by Adam Hartung | Oct 7, 2008 | General, In the Swamp, Lifecycle, Lock-in
So the stock market is crashing. Is now the time to buy? Many CEOs are asking this question.
The problem is that too often people try to buy a company that’s "cheap", using its past history as the basis. Take Bank of America (see chart here). BofA earlier this year bought the most troubled of all the mortgage companies Countrywide Financial. And then when Lehman Brothers was falling into bankruptcy BofA purchased Merrill Lynch, a retail stock brokerage that has been realing from on-line competition since e*Trade started in the 1990s, has one of the weakest mutual fund departments, one of the weakest research departments and a weak investment bank. BofA’s view was that based upon history, these companies were very cheap. But now, shortly after the acquisitions, BofA is announcing that it must halve its dividend, and raise additional equity through a new stock sale in order to shore up its balance sheet. And on top of this, earnings are down for the quarter and the year as the CEO starts claiming that estimates are pretty meaningless (read article here). Should you buy the new stock offering?
When markets shift, the value of assets tied to old Success Formulas decline. In the new market, the old Success Formula produces weaker returns and thus it is worth less. Too many people see this lower value as being a chance to "buy on the cheap." But far too often value will continue to decline because the old business simply isn’t worth as much. In Bank of America’s case, it bought extremely large players, but those that are inexorably linked to the old markets with old Success Formulas that are fast becoming out of date. While Merrill Lynch may be a great old name, the company itself has never been able to produce its old level of returns since brokerage markets shifted over a decade ago. Increasingly, it looks like BofA simply bought out-of-date competitors that were finding themselves on the rope as this market shift happened. And the BofA leadership is even leaving the old leaders in place after the acquisition.
Just in case you think that all the strategy and finance brains in big corporations means they are better judges of company value than yourself, remember that very rarely does any acquisition become worth what it cost. All finance academicians point out that buyers overvalue acquisitions in the process. In the end, it’s the buyers that see valuations suffer due to lower than anticipated earnings. In this case, BofA has bought large – but weak – competitors in markets reeling from shifts. And BofA has shown no proclivity to take dramatic changes to alter the Success Formulas (which JPMorgan Chase did upon acquiring Bear Sterns for almost nothing). This is a recipe for weak future performance.
Those companies that will benefit from acquisitions in this turmoil will have to purchase companies that better position the acquirers for future growth. Leaders not necessarily in size, but in the ability to produce growing revenues and profits. And acquisitions which can help migrate the acquirer’s Success Formula forward toward better competitiveness and higher returns – not just adding immediate (but declining) revenue. What’s going on at BofA may look like an effort to "buy on the cheap," but it’s more likely to end up "a pig in a poke."
by Adam Hartung | Oct 5, 2008 | General, Leadership, Lifecycle, Lock-in, Openness
This blog primarily focuses on businesses. But in Create Marketplace Disruption I point out that Success Formulas exist at multiple levels – not just companies. At a higher level, Success Formulas exist for functional groups, work teams and individuals. At a lower level than companies, Success Formulas exist for industries and even entire economies. When a shift happens at any level, all levels above that have to adjust for that shift. Over the last few weeks, we’ve been witnessing the impact of shifts in economies that are having a tumultuous impact on the financial services industry – and the companies participating in that industry.
With last week’s announcement of higher expected first time unemployment claims (see article here), The U.S. is confirmed to be headed into a recession (if not already there [article here].) But beyond the U.S., the economies of the developed economies in 2009 is expected to grow .6% -the weakest since 1982. The emerging markets are expected to grow at 6.1% (weakest since 2003) – 5.5 percentage points higher – 10x developed markets – 4x the average difference in growth rates during the 1990s. This is a pretty massive change. (Read article here)
The U.S. banking crisis has been the result of lots of bad loans on everything from mortgages to autos and credit cards. As asset values (principally homes) and incomes declined, the number of unpaid loans went up. It turned out that many of these loans had been packaged and sold off, and derivative instruments were created on those assets to help increase returns, causing not only the lenders to get into trouble by defaults, but investors (like insurance companies). Sort of a "domino effect" – or some say the falling of a "house of cards." While this explains why U.S. banks and insurance companies stumbled, why are we also seeing a rash of problems across Europe and some in Asia (read article here). The governments are "bailing out" banks and other financial companies from Ireland to Iceland – while putting in place lots of additional regulations (like banning short sales [article here] – a tactic also being used in the USA.)
In the USA, banks and investment banks allowed ever-increasing risk to creep into the debt market via higher lending limits on asset values and incomes. They were seeking ways to maintain results by manufacturing ever riskier transactions dependent on fast rising asset values and incomes – even if there was no reason to believe they would happen. They were looking for ways to Defend & Extend their Success Formula. We now can see that was happening all around the developed markets. Emerging market governments were buying secure U.S. Treasuries. But everywhere else institutions were trying to find higher yields in order to Defend & Extend their Success Formulas. As a result they bought mortgaged-backed securities and other even riskier instruments. Now that those securities are defaulting, all the developed markets are seeing big financial industry problems. The unwinding of risk is causing big problems all across the developed markets where actually making things – manufacturing, IT code, services – has been declining.
