Sears has performed horribly since acquired by Fast Eddie Lampert's KMart in 2005. Revenues are down 25%, same store sales have declined persistently, store margins have eroded and the company has recently taken to reporting losses. There really hasn't been any good news for Sears since the acquisition.
Bloomberg Businessweek made a frontal assault on CEO Edward Lampert's leadership at Sears this week. Over several pages the article details how a "free market" organization installed by Mr. Lampert led to rampant internal warfare and an inability for the company to move forward effectively with programs to improve sales or profits. Meanwhile customer satisfaction has declined, and formerly valuable brands such as Kenmore and Craftsman have become industry also-rans.
Because the Lampert controlled hedge fund ESL Investments is the largest investor in Sears, Mr. Lampert has no risk of being fired. Even if Nobel winner Paul Krugman blasts away at him. But, if performance has been so bad – for so long – why does the embattled Mr. Lampert continue to lead in the same way? Why doesn't he "fire" himself?
By all accounts Mr. Lampert is a very smart man. Yale summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa, he was a protege of former Treasury Secretay Robert Rubin at Goldman Sach before convincing billionaire Richard Rainwater to fund his start-up hedge fund – and quickly make himself the wealthiest citizen in Connecticut.
If the problems at Sears are so obvious to investors, industry analysts, economics professors, management gurus and journalists why doesn't he simply change?
Mr. Lampert, largely because of his success, is a victim of BIAS. Deep within his decision making are his closely held Beliefs, Interpretations, Assumptions and Strategies. These were created during his formative years in college and business. This BIAS was part of what drove his early success in Goldman, and ESL. This BIAS is now part of his success formula – an entire set of deeply held convictions about what works, and what doesn't, that are not addressed, discussed or even considered when Mr. Lampert and his team grind away daily trying to "fix" declining Sears Holdings.
This BIAS is so strong that not even failure challenges them. Mr. Lampert believes there is deep value in conventional retail, and real estate. He believes strongly in using "free market competition" to allocate resources. He believes in himself, and he believes he is adding value, even if nobody else can see it.
Mr. Lampert assumes that if he allows his managers to fight for resources, the best programs will reach the top (him) for resourcing. He assumes that the historical value in Sears and its house brands will remain, and he merely needs to unleash that value to a free market system for it to be captured. He assumes that because revenues remain around $35B Sears is not irrelevant to the retail landscape, and the company will be revitalized if just the right ideas bubble up from management.
Mr. Lampert inteprets the results very different from analysts. Where outsiders complain about revenue reductions overall and same store, he interprets this as an acceptable part of streamlining. When outsiders say that store closings and reduced labor hurt the brand, he interprets this as value-added cost savings. When losses appear as a result of downsizing he interprets this as short-term accounting that will not matter long-term. While most investors and analysts fret about the overall decline in sales and brands Mr. Lampert interprets growing sales of a small integrated retail program as a success that can turn around the sinking behemoth.
Mr. Lampert's strategy is to identify "deep value" and then tenaciously cut costs, including micro-managing senior staff with daily calls. He believes this worked for Warren Buffett, so he believes it will continue to be a successful strategy. Whether such deep value continues to exist – especially in conventional retail – can be challenged by outsiders (don't forget Buffett lost money on Pier 1,) but it is part of his core strategy and will not be challenged. Whether cost cutting does more harm than good is an unchallenged strategy. Whether micro-managing staff eats up precious resources and leads to unproductive behavior is a leadership strategy that will not change. Hiring younger employees, who resemble Mr. Lampert in quick thinking and intellect (if not industry knowledge or proven leadership skills) is a strategy that will be applied even as the revolving door at headquarters spins.
The retail market has changed dramatically, and incredibly quickly. Advances in internet shopping, technology for on-line shopping (from mobile devices to mobile payments) and rapid delivery have forever altered the economics of retailing. Customer ease of showrooming, and desire to shop remotely means conventional retail has shrunk, and will continue to shrink for several years. This means the real challenge for Sears is not to be a better Sears as it was in 2000 — but to become something very different that can compete with both WalMart and Amazon – and consumer goods manufacturers like GE (appliances) and Exide (car batteries.)
There is no doubt Mr. Lampert is a very smart person. He has made a fortune. But, he and Sears are a victim of his BIAS. Poor results, bad magazine articles and even customer complaints are no match for the BIAS so firmly underlying early success. Even though the market has changed, Mr. Lampert's BIAS has him (and his company) in internal turmoil, year after year, even though long ago outsiders gave up on expecting a better result.
Even if Sears Holdings someday finds itself in bankruptcy court, expect Mr. Lampert to interpret this as something other than a failure – as he defends his BIAS better than he defends its shareholders, employees, suppliers and customers.
What is your BIAS? Are you managing for the needs of changing markets, or working hard to defend doing more of what worked in a bygone era? As a leader, are you targeting the future, or trying to recapture the past? Have market shifts made your beliefs outdated, your interpretations of what happens around you faulty, your assumptions inaccurate and your strategies hurting results? If any of this is true, it may be time you address (and change) your BIAS, rather than continuing to invest in more of the same. Or you may well end up like Sears.
Tribune Corporation finally emerged from a 4 year bankruptcy on the last day of 2012. Before the ink hardly dried on the documents, leadership has decided to triple company debt to double up the number of TV stations. Oh my, some people just never learn.
The media industry is now over a decade into a significant shift. Since the 1990s internet access has changed expectations for how fast, easily and flexibly we acquire entertainment and news. The result has been a dramatic decline in printed magazine and newspaper reading, while on-line reading has skyrocketed. Simultaneously, we're now seeing that on-line streaming is making a change in how people acquire what they listen to (formerly radio based) and watch (formerly television-based.)
Unfortunately, Tribune – like most media industry companies – consistently missed these shifts and underestimated both the speed of the shift and its impact. And leadership still seems unable to understand future scenarios that will be far different from today.
