by Adam Hartung | Nov 28, 2011 | Books, Defend & Extend, Disruptions, In the Rapids, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
Not far from each other, in the area around Seattle, are two striking contrasts in leadership. They provide significant insight to what creates success today.
Steve Ballmer leads Microsoft, America's largest software company. Unfortunately, the value of Microsoft has gone nowhere for 10 years. Steve Ballmer has steadfastly defended the Windows and Office products, telling anyone who will listen that he is confident Windows will be part of computing's future landscape. Looking backward, he reminds people that Windows has had a 20 year run, and because of that past he is certain it will continue to dominate.
Unfortunately, far too many investors see things differently. They recognize that nearly all areas of Microsoft are struggling to maintain sales. It is quite clear that the shift to mobile devices and cloud architectures are reducing the need, and desire, for PCs in homes, offices and data centers. Microsoft appears years late recognizing the market shift, and too often CEO Ballmer seems in denial it is happening – or at least that it is happening so quickly. His fixation on past success appears to blind him to how people will use technology in 2014, and investors are seriously concerned that Microsoft could topple as quickly DEC., Sun, Palm and RIM.
Comparatively, across town, Mr. Bezos leads the largest on-line retailer Amazon. That company's value has skyrocketed to a near 90 times earnings! Over the last decade, investors have captured an astounding 10x capital gain! Contrary to Mr. Ballmer, Mr. Bezos talks rarely about the past, and almost almost exclusively about the future. He regularly discusses how markets are shifting, and how Amazon is going to change the way people do things.
Mr. Bezos' fixation on the future has created incredible growth for Amazon. In its "core" book business, when publishers did not move quickly toward trends for digitization Amazon created and launched Kindle, forever altering publishing. When large retailers did not address the trend toward on-line shopping Amazon expanded its retail presence far beyond books, including more products and a small armyt of supplier/partners. When large PC manufacturers did not capitalize on the trend toward mobility with tablets for daily use Amazon launched Kindle Fire, which is projected to sell as many as 12 million units next year (AllThingsD.com).
Where Mr. Ballmer remains fixated on the past, constantly reinvesting in defending and extending what worked 20 years ago for Microsoft, Mr. Bezos is investing heavily in the future. Where Mr. Ballmer increasingly looks like a CEO in denial about market shift, Mr. Bezos has embraced the shifts and is pushing them forward.
Clearly, the latter is much better at producing revenue growth and higher valuation than the former.
As we look around, a number of companies need to heed the insight of this Seattle comparison:
- At AOL it is unclear that Mr. Armstrong has a clear view of how AOL will change markets to become a content powerhouse. AOL's various investments are incoherent, and managers struggle to see a strong future for AOL. On the other hand, Ms. Huffington does have a clear sense of the future, and the insight for an entirely different business model at AOL. The Board would be well advised to consider handing the reigns to Ms. Huffington, and pushing AOL much more rapidly toward a different, and more competitive future.
- Dell's chronic inability to identify new products and markets has left it, at best, uninteresting. It's supply chain focused strategy has been copied, leaving the company with practically no cost/price advantage. Mr. Dell remains fixated on what worked for his initial launch 30 years ago, and offers no exciting description of how Dell will remain viable as PC sales diminish. Unless new leadership takes the helm at Dell, the company's future 5 years hence looks bleak.
- HP's new CEO Meg Whitman is less than reassuring as she projects a terrible 2012 for HP, and a commitment to remaining in PCs – but with some amorphous pledge toward more internal innovation. Lacking a clear sense of what Ms. Whitman thinks the world will look like in 2017, and how HP will be impactful, it's hard for investors, managers or customers to become excited about the company. HP needs rapid acceleration toward shifting customer needs, not a relaxed, lethargic year of internal analysis while competitors continue moving demand further away from HP offerings.
- Groupon has had an explosive start. But the company is attacked on all fronts by the media. There is consistent questioning of how leadership will maintain growth as reports emerge about founders cashing out their shares, highly uneconomic deals offered by customers, lack of operating scale leverage, and increasing competition from more established management teams like Google and Amazon. After having its IPO challenged by the press, the stock has performed poorly and now sells for less than the offering price. Groupon desperately needs leadership that can explain what the markets of 2015 will look like, and how Groupon will remain successful.
What investors, customers, suppliers and employees want from leadership is clarity around what leaders see as the future markets and competition. They want to know how the company is going to be successful in 2 or 5 years. In today's rapidly shifting, global markets it is not enough to talk about historical results, and to exhibit confidence that what brought the company to this point will propel it forward successfully. And everyone recognizes that managing quarter to quarter will not create long term success.
Leaders must demonstrate a keen eye for market shifts, and invest in opportunities to participate in game changers. Leaders must recognize trends, be clear about how those trends are shaping future markets and competitors, and align investments with those trends. Leadership is not about what the company did before, but is entirely about what their organization is going to do next.
Update 30 Nov, 2011
In the latest defend & extend action at Microsoft Ballmer has decided to port Office onto the iPad (TheDaily.com). Short term likely to increase revenue. But clearly at the expense of long-term competitiveness in tablet platforms. And, it misses the fact that people are already switching to cloud-based apps which obviate the need for Office. This will extend the dying period for Office, but does not come close to being an innovative solution which will propel revenues over the next decade.
by Adam Hartung | Nov 11, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lifecycle, Web/Tech
In the back half of the 1990s Apple was clearly on the route to bankruptcy. Sun Micrososystems seriously investigated buying Apple. After a review, leadership opted not to make the acquisition. Sun’s non-officer management, bouyed on rumors of the acquisition, was heartbroken upon hearing Sun would not proceed. When Chairman Scott McNeely was asked at a management retreat why the executive team passed on Apple, he responded with “Do you think you can fix that?”
Sun leadership clearly had answered “no.” Good for a lot of us that Steve Jobs said “yes.”
Sun has largely disappeared, losing 95% of its market cap after 2000 and being acquired by Oracle. Why did Mr. Jobs succeed where the leadership of Sun, which couldn’t save itself much less Apple, feared it would fail?
For insight, look no further than the recent failure of Filene’s Basement (“Filene’s Saga Ends” Boston.com) and its acquirer Sym’s (“Retailers’s Sym’s and Filene’s Go Out of Business” Chicago Tribune.) Most of the time, when a troubled business is acquirerd not only is the buyer unable to fix the poor performer, but investments incurred by the buyer jeapardizes its business to the point of failure as well. Given the track record of corporations at fixing bad businesses, Mr. McNeely was on statistically sound footing to reject buying Apple.
Why is the track record of corporate management so bad at fixing problem businesses? Largely because most of their time is spent tyring to extend the past, rather than create a business which can thrive in the future.
The leadership of Sun didn’t see a future filled with mobile devices for music, movies or telephony. They were fixated on the Unix-based computers Sun built and sold. It was unclear how Apple would help them sell more servers, so it was a management diversion – a “poor strategic fit” – for Sun to acquire a technology intensive, talent rich organization. They passed, stayed focused on Unix servers and high-end workstations, and failed as that market shifted to PC products.
Much is the same for Filene’s Basement. A great brand, Sym’s bought Filene’s in an effort to continue pushing the discount model both Filene’s and Sym’s had historically pursued. Unfortunately, the market for discount department store merchandise was rapidly shifting to higher end middle-market players like Kohl’s, and for deeply discounted goods the internet was making deal shopping a lot easier for everyone. Because management was fixated on the old business, they missed the opportunity to make Filene’s and Sym’s a leader in new retail markets – like Amazon has done.