At the base of the pyramid, the economy, we can now see that the markets which make things are doing a lot better than those which have been outsourcing. This had already made a big difference in many manufacturing industries. And now we can see it in financial services. What underlies these industry problems is that the relative competitiveness of the economies is shifting. Every industry, company, functional manager, work team and individual will have to alter their Success Formulas to deal with this change – or face declining returns. Some started making these changes years ago (such as GE and IBM), and others have not (such as GM and Ford).
If there is not going to be a wholesale realignment of global economic leadership, it will require the government, industry and company leaders in the developed countries to make substantial changes in their Success Formulas. The recent U.S. financial services industry bail-out bill only addressed the current debt and cash flow crisis. It did not address the fundamental changes in the economic competitiveness. We can soon expect similar requests for government bail-outs from the auto industry, homebuilding industry, appliance industry, etc. Until government leaders develop a different economic model, the developed countries will struggle. And the industries that formerly led in these countries will continue to see market dominance shift as it has done in IT services, customer service, furniture manufacturing and several others. Success Formulas must be changed from the bottom to the top – including those of the individuals who are seeing the changes in competition affect them.
What’s needed now more than ever is White Space to address these market Challenges. Just as the New Deal in the 1930s and the dramatic tax reductions of the 1980s allowed for experimentation and creation of entirely new Success Formulas to changed market conditions – similar White Space is needed in government today. And those who lead their industries and companies must begin using more White Space to find new ways to compete – rather than trying to Defend & Extend despite declining returns. Equally, functional group heads and work team leaders will find themselves having to use more White Space to address competitive needs – rather than falling back on old assumptions about what works.
Those who implement White Space and develop new Success Formulas they can migrate toward will be able to improve their competitiveness and survive – possibly thrive! Those that don’t will find the future very tough sledding. There is no doubt about the global shifts that started a decade ago and are continuing today. Trying to wind the clock backward will never happen. Old competitive models are now obsolete. The winners will be those who follow the Phoenix Principle and use White Space to migrate their Success Formulas.
by Adam Hartung | Sep 29, 2008 | General, Leadership, Lock-in, Openness
Today the U.S. Congress failed to pass a bail-out bill to buy up bad bank assets. Before the vote, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was down about 300 points. After the vote, the DJIA fell to close down about 700 points (read about the vote and market reaction on Marketwatch here.) So, is the end near – or is everything going to work out OK?
I’m reminded of the scene in It’s a Wonderful Life where George Bailey (played by Jimmy Stewart) is invited by the town patriarch, Mr. Potter, to take a job for Mr. Potter. As he starts the conversation Mr. Potter says something close to "George, back in the Depression when everyone lost their heads you and I kept ours. You ended up with the Building and Loan, and I ended up with everything else." The crisis happened, and lots of people got hurt. Some came out OK, and some did very well. On the other side of a crisis, there are winners. It’s just that often those winners are not the same people who were winners going into the crisis.
Over the last several months we’ve seen some big changes in financial services. We’re seeing some losers already. But we’re also seeing some plays being made that could become winners. It was the announced losses at Citibank, which led to the firing of their CEO Mr. Prince, that first alerted people to the reality of this crisis. Today, Citi announced it is buying Wachovia bank in its play to be a long-term winner. The new CEO says this is a rare opportunity for huge gain with almost no risk. It was JPMorganChase that first took a play to expand in this crisis with the acquisition of Bear Sterns, which many people at the time thought was done for a remarkably small amount of money. Later JPMC bought Washington Mutual for a fraction of its asset value. And Bank of America has moved aggressively, buying up the very troubled Countrywide Financial that was the first mortgage institution to fall, and later taking over Merrill Lynch the weekend when Lehman Brothers went bankrupt.
Will Jamie Dimon of JPMC be the next Mr. Potter, taking over control of his local market during a crisis? Some of these may become big winners. On the other hand, all 3 may falter.
What we know is that the demand for loans (the product that banks sell) is not going to disappear. That market may hiccup, but demand will continue to grow. Government, corporations and individuals all will continue to need loans. As the standard of living rises in China, India and elsewhere demand for loans will go up. And the winner will be the business that develops a solution to the future market need. You can’t judge the value of these actions by looking at how these businesses did in the past – because that past is gone. It’s all about the future. So, what should be the scenario for 2015?
- Will the dollar continue to be the world currency – the source of denominating oil and other commodities as well as most transactions? Or will we see a change to the Euro, or perhaps a basket of currencies put into some sort of as yet unavailable currency instrument?
- Will people continue to save their money in currencies, as deposits in banks, or will there be a re-emergence of keeping stores of value in silver, gold, and other commodities (in India, many people still carry their savings as jewelry on their arms).
- Will U.S. based companies dominate the equity markets, or will companies from the "emerging tiger" countries become relatively more powerful?
- Will the primary source of deposits be in the USA, Europe, China, India, or elsewhere?
- What rate of return will depositors require on their investments? Will this vary by region?
- Will real estate values in the USA, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Brazil, Russia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, China and India go down? Go up? Will there be big differences between regions? How will the differences vary?
- Where will deposits, regulations and legal devices converge to be the primary source of loan origination? The USA? Elsewhere?
Who wins depends on who has a good set of scenarios about the future. Not because they can predict, but because they are prepared for different potential outcomes, and they can shift to meet Challenges. And if you are an investor, your pick between the 3 mentioned – or possibly ICBC, HSBC, Banco Santander, Mitsubishi, ABN Amro, BNP Paribas, UBS or Royal Bank of Scotland? How will the big U.S. banks compare in a global market – and one that is less dominated by the USA?
