Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer appears to be planning a major reorganization. The apparent objective is to help the company move toward becoming a "devices and services company" as presented in the company's annual shareholder letter last October.
But, the question for investors is whether this is a crafty move that will help Microsoft launch renewed profitable growth, or is it leadership further confusing customers and analysts while leaving Microsoft languishing in stalled markets? After all, the shares are up some 31% the last 6 months and it is a good time to decide if an investor should buy, hold or sell.
There are a lot of things not going well for Microsoft right now.
Everyone knows PC sales have started dropping. IDC recently lowered its forecast for 2013 from a decline of 1.3% to negative 7.8%. The mobile market is already larger than PC sales, and IDC now expects tablet sales (excluding smartphones) will surpass PCs in 2015. Because the PC is Microsoft's "core" market – producing almost all the company's profitability – declining sales are not a good thing.
Microsoft hoped Windows 8 would reverse the trend. That has not happened. Unfortunately, ever since being launched Windows 8 has underperformed the horrific sales of Vista. Eight months into the new product it is selling at about half the rate Vista did back in 2007 – which was the worst launch in company history. Win8 still has fewer users than Vista, and at 4% share 1/10th the share of market leaders Windows 7 and XP.
Microsoft is launching an update to Windows 8, called Windows 8.1 or "blue." But rather than offering a slew of new features to please an admiring audience the release looks more like an early "fix" of things users simply don't like, such as bringing back the old "start" button. Reviewers aren't talking about how exciting the update is, but rather wondering if these admissions of poor initial design will slow conversion to tablets.
And tablets are still the market where Microsoft isn't – even if it did pioneer the product years before the iPad. Bloomberg reported that Microsoft has been forced to cut the price of RT. So far historical partners such as HP and HTC have shunned Windows tablets, leaving Acer the lone company putting out Windows a mini-tab, and Dell (itself struggling with its efforts to go private) the only company declaring a commitment to future products.
And whether it's too late for mobile Windows is very much a real question. At the last shareholder meeting Nokia's investors cried loud and hard for management to abandon its commitment to Microsoft in favor of returning to old operating systems or moving forward with Android. This many years into the game, and with the Google and Apple ecosystems so far in the lead, Microsoft needed a game changer if it was to grab substantial share. But Win 8 has not proven to be a game changer.
In an effort to develop its own e-reader market Microsoft dumped some $300million into Barnes & Noble's Nook last year. But the e-reader market is fast disappearing as it is overtaken by more general-purpose tablets such as the Kindle Fire. Yet, Microsoft appears to be pushing good money after bad by upping its investment by another $1B to buy the rest of Nook, apparently hoping to obtain enough content to keep the market alive when Barnes & Noble goes the way of Borders. But chasing content this late, behind Amazon, Apple and Google, is going to be much more costly than $1B – and an even lower probability than winning in hardware or software.
Then there's the new Microsoft Office. In late May Microsoft leadership hoped investors would be charmed to hear that 1M $99 subscriptions had been sold in 3.5 months. However, that was to an installed base of hundreds of millions of PCs – a less than thrilling adoption rate for such a widely used product. Companies that reached 1M subscribers from a standing (no installed base) start include Instagram in 2.5 months, Spotify in 5 months, Dropbox in 7 months and Facebook (which pioneered an entire new marketplace in Social) in only 10 months. One could have easily expected a much better launch for a product already so widely used, and offered at about a third the price of previous licenses.
A new xBox was launched on May 21st. Unfortunately, like all digital markets gaming is moving increasingly mobile, and consoles show all the signs of going the way of desktop computers. Microsoft hopes xBox can become the hub of the family room, but we're now in a market where a quarter of homes lead by people under 50 don't really use "the family room" any longer.
xBox might have had a future as an enterprise networking hub, but so far Kinnect has not even been marketed as a tool for business, and it has not yet incorporated the full network functionality (such as Skype) necessary to succeed at creating this new market against competitors like Cisco.
Thankfully, after more than a decade losing money, xBox reached break-even recently. However, margins are only 15%, compared to historical Microsoft margins of 60% in "core" products. It would take a major growth in gaming, plus a big market share gain, for Microsoft to hope to replace lost PC profits with xBox sales. Microsoft has alluded to xBox being the next iTunes, but lacking mobility, or any other game changer, it is very hard to see how that claim holds water.