Remember in 2006 when Western Auto’s leader (and former hedge fund manager) Ed Lampert bought up the bonds of KMart, then used that position to acquire Sears? The market went gaga over the acquisition, heralding Mr. Lampert as a genius. Jim Cramer urged on his television program Mad Money that everyone buy Sears. Now the merged KMart/Sears company has lost much of its value, and 24×7 Wall Street claimed it was the #1 worst performing retail chain (“America’s Eight Worst-Performing Retail Chains“.)
Chart courtesy Yahoo.com 11/11/11 (note vertical scale is logarithmic)
Both KMart and Sears were deeply troubled when Mr. Lampert acquired them. But he largely followed a program of cost cutting, hoping people would return to the stores once he lowered prices. What he missed was a retail market which had shifted to Wal-Mart for the low-end products, and had fragmented into multiple competitors in the mid-priced market leaving Sears Holdings with no compelling value proposition.
Mr. Lampert has turned over management, fired scores of employees, closed stores and largely led both brands to retail irrelevancy. By trying to do more of the past, only better, faster and cheaper he ran into the buzz saw of competitors already positioned in the shifted market and created nothing new for shoppers, or investors.
And that’s why investors need to worry about Home Depot. The company was a shopper and investor darling as it maintained double digit growth through the 1980s and 1990s. But as competition matched, or beat, Home Depot’s prices – and often the capability of in-store help – growth slowed.
The Board replaced the founding leader with a senior General Electric leader named Robert Nardelli. He rapidly moved to operate the historical Home Depot success formula cheaper, better and faster by cutting costs — from employees to store operations and inventory. And customers moved even more quickly to the competition.
As the recessions worsened job growth remained scarce and eventually home values plummeted causing Home Depot’s growth to disappear. The company may be good at what it used to do, but that is simply a more competitive market that is a lot less interesting to shoppers today. Because Home Depot has not shifted into new markets, it is in a difficult situation (and considered the 5th worst performing retailer.) Who cares if you are a competitive home improvement store when your house is only worth 75% of the outstanding mortgage and you can’t refinance?
Chart source Yahoo Finance 11/11/11
And it is worth taking some time to look at Wal-Mart. The chain is famous for its rural and suburban stores selling at low prices, both as Wal-Mart and Sam’s Club. But looking forward, we see the company has failed at everything else it has tried. It’s offshore businesses have never met expectations and the company has left most markets. It’s efforts at more targeted merchandise, upscale stores and smaller stores have all been abandoned. And the company remains a serious lagger in understanding on-line sales as it has continued pouring money into defending its historical business, providing almost no return to investors for a decade.
The market is shifting, competitors have attacked its old “core,” but Wal-Mart remains stuck trying to do more, better, faster, cheaper with no clear sign it will make any difference as people change buying patterns. How can any brick-and-mortar retailer compete on cost with a web page?
Chart Source Yahoo Finance 11/11/11
All markets shift. All of them. Poor performance is most often an indication that the company has not shifted with the market. Competition in lower growth markets leads to weak revenue performance, and declining profits. Trying to “fix” the business by doing more of the same is almost always a money-losing proposition that hastens failure.
It is possble to fix a weak business. Moving with shifting markets into mobile has been very valuable for Apple investors. Two decades ago IBM shifted from hardware sales to a services focus, and the company not only escaped bankruptcy but now is worth more than Microsoft.
“Fixing” requires focusing on the future, and figuring out how to compete in the shifting market. Rather than applying cost-cutting and operational improvement, it is important to determine what future markets value, and deliver that. Zappos figured out that it could take a big lead in footwear and apparel if it offered people on-line convenience, and guaranteed taking back any products customers didn’t want (“What Other Businesses Can Learn from Zappos” CMSWire.com.) It’s sales exploded. Toms Shoes tapped into the market desire for helping others by donating a pair of shoes every time someone bought a pair, and sales are growing in double digits (CNBC video on Tom’s Shoes).
History has taught us to be pessimistic about fixing a troubled business. But that is largely because most management is fixated on trying to defend & extend the past. But turnarounds can be a lot more common if leaders instead focus on the future and meet emerging needs. It simply takes a different approach.
In the meantime, in retail it’s a lot smarter to invest in Amazon and retailers meeting emerging needs than those fixated on cost cutting and operational improvement. Be wary of Sears, Home Depot and Wal-Mart as long as management remains locked-in to its past.
by Adam Hartung | Oct 27, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Web/Tech
There is a big cry for innovation these days. Unfortunately, despite spending a lot of money on it, most innovation simply isn't. And that's why companies don't grow.
The giant consulting firm Booz & Co. just completed its most recent survey on innovation. Like most analysts, they tried using R&D spending as yardstick for measuring innovation. Unfortunately, as a lot of us already knew, there is no correlation:
"There is no statistically significant relationship between financial performance and innovation spending, in terms of either total R&D dollars or R&D as a percentage of revenues. Many companies — notably, Apple — consistently underspend their peers on R&D investments while outperforming them on a broad range of measures of corporate success, such as revenue growth, profit growth, margins, and total shareholder return. Meanwhile, entire industries, such as pharmaceuticals, continue to devote relatively large shares of their resources to innovation, yet end up with much less to show for it than they — and their shareholders — might hope for."
(Uh-hum, did you hear about this Abbott? Pfizer? Readers that missed it might want to glance at last week's blog about Abbott, and why it is a sell after announcing plans to split the company.)
Far too often, companies spend most of their R&D dollars on making their products cheaper, operate better, faster or do more. Clayton Christensen pointed this out some 15 years ago in his groundbreaking book "The Innovator's Dilemma" (HBS Press, 1997). Most R&D, in most industries, and for most companies, is spent trying to sustain an existing technology – not identify or develop a disruptive technology that would have far higher rates of return.
While this is easy to conceptualize, it is much harder to understand. Until we look at a storied company like Kodak – which has received a lot of news this last month.
Kodak invented amateur photography, and was rewarded with decades of profitable revenue growth as its string of cheap cameras, film products and photographic papers changed the way people thought about photographs. Kodak was the world leader in photographic film and paper sales, at great margins, and its value grew exponentially!
Of course, we all know what happened. Amateur photography went digital. No more film, and no more film developing. Even camera sales have disappeared as most folks simply use mobile phones.
But what most people don't know is that Kodak invented digital photography! Really! They were the first to create the technology, and the first to apply it. But they didn't really market it, largely because of fears they would cannibalize their film sales. In an effort to defend & extend their old business, Kodak licensed digital photography patents to camera manufacturers, abandoned R&D in the product line and maintained its focus on its core business. Kodak kept making amateur film better, faster and cheaper – until nobody cared any more.
Of course, Kodak wasn't the first to fall into this trap. Xerox invented desktop publishing but let that market go to Apple, Wintel suppliers and HP printers as it worked diligently trying to defend & extend its copier business. With no click meter on the desktop publishing equipment, Xerox wasn't sure how to make money with it. So they licensed it away.
DEC pretty much created and owned the CAD/CAM business before losing it to AutoCad. Sears created at home shopping, a market now dominated by Amazon. What's your favorite story?
It's a pattern we see a lot. And nowhere worse than at Microsoft.
Do you remember that Microsoft had the Zune player at least as early as the iPod, but didn't bother to develop the technology, or market, letting Apple take the lead in digital music and video devices? Did you remember that the Windows CE smartphone (built by HTC) beat the iPhone to market by years? But Microsoft didn't really develop an app base, didn't really invest in the smartphone technology or market – and let first RIM and later Apple run away with that market as well.
Now, several years too late Microsoft hopes its Nokia partnership will help it capture a piece of that market – despite its still rather apparent lack of an app base or breakthrough advantage.