Too many investors don’t have future scenarios when they invest. They buy equities, or make loans (buying bonds), on the basis of company history. But the value you receive for investing has nothing to do with what the company did in the past – it’s all dependent upon the future. When an industry crisis occurs, like the one in financial services today, those who survive – and those who thrive – do so because they have a good set of scenarios about the future. There is no doubt some will come out of this crisis as winners. They may be players who had nothing to do with the past – or they may be companies people in the USA know very poorly. But if you are going to invest in financial services, you better have a good set of scenarios – and you better watch closely to see how things develop.
Note: Looking at the 3 companies referred to here, one is acting quite differently than the others. While Citibank and Bank of America are moving fairly slowly to change, JPMC is moving very, very fast with its acquisitions. Within 3 months of buying Bear Sterns, JPMC had dismantled the company, consolidated its assets and let go its employees. After acquisition many companies spend months trying to work their way toward some sort of "merged" solution – only to spend huge quantities of cash and end up with higher costs and lower revenues. At JPMC we see one company forcing its Success Formula onto its acquisitions – no belabored effort. Rather fast moves taken to consolidate assets and keep the Success Formula in place. Whether the JPMC Success Formula is the right one for the future is yet to be seen. But the leader’s actions at JPMC are far more likely to be effective for shareholders than the actions being taken at the other institutions. Especially if JPMC is able to shift with the marketplace.
by Adam Hartung | Sep 22, 2008 | Defend & Extend, Disruptions, Ethics, General, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
By now, everyone knows the story. After all the cost to take over Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, plus the guarantees given to J.P. Morgan Chase for their acquisition of Bear Sterns, and the cost to keep AIG alive – in the range of $300million to $600million – the Treasury secretary now says the U.S. taxpayers need to spend at least (it could be more – even more than 2x this amount) $700billion to purchase the bad loans sitting on the books of banks, investment firms, insurance companies and hedge funds.
So what does the taxpayer get for this? So far, all the taxpayer is told is "it’ll stave off an even worse crisis." I’m reminded of the words attributed to Illinois Senator Everett Dirkson "a billion here and a billion there and pretty soon it adds up to real money." This is a lollapalooza of a bunch of money – and yet no one seems interested in saying what the taxpayer gets. The proposal is pinned on "things will be worse if you don’t", without much talk about how things will ever get better. There’s no talk about how this will create more jobs, create rising incomes, or improve asset values. Just "it can get a lot worse."
So, put yourself in the role of CEO. If someone came into your office saying "I think we made a whopper of a mistake, and you need to agree to pony up something like $1 to $1.3trillion dollars to bail us out." After you get back up, what would you ask? How about, "what’s this for?" To which you hear "Well, it seems we simply made a bunch of bad investments, and now we have to buy them all back." Nothing about how your business will be better for having done it.
Now, it might occur to ask, "if I do this, how do I know it won’t happen again?" And that’s the question you really should be asking today. Have you heard before about this problem, and told your previous actions would stop the problem? If yes, wouldn’t you say "hey, I’m a bit tired of running around this tree and getting these recurrent bad news meetings. Seems like every Monday is something of a ‘here’s the newest crisis’ environment. What’s your plan to adjust to the market requirement?" And if the plan is to do more of the same, but now with more resources, done harder, and working smarter you’d be pretty smart to say "if the previous actions didn’t work, why should these work?"
In the end, this $700billion to $1.6trillion isn’t changing anything. It’s just putting the proverbial "finger in the dyke." Only what started out as a few hundred million dollars (the finger in the first hole) has exploded into over $1trillion and the dyke hole isn’t the size of a finger – it’s the Holland Tunnel! Clearly, what was tried hasn’t worked. Yet, this is asking more of the same. So, in the legislation the person who’s been watching and saying "things will be fine" and spending the hundreds of millions has now said "just to make sure this works, I want not only all this money but no oversight on what I might need to spend additionally – and no controls over what actions I might need to take – in order to finally stop the flooding problem." Uh, right. Since everything you’ve done before didn’t work the obvious right answer is to give you more money than I ever imagined, and on top of that give you unbridled permission to do anything else you want to keep trying more of the same to stop the problem.
When do you say "no"? Confronted week after week with crisis after crisis, when do you say "I don’t think this is working?" It’s so easy to go along. It’s so easy to say "this has been the way we’ve always done it. Things haven’t worked so far, so clearly all we need to do is do more of it. Possibly more than any of us ever dreamed imaginable – but surely if we do enough, do more, eventually it will work."
Now, more than ever, we need White Space. The financial markets have shifted. Competition has shifted. The balance of competitiveness has shifted to those who have access to lower cost resources of everything from oil to labor. Those who focus on industrial production can now see that it is dominated by those who have more people, who are equally trained and who work for less. Whether that is the production of shirts, or software code. Trying to prop up a global financial system based on the "full faith and credit of the U.S. government" is difficult when that government is significantly in debt, has lost its position as #1 in manufacturing output, and no longer controls the financing of everything from dams to auto purchases. Trying to "fix" this situation with solutions designed to work in another era, under a different set of circumstances, will not produce better results.