The Microsoft re-org has highlighted 3 new divisions focused on servers and tools, Skype/Lync and xBox. What is to happen with the business which has driven three decades of Microsoft growth – operating systems and office software – is, well, unclear. How upping the focus on these three businesses, so late in the market cycle, and with such low profitability will re-invigorate Microsoft's value is, well, unclear.
In fact, given how Microsoft has historically made money it is wholly unclear what being a "devices and services" company means. And this re-organization does nothing to make it clear.
My past columns on Microsoft have led some commenters to call me a "Microsoft hater." That is not true. More apt would be to say I am a Microsoft bear. Its historical core market is shrinking, and Microsoft's leadership invested far too much developing new products for that market in hopes the decline would be delayed – which did not work. By trying to defend and extend the PC world Microsoft's leaders chose to ignore the growing mobile market (smartphones and tablets) until far too late – and with products which were not game changers.
Although Microsoft's leaders invested heavily in acquisitions and other markets (Skype, Nook, xBox recently) those very large investments came far too late, and did little to change markets in Microsoft's favor. None of these have created much excitement, and recently Rick Sherland at Nomura securities came out with a prediction that Microsoft might well sell the xBox division (a call I made in this column back in January.)
As consumers, suppliers and investors we like the idea of a near-monopoly. It gives us comfort to believe we can trust in a market leader to bring out new products upon which we can rely – and which will continue to make long-term profits. But, good as this feels, it has rarely been successful. Markets shift, and historical leaders fall as new competitors emerge; largely because the old leadership continues investing in what they know rather than shifting investments early into new markets.
This Microsoft reorganization appears to be rearranging the chairs on the Titanic. The mobile iceberg has slashed a huge gash in Microsoft's PC hull. Leadership keeps playing familiar songs, but the boat cannot float without those historical PC profits. Investors would be smart to flee in the lifeboat of recent share price gains.
Michael Dell has put together a hedge fund, one of his largest suppliers and some debt money to take his company, Dell, Inc. private. There are large investors threatening to sue, claiming the price isn't high enough. While they are wrangling, small investors should consider this privatization manna from heaven, take the new, higher price and run to invest elsewhere – thankful you're getting more than the company is worth.
In the 1990s everybody thought Dell was an incredible company. With literally no innovation a young fellow built an enormously large, profitable company using other people's money, and technology. Dell jumped into the PC business as it was born. Suppliers were making the important bits, and looking for "partners" to build boxes. Dell realized he could let other people invest in microprocessor, memory, disk drive, operating system and application software development. All he had to do was put the pieces together.
Dell was the rare example of a company that was built on nothing more than execution. By marketing hard, selling hard, buying smart and building cheap Dell could produce a product for which demand was skyrocketing. Every year brought out new advancements from suppliers Dell could package up and sell as the latest, greatest model. All Dell had to do was stay focused on its "core" PC market, avoid distractions, and win at execution. Heck, everyone was going to make money building and selling PCs. How much you made boiled down to how hard you worked. It wasn't about strategy or innovation – just execution.
Dell's business worked for one simple reason. Everybody wanted PCs. More than one. And everybody wanted bigger, more powerful PCs as they came available. Market demand exploded as the PC became part of everything companies, and people, do. As long as demand was growing, Dell was growing. And with clever execution – primarily focused on speed (sell, build, deliver, get the cash before the supplier has to be paid) – Dell became a multi-billion dollar company, and its founder a billionaire with no college degree, and no claim to being a technology genius.
But, the market shifted. As this column has pointed out many times, demand for PCs went flat – never to return to previous growth rates. Users have moved to mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets, while corporate IT is transitioning from PC servers to cloud services. iPad sales now nearly match all of Dell's sales. Dell might well be the world's best PC maker, but when people don't want PCs that doesn't matter any more.
Market watchers knew this. That's why Dell's stock took a long ride from its lofty value on the rapids of growth to the recent distinctly low value as it slipped into the whirlpool of failure.
If you think adding debt to Dell will save it from the market shift, just look at how well that strategy worked for fixing Tribune Corporation. A Sam Zell led LBO took over the company claiming he had plans for a new future, as advertisers shifted away from newspapers. Bankruptcy came soon enough, employee pensions were wiped out, massive layoffs undertaken and 4 years of legal fighting followed to see if there was any plan that would keep the company afloat. Debt never fixes a failing company, and Dell knows that. Dell has no answer to changing market demand away from PCs.