Microsoft is a textbook example of over-investing in existing technology, in an effort to defend & extend an existing product line, to the point of "over-serving" customer needs. What new extensions do you want from your PC or office software?
Do you remember Clippy? That was the little paper clip that came up in Windows applications to help you do your job better. It annoyed everyone, and was disabled by everyone. A product development that nobody wanted, yet was created and marketed anyway. It didn't sell any additional software products – but it did cost money. That's defend & extend spending.
How much a company spends on innovation doesn't matter, because what's important is what the company spends on real breakthroughs rather than sustaining ideas. Microsoft spends a lot on Windows and Office – it doesn't spend enough on breakthrough innovation for mobile products or games.
And it doesn't spend nearly enough on marketing non-PC innovations. We are already well into the back end of the PC lifecycle. Today more bandwidth is consumed from mobile devices than PC laptops and desktops. Purchase rates of mobile devices are growing at double digits, while companies (and individuals) are curtailing PC purchases. But Microsoft missed the boat because it chose to defend & extend PCs years ago, rather than really try to develop the technology and markets for CE and Zune.
Just look at where Microsoft spends money today. It's hottest innovation is Kinect. But that investment is dwarfed by spending on Skype – intended to extend PC life – and ads promoting the use of PC technologies for families this holiday season.
Unfortunately, there are almost no examples of companies that miss the transition to a new technology thriving. And that's why it is really important to revisit the Kodak chart, and then look at a Microsoft chart.
(Chart 10/27/11)
Do you think Microsoft, after this long period of no value increase, is more likely to go up in value, or more likely to follow Kodak? Unfortunately, there are few companies that make the transition. But there have been thousands that have not. Companies that had very high market share, once made a lot of money, but fell into failure because they invested in better, faster, cheaper rather than innovation.
If you are still holding Kodak, why? If you're still holding Microsoft, Abbott, Kraft, Sara Lee, Sears or Wal-Mart — why?
by Adam Hartung | Oct 12, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, eBooks, In the Rapids, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Lifecycle, Lock-in, Transparency, Web/Tech
Wal-Mart has had 9 consecutive quarters of declining same-store sales (Reuters.) Now that’s a serious growth stall, which should worry all investors. Unfortunately, the odds are almost non-existent that the company will reverse its situation, and like Montgomery Wards, KMart and Sears is already well on the way to retail oblivion. Faster than most people think.
After 4 decades of defending and extending its success formula, Wal-Mart is in a gladiator war against a slew of competitors. Not just Target, that is almost as low price and has better merchandise. Wal-Mart’s monolithic strategy has been an easy to identify bulls-eye, taking a lot of shots. Dollar General and Family Dollar have gone after the really low-priced shopper for general merchandise. Aldi beats Wal-Mart hands-down in groceries. Category killers like PetSmart and Best Buy offer wider merchandise selection and comparable (or lower) prices. And companies like Kohl’s and J.C. Penney offer more fashionable goods at just slightly higher prices. On all fronts, traditional retailers are chiseling away at Wal-Mart’s #1 position – and at its margins!
Yet, the company has eschewed all opportunities to shift with the market. It’s primary growth projects are designed to do more of the same, such as opening smaller stores with the same strategy in the northeast (Boston.com). Or trying to lure customers into existing stores by showing low-price deals in nearby stores on Facebook (Chicago Tribune) – sort of a Facebook as local newspaper approach to advertising. None of these extensions of the old strategy makes Wal-Mart more competitive – as shown by the last 9 quarters.
On top of this, the retail market is shifting pretty dramatically. The big trend isn’t the growth of discount retailing, which Wal-Mart rode to its great success. Now the trend is toward on-line shopping. MediaPost.com reports results from a Kanter Retail survey of shoppers the accelerating trend:
- In 2010, preparing for the holiday shopping season, 60% of shoppers planned going to Wal-Mart, 45% to Target, 40% on-line
- Today, 52% plan to go to Wal-Mart, 40% to Target and 45% on-line.
This trend has been emerging for over a decade. The “retail revolution” was reported on at the Harvard Business School website, where the case was made that traditional brick-and-mortar retail is considerably overbuilt. And that problem is worsening as the trend on-line keeps shrinking the traditional market. Several retailers are expected to fail. Entire categories of stores. As an executive from retailer REI told me recently, that chain increasingly struggles with customers using its outlets to look at merchandise, fit themselves with ideal sizes and equipment, then buying on-line where pricing is lower, options more plentiful and returns easier!
While Wal-Mart is huge, and won’t die overnight, as sure as the dinosaurs failed when the earth’s weather shifted, Wal-Mart cannot grow or increase investor returns in an intensely competitive and shifting retail environment.
The winners will be on-line retailers, who like David versus Goliath use techology to change the competition. And the clear winner at this, so far, is the one who’s identified trends and invested heavily to bring customers what they want while changing the battlefield. Increasingly it is obvious that Amazon has the leadership and organizational structure to follow trends creating growth:
- Amazon moved fairly quickly from a retailer of out-of-inventory books into best-sellers, rapidly dominating book sales bankrupting thousands of independents and retailers like B.Dalton and Borders.
- Amazon expanded into general merchandise, offering thousands of products to expand its revenues to site visitors.
- Amazon developed an on-line storefront easily usable by any retailer, allowing Amazon to expand its offerings by millions of line items without increasing inventory (and allowing many small retailers to move onto the on-line trend.)
- Amazon created an easy-to-use application for authors so they could self-publish books for print-on-demand and sell via Amazon when no other retailer would take their product.
- Amazon recognized the mobile movement early and developed a mobile interface rather than relying on its web interface for on-line customers, improving usability and expanding sales.
- Amazon built on the mobility trend when its suppliers, publishers, didn’t respond by creating Kindle – which has revolutionized book sales.
- Amazon recently launched an inexpensive, easy to use tablet (Kindle Fire) allowing customers to purchase products from Amazon while mobile. MediaPost.com called it the “Wal-Mart Slayer“
Each of these actions were directly related to identifying trends and offering new solutions. Because it did not try to remain tightly focused on its original success formula, Amazon has grown terrifically, even in the recent slow/no growth economy. Just look at sales of Kindle books:
Source: BusinessInsider.com
Unlike Wal-Mart customers, Amazon’s keep growing at double digit rates. In Q3 unique visitors rose 19% versus 2010, and September had a 26% increase. Kindle Fire sales were 100,000 first day, and 250,000 first 5 days, compared to 80,000 per day unit sales for iPad2. Kindle Fire sales are expected to reach 15million over the next 24 months, expanding the Amazon reach and easily accessible customers.
While GroupOn is the big leader in daily coupon deals, and Living Social is #2, Amazon is #3 and growing at triple digit rates as it explores this new marketplace with its embedded user base. Despite only a few month’s experience, Amazon is bigger than Google Offers, and is growing at least 20% faster.
After 1980 investors used to say that General Motors might not be run well, but it would never go broke. It was considered a safe investment. In hindsight we know management burned through company resources trying to unsuccessfully defend its old business model. Wal-Mart is an identical story, only it won’t have 3 decades of slow decline. The gladiators are whacking away at it every month, while the real winner is simply changing competition in a way that is rapidly making Wal-Mart obsolete.