At the very least, when confronted with this kind of situation it is the time for leaders to say "where is the White Space to develop a new solution? If I have $1.3trillion to buy the problem – either by giving up the money or by printing more – and I forego all other expenditures (like health care, or defense against competitors) to put the money here – I deserve to see some money spent on developing a new solution. One that is built upon the new market characteristics." This is not the S&L crisis again, nor is it the failure of a single big bank. We are seeing the results of a market shift which the industry was not prepared for. And the only way to come out successful is to have White Space to develop a new solution.
So far, no one has asked for permission to develop a new solution – nor has anyone even proposed it. No one has even asked for resources to develop a new financial system. All the money is going to attempt propping up the old system – and the more we dig, the deeper we get.
At the very least, for $700billion, we need White Space. We don’t need hedge fund managers who are salivating to buy up beaten down assets. We don’t need regulators trying to roll back the clock. Nor do we need "do nothing" recommendations with "have faith this will all work out in a capitalistic system." We are in the information age – not the industrial age. We are in a global economy – not a U.S.-led international economy. We are facing new competitors, with different advantages, doing very different things. And we need new solutions. Without those, each Monday will continue to feel like the movie "Groundhog Day" as we relive over and again the problems we don’t address by simply throwing money at it. We have to find a way to move beyond "more of the same."
Mr. Paulson is willing to bet the U.S. Treasury on doing more of the same. He’s ready to spend money Americans don’t have (since there is a negative U.S. government budget and huge deficit.) This means either higher taxes, or turning on the printing press and creating inflation. That’s a bet he’s willing to take. Are you? Or would you like to see some options? Some new solutions? Or even some teams that are working on new solutions? If he’s your V.P., your CFO, do you approve his recommendation, or do you ask for something more – some White Space to develop a solution that does more than stave off future crisis. Do you look to the future, and how to win, or do you try to preserve the past and put all your money on the bet that old solutions will work?
by Adam Hartung | Sep 11, 2008 | In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
Leaders of organizations, especially those with lots of employees and/or big revenues, have a leveraged impact when making decisions. If a manager with 8 people in a group makes an error, it’s felt by those 8, plus those all 9 work with. If the CEO of a business with over $1B of revenue, or more than 1,000 employees makes a bad decision think about the leverage that creates. Lots of people suffer. Not only the employees, but customers, investors and suppliers.
This is very apparent now at Tribune Company and especially the newspapers it controls – including the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune. These aren’t the only 2 businesses owned by Tribune Corp., but their success, or lack therof, has a serious impact on the 35-50 million people that are tightly connected to the markets where they report the news. Yes, it is true that newspapers no longer have the power they once did. But there’s no doubt that lots of our news is still dependent upon writers and editors working at these two newspapers. If we’re to root out political corruption at the state or local level, or report on energy crises, or agricultural concerns we depend significantly on reporters at big city newspapers. As reported in BusinessWeek recently (read article here), these newspapers are now at significant risk of failure due to the leadership of Sam Zell.
Back at the end of 2006 Tribune’s equity value was down 65% from its high in 1999. Revenues had been declining since 2004. Cash flow was being propped up with draconian cuts across the organization. Pink slips littered the hallways, and long-term employees were being handed early retirement plans. It was clear that management was doing everything possible to dress up the corporation for a higher valuation to some potential suitor – which was proving hard to find. Most people were very wary of the proposed pricing, recognizing that changing market dynamics in media were pushing advertising more toward the web, and coming right out of newspapers. Meanwhile, in cable targeted channels were fragmenting the market leavng variety channels running reruns or second-rate programs (like CW) with precious few eyeballs and struggling ad revenues. This was all bad news for Tribune Corporation. Something needed to be done that would help Tribune find a new way to compete and grow against the ever-more-popular internet and ad-placement behemoth Google.
Enter Sam Zell, who had a Success Formula he was ready to apply. Throughout his history he had bought beaten up real estate, borrowed a gob of money against it, done some fixing up, leased it out and then sold it for a big gain. In real estate, this had always worked. So he was ready to apply his Success Formula to newspapers. He had no plans to change the operating Success Formula at Tribune Corporation, believing the revenue problems would self-correct. He read 3 papers every day, so he figured people would be like him and return to reading newspapers soon enough. And advertisers would follow. He was going to own the Cubs and Wrigley field, but he didn’t much like baseball, so to him this was just another asset to leverage and sell. Same for those 25 second-tier television stations around the country. He didn’t intend to change the Tribune’s operating Success Formula, just tweak it a bit. And overlay his own Success Formula based on lots of debt, waiting for recovery, doing some simple sprucing, and being overbearing with employees.
Of course, as I predicted in my several blogs at the time, this was a recipe for disaster. The Tribune Corp needed a big dose of internal Disruption, and plenty of White Space to figure out where advertisers were going and how to appeal to them. Tribune needed to move hard and fast to more web understanding, and dramatically rethink how to manage its independent television stations in a world where they were the weakest of weakening broadcast stations – as well as the most generic of cable stations. Revenues were going to continue to decline – and facing a predictable economic weakening they would decline a lot and very fast. The last thing Tribune Corporation needed was more debt. It needed to conserve its assets to pay for a transformation of the company – after it could figure out what that transformation needed to be!