In 2000 newspaper people thought they had "moats" around their markets. The big newspaper in most towns controlled the market for classified ads for things like job postings and used car sales. Classified ads represented about a third of newspaper revenues, and 40% of profits. Simultaneously display advertising for newspapers was considered a cash cow. Every theatre would advertise their movies, every car dealer their cars and every realtor their home listings. Tribune leadership felt like this was "untouchable" profitability for the LA Times and Chicago Tribune that had no competition and unending revenue growth.
So in 2000 Tribune spent $8B to buy Times-Mirror, owner of the Los
Angeles Times. Unfortunately, this huge investment (75% over market
price at the time, by the way) was made just as people were preparing to
shift away from newspapers. Craigslist, eBay and other user sites killed the market for classified ads. Simultaneously movie companies, auto companies and realtors all realized they could reach more people, with more information, cheaper on-line than by paying for newspaper ads.
These web sites all existed before the acquisition, but Tribune leadership ignored the trend. As one company executive said to me "CraigsList!! You think that's competition for a newspaper? Craigslist is for hookers! Nobody would ever put a job listing on Craigslist." Like his compadres running newspapers nationwide, the new competitors and trends toward on-line were dismissed with simplistic statements and broad generalizations that things would never change.
The floor fell out from under advertising revenues in newspapers in the 2000s. There was no way Times-Mirror would ever be worth a fraction of what Tribune paid. Debt used to help pay for the acquisition limited the options for Tribune as cost cutting gutted the organization.
Then, in 2007 Sam Zell bailed out management by putting together a leveraged buyout to acquire Tribune company. Saying that he read 3 newspapers every day, he believed people would never stop reading newspapers. Like a lot of leaders, Mr. Zell had more money than understanding of trends and shifting markets. He added a few billion dollars more debt to Tribune. By the end of 2008 Tribune was unable to meet its debt obligations, and filed for bankruptcy.
Now, new leadership has control of Tribune. They are splitting the company in two, seperating the print and broadcast businesses. The hope is to sell the newspapers, for which they believe there are 40 potential buyers. Even though profits continued falling, from $156M to $89M, in just the last year. Why anyone would buy newspaper companies, which are clearly buggy whip manufacturers, is wholly unclear. But hope springs eternal!
Let's see, what's the market trend in entertainment and news? Where once we were limited to local radio and television stations for most content, now we can acquire almost anything we want – from music to TV, movies, documentaries or news – via the internet. Rather than being subjected to what some programming executive decides to give us, we can select what we want, when we want it, and simply stream it to our laptop, tablet, smartphone, or even our large-screen TV.
A long time ago content was controlled by distribution. There was no reason to create news stories or radio programs or video unless you had access to distribution. Obviously, that made distribution – owning newspapers, radio and TV stations – valuable.
But today distribution is free, and everywhere. Almost every American has access to all the news and entertainment they want from the internet. Either free, or for bite-size prices that aren't too high. Today the value is in the content, not distribution.
While it might be easy for Tribune to ignore Hulu, Netflix and Amazon, the trend is very clear. The need for broadcast stations like NBC or WGN or Food Network to create content is declining as we access content more directly, from more sources. And the need to have content delivered to our home by a local affiliate station is becoming, well, an anachronism.
Yet, Tribune's new TV-oriented leadership is doubling down on its bet for local TV's future. Ignoring all the trends, they are borrowing more money to buy more assets that show all signs of becoming about as valuable whaling ships. It's a big, dumb bet. Similar to overpaying for Times-Mirror. Some leaders just seem destined to never learn.
The last 12 months Tesla Motors stock has been on a tear. From $25 it has more than quadrupled to over $100. And most analysts still recommend owning the stock, even though the company has never made a net profit.
There is no doubt that each of the major car companies has more money, engineers, other resources and industry experience than Tesla. Yet, Tesla has been able to capture the attention of more buyers. Through May of 2013 the Tesla Model S has outsold every other electric car – even though at $70,000 it is over twice the price of competitors!
How could a start-up company do so well competing against companies with much greater resources?
Firstly, never underestimate the ability of a large, entrenched competitor to ignore a profitable new opportunity. Especially when that opportunity is outside its "core."
A year ago when auto companies were giving huge discounts to sell cars in a weak market I pointed out that Tesla had a significant backlog and was changing the industry. Long-time, outspoken industry executive Bob Lutz – who personally shepharded the Chevy Volt electric into the market – was so incensed that he wrote his own blog saying that it was nonsense to consider Tesla an industry changer. He predicted Tesla would make little difference, and eventually fail.
For the big car companies electric cars, at 32,700 units January thru May, represent less than 2% of the market. To them these cars are simply not seen as important. So what if the Tesla Model S (8.8k units) outsold the Nissan Leaf (7.6k units) and Chevy Volt (7.1k units)? These bigger companies are focusing on their core petroleum powered car business. Electric cars are an unimportant "niche" that doesn't even make any money for the leading company with cars that are very expensive!
This is the kind of thinking that drove Kodak. Early digital cameras had lots of limitations. They were expensive. They didn't have the resolution of film. Very few people wanted them. And the early manufacturers didn't make any money. For Kodak it was obvious that the company needed to remain focused on its core film and camera business, as digital cameras just weren't important.
Of course we know how that story ended. With Kodak filing bankruptcy in 2012. Because what initially looked like a limited market, with problematic products, eventually shifted. The products became better, and other technologies came along making digital cameras a better fit for user needs.
Tesla, smartly, has not tried to make a gasoline car into an electric car – like, say, the Ford Focus Electric. Instead Tesla set out to make the best car possible. And the company used electricity as the power source. By starting early, and putting its resources into the best possible solution, in 2013 Consumer Reports gave the Model S 99 out of 100 points. That made it not just the highest rated electric car, but the highest rated car EVER REVIEWED!