Given that gladiators, at best, end up bloody – and most often dead – investing in one is not a good approach to wealth creation. However, investing in those who find ways to compete indirectly, and change the battlefield (like Apple,) make enormous returns for investors. Amazon today is a really good opportunity.
by Adam Hartung | Sep 26, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, Disruptions, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Transparency, Web/Tech
The media has enjoyed a field day last week amidst the ouster of Leo Apotheker as Hewlett Packard’s CEO and appointments of former Oracle executive Ray Lane as Executive Chairman and former eBay CEO Meg Whitman as CEO. There have been plenty of jabs at the Board, which apparently hired Mr. Apotheker without everyone even meeting him (New York Times), and plenty of complaining about HP’s deteriorating performance and stock price. But the big question is, will Meg Whitman be able to turn around HP?
Ms. Whitman is the 7th HP CEO in a mere 12 years. Of those CEOs, the only one pointed to with any attraction was Mark Hurd. He did not take any strategic actions, but merely slashed costs – which immediately improved the profit line and drove up the short-term stock price. Actions taken at the expense of R&D, new product development and creating new markets, leaving HP short on a future strategy when he was summarily let go by the Baord that hired Apotheker.
And that indicates the strategy problem at HP – which is pretty much a lack of strategy.
HP was once a highly innovative company. We all can thank HP for a world of color. Before HP brought us the low-priced ink-jet printer all office printing was black. HP unleashed the color in desktop publishing, and was critical to the growth of office and home printing, as well as faxing with their all-in-one, integrated devices.
But then someone – largely Ms. Fiorina – had the idea to expand on the HP presence in desktop publishing by expanding into PC manufacturing and sales, even though there was no HP innovation in that market. Mr. Hurd expanded that direction by buying a service organization to support field-based PCs.
This approach of expanding on HPs “core” printer business, almost all by acquisition, cost HP a lot of money. Further, supply chain and retail program investments to sell largely undifferentiated products and services in a hotly contested PC market sucked all the money out of new products development. Every year HP was spending more to grow sales of products becoming increasingly generic, while falling farther behind in any sort of new market creation.
Into that innovation void jumped Apple, Google and Amazon. They pushed new mobile solutions to market in smartphones and tablets. And now PCs, and the printers they used, are seeing declining growth. All future projections show an increase in mobile devices, and a sales cliff emerging for PCs and their supporting devices. Simultaneously as mobile devices have become more popular the trend away from printing has grown, with users in business and consumer markets finding digital devices less costly, more user friendly and more adaptable than printed material (just compare Kindle sales and printed book sales – or the volume of tablet newspaper and magazine subscriptions to printed subscriptions.) HP invested heavily in PC products, and now that market is dying.
Now HP is in big trouble. There are plenty of skeptics that think Ms. Whitman is not right for the job. What should HP under Ms. Whitman do next? Keep doubling down on investments in existing markets? That direction looks pretty dangerous. IBM jumped out years ago, selling its laptop line to Lenovo for a tidy profit before sales slackened. With all the growth in smartphones and tablets, it’s hard to imagine that strategy would work. Even Mr. Apotheker took action to deal with the market shift by redirecting HP away from PCs with his announced intention to spin off that business while buying an ERP (enterprise ressource planning) software company to take HP into a new direction. But that backfired on him, and investors.
Mr. Apotheker and Carol Bartz, recently fired CEO of Yahoo, made similar mistakes. They relied heavily on their personal past when taking leadership of a struggling enterprise. They looked to their personal success formulas – what had worked for them in the past – when setting their plans for their new companies. Unfortunately, what worked in the past rarely works in the future, because markets shift. And both of these companies suffered dramatically as the new CEO efforts took them further from market trends.
The job Ms. Whitman is entering at HP is wildly different from her job at eBay. eBay was a small company taking advantage of the internet explosion. It was an early leader in capitalizing on web networking and the capability of low-cost on-line transactions. At eBay Ms. Whitman needed to keep the company focused on investing in new solutions that transformed PC and internet connectivity into value for users. As long as the number of users on the internet, and the time they spent on the web, grew eBay could capitalize on that trend for its own growth. eBay was in the right place at the right time, and Ms. Whitman helped guide the company’s product development so that it helped users enjoy their on-line experience. The trends supported eBay’s early direction, and growth was built opon making on-line selling better, faster and easier.
The situation could not be more different at HP. It’s products are almost all out of the trend. If Ms. Whitman does what she did at eBay, trying to promote more, better and faster PCs, printers and traditional IT services things will not go well. That was Mr. Hurd’s strategy. “Been there, done that” as people like to say. That strategy ran its course, and more cost-cutting will not save HP.
In 2020 if we are to discuss HP the way we now discuss Apple’s dramatic turnaround from the brink of failure, Ms. Whitman will have to behave very differently than her past – and from what her predecessor and Ms. Bartz did. She has to refocus HP on future markets. She has to identify triggers for market change – like Steve Jobs did when he recognized that the growing trend to mobility would explode once WiFi services reached 50% of users – and push HP toward developing solutions which take advantage of those market shifts.
HP has under-invested in new market development for years. It’s acquisition of Palm was supposed to somehow rectify that problem, only Palm was a failing company with a failing platform when HP bought it. And the HP tablet launch with its own proprietary solution was far too late (years too late) in a market that requires thousands of developers and a hundred thousand apps if it is to succeed. The investment in Palm and WebOS was too late, and based on trying to be a “me too” in a market where competitors are rapidly advancing new solutions.
There are a world of market opportunities out there that HP can develop. To reach them Ms. Whitman must take some quick actions:
- Develop future scenarios that define the direction of HP. Not necessarily a “vision” of HP in 2020, but certainly an identification of the big trends that will guide HP’s future direction for product and market development. Globalization (like IBM’s “smarter planet”) or mobility are starts – but HP will have to go beyond the obvious to identify opportunities requiring the resources of a company with HP’s revenue and resources. HP desperately needs a pathway to future markets. It needs to be developing for the emerging trends.
- A recognition of how HP will compete. What is the market gap that HP will fulfill – like Apple did in mobility? And how will it fulfill it? Google and Facebook are emerging giants in software, offering a host of new capabilities every day to better network users and make them more productive. HP must find a way to compete that is not toe-to-toe with existing leaders like Apple that have more market knowledge and extensive resoureces.
- HP needs to dramatically up the ante in new product development. Innovation has been sorely lacking, and the hierarchical structure at HP needs to be changed. White Space projects designed to identify opportunities in market trends need to be created that have permission to rapidly develop new solutions and take them to market – regardless of HP historical strengths. Resources need to shift – rapidly – from supporting the aging, and growth challenged, historical product lines to new opportunities that show greater growth promise.
Apple and IBM were once given almost no chance of survival. But new leadership recognized that there were growth markets, and those leaders altered the resource allocation toward things that could grow. Investments in the old strategy were dropped as money was pushed to new solutions that built on market trends and headed toward future scenarios. HP is not doomed to failure, but Ms. Whitman has to start acting quickly to redirect resources or it could easily be the next Sun Microsystems, Digital Equipment, Wang, Lanier or Cray
by Adam Hartung | Sep 15, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Science, Web/Tech, Weblogs
Carol Bartz was unceremoniously fired as CEO by Yahoo’s Board last week. Fearing their decision might leak, the Chairman called Ms. Bartz and fired her over the phone. Expeditious, but not too tactful. Ms. Bartz then informed the company employees of this action via an email from her smartphone – and the next day called the Board of Directors a bunch of doofusses in a media interview. Salacious fodder for the news media, but a distraction from fixing the real problems affecting Yahoo!
Unfortunately, the Yahoo Board seems to have no idea what to do now. A small executive committee is running the company – which assures no bold actions. And a pair of investment banks have been hired to provide advice – which can only lead to recommendations for selling all, or pieces, of the company. Most people seem to think Yahoo’s value is worth more sold off in chunks than it is as an operating company. Wow – what went so wrong? Can Yahoo not be “fixed”?