Now the buzzards are circling. HP has been caught in a rush to destruction ever since CEO Fiorina decided to buy Compaq and gut the HP R&D in an effort to follow Dell's wild revenue ride. Only massive cost cutting by the following CEO Hurd kept HP alive, wiping out any remnants of innovation. Now HP has a dismal future. But it hopes that as the PC market shrinks the elimination of one competitor, Dell, will give newest CEO Whitman more time to somehow find something HP can do besides follow Dell into bankruptcy court.
Watching as its execution-oriented ecosystem manufacturers are struggling, supplier Microsoft is pulling out its wallet to try and extend the timeline. Plundering its $85B war chest, Microsoft keeps adding features, with acquisitions such as Skype, that consume cash while offering no returns – or even strong reasons for people to stop the transition to tablets.
Additionally it keeps putting up money for companies that it hopes will build end-user products on its software, such as its $500M investment in Barnes & Noble's Nook and now putting $2B into Dell. $85B is a lot of money, but how much more will Microsoft have to spend to keep HP alive – or money losing Acer – or Lenovo? A billion here, a billion there and pretty soon it adds up to a lot of money! Not counting losses in its own entertainmnet and on-line divisions. The transition to mobile devices is permanent and Microsoft has arrived at the game incredibly late – and with products that simply cannot obtain better than mixed reviews.
The lesson to learn is that management, and investors, take a big risk when they focus on execution. Without innovation, organizations become reliant on vendors who may, or may not, stay ahead of market transitions. When an organization fails to be an innovator, someone who creates its own game changers, and instead tries to succeed by being the best at execution eventually market shifts will kill it. It is not a question of if, but when.
Being the world's best PC maker is no better than being the world's best maker of white bread (Hostess) or the world's best maker of photographic film (Kodak) or the world's best 5 and dime retailer (Woolworth's) or the world's best manufacturer of bicycles (Schwinn) or cold rolled steel (Bethlehem Steel.) Being able to execute – even execute really, really well – is not a long-term viable strategy. Eventually, innovation will create market shifts that will kill you.
The web lit up yesterday when people started sharing a Fortune quote from Marissa Mayer, CEO of Yahoo, "We are literally moving the company from BlackBerrys to smartphones." Why was this a big deal? Because, in just a few words, Ms. Mayer pointed out that Research In Motion is no longer relevant. The company may have created the smartphone market, but now its products are so irrelevant that it isn't even considered a market participant.
Ouch. But, more importantly, this drove home that no matter how good RIM thinks Blackberry 10 may be, nobody cares. And when nobody cares, nobody buys. And if you weren't convinced RIM was headed for lousy returns and bankruptcy before, you certainly should be now.
But wait, this is certainly a good bit of the pot being derogatory toward the kettle. Because, other than the highly personalized news about Yahoo's new CEO, very few people care about Yahoo these days as well. After being thoroughly trounced in ad placement and search by Google, it is wholly unclear how Yahoo will create its own relevancy. It may likely be soon when a major advertiser says "When placing our major internet ad program we are focused on the split between Google and Facebook," demonstrating that nobody really cares about Yahoo anymore, either.
And how long will Yahoo survive?
The slip into irrelevancy is the inflection point into failure. Very few companies ever return. Once you are no longer relevant, customer quickly stop paying attention to practically anything you do. Even if you were once great, it doesn't take long before the slide into no-growth, cost cutting and lousy financial performance happens.
Consider:
Garmin once led the market for navigation devices. Now practically everyone uses their mobile phone for navigation. The big story is Apple's blunder with maps, while Google dominates the marketplace. You probably even forgot Garmin exists.
Radio Shack once was a consumer electronics powerhouse. They ran superbowl ads, and had major actresses parlaying with professional sports celebrities in major network ads. When was the last time you even thought about Radio Shack, much less visited a store?
Sears was once America's premier, #1 retailer. The place where everyone shopped for brands like Craftsman, DieHard and Kenmore. But when did you last go into a Sears? Or even consider going into one? Do you even know where one is located?
Kodak invented amateur photography. But when that market went digital nobody cared about film any more. Now Kodak is in bankruptcy. Do you care?