As the big car companies point out limits to electric vehicles, Tesla keeps making them better and addresses market limitations. Worries about how far an owner can drive on a charge creates "range anxiety." To cope with this Tesla not only works on battery technology, but has launched a program to build charging stations across the USA and Canada. Initially focused on the Los-Angeles to San Franciso and Boston to Washington corridors, Tesla is opening supercharger stations so owners are never less than 200 miles from a 30 minute fast charge. And for those who can't wait Tesla is creating a 90 second battery swap program to put drivers back on the road quickly.
This is how the classic "Innovator's Dilemma" develops. The existing competitors focus on their core business, even though big sales produce ever declining profits. An upstart takes on a small segment, which the big companies don't care about. The big companies say the upstart products are pretty much irrelevant, and the sales are immaterial. The big companies choose to keep focusing on defending and extending their "core" even as competition drives down results and customer satisfaction wanes.
Meanwhile, the upstart keeps plugging away at solving problems. Each month, quarter and year the new entrant learns how to make its products better. It learns from the initial customers – who were easy for big companies to deride as oddballs – and identifies early limits to market growth. It then invests in product improvements, and market enhancements, which enlarge the market.
Eventually these improvements lead to a market shift. Customers move from one solution to the other. Not gradually, but instead quite quickly. In what's called a "punctuated equilibrium" demand for one solution tapers off quickly, killing many competitors, while the new market suppliers flourish. The "old guard" companies are simply too late, lack product knowledge and market savvy, and cannot catch up.
The integrated steel companies were killed by upstart mini-mill manufacturers like Nucor Steel.
Healthier snacks and baked goods killed the market for Hostess Twinkies and Wonder Bread.
Minolta and Canon digital cameras destroyed sales of Kodak film – even though Kodak created the technology and licensed it to them.
Cell phones are destroying demand for land line phones.
Digital movie downloads from Netflix killed the DVD business and Blockbuster Video.
CraigsList plus Google stole the ad revenue from newspapers and magazines.
Amazon killed bookstore profits, and Borders, and now has its sites set on WalMart.
IBM mainframes and DEC mini-computers were made obsolete by PCs from companies like Dell.
And now Android and iOS mobile devices are killing the market for PCs.
There is no doubt that GM, Ford, Nissan, et. al., with their vast resources and well educated leadership, could do what Tesla is doing. Probably better. All they need is to set up white space companies (like GM did once with Saturn to compete with small Japanese cars) that have resources and free reign to be disruptive and aggressively grow the emerging new marketplace. But they won't, because they are busy focusing on their core business, trying to defend & extend it as long as possible. Even though returns are highly problematic.
Tesla is a very, very good car. That's why it has a long backlog. And it is innovating the market for charging stations. Tesla leadership, with Elon Musk thought to be the next Steve Jobs by some, is demonstrating it can listen to customers and create solutions that meet their needs, wants and wishes. By focusing on developing the new marketplace Tesla has taken the lead in the new marketplace. And smart investors can see that long-term the odds are better to buy into the lead horse before the market shifts, rather than ride the old horse until it drops.
Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer appears to be planning a major reorganization. The apparent objective is to help the company move toward becoming a "devices and services company" as presented in the company's annual shareholder letter last October.
But, the question for investors is whether this is a crafty move that will help Microsoft launch renewed profitable growth, or is it leadership further confusing customers and analysts while leaving Microsoft languishing in stalled markets? After all, the shares are up some 31% the last 6 months and it is a good time to decide if an investor should buy, hold or sell.
There are a lot of things not going well for Microsoft right now.
Everyone knows PC sales have started dropping. IDC recently lowered its forecast for 2013 from a decline of 1.3% to negative 7.8%. The mobile market is already larger than PC sales, and IDC now expects tablet sales (excluding smartphones) will surpass PCs in 2015. Because the PC is Microsoft's "core" market – producing almost all the company's profitability – declining sales are not a good thing.
Microsoft hoped Windows 8 would reverse the trend. That has not happened. Unfortunately, ever since being launched Windows 8 has underperformed the horrific sales of Vista. Eight months into the new product it is selling at about half the rate Vista did back in 2007 – which was the worst launch in company history. Win8 still has fewer users than Vista, and at 4% share 1/10th the share of market leaders Windows 7 and XP.
Microsoft is launching an update to Windows 8, called Windows 8.1 or "blue." But rather than offering a slew of new features to please an admiring audience the release looks more like an early "fix" of things users simply don't like, such as bringing back the old "start" button. Reviewers aren't talking about how exciting the update is, but rather wondering if these admissions of poor initial design will slow conversion to tablets.
And tablets are still the market where Microsoft isn't – even if it did pioneer the product years before the iPad. Bloomberg reported that Microsoft has been forced to cut the price of RT. So far historical partners such as HP and HTC have shunned Windows tablets, leaving Acer the lone company putting out Windows a mini-tab, and Dell (itself struggling with its efforts to go private) the only company declaring a commitment to future products.
And whether it's too late for mobile Windows is very much a real question. At the last shareholder meeting Nokia's investors cried loud and hard for management to abandon its commitment to Microsoft in favor of returning to old operating systems or moving forward with Android. This many years into the game, and with the Google and Apple ecosystems so far in the lead, Microsoft needed a game changer if it was to grab substantial share. But Win 8 has not proven to be a game changer.
In an effort to develop its own e-reader market Microsoft dumped some $300million into Barnes & Noble's Nook last year. But the e-reader market is fast disappearing as it is overtaken by more general-purpose tablets such as the Kindle Fire. Yet, Microsoft appears to be pushing good money after bad by upping its investment by another $1B to buy the rest of Nook, apparently hoping to obtain enough content to keep the market alive when Barnes & Noble goes the way of Borders. But chasing content this late, behind Amazon, Apple and Google, is going to be much more costly than $1B – and an even lower probability than winning in hardware or software.
