by Adam Hartung | Dec 10, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lifecycle, Television
Remember when almost everyone read a daily newspaper?
Newspaper readership peaked around 2000. Since then printed media has declined, as readers shifted on-line. Magazines have folded, and newspapers have disappeared, quit printing, dramatically cut page numbers and even more dramatically cut staff.
Amazingly, almost no major print publisher prepared for this, even though the trend was becoming clear in the late 1990s.
Newspapers are no longer a viable business. While industry revenue grew for
almost 2 centuries, it collapsed in a mere decade.
Chart Source: BusinessInsider.com
This market shift created clear winners, and losers. On-line news sites like Marketwatch and HuffingtonPost were clear winners. Losers were traditional newspaper companies such as Tribune Corporation, Gannett, McClatchey, Dow Jones and even the New York Times Company. And investors in these companies either saw their values soar, or practically disintegrate.
In 2012 it is equally clear that television is on the brink of a major transition. Fewer people are content to have their entertainment programmed for them when they can program it themselves on-line. Even though the number of television channels has exploded with pervasive cable access, the time spent watching television is not growing. While simultaneously the amount of time people spend looking at mobile internet displays (tablets, smartphones and laptops) is growing at double digit rates.
Chart Source: Silicone Alley Insider Chart of the Day 12/5/12
It would be easy to act like newspaper defenders and pretend that television as we've known it will not change. But that would be, at best, naive. Just look around at broadband access, the use of mobile devices, the convenience of mobile and the number of people that don't even watch traditional TV any more (especially younger people) and the trend is clear. One-way preprogrammed advertising laden television is not a sustainable business.
So, now is the time to prepare. And change your business to align with impending new realities.
Losers, and winners, will be varied – and not entirely obvious. Firstly, a look at those trying to maintain the status quo, and likely to lose the most.
Giant consumer goods and retail companies benefitted from the domination of television. Only huge companies like P&G, Kraft, GM and Target could afford to lay out billions of dollars for television ads to build, and defend, a brand. But what advantage will they have when TV budgets no longer control brand building? They will become extremely vulnerable to more innovative companies that have better products and move on fast lifecycles. Their size, hierarchy and arcane business practices will lead to huge problems. Imagine a raft of new Hostess Brands experiences.
Even as the trends have started changing these companies have continued pumping billions into the traditional TV networks as they spend to defend their brand position. This has driven up the value of companies like CBS, Comcast (owns NBC) and Disney (owns ABC) over the last 3 years substantially. But don't expect that to last forever. Or even a few more years.
Just like newspaper ad spending fell off a cliff when it was clear the eyeballs were no longer there, expect the same for television ad spending. As giant advertisers find the cost of television harder and harder to justify their outlays will eventually take the kind of cliff dive observed in the chart (above) for newspaper advertising. Already some consumer goods and ad agency executives are alluding to the fact that the rate of return on traditional TV is becoming sketchy.
So far, we've seen little at the companies which own TV networks to demonstrate they are prepared for the floor to fall out of their revenue stream. While some have positions in a few internet production and delivery companies, most are clearly still doing their best to defend & extend the old business – just like newspaper owners did. Just as newspapers never found a way to replace the print ad dollars, these television companies look very much like businesses that have no apparent solution for future growth. I would not want my 401K invested in any major network company.
And there will be winners.
For smaller businesses, there has never been a better time to compete. A company as small as Tesla or Fisker can now create a brand on-line at a fraction of the old cost. And that brand can be as powerful as Ford, and potentially a lot more trendy. There are very low entry barriers for on-line brand building using not only ad words and web page display ads, but also using social media to build loyal followers who use and promote a brand. What was once considered a niche can become well known almost overnight simply by applying the new dynamics of reaching customers on-line, and increasingly via mobile. Look at the success of Toms Shoes.
