sun) invented a lot of what became future growth markets did not insure success, because the slavish dedication to the old Success Formula (in Xerox's case big copiers) kept the company from moving forward with the marketplace.
Instead, Sun Microsystems kept trying to Defend & Extend its old, original Success Formula to the end. Even after several years struggling to sell hardware, Sun refused to change into the software company it needed to become. To unleash this value, Sun had to be acquired by another software company, Oracle, willing to let the hardware go and keep the software – according to the MercuryNews.com "With Oracle's acquisition of Sun, Larry Ellison's empire grows." Scott McNealy wouldn't Disrupt Sun and use White Space to change Sun, so its value deteriorated until it was a cheap buy for someone who could use the software pieces to greater value in another company.
Compare this with Steve Jobs. When Jobs left Apple in disrepute he founded NeXt to be another hardware company – something like a cross between Apple and Sun. But he found the Unix box business tough sledding. So he changed focus to a top application for high powered workstations – graphics – intending to compete with Silicon Graphics (SGI). But as he learned about the market, he realized he was better off developing application software, and he took over leadership of Pixar. He let NeXt die as he focused on high end graphics software at Pixar, only to learn that people weren't as interesed in buying his software as he thought they would be. So he transitioned Pixar into a movie production company making animated full-length features as well as commercials and short subjects. Mr. Jobs went through 3 Success Formulas getting the business right – using Disruptions and White Space to move from a box company to a software company to a movie studio (that also supplied software to box companies). By focusing on future scenarios, obsessing about competitors and Disrupting his approach he kept pushing into White Space. Instead of letting Lock-in keep him pushing a bad idea until it failed, he let White Space evolve the business into something of high value for the marketplace. As a result, Pixar is a viable competitor today – while SGI and Sun Microsystems have failed within a few months of each other.
It's incredibly easy to Defend & Extend your Success Formula, even after the business starts failing. It's easy to remain Locked-in to the original Success Formula and keep working harder and faster to make it a little better or cheaper. But when markets shift, you will fail if you don't realize that longevity requires you change the Success Formula. Where Unix boxes were once what the market wanted (in high volume), shifts in competitive hardware (PC) and software (Linux) products kept sucking the value out of that original Success Formula.
Sun needed to Disrupt its Lock-ins – attack them – in order to open White Space where it could build value for its software products. Where it could learn to sell them instead of force-bundling them with hardware, or giving them away (like Java.) And this is a lesson all companies need to take to heart. If Sun had made these moves it could have preserved much more of its value – even if acquired by someone else. Or it might have been able to survive as a different kind of company. Instead, Sun has failed costing its investors, employees and vendors billions.
by Adam Hartung | Mar 20, 2009 | Current Affairs, General, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Travel, Web/Tech
"Xerox chops earnings outlook as sales slide" is the headline on Marketwatch.com. Do you remember when Xerox was considered the most powerful sales company on earth? In the 1970s and into the 1980s corporations marveled at the sales processes at Xerox – because those processes brought in quarter after quarter of increasing profitable revenue. Xerox practically wiped out competitors – the small printing press manufacturers – during this period, and "carbon paper" was quickly becoming a museum relic (if you are under 30 you'll have to ask someone older what carbon paper is – because it requires an explanation of something called a typewriter as well [lol]).
But today, do you care about Xerox? If you have a copier, you don't care who made it. It could be from Sharp, or Canon, or anybody. You don't care if it's Xerox unless you work in a "copy store" like Kinko's or run the copy center for the corporation – and possibly not even in those jobs. And because desktop printers have practically made copiers obsolete, you may not care about copiers at all. In short, even though Xerox invented the marketplace for widespread duplicating, because the company stayed in its old market of big copiers it has seen revenue declines and has largely become irrelevant.
"U.S. airline revenue plunges for another month" is another Marketwatch.com headline. And I ask again, do you care? The airlines were deregulated 30 years ago, and since then as a group they've never consistently made money (only 1 airline – Southwest – is the exception to this discussion.) The big players in the early days included TWA, Eastern, Braniff, PanAm – names long gone from the skies. They've been replaced by Delta, American and United – as we've watched the near collapse of US Airways, Northwest and Continental. But we've grown so used to the big airlines losing money, and going bankrupt, and screaming about unions and fuel costs, that we've pretty much quit caring. The only thing frequent travelers care about now is their "frequent flier miles" and how they can use them. The airline itself is irrelevant – just so long as I get those miles and get my status and they let me board early.
When you don't grow, you lose relevance. In the mid-1980s the battle raged between Apple's Macintosh and the PC (generically, from all manufacturers) as to which was going to be the dominant desktop computer. By the 1990s that question had been answered, and as Macintosh sales lagged Apple lost relevance. But then when the iPod, iTunes, iTouch and iPhone came along suddenly Apple gained a LOT of relevance. When companies grow, they demonstrate the ability to serve markets. They are relevant. When they don't grow, like GM and Citibank, they lose relevance. It's not about cash flow or even profitability. When you grow, like Amazon with its Kindle launch, you get attention because you demonstrate you are connected to where markets are headed.
Is your business obsessing about costs to the point it is hurting revenue? If so, you are at risk of losing relevance. Like Sara Lee in consumer goods, or Sears in retailing, even if the companies are able to make a profit – possibly even grow profits after some bad years – if you can't grow the top line you just aren't relevant. And if you aren't relevant, you can't get more customers interested in your products/services, and you can't encourage investors. People want to be part of Google, not Kodak.
To maintain (or regain) relevance today, you have to focus on growth. Cutting costs is not enough. If you lose relevance, you lose your customer base and financing, and you make it a whole lot easier for competitors to grow. While you're looking internally, or managing the bottom line, competitors are figuring out the market direction, and proving it by demonstrating growth. And that's why today, even more than before, it is so critical you focus planning on future markets for growth, obsess about competitors, use Disruptions to change behavior and implement White Space to experiment with new business opportunities. Because if you don't do those things you are far, far too likely to simply become irrelevant.
[note: Thanks for feedback that my spelling and grammar have gotten pretty sloppy lately. I'm going to allocate more time to review, as well as writing. And hopefully pick up some proofreading to see if this can improve. Sorry for the recent problems, and I appreciate your feedback on errors.]