Then there's the new Microsoft Office. In late May Microsoft leadership hoped investors would be charmed to hear that 1M $99 subscriptions had been sold in 3.5 months. However, that was to an installed base of hundreds of millions of PCs – a less than thrilling adoption rate for such a widely used product. Companies that reached 1M subscribers from a standing (no installed base) start include Instagram in 2.5 months, Spotify in 5 months, Dropbox in 7 months and Facebook (which pioneered an entire new marketplace in Social) in only 10 months. One could have easily expected a much better launch for a product already so widely used, and offered at about a third the price of previous licenses.
A new xBox was launched on May 21st. Unfortunately, like all digital markets gaming is moving increasingly mobile, and consoles show all the signs of going the way of desktop computers. Microsoft hopes xBox can become the hub of the family room, but we're now in a market where a quarter of homes lead by people under 50 don't really use "the family room" any longer.
xBox might have had a future as an enterprise networking hub, but so far Kinnect has not even been marketed as a tool for business, and it has not yet incorporated the full network functionality (such as Skype) necessary to succeed at creating this new market against competitors like Cisco.
Thankfully, after more than a decade losing money, xBox reached break-even recently. However, margins are only 15%, compared to historical Microsoft margins of 60% in "core" products. It would take a major growth in gaming, plus a big market share gain, for Microsoft to hope to replace lost PC profits with xBox sales. Microsoft has alluded to xBox being the next iTunes, but lacking mobility, or any other game changer, it is very hard to see how that claim holds water.
The Microsoft re-org has highlighted 3 new divisions focused on servers and tools, Skype/Lync and xBox. What is to happen with the business which has driven three decades of Microsoft growth – operating systems and office software – is, well, unclear. How upping the focus on these three businesses, so late in the market cycle, and with such low profitability will re-invigorate Microsoft's value is, well, unclear.
In fact, given how Microsoft has historically made money it is wholly unclear what being a "devices and services" company means. And this re-organization does nothing to make it clear.
My past columns on Microsoft have led some commenters to call me a "Microsoft hater." That is not true. More apt would be to say I am a Microsoft bear. Its historical core market is shrinking, and Microsoft's leadership invested far too much developing new products for that market in hopes the decline would be delayed – which did not work. By trying to defend and extend the PC world Microsoft's leaders chose to ignore the growing mobile market (smartphones and tablets) until far too late – and with products which were not game changers.
Although Microsoft's leaders invested heavily in acquisitions and other markets (Skype, Nook, xBox recently) those very large investments came far too late, and did little to change markets in Microsoft's favor. None of these have created much excitement, and recently Rick Sherland at Nomura securities came out with a prediction that Microsoft might well sell the xBox division (a call I made in this column back in January.)
As consumers, suppliers and investors we like the idea of a near-monopoly. It gives us comfort to believe we can trust in a market leader to bring out new products upon which we can rely – and which will continue to make long-term profits. But, good as this feels, it has rarely been successful. Markets shift, and historical leaders fall as new competitors emerge; largely because the old leadership continues investing in what they know rather than shifting investments early into new markets.
This Microsoft reorganization appears to be rearranging the chairs on the Titanic. The mobile iceberg has slashed a huge gash in Microsoft's PC hull. Leadership keeps playing familiar songs, but the boat cannot float without those historical PC profits. Investors would be smart to flee in the lifeboat of recent share price gains.
JCPenney's board fired the company CEO 18 months ago. Frustrated with weak performance, they replaced him with the most famous person in retail at the time. Ron Johnson was running Apple's stores, which had the highest profit per square foot of any retail chain in America. Sure he would bring the Midas touch to JC Penney they gave him a $50M sign-on bonus and complete latitude to do as he wished.
Things didn't work out so well. Sales fell some 25%. The stock dropped 50%. So about 2 weeks ago the Board fired Ron Johnson.
The first mistake: Ron Johnson didn't try solving the real problem at JC Penney. He spent lavishly trying to remake the brand. He modernized the logo, upped the TV ad spend, spruced up stores and implemented a more consistent pricing strategy. But that all was designed to help JC Penney compete in traditional brick-and-mortar retail. Against traditional companies like Wal-Mart, Kohl's, Sears, etc. But that wasn't (and isn't) JC Penney's problem.
The problem in all of traditional retail is the growth of on-line. In a small margin business with high fixed costs, like traditional retail, even a small revenue loss has a big impact on net profit. For every 5% revenue decline 50-90% of that lost cash comes directly off the bottom line – because costs don't fall with revenues. And these days every quarter – every month – more and more customers are buying more and more stuff from Amazon.com and its on-line brethren rather than brick and mortar stores. It is these lost revenues that are destroying revenues and profits at Sears and JC Penney, and stagnating nearly everyone else including Wal-Mart.
Coming from the tech world, you would have expected CEO Johnson to recognize this problem and radically change the strategy, rather than messing with tactics. He should have looked to close stores to lower fixed costs, developed a powerful on-line presence and marketed hard to grab more customers showrooming or shopping from home. He should have targeted to grow JCP on-line, stealing revenues from other traditional retailers, while making the company more of a hybrid retailer that profitably met customer needs in stores, or on-line, as suits them. He should have used on-line retail to take customers from locked-in competitors unable to deal with "cannibalization."
No wonder the results tanked, and CEO Johnson was fired. Doing more of the tired, old strategies in a shifting market never works. In Apple parlance, he needed to be focused on an iPad strategy, when instead he kept trying to sell more Macs.
What was that old description of insanity? Something about repeating yourself…..
Expectedly, Penney's stock dropped another 10% after announcing the old CEO would return. Investors are smart enough to recognize the retail market has shifted. That newsapaper coupons, circulars and traditional advertising is not enough to compete with on-line merchants which have lower fixed costs, faster inventory turns and wider product selection.
It certainly appears Mr. Johnson was not the right person to grow JC Penney. All the more reason JCP needs to accelerate its strategy toward the on-line retail trend. Going backward will only worsen an already terrible situation.