There was a time, a decade or so back, when Yahoo was the #1 home page for browsers. Yahoo! was the #1 internet location for reading news, and for doing internet searches. And, it pioneered the model of selling internet ads to support the content aggregation and search functions. Yahoo was early in the market, and was a tremendous success.
Like most companies, Yahoo kept doing more of the same as its market shifted. Alta Vista, Microsoft and others made runs at Yahoo’s business, but it was Google primarily that changed the game on Yahoo! Google invested heavily in technology to create superior searches, offered a superior user experience for visitors, gave unique content (Google Maps as an example) and created a tremendously superior engine for advertisers to place their ads on searches – or web pages.
Google was run by technologists who used technology to dramatically improve what Yahoo started – seeing a future which would take advantage of an explosion in users and advertisers as well as web pages and internet use. Yahoo had been run by advertising folks who missed the technology upgrades. Yahoo’s leadership was locked-in to what it new (advertising) and they were slow with new solutions and products, falling further behind Google every year.
In an effort to turn the tide, Yahoo hired what they thought was a technologist in Carol Bartz to run the company. She had previously led AutoCad, which famously ran companies like IBM, Intergraph, DEC (Digital Equipment) and General Electric owned CALMA out of the CAD/CAM (computer aided design and manufacturing) business. She had been the CEO of a big technology winner – so she looked to many like the salvation for Yahoo!
But Ms. Bartz really wasn’t familiar with how to turn an ad agency into a tech company – nor was she particularly skilled at new product development. Her skills were mostly in operations, and developing next generation software. AutoCad was one of the first PC-based CAD products, and over 2 decades AutoCad leveraged the increasing power of PCs to make its products better, faster and relatively cheaper. This constant improvement, and close attention to cost control, made it possible for AutoCad on a PC to come closer and closer to doing what the $250,000 workstations had done. Users switched to the cheaper AutoCad not because it suddenly changed the game, but because PC enhancements made the older, more costly technology obsolete.
Ms. Bartz was stuck on her success formula. Constantly trying to improve. At Yahoo she implemented cost controls, like at AutoCad. But she didn’t create anything significantly new. She didn’t pioneer any new platforms (software or hardware) nor any dramatically new advertising or search products. She tried to do deals, such as with Bing, to somehow partner into better competitiveness, but each year Yahoo fell further behind Google. In a real way, Ms. Bartz fell victim to Google just as DEC had fallen victim to AutoCad. Trying to Defend & Extend Yahoo was insufficient to compete with the game changing Google.
The Board was right to fire Ms. Bartz. She simply did what she knew how to do, and what she had done at AutoCad. But it was not what Yahoo needed – nor what Yahoo needs now. Cost cutting and improvements are not going to catch the ad markets now driven by Google (search and adwords) and Facebook (display ads.) Yahoo is now out of the rapidly growing market – social media – that is driving the next big advertising wave.
Breaking up Yahoo is the easy answer. If the Board can get enough money for the pieces, it fulfills its fiduciary responsibility. The stock has traded near $15/share for 3 years, and the Board can likely obtain the $18B market value for investors. But “another one bites the dust” as the song lyrics go – and Yahoo will follow DEC, Atari, Cray, Compaq, Silicon Graphics and Sun Microsystems into the technology history on Wikipedia. And those Yahoo employees will have to find jobs elsewhere (oh yeah, that pesky jobs problem leading to 9%+ U.S. unemployment comes up again.)
A better answer would be to turn around Yahoo! Yahoo isn’t in any worse condition than Apple was when Steve Jobs took over as CEO. It’s in no worse condition than IBM was when Louis Gerstner took over as its CEO. It can be done. If done, as those examples have shown, the return for shareholders could be far higher than breaking Yahoo apart.
So here’s what Yahoo needs to do now if it really wants to create shareholder value:
- Put in place a CEO that is future oriented. Yahoo doesn’t need a superb cost-cutter. It doesn’t need a hatchet wielder, like the old “Chainsaw Al Dunlap” that tore up Scott Paper. Yahoo needs a leader that can understand trends, develop future scenarios and direct resources into developing new products that people want and need. A CEO who knows that investing in innovation is critical.
- Quit trying to win the last war with Google. That one is lost, and Google isn’t going to give up its position. Specifically, the just announced Yahoo+AOL+Microsoft venture to sell ad remnants is NOT where Yahoo needs to spend its resources. Every one of these 3 companies has its own problems dealing with market shifts (AOL with content management as dial-up revenues die, Microsoft with PC market declines and mobile device growth.) None is good at competing against Google, and together its a bit like asking 3 losers in a 100 meter dash if they think by forming a relay team they could somehow suddenly become a “world class” group. This project is doomed to failure, and a diversion Yahoo cannot afford now.
- In that same vein, quit trying to figure out if AOL or Microsoft will buy Yahoo. Microsoft could probably afford it – but like I said – Microsoft has its hands full trying to deal with the shift from PCs to tablets and smartphones. Buying Yahoo would be a resource sink that could possibly kill Microsoft – and it’s assured Microsoft would end up shutting down the company piecemeal (as it does all acquisitions.) AOL has seen its value plummet because investors are unsure if it will turn the corner before it runs out of cash. While there are new signs of life since buying Huffington Post, ongoing struggles like firing the head of TechCrunch keep AOL fully occupied fighting to find its future. Any deal with either company should send investors quickly to the sell post, and probably escalate the Yahoo demise with the lowest possible value.
- Give business heads the permission to develop markets as they see fit. Ms. Bartz was far too controlling of the business units, and many good ideas were not implemented. Specifically, for example, Right Media should be given permission to really advance its technology base and go after customers unencumbered by the Yahoo brand and organization. Right Media has a chance of being really valuable – that’s why people would ostensibly buy it – so give the leaders the chance to make it successful. Maybe then the revolving door of execs at Right (and other Yahoo business units) would stop and something good would happen.
- Hold existing business units “feet to the fire” on results. Yahoo has notoriously not delivered on new ad platforms and other products – missing development targets and revenue goals. Innovation does not succeed if those in leadership are not compelled to achieve results. Being lax on performance has killed new product development – and those things that aren’t achieving results need to stop. Specifically, it’s probably time to stop the APT platform that is now years behind, and because it’s targeted against Google unlikely to ever succeed.
- Invest in new solutions. Take all that wonderful trend data that Yahoo has (maybe not as much as Google – but a lot more than most companies) and figure out what Yahoo needs to do next. Rip off a page from Apple, which flattened spending on the Mac in order to invest in the iPod. Learn from Amazon, which followed the trends in retail to new storefronts, expanded offerings, a mobile interface and Kindle launch. Yahoo needs to quit trying to gladiator fight with Google – where it can’t win – and identify new markets and solutions where it can. Yahoo must quit being a hostage to its history, and go do the next big thing! Create some white space in the company to invest in new solutions on the trends!
Of course, this is harder than just giving up and selling the company. But the potential returns are much, much higher. Yahoo’s predicament is tough, but it’s been a management failure that got it here. If management changes course, and focuses on the future, Yahoo can once again become a market leading company. Sure would like to see that kind of leadership. It’s how America creates jobs.
by Adam Hartung | Aug 2, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
Bernie Ebbers (of WorldCom) and Jeff Skilling (of Enron) went to prison. Less well known is Conrad Black – the CEO of Sun Times Group – who also went to the pokey. What do they have in common with Rupert Murdoch – besides CEO titles? The famous claim, “I am not responsible” closely allied with “I’ve done nothing wrong.” While Murdoch hasn’t been charged with crimes, or come close to jail (yet,) there is no doubt people at News Corp have been charged, and some will go to jail. And there is public outcry Murdoch be fired.