After adding an additional $8billion debt, growing it to $13.5billion,, and investing only $350million of his money, Sam Zell set off on a path of value destruction. And who holds the bag? The bondholders of course. Someone once told me that debt was not supposed to carry risk – that’s what equity was for. But Zell convinced investment bankers to sell his extremely risky bonds to various holders (mostly pension funds) so he could finance an overpriced deal. Now those bondholders have seen as much as a 65% reduction in the value of their investments. Were the pensioners to know they wold be so glad! Mr. Zell’s Success Formula, so tied to real estate during boom times, was the worst thing that could be applied to the struggling newspapers at Tribune. But he was able to apply it using other people’s money – so he has little to lose and much to gain while the bondholders have much to lose and almost nothing to gain.
Meanwhile, employees across Tribune are falling like flies exposed to DDT. And the news products in L.A. and Chicago are getting weaker with each passing month as journalists aren’t there to write. The people of these great cities are simply left knowing less about what’s happening in their metropolises. Everyone in both cities is getting a cold slap from this folly.
Mr. Zell keeps saying he’ll do whatever he has to do to make money with Tribune Corporation. But that’s not true. What he means is he’ll do whatever his old Success Formula recommends he do. So now, as his own newspaper boss says, they are chewing off a leg to try and get out of the falling revenue trap. This is not an approach that will make for a strong Tribune Corporation. It is a path toward a corporation with no resources, weak products and customers left without a solution. What Tribune needs is White Space to figure out how to compete as a 21st century media company. But instead all energy is being diverted toward paying off the bonds Mr. Zell sold to fund his all-too-risky bet on debt.
We all have a responsibility to understand our Success Formulas. And to understand those of the people who would lead our organization. If we see that Success Formula Locked-in, we can bet on more of the same – regardless of the outcome. Mr. Zell would rather fail as a cost-cutter than lead Tribune Corporation to its next legacy of success. But unfortunately, it is all the people dependent on Mr. Zell who will suffer most – the vendors, customers, investors and employees. They will suffer from his outdated Success Formula even more than he will – as he jets each weekend to between his home in Malibu and his home in Chicago. Leaders have the greatest responsibility to recognize their Success Formula Lock-ins, and be open to Disrupt and use White Space to find solutions which can succeed. Because when they fail, everyone around them fails as well.
by Adam Hartung | Sep 10, 2008 | General, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lock-in
CEOs and investment bankers love to talk about, and do, mergers. So do journalists. A big combination of two companies gets people all excited. There is always a lot of talk about how "synergy" will allow the two companies to be worth more combined than they were worth independently. Yet, there are no academic studies that prove this point. Quite to the contrary, academicians will tell you over and over that the synergies don’t appear, and the combined companies are worth less than they were worth independently. Usually quite quickly. So, if CEOs like to make these deals – why don’t they work? Why does Mercedez Benz buy Chrysler, only to see the value plummet and eventually sell the company off to a private equity firm?
Let’s take a look at AOL/Time Warner (see chart here). In the 1990s these two companies were leaders in their markets. AOL had pioneered internet access to the home, and was clearly #1. Time Warner had become the dominant player in cable television, also #1. Both were growing at double digit rates. To the CEOs, investment bankers, and most onlookers putting these two entities together brought together the best of both markets – creating a no-lose media company destined to be pre-eminent in the next decade. But the cost of the merger ended up far outweighing any benefits. The value of the combined company plummeted. Worth almost $100/share in 2000, today the equity trades for about $15/share (an 85% value decline.) Billions of dollars in investor equity was wiped out. And today as AOL tries to revive itself as an internet player it is derisively referred to as "AO Hell" or "Albatross OnLine" (read about AOLs newest move here.) Why didn’t the great media company that was predicted develop?
All businesses have Success Formulas. Whether profitable or not, whether growing or not, all businesses have Success Formulas. These Success Formulas are a nested, tighly integrated combination of the business’s very Identity, it’s Strategy for growth and the Tactics which support the Identity and the Strategy. All behaviors, internal sacred cows, hierarchy and organization, decision making systems, IT system, hiring procedures, asset utilization programs, metrics and costs are organized to support that Success Formula. The business isn’t an ideological being as often described by executives or journalists – it is a very tightly-knitted Success Formula operated day in and day out, every day, in pursuit of doing those things that made the business grow.
In a merger, the two business Success Formulas collide. As sensible as a combination may be, as powerfullly as they share customers, as efficiently as they may use the same infrastructure, as aligned as their strategies appear, they have two different Success Formulas. And when it comes time to merge – neither simply disappears. Suddenly, to achieve the great projected value, it is expected that some kind of new Success Formula will appear that achieves the lofty future goals. But how will that happen? These Success Formulas grew out of years of development during the businesses’ growth. This sudden combination is no substitute for the evolutionary development of a Success Formula. At the time of merger, regardless of the size or success of either business, they two suddently confront themselves as two gladiators in the colliseum. Which will reign?
And that is when things go wrong. The only way the desired value can be achieved is if a new entity is created that actually develops an entirely new, third Success Formula. But given the high stakes, who wants to take the time to develop this? Who believes they can afford to define a new Identity, to craft a new Strategy out of market success, and to build a whole new set of Tactics that support the new Strategy? Who will set up White Space to start bringing together pieces, testing the development of anything new and putting plans against the rigor of market acceptance? The CEO and investors want results – and now!!! So what happens? Inevitably, one of the Success Formulas gets picked as the winner (usually by the new CEO), and that one sets about to convert the other entity into the "designated winning" Success Formula. At this point, many of the value creators of the losing Success Formula disappear. People leave. Products are dropped. Customers, or whole markes, are dropped. Manufacturing and service systems are eliminated. Very rapidly, the exercise becomes a cost-cutting frenzy as two of everything is converted to one. And the "winner" becomes a subset of what the two starters brought to the merger.