Interestingly, this study is based wholly on statistical performance, rather than customer input. The academics utilize on-time flight performance, denied passenger boardings, mishandled bags and complaints filed with the Department of Transportation. It does not even begin to explore surveying customers about their satisfaction. Anyone who flies regularly can well imagine those results. Oh my.
So how would you expect an innovative, adaptive growth-oriented company (think like Amazon, Apple, Samsung, Virgin, Neimann-Marcus, Lulu Lemon) to react to declining customer performance metrics? They might actually change the product, to make it more desirable by customers. They might hire more customer service representatives to identify customer issues and fix problems quicker. They might adjust their processes to achieve higher customer satisfaction. They might train their employees to be more customer-oriented.
But, United decidedly is not an innovative, adaptive organization. So it responded by denying the situation. Claiming things are getting better. And talking about how it is spending more money on its long-term strategy.
United doesn't care about customers – and really never has. United is focused on "operational excellence" (using the word excellence very loosely) as Messrs. Treacy and Wiersema called this strategy in their mega-popular book "The Discipline of Market Leaders" from 1995. United's strategy, like many, many businesses, is to constantly strive for better execution of an old strategy (in their case, hub-and-spoke flight operations) by hammering away at cutting costs.
Locked in to this strategy, United invests in more airplanes and gates (including making acquisitions like Continental) believing that being bigger will lead to more cost cutting opportunities (code named "synergies".) They beat up on employees, fight with unions, remove anything unessential (like food) invent ways to create charges (like checked bags or change fees), fiddle with fuel costs, ignore customers and constantly try to engineer minute enhancements to operations in efforts to save pennies.
Like many companies, United is fixated on this strategy, even if it can't make any money. Even if this strategy once drove it to bankruptcy. Even if its employees are miserable. Even if quality metrics decline. Even if every year customers are less and less happy with the product. All of that be darned! United just keeps doing what it has always done, for over 3 decades, hoping that somehow – magically – results will improve.
Today people have choices. More choices than ever. That's true for transportation as well. As customers have become less happy, they simply won't pay as much to fly. The impact of all this operational focus, but let the customer be danged, management is price degradation to the point that United, like all the airlines, barely (or doesn't – like American) cover costs. And because of all the competition each airline constantly chases the other to the bottom of customer satisfaction – each lowering its price as it mimics the others with cost cuts.
Success today – everywhere, not just airlines – requires more than operational focus. Constantly cutting costs ruins the brand, customer satisfaction, eliminates investment in new products and inevitably kills profitability. The litany of failed airlines demonstrates just how ineffective this strategy has become. Because operational improvements are so easily matched by competitors, and ignores alternatives (like trains, buses and automobiles for airlines) it leads to price wars, lower profits and bankruptcy.
Nobody looks to airlines as a model of management. But many companies still believe operational excellence will lead to success. They need to look at the long-term implications of this strategy, and recognize that without innovation, new products and highly satisfied new customers no business will thrive – or even survive.
The iPad is now 3 years old. Hard to believe we've only had tablets such a short time, given how common they have become. It's easy to forget that when launched almost all analysts thought the iPad was a toy that would be lucky to sell a few million units. Apple blew away that prediction in just a few months, as people demonstrated their lust for mobility. To date the iPad has sold 121million units – with an ongoing sales rate of nearly 20million per quarter.
Following very successful launches of the iPod (which transformed music from CDs to MP3) and iPhone (which turned everyone into smartphone users,) the iPad's transformation of personal technology made Apple look like an impenetrable juggernaut – practically untouchable by any competitor! The stock soared from $200/share to over $700/share, and Apple became the most valuable publicly traded company on any American exchange!
But things look very different now. Despite huge ongoing sales (iPad sales exceed Windows sales,) and a phenomenal $30B cash hoard ($100B if you include receivables) Apple's value has declined by 40%!
In the tech world, people tend to think competition is all about the product. Feature and functionality comparisons abound. And by that metric, no one has impacted Apple. After 3 years in development, Microsoft's much anticipated Surface has been a bust – selling only about 1.5million units in the first 6 months. Nobody has created a product capable of outright dethroning the i product series. Quite simply, there have been no "game changer" products that dramatically outperform Apple's.
But, any professor of introductory marketing will tell you that there are 4 P's in marketing: Product, Price, Place and Promotion. And understanding that simple lesson was the basis for the successful onslaught Samsung has waged upon Apple in 2012 and 2013.
Samsung did not change the game with technology or product. It has used the same Android starting point as most competitors for phones and tablets. It's products are comparable to Apple's – but not dramatically superior. And while they are cheaper, in most instances that has not been the reason people switched. Instead, Samsung changed the game by focusing on distribution and advertising!
The remarkable insight from this chart is that Samsung is spending almost 4.5 times Apple – and $1B more than perennial consumer goods brand leader Coca-Cola on advertising! Simultaneously, Samsung has set up kiosks and stores in malls and retail locations all over America.
Can you imagine having the following conversation in your company in 2010?:
"As Vice President of Marketing I propose we take on the market leader not by having a superior product. We will change the game from features and function comparisons to availability and awareness. I intend to spend more than anyone in our industry on advertising – even more than Coke. And I will open so many information and sales locations that our products will be as available as Coke. We'll be everywhere. Our products may not be better, but they will be everywhere and everyone will know about them."
Samsung found Apple's Achilles heel. As Apple's revenues rose it did not keep its marketing growing. SG&A (Selling, General and Administrative) expense declined from 14% of revenues in 2006 to 5% in 2012; of course aiding its skyrocketing profits. And Apple continued to sell through its fairly limited distribution of Apple stores and network providers. Apple started to "milk" its hard won brand position, rather than intensify it.