Motorola Razr phones dominated the last wave of traditional cell phones. As sales plummeted they flirted with bankruptcy, until Motorola split into 2 pieces and the money losing phone business became Google – and nobody even noticed.
When was the last time you thought about "building your body 12 ways" with Wonder bread? Right. Nobody else did either. Now Hostess is liquidating.
Being relevant is incredibly important, because markets shift quickly today. As they shift, either you are part of the trend going forward – or you are part of the "who cares" past. If you are the former, you are focused on new products that customers want to evaluate. If you are the latter, you can disappear a whole lot faster than anyone expected as customers simply ignore you.
So now take a look at a few other easy-to-spot companies losing relevancy:
HP headlines are dominated by write offs of its investments in services and software, causing people to doubt the viability of its CEO, Meg Whitman. Who wants to buy products from a company that would spend billions on Palm, business services and Autonomy ERP software only to decide they overspent and can never make any money on those investments? Once a great market leader, HP is rapidly becoming a company nobody cares about; except for what appears to be a bloody train wreck in the making. In tech – lose customesr and you have a short half-life.
Similarly Dell. A leader in supply chain management, what Dell product now excites you? As you think about the money you will spend this holiday, or in 2013, on tech products you're thinking about mobile devices — and where is Dell?
Best Buy was the big winner when Circuit City went bankrupt. But Best Guy didn't change, and now margins have cratered as people showroom Amazon while in their store to negotiate prices. How long can Best Buy survive when all TVs are the same, and price is all that matters? And you download all your music and movies?
Wal-Mart has built a huge on-line business. Did you know that? Do you care? Regardless of Wal-mart's on-line efforts, the company is known for cheap looking stores with cheap merchandise and customers that can't maintain credit cards. When you look at trends in retailing, is Wal-Mart ever the leader – in anything – anymore? If not, Wal-mart becomes a "default" store location when all you care about is price, and you can't wait for an on-line delivery. Unless you decide to go to the even cheaper Dollar General or Aldi.
And, the best for last, is Microsoft. Steve Ballmer announced that Microsoft phone sales quadrupled! Only, at 4 million units last quarter that is about 10% of Apple or Android. Truth is, despite 3 years of development, a huge amount of pre-release PR and ad spending, nobody much cares about Win8, Surface or new Microsoft-based mobile phones. People want an iPhone or Samsung product.
After its "lost decade" when Microsoft simply missed every major technology shift, people now don't really care about Microsoft. Yes, it has a few stores – but they dwarfed in number and customers by the Apple stores. Yes, the shifting tiles and touch screen PCs are new – but nobody real talks about them; other than to say they take a lot of new training. When it comes to "game changers" that are pushing trends, nobody is putting Microsoft in that category.
So the bad news about a $6 billion write-down of aQuantive adds to the sense of "the gang that can't shoot straight" after the string of failures like Zune, Vista and early Microsoft phones and tablets. Not to mention the lack of interest in Skype, while Internet Explorer falls to #2 in browser market share behind Chrome.
When a company is seen as never able to take the lead amidst changing
trends, investors see accquisitions like $1.2B for Yammer as a likely future write down. Customers lose interest and simply spend money elsewhere.
As investors we often hear about companies that were once great brands, but selling at low multiples, and therefore "value plays." But the truth is these are death traps that wipe out returns. Why? These companies have lost relevancy, and that puts them one short step from failure.
As company managers, where are you investing? Are you struggling to be relevant as other competitors – maybe "fringe" companies that use "voodoo solutions" you don't consider "enterprise ready" or understand – are obtaining a lot more interest and media excitment? You can work all you want to defend & extend your past glory, but as markets shift it is amazingly easy to lose relevancy. And it's a very, very tough job to play catch- up.
Just look at the money being spent trying at RIM, Microsoft, HP, Dell, Yahoo…………
There is a big cry for innovation these days. Unfortunately, despite spending a lot of money on it, most innovation simply isn't. And that's why companies don't grow.
"There is no statistically significant relationship between financial performance and innovation spending, in terms of either total R&D dollars or R&D as a percentage of revenues. Many companies — notably, Apple — consistently underspend their peers on R&D investments while outperforming them on a broad range of measures of corporate success, such as revenue growth, profit growth, margins, and total shareholder return. Meanwhile, entire industries, such as pharmaceuticals, continue to devote relatively large shares of their resources to innovation, yet end up with much less to show for it than they — and their shareholders — might hope for."