At AOL, Time Warner bought AOL. The Time Warner guys remained in charge. Pretty quickly, they set about converting AOL into a Time Warner Success Formula. And in the fast-changing internet world, AOL quickly started losing value. Time Warner froze AOL into place as a dial-up service with specific extras. They flooded mailboxes with CDs begging people to sign up for a free 3 month service. But as bandwidth expanded, and Comcast along with the phone companies installed broadband to more and more homes and businesses, the value simply evaporated out of AOL. Time Warner remained Time Warner, but AOL soon became an out-of-date internet dinosaur.
Creating value via merger is a very tough thing. One company, ITW, does it very well (see chart here). But ITW doesn’t try to put its acquisitions onto common systems, or bring them into one operating unit. ITW is quite unique in allowing its acquisitions to create value out of their markets as they see fit. Most CEOs can’t stand this sort of independence, and they move quickly to convert the merged company into the Success Formula of the acquirer. And within months, much of the value originally sought is gone. Just like at Time Warner and AOL.
by Adam Hartung | Sep 4, 2008 | Defend & Extend, General, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lifecycle, Lock-in
WalMart (see chart here) has announced recent earnings, and they were better than Wall Street anticipated (read Marketwatch article here). Same store sales were up 3% compared to last year. As a result, the stock is worth today almost what it was worth 5 years ago (yet still more than 10% shy of all time highs from a decade ago.) Here we are in a terrible economy for retailers, with department stores, specialty stores and luxury stores all seeing double digit revenue declines. Yet WalMart comes in with a good quarterly result. Does this show WalMart is back on track to recapture past greatness?
WalMart has done nothing to make itself a better, more competitive company over the last year. It’s just done exactly what it has always done – but with a bit more price chopping than usual in some areas – and expansion of low-margin grocery sales in others. More of the same. For example, in the 30,000 person town of Minocqua, Wisconsin Wal-Mart opened a new store that was 5 times the previous store size and included a Wal-Mart grocery – offering the first competition to local grocers ever in that town. In other words, Wal-Mart kept being Wal-Mart.
Of course what happened was a recession. Certainly a recession in consumer spending. The decade of declining incomes in real terms met with the credit contraction of 2008, as well as declining home and auto values, reducing available cash for consumers. The immediate reaction was to simply buy less stuff – and become price sensitive. The first means people quit buying new diamonds and going to Aeropastale for sweatshirts, and the latter meant they started looking for where they could save dimes – not just dollars – on everything from sweatshirts to green beans. So where would you expect people to turn? Why to the retailer that has always been focused on saving dimes.
But this doesn’t mean Wal-Mart is the company you should invest in. Low-price is not the exclusive domain of Wal-Mart. I recently blogged about Aldi, a company that is even lower priced than Wal-Mart on groceries and is itself in an even bigger growth boom right now. And it’s doing new things (like its first-ever television advertising) to help itself grow. So Wal-Mart isn’t the only game in town for low-price. Competition to be the low-cost retailer will remain constant as other companies search out ways to be even lower cost than Wal-Mart – with strategies such as Aldi’s to carry a limited product line and use less labor (rather than just use cheap labor.)
More importantly, consumers don’t remain focused on price long-term. Recessions are characterized by job losses, hours worked reductions, bonus retractions and other income bashers. But things do move on. People don’t remain in a "recessionary mindset" forever. They change expenditure patterns and household budgets to get back into more comfortable lifestyles. And jobs, hours and bonuses come back. When that happens, the desire to shop WalMart will remain where it is now "only if I have to." Not a lot of high-schoolers want to show up in the sweatshirt everyone knows came from Wal-Mart, nor do many men want to purchase their work slacks at Wal-Mart. Now people feel they have to – it doesn’t mean they want to – nor that they’ll do it long term.
When short-term market shifts happen even a bad Success Formula can look good for a short while. Like the old phrase "even a stopped clock is right twice a day." Wal-Mart is extremely Locked-in to its one-horse strategy. Wal-Mart has not developed a culture which can adapt to the needs of modern consumers. It has not made its merchandizing modern, nor its store layouts, nor has it figured out how to adapt in-store selections to fit local market differences. Wal-Mart is still the company that controls the temperature in every store via thermostats in Fayetteville, Arkansas. The recent quarterly results are good news for the short-term, but do not reflect the out-of-date nature nor Lock-in of Wal-Mart’s Success Formula. By next year Wal-Mart will again be struggling to compete with more fashionable companies like Target, while fighting an even tougher batte on the price side with emerging competitors like Aldi.
If you bought Wal-Mart 5 years ago, you’ve been sitting on a paper loss (with almost no dividend return) for this whole period. Now’s the time to get out.
by Adam Hartung | Aug 27, 2008 | Defend & Extend, General, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
The U.S. credit crisis has a lot of people very concerned about the economy. (Read LATimes article on the high stakes of this problem here.) As well it should. It was a credit crisis in the 1930s which created a rash of loan failures lead to bank failures, deflation and the worst economy in American history. While we keep being assured there will not be another Great Depression, there is still reason for serious concern. Three major financial institutions have failed in the last year (Countrywide, Bear Sterns and IndyMac), and one of the world’s leading economists has predicted the worst is yet to come with at least one additional major financial institution collapsing. So, isn’t it worth asking "how did we get into this mess?"