Samsung took advantage of Apple's oversight. Samsung maintained its SG&A budget at 15% of revenues – even growing it to 24% for a brief time in 2009, before returning to 15%. As its revenues grew, advertising and distribution grew. Instead of looking back at its old ad budget in dollars, and maintaining that budget, Samsung allowed the budget to grow (to a huge number!) along with revenues.
And that's how Samsung changed the game on Apple. Once America's untouchable brand, the Apple brand has faltered. People now question Apple's sustainability. Some now recognize Apple is vulnerable, and think its best times are behind it. And it's all because Samsung ignored the industry lock-in to constantly focusing on product, and instead changed the game on Apple.
Something Microsoft should have thought about – but didn't.
Of course, Apple's profits are far, far higher than Samsung's. And Apple is still a great company, and a well regarded brand, with tremendous sales. There are ongoing rumors of a new iOS 7 operating system, an updated format for iPads, potentially a dramatically new iPhone and even an iTV. And Apple is not without great engineers, and a HUGE war chest which it could use on advertising and distribution to go heads up with Samsung.
But, at least for now, Samsung has demonstrated how a competitor can change the game on a market leader. Even a leader as successful and powerful as Apple. And Samsung's leaders deserve a lot of credit for seeing the opportunity – and seizing it!
It is an unfortunate fact that small businesses fail at a higher rate than large businesses. While we've come to accept this, it somewhat flies in the face of logic. After all, small businesses are run by owners who can achieve entrepreneurial returns rather than managerial bonuses, so incentive is high. Conventional wisdom is that small businesses have fewer, and closer relationships to customers (think Ace Hardware franchisees vs. Home Depot.) And lacking layers of overhead and embedded management they should be more nimble.
Yet, they fail. From as high as 9 out of 10 for restaurants to 4 out of 10 in more asset intensive business-to-business ventures. That is far higher than large companies.
Why? Despite conventional wisdom most small businesses are run by leaders committed to a single, narrow success formula. Most are wedded to their core ideology, based on personal history, and unwilling to adapt until the business completely fails. Most reject new technologies and other emerging innovations as long as possible, trying to conserve cash and wait for "more proof" change will pay off. Additionally, most spend little time investing time, or money, in innovation at all as they pour everything into defending and extending their historical business approach.
Take for example the major trend to digital marketing. Everyone knows that digital is the only growing ad market, while print is fast dying: Chart republished with permission of Jay Yarow, Business Insider 3/19/2013
Digital marketing is one of the few places where ads can be purchased for as little as $100. Digital ads are targeted at users based upon their searches and pages viewed, thus delivered directly to likely buyers. And digital ads consistently demonstrate the highest rate of return. That's why it's growing at over 20%/year!
Yet, small businesses continue to put most of their money into local newspapers and direct mail circulars. The least targeted of all advertising, and increasingly the least read! While print ad spending has declined over 80% the last few years, to 1950 levels (adjusted for inflation,) smarter businesses have abandoned the media. At large companies in 2012 38% of advertising is on digital, second only to TV's 42% – and rapidly moving into first place!
A second major trend is the move to mobile and app usage. In the last 2 years mobile users have grown and shown a distinct preference for apps over mobile web sites. App use is growing while mobile web sites have stalled: Chart republished with permission of Alex Cocotas, Business Insider 3/20/13
Even though there are over 1million apps available for iPhone and Android users, the vast majority of small businesses have no apps aligned with their business and customers. Most small businesses, late to the game in digital marketing, are content to try and add mobile capability to their already existing web site – hoping that it will be sufficient for future growth. Meanwhile, customers are going directly for apps in accelerating numbers every month! Chart republished with permission of Alex Cocotas, Business Insider 1/8/13
Rather than act like market leaders, using customer intimacy and nimbleness to jump ahead of lumbering giants, small business leaders complain they are unsure of app value – and keep spending money on historical artifacts (like their web site) rather than invest in higher return innovation opportunities. Many small businesses are spending $20k+/year on printed brochures, coupons and newspaper or magazine PR when a like amount spent on an app could connect them much more tightly with customers, add higher value and expand their base more quickly and more profitably!
The trend to digital marketing – including the explosive growth in mobile app use – is proven. And due to very low relative up-front cost, as well as low variable cost, both trends are a wonderful boon for small businesses ready to adopt, adapt and grow. But, unfortunately, the vast majoritiy of small business leaders are behaving oppositely! They remain wedded to outdated marketing and customer relationship processes that are too expensive, with lower yield!
The opportunity is greater now than during most times for smaller competitors to be disruptive. They can seize new innovations faster, and leverage them before larger competitors. But as long as they cling to old practices and processes, and beliefs about historical markets, they will continue to fail, smashed under the heal of slower moving, bureaucratic large companies who have larger resources when they do finally take action.
Forbes republished its annual "Most Miserable Cities" list. It looks at employment/unemployment, inflation, incomes and cost of living, crime, weather, commute times – a pretty good overview of things tied to living somewhere. Detroit ranked first, as the most miserable city, with Flint, MI second. And my home-sweet-home Chicago came in fourth. Ouch!
There is an important lesson here for every city – and for our country.
Detroit was a thriving city during the industrial revolution. Innovation in all things mechanical led to the modern automobile; a marvelous innovation which, literally, everyone wanted. As demand skyrocketed, Henry Ford's management team developed the modern assembly line which allowed production volumes to skyrocket as well. Detroit was a hotbed of industrial innovation.
This fueled growth in jobs, which led to massive immigration to Detroit. With growth the tax base expanded, and quickly Detroit was a leading city with all the best things people could want. In the 1950s and 1960s Detroit reaped the benefits of the local auto companies, and their suppliers, as ongoing innovations drove better cars, more sales, more revenue taxes, higher property values and higher property taxes. It was a glorious virtuous circle.
But things changed.
Offshore competitors came into the market creating different kinds of autos appealing to different customers. Initially they had lower costs, and less expensive designs. Their cars weren't as good as GM, Ford or Chrysler – but they were cheap. And when gasoline prices took off in the 1970s people suddenly realized these cars were also more fuel efficient and cheaper to maintain. As these offshore competitors gained more sales they invested in making better cars, until they had quality as good as the Detroit companies, plus better fuel efficiency.