Zappos and Amazon have shown that with almost no television ads they can create powerhouse retail brands. The new retailers do not compete just on price, but are able to offer selection, availability and customer service at levels unachievable by traditional brick-and-mortar retailers. They can suggest products and prices of things you're likely to need, even before you realize you need them. They can educate better, and faster, than most retail store employees. And they can offer great prices due to less overhead, along with the convenience of shipping the product right into your home.
And as people quit watching preprogrammed TV, where will they go for content? Anybody streaming will have an advantage – so think Netflix (which recently contracted for all the Disney content,) Amazon, Pandora, Spotify and even AOL. But, this will also benefit those companies providing content access such as Apple TV, Google TV, YouTube (owned by Google) to offer content channels and the increasingly omnipresent Facebook will deliver up not only friends, but content — and ads.
As for content creation, the deep pockets of traditional TV production companies will likely disappear along with their ability to control distribution. That means fewer big-budget productions as risk goes up without revenue assurances.
But that means even more ability for newer, smaller companies to create competitive content seeking audiences. Where once a very clever, hard working Seth McFarlane (creator of Family Guy) had to hardscrabble with networks to achieve distribution, and live in fear of a single person controlling his destiny, in the future these creative people will be able to own their content and capture the value directly as they build a direct audience. A phenomenon like George Lucas will be more achievable than ever before as what might look like chaos during transition will migrate to a much more competitive world where audiences, rather than network executives, will decide what content wins – and loses.
So, with due respects to Don McLean, will today be the day TV Died? We will only know in historical context. Nobody predicted newspapers had peaked in 2000, but it was clear the internet was changing news consumption behavior. And we don't know if TV viewership will begin its rapid decline in 2013, or in a couple more years. But the inevitable change is clear – we just don't know exactly when.
So it would be foolish to not think that the industry is going to change dramatically. And the impact on advertising will be even more profound, much more profound, than it was in print. And that will have an even more profound impact on American society – and how business is done.
What are you doing to prepare?
by Adam Hartung | Oct 4, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, Film, In the Rapids, Innovation, Leadership, Television, Transparency, Web/Tech
Reed Hastings, the CEO of Netflix, has long been considered a pretty good CEO. In January, 2009 his approval ranking, from Glassdoor, was an astounding 93%. In January, 2010 he was still on the top 25 list, with a 75% approval rating. And it's not surprising, given that he had happy employees, happy customers, and with Netflix's successful trashing of Blockbuster the company's stock had risen dramaticall,y leading to very happy investors.
But that was before Mr. Hastings made a series of changes in July and September. First Netflix raised the price on DVD rentals, and on packages that had DVD rentals and streaming download, by about $$6/month. Not a big increase in dollar terms, but it was a 60% jump, and it caught a lot of media attention (New York Times article). Many customers were seriously upset, and in September Netflix let investors know it had lost about 4% of its streaming subscribers, and possibly as many as 5% of its DVD subscribers (Daily Mail).
No investor wants that kind of customer news from a growth company, and the stock price went into a nosedive. The decline was augmented when the CEO announced Netflix was splitting into 2 companies. Netflix would focus on streaming video, and Quikster would focus on DVDs. Nobody understood the price changes – or why the company split – and investors quickly concluded Netflix was a company out of control and likely to flame out, ruined by its own tactics in competition with Amazon, et.al.
(Source: Yahoo Finance 3 October, 2011)
This has to be about the worst company communication disaster by a market leader in a very, very long time. TVWeek.com said Netflix, and Reed Hastings, exhibited the most self-destructive behavior in 2011 – beyond even the Charlie Sheen fiasco! With everything going its way, why, oh why, did the company raise prices and split? Not even the vaunted New York Times could figure it out.
But let's take a moment to compare Netflix with another company having recent valuation troubles – Kodak.