Investors should take note; three bankruptcies killed 2 of the organizations the ex-cons led and investors were wiped out at Sun Times which barely remains in business. What will happen at News Corp? Given the commonalities between the 4 leaders, I don’t think I’d want to be a News Corp. stockholder, employee or supplier right now.
How in the world could something like this happen?
Like the infamous trio, Rupert Murdoch was, and is, a leader who defined the success formula of his company. As time passed, the growing organization became adroit at implementing the success formula, operating better, faster and cheaper. Loyal managers, who identified with, and implemented intensely, the success formula were rewarded. Those who asked questions were let go. Acquisitions were forced to conform to the success formula (such as MySpace) even if such conformance created a gap between the business and market needs. Business failure was not nearly as bad as operating outside the success formula. Failure could be forgiven – but better yet was finding a creative way to make things look successful.
Supporting the company’s success formula – its identity, cultural norms and operating methods – using all forms of ingenuity became the definition of success in these companies. This ingenuity was unbridled, even rewarded! Even when it came to skirting the edge of – or even breaking – the law. Cleverly using outsiders to do “dirty work” was an ingenious way to create plausible deniability. Financial machinations were not considered a problem if there was any way to explain changes. Violating accounting conventions not really an issue if done in the pursuit of shoring up reported results. Moving money wherever necessary to avoid taxes, or fines, and pay off executives or their friends, not really a big deal if it helped the company implement its success formula. Any behavior that reinforced the success formula, as the leader expressed it, made employees and contractors successful.
Do the ends justify the means? Of course! As long as the results appear good, and the leader is taking home a whopping amount of cash, everything appears “A-OK.”
Is this because these are crooks? Far from it. Rather, they are dedicated, hard working, industrious, smart, inventive managers who have been given a clear mission. To make the success formula work. Each small step down the ethical gangplank was a very small increment – and everyone believed they operated far from the end. If they got away with something yesterday, then why not expect to get away with a little more today? What are ethics anyway? Relative, changeable, difficult to define. Whereas fulfilling the success formula creates clear, measurable outcomes!
What is the News Corp’s Board of Directors position? The New York Times headlined “Murdoch’s Board Stands By as Scandal Widens.” Mr. Murdoch, like any good leader implementing a success formula, made sure the Board, as well as the executives and managers, were as dedicated to the success formula as he. Through that lens there are no difficult questions facing the Board. Everything was done to defend and extend the success formula. Mr. Murdoch and his team have done nothing wrong – except perhaps a zealous pursuit of implementation. What’s wrong with that? Why should the Board object?
Could this happen to you, and your organization? It may already be happening.
Answer this option, what’s more important to you and your company:
- Focusing on and identifying market trends, and adapting your strategy, tactics, products, services and processes to align with emerging future trends, or
- Focusing on execution. Setting goals, holding people to metrics and making sure implementation remains true to the company’s history, strengths and core capabilities, customers and markets? Rewarding those who meet metrics, and firing those who don’t?
If it’s the latter, it’s an easy slide into Murdoch’s very uncomfortable public seat. Very few will end up with an Enron Sized Disaster, as BNET.com headlined. But failure is likely. Any time execution is more important than questioning, implementation is more important than listening and conforming to historical norms is more important than actual business results you are chasing the select group of leaders exemplified today by Mr. Murdoch.
Here are 10 questions to ask if you want to know how at risk you just might be. If even a couple of these ring “yes,” you could be confidently, but errantly, thinking everything is OK :
- Is loyalty more important than business results? Do you have people working for you that don’t do that good a job, but do exactly what you want so you keep them?
- Do you hold certain aspects of your business as being beyond challenge – such as technology base, meeting key metrics, supporting historical distributors (or customers) or operating according to specified “rules?”
- Do you ask employees to operate according to norms before asking if they have a better idea?
- Does HR tell employees how to do things rather than asking employees what they need to succeed?
- Do employee and manager reviews have a section for asking how well they “fit” into the organization? Are people pushed out that don’t “fit?”
- Are “trusted lieutenants” moved into powerful positions over talented managers just because leaders aren’t comfortable with the newer people?
- Are certain functions (finance, HR, IT) expected (perhaps enforcers?) to make sure everyone operates according to the historical status quo?
- Is management meeting time spent predominantly on internal, versus external, issues? Talking about “how to do it” rather than “what should we do?”
- Is your advisory board, or Board of Directors, filled with your friends and co-workers that agree with your success formula and don’t seek change?
- Do your customers, employees, or suppliers learn that demonstrating dissatisfaction leads to a bad (or ended) relationship?
by Adam Hartung | Jul 20, 2011 | Current Affairs, In the Rapids, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Web/Tech
“Buy Low, Sell High” was an industrial era investor expression. Before we shifted into an information economy, investors were admonished to invest along with economic cycles, buying during recessions, selling during booms.
In today’s information economy it’s not nearly so simple. While growth occurs, companies falter and disappear (Sun Microsystems and Silicon Graphics, for example.) Meanwhile, during bad economic periods there are flourishing growth companies.
Company performance today has much more to do with whether the company’s products and services are aligned with trends, and market shifts created by trends, than the overall economy. When revenues first show signs fo faltering, often the company fails completely, unable to react to market shifts. Competitors quickly steal customers, revenue and precious cash flow. Investors frequently have little warning, or time, before company value slides into the oblivion, leaving them with negative returns.
So now it’s more important to look at trends in where product and service markets are headed than overall economic conditions. The economy won’t save a company that’s against the trend – or hurt a company that’s delivering the market trend.
Yahoo caught the early trend toward internet usage. In the early years people didn’t quite know what to do on the internet, so content providers, aggregators, and ability to search were valuable. People like Yahoo because it gave them what they wanted, and the company flourished as it became the home page for over 80% of internet users. Advertisers loved the user base, so they bought ads.
Then the market shifted. Users gained more experience, and didn’t need the aggregation function Yahoo provided. Increasingly they wanted to find answers themselves, making the quality of search more important than content. A white page with a simple box (Google) that did great searching across the entire web overtook Yahoo’s content. And, as time progressed people started using the internet as a primary location for socially connecting with friends and colleagues, making the content aggregation even less valuable. Time spent on Yahoo as a percent of time on-line began dropping:
Source: Business Insider
But although this trend began in 2009, and was clear in 2010, Yahoo’s CEO kept pushing the same business model. She missed the trend.
The market kept right on shifting, and by 2011, Yahoo is in a very bad competitive position:
Source: Business Insider
So, nobody should be surprised that revenue would fall – correct? It’s not that the folks at Yahoo are wasteful, or not working hard. They simply are becoming out of step with the market trend. The result one would expect is worsening results in the old, “core” business – and that’s exactly what is happening:
Source: Business Insider
Meanwhile, where the eyeballs go is where the display ad revenues go as well. And with the trends, that means we would expect display ad revenu growth to move away from Yahoo – as it has done:
Source: Business Insider
So yesterday when Yahoo announced sales and earnings, it was a disappointment. What increase Yahoo had in fast growing display ads (5%) was insufficient to cover the decline in search ads (down 15%). Clearly, Yahoo missed the market shift. But, the CEO did not admit that the business model was ineffective (as results indicate.) Rather, she said the company needed more salespeople!
This proclivity to look inward, as if working harder, faster and better would “fix” Yahoo, defies the reality that the company is no longer competitive given where the market is headed. Ms. Bartz can’t succeed by trying to defend and extend the traditional Yahoo business model. Yahoo doesn’t need more salespeople, it needs an entirely different business!