But the Detroit companies had become stuck in their processes that worked in earlier days. Even though the market shifted, they didn't. What passed for innovations were increasingly simple appearance changes as bottom-line focus reduced willingness to do new things, and offered fewer new things to do. GM and its brethren didn't shift with the market, and by the 1980s the seeds of big problems already were showing. By the 1990s profits were increasingly variable and elusive.
The formerly weak and small competitors now were more competitive in a changed market favoring smaller cars with more, and better, technology. The market had changed, but the big American auto companies had not. They kept doing more of the same – hopefully better, faster and striving for cheaper. But they were falling further behind. By the 2000s decade failure had become the viable option, with both Chrysler and GM going bankrupt.
As this cycle played out, the impact on Detroit was clear. Less success in the business base meant fewer revenue tax dollars from less profitable companies. Cost reductions meant employment stagnated, then started falling. Incomes stagnated, and people left Detroit to find better paying jobs. Property values began to fall. Income and property taxes declined. Governments had to borrow more, and cut costs, leading to declines in services. What had been a virtuous circle became a violently destructive whirlpool.
Detroit's business leaders failed to invest in programs to drive more new jobs in non-auto, non-industrial, business development. As competitors hurt the local industry, Detroit (and Michigan's) leaders kept trying to invest in saving the historical business, while the economy was shifting from an industrial base to an information one. It wasn't just autos that were less valuable as companies, but everything industrial. Yet, leaders failed at attracting new technology companies. The economic shift – the market shift – was unaddressed, and now Detroit is bankrupt.
Much as I like living in Chicago, unfortunately the story is far too similar in my town. Long an industrial hub, Chicago (and Illinois) enjoyed the benefits of growing companies, employment and taxes during the heyday of industrialism. This led to well paid, and very well pensioned, government employees providing services. The suburbs around Chicago exploded as people migrated to the Windy City for jobs – despite the brutal winters.
But Chicago has been dramatically affected by the shift to an information economy. The old machine shops, tool and dye makers and myriad parts manufacturers were decimated as that work often went offshore to cheaper manufacturers. Large manufacturers like Western Electric and International Harvester (renamed Navistar) failed. Big retailers like Montgomery Wards disappeared, and even Sears has diminished to a ghost of its former self. All businesses killed by market shifts.
And as a result, people quit moving to Chicago – and actually started leaving. There are now fewer jobs in Illinois than in the year 2000, and as a result people have left town. They've gone to cities (and states) where they could find jobs in growth industries allowing for more opportunity, and rising incomes.
Just like Detroit, Chicago shows early signs of big problems. Crime is up, with an unpleasantly large increase in murders. Insufficient income and property tax revenues led to budget crises across the board. Dramatic actions like selling city parking meters to shore up finances has led to Chicago having the most expensive parking in the country – despite far from the highest incomes. Property taxes in suburbs have escalated, with taxes in collar Lake county higher than Los Angeles! Yet the state pension system is bankrupt, causing the legislature to put in place a 50% state income tax increase! Meanwhile the infrastructure is showing signs of needing desperate work, but there is no money.
Like Detroit, Chicago's businesses (and governments) have invested insufficiently in innovation. Recent Chicago Tribune columns on local consumer goods behemoth Kraft emphasized (and typified) the lack of new product development and stalled revenue growth. Where Bay Area tech companies expect 50% of revenues (or more) from new products (or variations), Kraft has admitted it has relied on stalwarts like Velveeta and Mac & Cheese so much that fewer than 10% of revenues come from anything new.
Culturally, too many decisions in the executive suites of both the companies, and the governments, are focused on what worked in the past rather than investing in innovation. Even though the vaunted University of Illinois has one of the world's top 5 engineering schools, the majority of graduates find they leave the state for better paying jobs. And a dearth of angel or venture funding means that start-ups simply are forced coastal if they hope to succeed.
And this reaches to our national policies as well. Plenty of arguments abound for cutting costs – but are we effectively investing in innovation? Do our tax policies, as well as our expenditures, drive innovation – or constrict it? It was government programs which unleashed nuclear power and gave us a rash of innovations from putting a man on the moon. Yet, today, we seem obsessed with cutting budgets, cutting costs and doing less – not even more – of the same.
Growth is a wonderful thing. But growth does not happen without investment in innovation. When companies, or industries, stop investing in innovation growth slows – and eventually stops. Communities, states and even nations cannot thrive unless there is a robust program of investing for, and implementing, innovation.
With innovation you create renewal. Without it you create Detroit.
Last week's earning's announcements gave us some big news. Looking around the tech industry, a number of companies reported about as expected, and their stocks didn't move a lot. Apple had robust sales and earnings, but missed analyst targets and fell out of bed! But without a doubt, the big winner was Netflix, which beat expectations and had an enormous ~50% jump in valuation!
My what a difference 18 months makes (see chart.) For anyone who thinks the stock market is efficient the value of Netflix should make one wonder. In July, 2011 the stock ended a meteoric run-up to $300/share, only to fall 80% to $60/share by year's end. After whipsawing between $50 and $130, but spending most of 2012 near the lower number, the stock is now up 3-fold to $160! Nothing scares investors more than volatility – and this kind of volatility would scare away almost anyone but a day trader!
Yet, through all of this I have been – and I remain – bullish on Netflix. During its run-up in 2010 I wrote "Why You Should Love Netflix," then when the stock crashed in late 2011 I wrote "The Case for Buying Netflix" and last January I predicted Netflix to be "the turnaround story of 2012." It would be logical to ask why I would remain bullish through all the ups and downs of this cycle – especially since Netflix is still only about half of its value at its high-point.