Kodak invented home photography, leading it to tremendous wealth as amature film sales soared for seveal decades. But last week Kodak announced it was about out of cash, and was reaching into its revolving credit line for some $160million to pay bills. This latest financial machination reinforced to investors that film sales aren't what they used to be, and Kodak is in big trouble – possibly facing bankruptcy. Kodak's stock is down some 80% this year, from $6 to $1 – and quite a decline from the near $80 price it had in the late 1990s.
(Source: Yahoo Finance 10-3-2011)
Why Kodak declined was well described in Forbes. Despite its cash flow and company strengths, Kodak never succeeded beyond its original camera film business. Heck, Kodak invented digital photography, but licensed the technology to others as it rabidly pursued defending film sales. Because Kodak couldn't adapt to the market shift, it now is probably going to fail.
And that is why it is worth revisiting Netflix. Although things were poorly explained, and certainly customers were not handled well, last quarter's events are the right move for investors in the shifting at-home video entertainment business:
- DVD sales are going the direction of CD's and audio cassettes. Meaning down. It is important Netflix reap the maximum value out of its strong DVD position in order to fund growth in new markets. For the market leader to raise prices in low growth markets in order to maximize value is a classic strategic step. Netflix should be lauded for taking action to maximize value, rather than trying to defend and extend a business that will most likely disappear faster than any of us anticipate – especially as smart TVs come along.
- It is in Netflix's best interest to promote customer transition to streaming. Netflix is the current leader in streaming, and the profits are better there. Raising DVD prices helps promote customer shifting to the new technology, and is good for Netflix as long as customers don't change to a competitor.
- Although Netflix is currently the leader in streaming it has serious competition from Hulu, Amazon, Apple and others. It needs to build up its customer base rapidly, before people go to competitors, and it needs to fund its streaming business in order to obtain more content. Not only to negotiate with more movie and TV suppliers, but to keep funding its exclusive content like the new Lillyhammer series (more at GigaOm.com). Content is critical to maintaining leadership, and that requires both customers and cash.
- Netflix cannot afford to muddy up its streaming strategy by trying to defend, and protect, its DVD business. Splitting the two businesses allows leaders of each to undertake strategies to maximize sales and profits. Quikster will be able to fight Wal-Mart and Redbox as hard as possible, and Netflix can focus attention on growing streaming. Again, this is a great strategic move to make sure Netflix transitions from its old DVD business into streaming, and doesn't end up like an accelerated Kodak story.
Historically, companies that don't shift with markets end up in big trouble. AB Dick and Multigraphics owned small offset printing, but were crushed when Xerox brought out xerography. Then, afater inventing desktop publishing at Xerox PARC, Xerox was crushed by the market shift from copiers to desktop printers – a shift Xerox created. Pan Am, now receiving attention due to the much hyped TV series launch, failed when it could not make the shift to deregulation. Digital Equipment could not make the shift to PCs. Kodak missed the shift from film to digital. Most failed companies are the result of management's inability to transition with a market shift. Trying to defend and extend the old marketplace is guaranteed to fail.
Today markets shift incredibly fast. The actions at Netflix were explained poorly, and perhaps taken so fast and early that leadership's intentions were hard for anyone to understand. The resulting market cap decline is an unmitigated disaster, and the CEO should be ashamed of his performance. Yet, the actions taken were necessary – and probably the smartest moves Netflix could take to position itself for long-term success.
Perhaps Netflix will fall further. Short-term price predictions are a suckers game. But for long-term investors, now that the value has cratered, give Netflix strong consideration. It is still the leader in DVD and streaming. It has an enormous customer base, and looks like the exodus has stopped. It is now well organized to compete effectively, and seek maximum future growth and value. With a better PR firm, good advertising and ongoing content enhancements Netflix has the opportunity to pull out of this communication nightmare and produce stellar returns.