It wasn’t long ago the big controversy was about how much the heads of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were getting paid. The argument was whether these institutions were independent banks, or government agencies. After all, they were guaranteeing FHA and similar loans, so they were using government backing as they regulated the mortgage market as well as underwrote its activities. So the question was whether the leaders should be paid like regulators – say a Federal Reserve Board member – or like executives of an independent bank. As the mortgage markets ballooned these institutions were booking more and more paper profits, and the CEO pay had gone up dramatically. Many people were questioning whether this was appropriate.
Now we can see that both institutions were allowing ever riskier loans to be made by mortgage providers. And both are near insolvency. Equity holders have been nearly wiped out as Freddie Mac’s value has dropped from $70/share to under $5 (see chart here) and Fannie Mae has dropped from $80 to $6.50 (see chart here.) Privatizing these formerly government agencies hasn’t worked out too well for investors lately.
Freddie and Fannie didn’t have bad leaders, they just kept trying to make it possible for their primary customers – the banks and mortgage companies – to keep making more and larger loans. They didn’t come out and say "we’re going to take more risk", they just slowly inched their way forward allowing loans to have less down payment, allowing the buildings to have higher valuations as collateral, allowing higher debt-to-income ratios. They didn’t start out in 1995 with the idea they would eventually be making loans for $300,000 to people who never before owned a house, had no down payment, could provide no proof of income and on an asset valuation that was 25% higher than the most recent sale. That loan would never have been approved by any bank in 1995. Or 1996. Or 2001.
But the banks and mortgage companies wanted to grow. They had a well known Success Formula. They could advertise a good rate, implement the loan application process, then sell off the loan in the secondary market with a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac guarantee. As real estate values took off, they simply needed more leniency on some of these items so they could do more loans faster and cheaper – extend their business (the back half of Defend & Extend Management). They wanted to Defend & Extend what they knew how to do. So Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae went along. And they got the big financial houses involved as well as they packaged up what were becoming increasingly risky loans.
And that’s what happens in D&E management. In order to keep growing, it is tempting to push just a little harder by trying to extend the old Success Formula. Cut a cost corner here. Take a little more risk there. Just do a little bit more of what was previously done. Everyone can see that these actions are taking them downstream. But, so far so good! Nobody has drowned yet. We might be able to see the waterfall ahead, and hear the water crashing down below a little clearer, but so far we haven’t seen any problems. So let’s try to do just a little bit more.
Of course, inevitably, D&E managers go over the waterfall – and take their customers, investors, employees, suppliers and this time the U.S. citizenry along with them. They reach just a little farther than they should have, and then it’s a free-for-all as the business gets sucked into the Whirlpool from which there will be no return.
We saw this before, when the Savings & Loan industry melted down and went away because of the ever increasing risk its leaders took. Equity holders were wiped out, and many lenders were significantly damaged despite the unprecedented government bailout at the time. In the end, we suffered a recession and a big loss of faith in real estate as the Keating 5 were tried and the S&L industry collapsed. All by trying to maintain the Lock-in, then Extend the business just a little more into some new area. And by getting the regulators to go along, the entire country and its economy end up at risk.
D&E managers don’t like risk, and intend to take risk. But because there isn’t any White Space to develop a new Success Formula they keep extending the old one. They claim they aren’t taking risk, but in fact they are. Each risk may be small, but as we’ve seen they quickly add up. These leaders start turning a blind eye to the risk as they remain Locked-in and see no other way to grow. They have to grow, and they have to remain Locked-in, so they take risks that to outsiders might look crazy. (Think about how Enron started guaranteeing its own derivatives so it could keep growing.) But Lock-in allows them to pretend the risk isn’t as great as it is. These extensions keep the Success Formula in place, and make it appear to be producing better results. But these extensions are moving closer and closer to the waterfall, and the inevitable fall into the Whirlpool. Eventually, we all must have White Space to evolve a new Success Formula, or the trip over the waterfall is inevitable.
by Adam Hartung | Aug 26, 2008 | Defend & Extend, Ethics, General, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lock-in
Sometimes management behavior can cause outsiders to think the industry and company leaders fear growth. Take for example a new book about innovation in the movie business Inventing the Movies by Scott Kirsner (see at Amazon here or read a review in Forbes here.) As the author points out, after Edison invented the first Kinetiscope movies – which were small viewer-based single person devices – he saw no reason to move forward with a projection system. Why advance the innovation when multiple audience members appeared to risk the revenue? To Edison, he could assure each and every viewing created a payment with his single-viewer technology, but the audience viewership meant he would lose control and possibly see revenue cannibalized. Fear of cannibalization caused him to avoid new innovations which would grow total demand, and considerably grow the revenues of his fledgling movie business.
But we all know this didn’t happen. Projection systems only caused more people to want to go to the movies. Then when talking movies came about again the industry feared that investing in sound equipment would be a cost not recovered and they delayed and delayed. But talking films again increased the audience. And this cycle played out again with color movies. And lest we not forget the wars that were fought over video tapes of movies, which all industry leaders feared would kill the business. Yet, videos (and now CDs) have only increased the audience, and demand more.