Source: Business Insider
Alternatively, Apple exemplifies the other side of this coin. I have been an unabashed bull on Apple for months. Why? Because it does create solutions tightly linked to market trends. People, as consumers or in business, demand more mobility. And Apple’s products deliver that mobility more seamlessly and effectively than any other solution provider.
Apple could well have kept itself focused on Mac sales. Had it done so, it would likely be out of business today. Instead, Apple focused the bulk of its development on delivering products that fulfilled trends. The result has been expansion into new markets, which have delivered massive revenue gains.
Source: Business Insider
Last quarter Apple sold more iPhones and even more iPad tablets (9.25million units, $6.1B) than it sold Macs (~4 million units, $5.1B.) The old business has been replaced (cannibalized) by new, growing businesses that support the market trend. iPads are now 11% of the PC business overall, and growing fast as they obsolete PCs. Combined, iPads and Macs sold 13.25 million “computing devices” which would make it second in the world, behind only HP (15.3million PCs.) Bigger than Dell, for example, that has stuck to its “core” PC business.
Because Apple is all about delivering on trends, there’s really no reason to think revenues, and profits, won’t continue growing. The shift to mobility has just taken hold, and there are legions of people still without an apps-powerful smartphone (lots of Blackberry customers out there to shift.) The shift to tablets has just started. As these trends continue, Apple is continuing to develop new solutions that keep it ahead of competitors.
Where Yahoo’s CEO wants to add more salespeople, in hopes she can push outdated products, Mr. Jobs said in the earnings call yesterday “Right now we’re very focused and excited about bringing iOS5 and iCloud to our users this fall.” Yahoo is trying to do more of what it always did, as the market moves away. While Apple keeps its collective management eyes on the future – and where the market is headed – to constantly bring new solutions that deliver on the trends.
Sell Yahoo, if you haven’t already. And buy Apple. It’s all about investing with the trends.
Note: update on “Is Cisco a Value Stock? Skip It.” In the month since publishing that blog (6/23/11) Cisco has demonstrated that it is running headlong from the rapids of growth into the swamp of stagnation. Not only has it been killing off new products, but as it announced weak results the CEO has taken to a massive cutback. 11,500 employees are being laid off, or sent off to work for other companies as facilities are being sold to a Chinese company.
Worse, the CEO is now stooping to financial machinations in order to make the future look better. According to HuffingtonPost.com Cisco is taking a massive $1.3B charge. This allows Cisco to write off various costs that are old, current and even future to the current P&L. This will inflate future earnings, regardless of actual performance, while deflating current results. The net impact is P&L manipulation designed to make the company – quarter over quarter or year over year – look better than it is actually performing. Transparency is being intentionally muddled, to hide the company’s inability to provide solutions delivering on market trends.
Cisco shows all the signs of a company in a growth stall. Unable to shift with market trends, it is now shedding products, employees and assets in an effort to pad the P&L. It is “reorganizing” the company, rather than linking to market needs. Remember that fewer than 7% of companies that slip into a growth stall ever successfully maintain an ongoing 2% growth rate. Because they are focused on internal issues, and financial management – rather being clearly focused market trends.
Don’t just skip buying Cisco – if you are a shareholder, SELL!
And buy Apple.
by Adam Hartung | Jun 23, 2011 | Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Lifecycle, Lock-in, Web/Tech
Will Cisco be like Apple and go on to continued greatness? Or will it be more like Sun Microsystems? The answer isn’t clear yet, but the negatives are looking a lot clearer than the positives.
Cisco grew like the internet – because it supplied a lot of the internet’s infrastructure. Most of those wi-fi connections, wired and wireless, were supplied by the highly talented team at Cisco. And yet today, revenues for internet routers, switches and company services for networks account for 90% of Cisco’s sales — and its non-cash value (see chart at Trefis.com.) The problem is that those markets aren’t growing like they used to, and some are shrinking, as companies are increasingly switching to common carrier services to access cloud-based services supporting corporate needs. Just like cloud-based IT architectures put risk on Microsoft PC usage, they create similar risks for private network suppliers. Even corporations, the (in)famous “enterprise” customers for Cisco, are finding they can create security and reliability by giving up proprietary networks.
The market capitalization for Cisco has plunged some 40% the last year, and over 55% since peaking in late 2007. Those who support investing in Cisco think like the SeekingAlpha.com headline “3 Reasons Why Cisco is Oversold.” They cite a huge cash hoard (some 25% of market cap) and Cisco’s dominance in its historical “core” product markets. They hope that a revived economy will create an uptick in infrastructure spending by corporations and public entities. Or big buying in emerging countries.
Detractors become vitriolic about the company’s lost valuation, blaming Chairman/CEO John Chambers in articles like the SeekingAlpha.com “Cisco, Either Chambers Goes or I Go.” Their arguments are less about product miscues, and more intensely claiming the CEO misdirected funds into bad consumer market opportunities (Flip phone,) undeveloped new projects like virtual conferencing and an overly complicated organization structure.
What Cisco really needs is more new products in growth markets. Places where demand is growing, and the company can flourish like it did in the hey-day halcyon growth days of the internet. That was why CEO Chambers implemented a market-focused organization structure – complete with multi-layered committees – in an effort to seek out growth opportunities and fund them. Only, the organization lacked the permission and resource commitment to really allow developing most new markets and was overly complex in the resource allocation process. Instead of moving rapidly to identify and develop growth, the organization stalled in endless discussions. A couple of months ago the new org was gutted in a “refocusing” effort (typical reaction: BusinessInsider.com “Cisco’s Crazy Management Structure Wasn’t Working, So Chambers is Changing It“.)
But, if the previously more open organization couldn’t find permission to identify, fund and develop new markets, how will a “more focused” organization do so? Focus isn’t going to make companies (or households) buy more switches and routers. Or buy more network consulting services. The market has shifted, so as people move to smartphones and tablets, and cloud-based apps they access over common networks, how will an organization focused on old customers and products prove more successful? While the old organization may have been problematic, is abandoning a market-focused organization going to be an improvement? Sounds like a set-up for future layoffs.
In the drive for new products Cisco bought a very successful business in the Flip camera two years ago, which according to MediaPost.com had 26% market share. But, “Flip Camera: Dream Becomes a Nightmare” details the story of how Cisco was too late. The market quickly was shifting from digital cameras to smart phones – and sales stagnated. Cisco didn’t learn much about consumer products, or smart phones or how to launch new products outside its “core” from the experience, choosing to shut the business down and withdraw the product this spring (“Cisco Kills the Flip Camera“.) Ouch!
Clearly, Flip was a financially unsuccessful venture. But that could be forgiven if Cisco learned from the experience so it could move, like Apple, toward launching something really good (like Apple did with iPods.) But we don’t hear of any organizational learning from Flip, just failure.
And that’s too bad, because Cisco’s virtual conferencing could have great promise. Most of us now hate to travel (thanks TSA and all that great airline service!) And most corporate controllers hate to pay for business travel. The trends all point toward more and more virtual conferencing. For everything from one-on-one meetings to multi-site meetings to industry conferences for learning. This is a BIG trend, that will go well beyond a simple WebEx. Someone is going to make money with this – taking Skype to an entirely new level of performance. But given how badly Cisco managed Flip, and the new “refocusing” effort, it’s hard to see how that winner will be Cisco.
Cisco’s not yet a Sun Microsystems, so locked-in to old products it cannot do anything else and unable to grow at all. It’s not yet a Dell or Microsoft that’s missed the market shifts and is trying to spend too much money, too late on weak products against well funded, fast growing and profitable competitors.