(Uh-hum, did you hear about this Abbott? Pfizer? Readers that missed it might want to glance at last week's blog about Abbott, and why it is a sell after announcing plans to split the company.)
Far too often, companies spend most of their R&D dollars on making their products cheaper, operate better, faster or do more. Clayton Christensen pointed this out some 15 years ago in his groundbreaking book "The Innovator's Dilemma" (HBS Press, 1997). Most R&D, in most industries, and for most companies, is spent trying to sustain an existing technology – not identify or develop a disruptive technology that would have far higher rates of return.
While this is easy to conceptualize, it is much harder to understand. Until we look at a storied company like Kodak – which has received a lot of news this last month.
Kodak invented amateur photography, and was rewarded with decades of profitable revenue growth as its string of cheap cameras, film products and photographic papers changed the way people thought about photographs. Kodak was the world leader in photographic film and paper sales, at great margins, and its value grew exponentially!
Of course, we all know what happened. Amateur photography went digital. No more film, and no more film developing. Even camera sales have disappeared as most folks simply use mobile phones.
But what most people don't know is that Kodak invented digital photography! Really! They were the first to create the technology, and the first to apply it. But they didn't really market it, largely because of fears they would cannibalize their film sales. In an effort to defend & extend their old business, Kodak licensed digital photography patents to camera manufacturers, abandoned R&D in the product line and maintained its focus on its core business. Kodak kept making amateur film better, faster and cheaper – until nobody cared any more.
Of course, Kodak wasn't the first to fall into this trap. Xerox invented desktop publishing but let that market go to Apple, Wintel suppliers and HP printers as it worked diligently trying to defend & extend its copier business. With no click meter on the desktop publishing equipment, Xerox wasn't sure how to make money with it. So they licensed it away.
DEC pretty much created and owned the CAD/CAM business before losing it to AutoCad. Sears created at home shopping, a market now dominated by Amazon. What's your favorite story?
It's a pattern we see a lot. And nowhere worse than at Microsoft.
Do you remember that Microsoft had the Zune player at least as early as the iPod, but didn't bother to develop the technology, or market, letting Apple take the lead in digital music and video devices? Did you remember that the Windows CE smartphone (built by HTC) beat the iPhone to market by years? But Microsoft didn't really develop an app base, didn't really invest in the smartphone technology or market – and let first RIM and later Apple run away with that market as well.
Now, several years too late Microsoft hopes its Nokia partnership will help it capture a piece of that market – despite its still rather apparent lack of an app base or breakthrough advantage.
Microsoft is a textbook example of over-investing in existing technology, in an effort to defend & extend an existing product line, to the point of "over-serving" customer needs. What new extensions do you want from your PC or office software?
Do you remember Clippy? That was the little paper clip that came up in Windows applications to help you do your job better. It annoyed everyone, and was disabled by everyone. A product development that nobody wanted, yet was created and marketed anyway. It didn't sell any additional software products – but it did cost money. That's defend & extend spending.
How much a company spends on innovation doesn't matter, because what's important is what the company spends on real breakthroughs rather than sustaining ideas. Microsoft spends a lot on Windows and Office – it doesn't spend enough on breakthrough innovation for mobile products or games.
And it doesn't spend nearly enough on marketing non-PC innovations. We are already well into the back end of the PC lifecycle. Today more bandwidth is consumed from mobile devices than PC laptops and desktops. Purchase rates of mobile devices are growing at double digits, while companies (and individuals) are curtailing PC purchases. But Microsoft missed the boat because it chose to defend & extend PCs years ago, rather than really try to develop the technology and markets for CE and Zune.
Just look at where Microsoft spends money today. It's hottest innovation is Kinect. But that investment is dwarfed by spending on Skype – intended to extend PC life – and ads promoting the use of PC technologies for families this holiday season.
Unfortunately, there are almost no examples of companies that miss the transition to a new technology thriving. And that's why it is really important to revisit the Kodak chart, and then look at a Microsoft chart.