All businesses develop a Success Formula early in their life cycle. That Success Formula ties the Identity of the business to its strategy and tactics. So a tactic as simple as having a single-viewer kinetiscope becomes almost impossible to change because it gets linked to the identity of the business (and often its founder – in this case Edison). Thus it takes a new entrant, often from outside the industry, to parlay the new technology into the market. This new entrant, not afraid of controlling the business through administration of an old Success Formula, is able to bring forward the new technology/solution and build the new audience/demand. And often we see the old industry leader far too late to change – stumbling, fumbling and failing.
Businesses need not follow this course, however. If they are willing to invest in White Space they can test new solutions. They can figure out new Success Formulas. They can evolve, and they can grow. Doing so isn’t really hard, it just takes a willingness to accept the requirement for White Space to take advantage of market shifts. White Space allows you to migrate forward, rather than constantly fall back into Defending & Extending what you’ve always done.
As we all know, each innovation in the movies has grown the industry, not been its doom. And that’s true in all industries. Yet, the largest players are rarely the ones who lead these shifts. Look at how it took Apple to bring about the revolution in digital music, rather than Sony. Lock-in gets in their way. If we want to avoid being pummeled by market shifts that create great growth opportunities for the new competitor we have to be vigilant about implementing and maintaining White Space that can provide our beacon for growth.
Where’s your organization’s White Space?
by Adam Hartung | Aug 21, 2008 | Defend & Extend, General, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
What is success? We often think of it as accomplishing goals. If we set a goal, and achieve it, we succeeded. If however we repetitively don’t achieve goals that leads to failure. So, you would think that managers would do the things that would most likely insure reaching goals year after year, quarter after quarter and month after month. And because markets shift, that would mean doing things differently to deal with market shifts.
But if we look at Chicago-based United Airlines, as an example, we can see that is not how many leaders define success. Their definition of success is all about Defending & Extending an old Success Formula – even when the results of that Success Formula have sunk to dismal lows. Often leaders, and this does appear true at United Airlines, would rather fail, by missing goals over and over, than Disrupt and use White Space to change. As we know, United fell into bankruptcy (not the first time) earlier this decade blaming the events of 9/11/01. But everyone who’s followed United knows the company has never flourished, and has a long litany of missing its goals for revenues, revenue per passenger mile, and especially all measures of profit.
No business can succeed without the support of its customers and employees. Investors will not achieve a satisfactory rate of return when customers and/or employees are unhappy. Yet, let’s look at the actions United is taking to deal with its most recent hard times. It lengthened check-in lines by refusing to develop a streamlined method for gate access – preferring to maintain its status quo while security requirements grew substantially. It started charging to check a bag, even though carry-on bags are the biggest problem for security checks and boardig. It cut food on all domestic coach flights. And now it has cut food for most international flights in coach class (read article here.) With each step, United Airlines might as well get a bullhorn and shout through the terminal "we think you customers are irrelevant to us as an airline. We wish you would shut up and do what we tell you to do and quit complaining. We’d be a great company if it wasn’t for you stupid customers."
United Airlines’ unions have made round after round of concessions the last 25 years. All classes of employee, from pilot to gate agent to flight attendant to ground crew to mechanic have taken pay cuts. They have deferred compensation into pension plans, only to see the deferral wiped out by company losses. They have seen benefits slashed. And they have seen work rules tightened in order to pursue tighter enformcement of behavior intended to cut hours worked, overtime and even base pay. Meanwhile, the executives (and there’s been a lot of executives through the United revolving door) have paid themselves quite richly on both base pay and bonuses – and departing execs have received very rich golden parachutes. With each management decision they got out the old bullhorn and announced "hey, you employees should just shut up and be glad you have a job. We run this place, for better or worse, and you don’t have a say in what we do. You’re the reason we’re not a more successful company, you crummy employees, and its because of you that we as a management team look so incompetent."
Now, the employees have taken to wearing plastic bracelets that say "Glenn’s Gotta Go" referring to a dismissal of the CEO (read article here.) And management is taking the tack that these employees are out of line with this behavior. Management says employees should "suck it up" and keep their grievances quiet. Even though management has not done the employees any favors for over 20 years, they are upset these overworked, much abused and underpaid employees would offer up this quiet form of civil disobedience. But employees are finding themselves more aligned with customers than management these days – and their wrist bands are a show of unity with the customers that management is the group out of step with shifting market requirements.
At the end of the day, management is responsible for results. Current results. United could have hedged fuel costs, like Southwest, and never gotten into its current jam. Management could have acted at any time the last 30 years to work with Unions to make a better airline, rather than maintain long-term contentious negotiations keeping them from the benefits of employee ideas. United Management could have launched Ted with the permission to develop a new Success Formula rather than hamstringing the idea to nothing more than a name change on certain flights. Management could have done many things differently.
But over the years, despite different people in the managerial seats, United Airline leadership has chosen to remain steadfast to its Lock-ins. It has consistently chosen to Defend & Extend a lousy business model that’s never consistently made money. For United Airlines management, success has not been about meeting goals – it has been about extending the status quo. No matter who suffers amongst customers, employees or vendors. Despite what management is saying, these leaders would rather fail than change. Success isn’t nearly as important for them as we would assume.