Simply put, Netflix has 2 things going for it that portend a successful future:
Netflix is in a very, very fast growing market. Streaming entertainment. People have what appears to be an insatiable desire for entertainment, and the market not only has grown at a breathtaking rate, but it will continue to grow extremely fast for several more quarters. It is unclear where the growth rate may tap out for content delivery – putting Netflix in a market that offers enormous growth for all participants.
Netflix leadership has shown a penchant for having the right strategy to remain a market leader – even when harshly criticized for taking fast action to deal with market shifts. Specifically, choosing to rapidly cannibalize its own DVD business by aggressively promoting streaming – even at lower margins – meant Netflix chose growth over defensiveness.
In 2011 CEOReed Hastings was given "CEO of the Year 2010" honors by Fortune magazine. But in 2011, as he split Netflix into 2 businesses – DVD and streaming – and allowed them to price independently and compete with each other for customer business he was trounced as the "dunce" of tech CEOs.
His actions led to a price increase of 60% for anyone who decided to buy both Netflix products, and many customers chose to drop one. Analysts predicted this to be the end of Netflix.
But in retrospect we can see the brilliance of this decision. CEO Hastings actually did what textbooks tell us to do – he began milking the installed, but outdated, DVD business. He did not kill it, but he began pulling profits and cash out of it to pay for building the faster growing, but lower margin, streaming business. This allowed Netflix to actually grow revenue, and grow profits, while making the market transition from one platform (DVD) to another (streaming.)
Almost no company pulls off this kind of transition. Most companies try to defend and extend the company's "core" product far too long, missing the market transition. But now Netflix is adding around 2 million new streaming customers/quarter, while losing 400,000 DVD subscribers. And with the price changes, this has allowed the company to add content and expand internationally — and increase profits!!
Marketwatch headlined that "Naysayers Must Feel Foolish." But truthfully, they were just looking at the wrong numbers. They were fixated on the shrinking installed base of DVD subscribers. But by pushing these customers to make a fast decision, Netflix was able to convert most of them to its new streaming business before they went out and bought the service from a competitor.
Aggressive cannibalization actually was the BEST strategy given how fast tablet and smartphone sales were growing and driving up demand for streaming entertainment. Capturing the growth market was far, far more valuable than trying to defend the business destined for obsolescence.
Netflix simply did its planning looking out the windshield, at what the market was going to look like in 3 years, rather than trying to protect what it saw in the rear view mirror. The market was going to change – really fast. Faster than most people expected. Competitors like Hulu and Amazon and even Comcast wanted to grab those customers. The Netflix goal had to be to go headlong into the cold, but fast moving, water of the new streaming market as aggressively as possible. Or it would end up like Blockbuster that tried renting DVDs from its stores too long – and wound up in bankruptcy court.
There are people who still doubt that Netflix can compete against other streaming players. And this has been the knock on Netflix since 2005. That Amazon, Walmart or Comcast would crush the smaller company. But what these analysts missed was that Amazon and Walmart are in a war for the future of retail – not entertainment – and their efforts in streaming were more to protect a flank in their retail strategy, not win in streaming entertainment. Likewise, Comcast and its brethren are out to defend cable TV, not really win at anytime, anywhere streaming entertainment. Their defensive behavior would never allow them to lead in a fast-growing new marketplace. Thus the market was left for Netflix to capture – if it had the courage to rapidly cannibalize its base and commit to the new marketplace.
Hulu and Redbox are also competitors. And they very likely will do very well for several years. Because the market is growing very fast and can support multiple players. But Netflix benefits from being first, and being biggest. It has the most cash flow to invest in additional growth. It has the largest subscriber base to attract content providers earlier, and offer them the most money. By maintaining its #1 position – even by cannibalizing itself to do so – Netflix is able to keep the other competitors at bay; reinforcing its leadership position.
There are some good lessons here for everyone:
Think long-term, not short-term. A king can become a goat only to become a king again if he haa the right strategy. You probably aren't as good as the press says when they like you, nor as bad as they say when hated. Don't let yourself be goaded into giving up the long-term win for short-term benefits.
Growth covers a multitude of sins! The way Netflix launched its 2-division campaign in 2011 was a disaster. But when a market is growing at 100%+ you can rapidly recover. Netflix grew its streaming user base by more than 50% last year – and that fixes a lot of mistakes. Anytime you have a choice, go for the fast growing market!!
Follow the trend! Never fight the trend! Tablet sales were growing at an amazing clip, while DVD players had no sales gains. With tablet and smartphone sales eclipsing DVD player sales, the smart move was to go where the trend was headed. Being first on the trend has high payoff. Moving slowly is death. Kodak failed to aggressively convert film camera customers to its own digital cameras, and it filed bankruptcy in 2012.
Dont' forget to be profitable! Even if it means raising prices on dated solutions that will eventually become obsolete – to customer howls. You must maximize the profits of an outdated product line as fast as possible. Don't try to defend and extend it. Those tactics use up cash and resources rather than contributing to future success.
Cannibalizing your installed base is smart when markets shift. Regardless the margin concerns. Newspapers said they could not replace "print ad dollars" with "on-line ad dimes" so many went bankrupt defending the paper as the market shifted. Move fast. Force the cannibalization early so you can convert existing customers to your solution, and keep them, before they go to an emerging competitor.
When you need to move into a new market set up a new division to attack it. And give them permission to do whatever it takes. Even if their actions aggravate existing customers and industry participants. Push them to learn fast, and grow fast – and even to attack old sacred cows (like bundled pricing.)
There were a lot of people who thought my call that Netflix would be the turnaround tech story of 2012 was simply bizarre. But they didn't realize the implications of the massive trend to tablets and smartphones. The impact is far-reaching – affecting not only computer companies but television, content delivery and content creation. Netflix positioned itself to be a winner, and implemented the tactics to make that strategy work despite widespread skepticism.
Hats off to Netflix leadership. A rare breed. That's why long-term investors should own the stock.