(Chart 10/27/11)
Do you think Microsoft, after this long period of no value increase, is more likely to go up in value, or more likely to follow Kodak? Unfortunately, there are few companies that make the transition. But there have been thousands that have not. Companies that had very high market share, once made a lot of money, but fell into failure because they invested in better, faster, cheaper rather than innovation.
If you are still holding Kodak, why? If you're still holding Microsoft, Abbott, Kraft, Sara Lee, Sears or Wal-Mart — why?
Were you ever told “pretty is as pretty does?” This homily means “don’t just look at the surface, it’s the underlying qualities that matter.” When I read analyst reviews of companies I’m often struck by how fascinated they are with the surface, and how weakly they seem to understand the underlying markets. Financials are a RESULT of management’s ability to provide competitive solutions, and no study of financials will give investors a true picture of management or the company’s future prospects.
The good:
Everyone should own Apple. The list of its market successes are clear, and well detailed at SeekingAlpha.com “Apple: The Most Undervalued Equity in Techdom.” The reason you should own Apple isn’t its past performance, but rather that the company has built a management team completely focused on the future. Apple is using scenario planning to create solutions that fit the way people want to work and live – not how they did things in the past.
And Apple managers are obsessive about staying ahead of competitors with better solutions that introduce new technologies, and higher levels of user productivity. By constantly being willing to disrupt the old ways of doing things, Apple keeps bringing better solutions to market via its ongoing investment in teams dedicated to developing new solutions and figuring out how they will adapt to fit unmet needs. And this isn’t just a “Steve Jobs thing” as the company’s entire success formula is built on the ability to plan for the future, and outperform competitors. We are seeing this now with the impending launch of iCloud (Marketwatch.com “Could Apple Still Surprise at Its Conference?“)
For nearly inexplicable reasons, many investors (and analysts) have not been optimistic about Apple’s future price. The company’s earnings have grown so fast that a mere fear of a slow-down has caused investors to retrench, expecting some sort of inexplicable collapse. Analysts look for creative negatives, like a recent financial analyst told me “Apple is second in value only to ExxonMobile, and I’m just not sure how to get my mind around that. Is it possible growth could be worth that much? I thought value was tied to assets.”
Uh, yes, growth is worth that much! Apple’s been growing at 100%. Perhaps it won’t continue to grow at that breakneck pace (or perhaps it will, there’s no competitor right now blocking its path), but even if it slows by 75% we’re still talking 25% growth – and that creates enormous value (compounded, 25% growth doubles your investment in 3 years.) When you find profitable growth from a company designed to repeat itself with new market introductions, you have a beautiful thing! And that’s a good investment.
Similarly, investors should really like Netflix. Netflix did what almost nobody does. It overcame fears of cannibalizing its base business (renting DVDs via mail-order) and introduced a streaming download service. Analysts decried this move, fearing that “digital sales would be far lower than physical sales.” But Netflix, with its focus firmly on the future and not the past, recognized that emerging competitors (like Hulu) were quickly changing the game. Their objective had to be to go where the market was heading, rather than trying to preserve an historical market destined to shrink. That sort of management thinking is a beautiful thing, and it has paid off enormously for Netflix.
Of course, those who look only at the surface worry about the pricing model at Netflix. They mostly worry that competitors will gore the Netflix digital ox. But what we can see is that the big competitors these analysts trot out for fear mongering – Wal-Mart, Amazon.com and Comcast – are locked-in to historical approaches, and not aggressively taking on Netflix. When you look at who has the #1 market position, the eyes and ears of customers, the subscriber/customer base and the delivery solution customers love you have to be excited about Netflix. After all, they are the leaders in a market that we know is going to shift their way – downloads. Sort of reminds you of Apple when they brought out the iPod and iTunes, doesn’t it?
The bad:
Google has been a great company. The internet wouldn’t be the internet if we didn’t have Google, the search engine that made the web easy and fast to use, plus gave us the ads making all of that search (and lots of content) free. But, the company has failed to deliver on its own innovations. Android is a huge market success, but unfortunately lock-in to its old mindset led Google to give the product away – just a tad underpriced. Other products, like Wave were great, but there hasn’t been enough White Space available for the products to develop into commercial successes. And we’ve all recently read how it happened that Google missed the emergence of social media, now positioning Facebook as a threaten to their long-term viability (AllThingsD.com “Schmidt Says Google’s Social Networking Problem is His Fault.“)
Chrome, Chromebooks and Google Wallet could be big winners. And there’s a new CEO in place who promises to move Google beyond its past glory. But these are highly competitive markets, Google isn’t first, it’s technology advantages aren’t as clear cut as in the old search days (PCWorld.com “Google Wallet Isn’t the Only Mobile POS Tool.”) Whether Google will regain its past glory depends on whether the company can overcome its dedication to its old success formula and actually disrupt its internal processes enough to take the lead with disruptive marketplace products.