by Adam Hartung | Feb 1, 2011 | Current Affairs, In the Rapids, Innovation, Leadership, Television, Web/Tech
Summary:
- There is dramatic change in the television/media industry
- NBC Universal/Comcast is changing ownership, and leaders
- The company’s future success will have more to do with which battles the new President invests in than the history, or style of the past and future company President’s
- Trying to “fix” the old business will waste resources and harm future prospects
- Success will require developing a management approach that gives permission and resources to find a path to the future – a future that will be nothing like the past
NBC Universal is changing owners, from General Electric to Comcast. The former NBC President, Jeff Zucker, is being replaced by Steve Burke. Stylistically, it’s hard to imagine two fellas less alike. Mr. Burke, portraited in the New York Times “A Little Less Drama at NBC,” is a mild-mannered, quiet, self-effacing executive who almost attended divinity school. He avoids the limelight as much as he avoids being abrasive with colleagues. The outgoing Mr. Zucker is by all accounts brash,abrasive and quick to make decisions, as he was portraited in PaidContent.org “Was Jeff Zucker Really So Bad For NBC Universal?“
But it isn’t executive style that will determine whether Mr. Burke succeeds. Although NBCU just returned its highest profits since 2004, the television and media industries are in dramatic transition. Things aren’t like they used to be, and they will never be that way again. Growing revenues, and profits, at the combined NBCU/Comcast will require Mr. Burke quickly move both companies into a different kind of competitor focused on the changed market of 2015 – when media customers and suppliers will both be very different, with quite different demands.
Although Mr. Zucker is blasted for allowing NBC’s ratings to fall to last among the Big 3 networks (including CBS and ABC), it’s not at all clear why that wasn’t a smart move. What has grown NBC’s profits has been far removed from network programming. It was the acquisition of cable channels USA and Sci Fi (now Syfy) via Universal, and later Bravo, Oxygen and The Weather Channel that contributed greatly to NBC’s revenue and profit growth. These were also enhanced by building, from scratch, the #1 business-content television channel at CNBC, and the profitable, somewhat populist counter-channel to powerhouse conservative Fox News with MSNBC. Despite what the critics (who are largely interested in programs rather than profits) have said, it may have been an act of brilliance to avoid investing in the declining business that is prime time network programming.
What anyone thinks about the brouhaha over Jay Leno’s attempt at prime time, and Conan O’Brien’s stint leading The Today Show, is immaterial to revenue growth and profits. I’m a late boomer, so I remember when there were only 3 stations, and Johny Carson dominated the post-news late evening. But now I have college age sons that don’t even own televisions, have almost no idea who Jay Leno is (other than know of him as a car and motorcycle collector) and find all interview programs boring. “Network” TV is something they don’t quite understand – since their tolerance for watching entertainment on someone else’s pre-determined schedule is non-existent, and their patience for sitting through commercials of real-time programming is even lower. In other words, what happens in the “prime time” race, or with network celebrities, really doesn’t matter any more. And if NBCU can’t grow viewers it can’t grow ad revenues – so why should it invest in the prime time business? Just because it used to? Or started that way?
While lots of media “experts” are screaming for Mr. Burke to “fix” NBC, that business is already well into the hospice. Network share of entertainment interest is falling rapidly as boomers die, dozens of new offerings are micro-targeting across the channel spectrum, and we all turn to the internet for downloads, ignoring the TV for news or entertainment several additional hours each year. Meanwhile, people under the age of 30 aren’t even watching much television any more. They just pretend to watch while sitting with their parents as they text, check Facebook or watch a downloaded program on their iPhone.
“Network” programming is a business which is not going to grow again. Given how costs are increasing for traditional shows, and the over-explosion of inexpensive “reality” or “news” shows, and fragmentation and decline of advertising why would anyone ever expect this to be a profitable business? Being last in that 3 horse race is about as interesting as tracking share of market for printed phone directories. Probably the first to quit ist he big winner. So why should Mr. Burke spend much time, or money, fighting the last war? “Fixing” that outdated business model is fraught with high risk, and low return. Now that tthe artificial limits on news and entertainment programming have been removed (thanks to the internet) isn’t it time to let go of that historial artifact and focus on the future?