But, the signs don’t look good. There’s no discussion about what Cisco sees itself doing new and differently in 5 years. We don’t see Cisco offering leading edge products like it did 15 years ago in its old “core” market. It’s historical market is not growing like it once did, and new competitors are changing the market entirely. The layered organization was an effort to attack old sacred cows, and limit the power of old status quo police, but now the new “focused” re-organization is reversing those efforts to find new markets for growth. “Focus” rarely goes hand-in-hand with successful innovation. We cannot find an obvious group of people focusing on new markets, with permission and resources to bring out the “next big thing” that could drive a doubling of revenues by 2017.
Unlike RIMM, the game isn’t over for CSCO. It’s markets still have some longevity. But the organization has been failing at doing the kind of new things, bringing out the new innovations, that would make it a good investment. Until management shows it knows how to find new markets and launch disruptive innovations, CSCO is not a place to invest. Don’t expect a fat dividend, and don’t expect revisiting old growth rates any time soon.
There are likely to be some good, and bad quarters. Cost management, and occasional big orders, combined with manipulating the timing of revenues and costs will allow for management to say “things are all better.” But there will be miscues and problems, and blaming of competitors and weak economic conditions in the bad quarters. Defend and extend management does not work when markets shift. Sideways is not moving forward. It’s more like treading water in the ocean – not a good strategy for rescue. Overall, I wouldn’t be optimistic.
by Adam Hartung | Jun 16, 2011 | Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
Dell is a dog. From $25/share a decade ago the company rose to around $40/share around 2005, only to collapse. The stock now trades around $15, rising from recent lows of about $10. The company’s value is only $30B, only half revenues of $61B, instead of the revenue multiple obtained by most growth stocks. But then, revenues have been flat for the last 4 years — so maybe it’s time to say Dell isn’t a growth stock any longer.
And that would be correct.
In the 1990s Dell was a darling. The company could do no wrong as its revenues and valuation soared. Founder and CEO Michael Dell was a highly desired speaker at fees of $100,000+. Michael Dell was quick to tell people his success formula, which was pretty simple:
- Do no R&D. Outsource product development to key vendors (Intel and Microsoft). Focus on price and cost. Be operationally excellent! Be the best, most focused manufacturer/assembler.
- Genericize the product. Make it easy to buy, thus cheap and easy to sell.
- Sell direct rather than through distributors so you lower sales cost.
- Use supply chain practices to drive down parts cost and inventory, making it possible to compete on price and collect your funds before paying vendors.
In short, focus on operational excellence to be really fast and cheap. Faster and cheaper than anyone else.
And this success formula worked!! As long as folks wanted personal computers, Dell was the game to beat. And the company reaped the reward of PC market growth, expanding as the PC – especially the Wintel PC – market exploded.
Dell’s problems today aren’t the result of bad management. Dell has been focused, diligent, hard working and very cost conscientuous. Dell made no horrible decisions, and made no serious mistakes in its strategy or tactics. Although for a while it was vilified for weaker support from outsourced vendors in India (again, a tactic used in all parts of Dell’s strategy) that was rectified. Largely for 2 decades Dell has continued to perform better and better at its internal metrics – its success formula.
Dell’s fall from grace was due to the market shifting. Firstly, competitors figured out how to do what Dell did pretty much as good as Dell did it. No operationally oriented strategy is immune from copy-cats, and Dell discovered other companies could do pretty much what they did. It becomes a dog-eat-dog world quickly when your discussions are all “price, delivery, service” and you can’t offer something truly unique. It may not be obvious when markets are growing, and there’s plenty of business for everyone, but oh how quickly it shows up in declining margins when growth slows.
Secondly, and more importantly, the market shifted away from Dell’s primary products. PC sales are now flat to declining, depending on marketplace, as customers shift from Wintel platforms to smartphones and tablets. Despite big acquisitions in data storage and services (to the tune of $5B the last couple of years) Dell still has 70% of its revenues in PCs (55% hardware, 15% software and services.) Most of that money was spent attempting to shore up the Dell success formula by extending its core offerings to core customers. Now all future forecasts show the market will continue to move away from PCs and toward new platforms, making it impossible to create organic growth, and pinching margins in all sectors.
So, were Dell’s executives dumb, incompetent, lethargic or some combination of all 3? Actually, none of those things – as CNNMoney.com points out in “Dell’s Dilemma“. They were simply stuck. Stuck with their own best practices, doing what they do really well, and continuing to do more of it. Unable to move forward, because most attention was focused on defending and extending the old core.
Nobody knows the Dell core better than Michael Dell. His return spells only less likelihood of success for Dell. As opportunities emerged in smartphones and other markets he found it simply easier, faster, cheaper and more consistent to wait on those markets while defending the core PC business. Key vendors Intel and Microsoft, critical to historical success, were not offering new solutions for these markets, or promoting sales in them. Key customers, the IT departments in government and corporate accounts, weren’t clamoring for these new products. They wanted more PCs that were better, faster and cheaper. Dell was looking for the divine light of perfect future understanding to change the company investments – and when it didn’t emerge he kept right on plunking money into the business headed for decline.
Inside consultants (Bain and Co. is well known to be the primary strategists and tacticians at Dell) and employee experts had never-ending opportunities to improve the Dell systems, in their efforts to defend the Dell sales against other PC competitors and seek out additional expansion opportunities in targeted offshore or niche markets. Suppliers wanted Dell to keep building and promoting PCs. And customers locked-in to old platforms were just experimenting with new solutions – far from adopting anything new in the volumes that would match historical PC sales. “If just the economy comes around, I’m sure sales will return” it’s easy to imagine everyone at Dell saying.
Now Dell is in declining products, with an outdated strategy chasing a larger competitor as margins continue to remain squeezed. Nobody wants to exit this business quickly, so prices are under ever greater pressure – especially since Android tablets are cheaper than laptops already – and smartphones can be had for free from the right wireless supplier.
It’s too late for Dell. The time to act was 5 years ago. Then Dell could have set up a team to explore the market for new solutions. Dell could have been the first to offer an Android phone or tablet – the company has plenty of smart folks who could experiment and figure it out. They could have championed the Zune, and created a download store for the product to compete with iPods and iTunes (the Zune is no longer supported by Microsoft.) But there were no resources, and no permission given to try changing the success formula.
As Chromebooks are launched (“The First Google Chromebooks are On Sale Now, Here’s Everything You Need to Know” BusinessInsider.com) Dell could have been the market leader, instead of Acer and Samsung. There’s even a chance that Dell might have blunted the huge market lead Apple created since 2005 if management had just created a team with the opportunity to really discover what people would do with these new solutions. There was a time a “strategic partnership” between Dell and Google could have been a big threat to Apple. But no longer.
Apple, which put its resources into pioneering new markets the last decade has seen its value explode many-fold. It’s value is over 10x Dell. Apple has enough cash to buy Dell outright. But why would it? Dell has become a niche player – and due to its lock-in to historical best practices and its old success formula has no opportunities to grow.
All companies risk becoming marginalized. Focusing on your core products, core technology vendors and core customers leads to blindness about the possibility of market shifts. You can work yourself to death, be focused and diligent, and remain dedicated to constant improvement — even excellence! But when markets shift it’s easy to become obsolete, and fall into margin killing price wars as growth stagnates. Just look at Dell. From darling to dog in just 10 years.
If you still own DELL, the recent price rise makes this a great time to SELL. Dell has no new products, and no idea how to move into new markets. It’s commitment to its core is a death knell. And without white space to do anything new, it can/t (and won’t) transform itself into a winner.