Cisco is in a similar situation. A great innovator who’s products put us all on the web, and made us wi-fi addicted. But markets are shifting as people change their needs for costly internal networks, moving to the cloud, and other competitors (like NetApp) are the game changers in the new market. Cisco’s efforts to enter new markets have been fragmented, poorly managed, and largely ineffective as it spent too much energy focused on historical markets. Emblematic was the abandoned effort to enter consumer markets with the Flip camera, where its inability to connect with fast shifting market needs led to the product line shutdown and a loss of the entire investment (BusinessInsider.com “Cisco Kills the Flip Camera.”)
Cisco’s value is tied not to its historical market, but its ability to develop new ones. Even when they likely cannibalize old products. HIstorically Cisco did this well. But as customers move to the cloud it’s still not clear what Cisco will do to remain an industry leader. Whether Google and Cisco will ever be good investments again doesn’t look too good, today. Maybe. But only if they realign their investments and put in place teams dedicated to new, growth markets.
The ugly:
Another homily goes “beauty may be on the surface, but ugly goes clear to the bone.” Meaning? For something to be ugly, it has to be deeply flawed inside. And that’s the situation at Research in Motion and Microsoft. Optimistic investors describe both of these companies as potential “value stocks” that will find a way to “protect the installed base as an economic recovery develops” and “sell their products cheaply in developing countries that can’t afford new solutions” eventually leading to high dividend payouts as they milk old businesses. Right. That won’t happen, because these companies are on a self-destructive course to preserve lost markets which will eat up resources and leave them shells of their former selves.
Both companies were wildly successful. Both once had near-monopolies in their markets. But in both cases, the organizations became obsessed with defending and extending sales to their “core” or “base” customers using “core” technologies and products. This internal focus, and desire to follow best practices, led them to overspending on what worked in the past, while the market shifted away from them.
At RIMM the market has moved from enterprise servers and secure enterprise applications to local apps that access data via the cloud. People have moved from PCs to smartphones (and tablets) that allow them to do even more than they could do on old devices, and RIM’s devotion to its historical business base caused the company to miss the shift. Blackberry and Playbook have 1/10th the apps of leaders Apple and Android (at best) and are rapidly being competitively outrun.
Likewise, Microsoft has offered the market nothing new when it comes to emerging markets and unmet user needs as it has invested billions of dollars trying to preserve its traditional PC marketplace. Vista, Windows 7 and Office 2010 all missed the fact that users were going off the PC, and toward new solutions for personal productivity. Now the company is trying to play catch-up with its Skype acquisition, Nokia partnership (where sales are in a record, multi-year slide; SeekingAlpha.com “Nokia Deluged with Downgrades“) and a planned launch of Windows 8. Only they are against ferocious competition that has developed an enormous market lead, using lower cost technologies, and keep offering innovations that are driving additional market shift.
Companies that plan for the future, keep their eyes firmly focused on unmet needs and alternative competitors, and that accept and implement disruptions via internal teams with permission to be game-changers are the winners. They are good investments.
Big winners that keep seeking new opportunities, but fall into over-reliance (and focus) on historical markets and customers can move from being good investments to bad ones. They have to change their planning and competitive analysis, and start attacking old notions about their business to free up resources for doing new things. They can return to greatness, but only if they recognize market shifts and move aggressively to develop solutions for emerging needs in new markets.
It gets ugly when companies lose their ability to see external market shifts because they are inwardly focused (inside their organizations, and inside their historical customer base or supply chain.) Their market sensing disappears, and their investments become committed on trying to defend old businesses in the face of changes far beyond their control. Their internal biases cause reduction of shareholder value as they spend money on acquisitions and new products that have negative rates of return in their overly-optimistic effort to regain past glory. Those situations almost never return to former beauty, as ugly internal processes lock them into repeating past behaviors even when its clear they need an entirely new approach to succeed.