We know the future will be a mix of traditional TV (at least for a while, but don’t make any bets on it being too long), as well as targeted channels we now refer to as “cable” (even though that moniker is clearly losing meaning in a WiFi world.) Some of these will be free access, and some will be paid content. But all of that now must compete with downloads from Netfilx, Hulu (in which NBCU is a part owner) and YouTube (partially owned by Google.) People can create and post their own programs, and even do their own marketing. Instant availability, reviews and promotion will be couresy of Twitter and Facebook. This is a lot more complex than just ordering a new crime drama series, or situation comedy, and foisting it on a market with only a handful of channel options.
Viewership will range from 50″ panels, to 2″ hand-held screens – with a plethora of optional sizes in between. Program length will be infinitely variable from hours of non-stop viewing to constantly interrupted sound bites, no longer proscribed by 30 minute increments. Traditional programming, like local or national “news” will have little meaning, or value, in 2020 (or maybe 2015) when we will be receiving instant updates several times each day on our mobile device.
Mr. Zucker did a yeoman’s job of steering NBCU toward the future. He was smart enough to understand that only historians, locked-in media critics and old farts in Lay-Z-Boys care about what’s happening on The Tonight Show or the NBC News. His primary investments were oriented toward understanding the future, and getting NBCU’s toes into that rapidly churning water where future growth lies. But he’s leaving just as the stream is turning into a torrent. Even what he did could well be out of date within a few years – or months!
Now it is Mr. Burke’s turn. The very pleasant fellow has a daunting challenge. If he isn’t supposed to “double down” his bets in network TV, and traditional “cable,” what is he supposed to do? In a dramatically changing advertising world, where Google, Facebook and mobile device ads are now becoming the hot markets, what is the role for NBCU/Comcast? If we no longer need the physucal cable (say in 2020), won’t Comcast lose subscribers for cable access just like we’re seeing declines in subscribers for newspapers, DVD subscriptions, land-line telephones and land-line long distance? What is the role of a “programmer” like NBCU if viewers all have unlimited access to everything, anytime, anywhere, in any format? And what is the value of a content provider if self-published content streams onto the web by the terabyte daily? And is sorted by engines like Google and YouTube?
What Mr. Burke must do, regardless of style, is develop some scenarios about the future, and understand the much more complex playing field that is today’s media business. He has to find the holes in competition, and learn how to leverage what the “fringe” competitors are doing that drives all that usage, and viewership. And, most importantly, he has to keep experimenting – just as Mr. Zucker did. He has to create opportunities to test the newly developing markets, figure out who will buy, and what they will buy. He has to set up white space teams who have permission to be experimental, even if they attack the old businesses like “network” TV – even cannibalizing the historical viewr base as they transition toward future media markets. If he can create these teams, give them the right permission and resources, NBCU/Comcast could be the next great media company.
We’ll have to wait and see. Will the sirens of the past, looking backward, pull the company into gladiator battles with old foes trying to hold share in narrowing, declining markets? That path looks like a sure disaster. Despite being an early leader with satellite TV and MySpace that approach has not helped NewsCorp. But betting on the future is more a bet on the journey, and finding the right path, than betting on any particular destination. The future-based approach takes a lot of faith in company leadership, and the company management team. It will be interesting to see which way Mr. Burke goes.
by Adam Hartung | Jul 20, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, eBooks, General, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
Years ago there was a TV ad featuring the actor Pauly Shore. Sitting in front of a haystack there was a sign over his frowning head reading "Find the needle." The voice over said "hard." Then another shot of Mr. Shore sitting in front of the same haystack grinning quite broadly, and the sign said "Find the hay." the voice over said "easy." Have you ever noticed that in business we too often try to do what's hard, rather than what's easy?
Take for example The New York Times Company, profiled today on Marketwatch.com in "The Gray Lady's Dilemma." The dilemma is apparently what the company will do next. Only, it really doesn't seem like much of a dilemma. The company is rapidly on its way to bankruptcy, with cash flow insufficient to cover operations. The leaders are negotiating with unions to lower costs, but it's unclear these cuts will be sufficient. And they definitely won't be within a year or two. Meanwhile the company is trying to sell The Boston Globe, which is highly unprofitable, and will most likely sell the Red Sox and the landmark Times Building in Manhattan, raising cash to keep the paper alive.
Only there isn't much of a dilemma here. Newspapers as they have historically been a business are no longer feasible. The costs outweigh the advertising and subscription dollars. The market is telling newspaper owners (Tribune Corporation, Gannett, McClatchey, News Corp. and all the others as well as The Times) that it has shifted. Cash flow and profits are a RESULT of the business model. People now are saying that they simply won't pay for newspapers – nor even read them. Thus advertisers have no reason to advertise. The results are terrible because the market has shifted. The easy thing to do is listen to the market. It's saying "stop." This should be easy. Quit, before you run out of money.
Of course, company leadership is Locked-in to doing what it always has done. So it doesn't want to stop. And many employees are Locked-in to their old job descriptions and pay – so they don't want to stop. They want to do what's hard – which is trying to Defend & Extend a money-losing enterprise after its useful life has been exhausted. But if customers have moved on, isn't this featherbedding? How is it different than trying to maintain coal shovelers on electric locomotives? This approach is hard. Very hard. And it won't succeed.
For a full half-decade, maybe longer, it has been crystal clear that print news, radio news and TV news (especially local) is worth a lot less than it used to be. They all suffer from one-way communication limits, poor reach and frequently poor latency. All problems that didn't exist before the internet. This technology and market shift has driven down revenues. People won't pay for what they can get globally, faster and in an interactive environment. As these customers shift, advertisers want to go where they are. After all, advertising is only valuable when it actually reaches someone.
Meanwhile, reporting and commentary increasingly is supplied by bloggers that work for free – or nearly so. Not unlike the "stringers" used by news services back in the "wire" days of Reuters, UPI and AP. Only now the stringers can take their news directly to the public without needing the wire service or publishers. They can blog their information and use Google to sell ads on their sites, thus directly making a market for their product. They even can push the product to consolidators like HuffingtonPost.com in order to maximize reach and revenue. Thus, the costs of acquiring and accumulating news has dropped dramatically. Increasingly, this pits the expensive journalist against the low cost journalist. And the market is shifting to the lower cost resource — regardless of how much people argue about the lack of quality (of course, some [such as politicians] would question the quality in today's "legitimate" media.)
Trying to keep The New York Times and Boston Globe alive as they have historically been is hard. I would contend a suicide effort. Continuing is explained only by recognizing the leaders are more interested in extending Lock-in than results. Because if they want results they would be full-bore putting all their energy into creating mixed-format content with maximum distribution that leads with the internet (including e-distribution like Kindle), and connects to TV, radio and print. Pricing for newspapers and magazines would jump dramatically in order to cover the much higher cost of printing. And the salespeople would be trained to sell cross-format ads which run in all formats. Audience numbers would cross all formats, and revenue would be tied to maximum reach, not the marginal value of each format. That is what advertisers want. Creating that sale, building that company, would be relatively much easier than trying to defend the Lock-in. And it would produce much better results.
The only dilemma at The New York Times Company is between dying as a newspaper company, or surviving as something else. The path it's on now says the management would rather die a newspaper company than do the smart thing and change to meet the market shift. For investors, this poses no dilemma. Investors would be foolhardy to be long the equity or bonds of The New York Times. There will be no GM-style bailout, and the current direction is into the Whirlpool. Employees had better be socking away cash for the inevitable pay cuts and layoffs. Suppliers better tighten up terms and watch the receivables. Because the company is in for a hard ending. And faster than anyone wants to admit.
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