by Adam Hartung | Jan 30, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lock-in
For the last decade, Wal-Mart has been "dead money" in investor parlance. After a big jump between 1995 and 2000, the stock today is still worth less than it was in 2000. There has been volatility, which might have benefited some traders. But for most of the decade Wal-Mart's price has been lower. There has been excitement because recently the price has been catching up with where it was in 2002, even though there have been no real gains for long term investors.
Source: YahooFinance 1/30/12
What happened to Wal-Mart was the market shifted. For many years being the market leader with every day low pricing was a winning strategy. Wal-Mart was able to expand from town to town opening new stores, all pretty much alike, doing the same thing and making really good money.
Then competitors took aim at Wal-Mart, and found out they could beat the giant.
Eventually the number of towns that both needed, and justified, a new Wal-Mart (or Sam's Club) dried up. Wal-Mart reacted by expanding many stores, making them "bigger and better," even adding groceries to some. But that added only marginally to revenue, and even less marginally to profits.
And Wal-Mart tried exporting its stores internationally, but that flopped as local market competitors found ways to better attract local customers than Wal-Mart's success formula offered.
Other U.S. discounters, like Target and Kohl's, offered nicer stores with more varieties or classier merchandise – and often their pricing was not much higher, or even the same. And a new category of retailer, called "dollar stores" emerged that beat Wal-Mart's price on almost everything for the true price shopper. These 99 cent stores became really popular, and the fastest growing traditional retail concept in America. Simultaneously, big box retailers like Best Buy expanded their merchandise and footprint into more locations, dramatically increasing the competition against local Wal-Mart's stores.
But, even more dramatically, the whole retail market began shifting on-line.
Amazon, and its brethren, kept selling more and more products. And at prices even lower than Wal-Mart. And again, for price shoppers, the growth of eBay, Craigslist and vertical market sites made it possible for shoppers to find slightly used, or even new, products at prices lower than Wal-Mart, and shipped right into the customer's home. With each year, people found less need to buy at Wal-Mart as the on-line options exploded.
More recently, traditional price-focused retailers have been attacked by mobile devices. Firstly, there's the new Kindle Fire. In just one quarter it has gone from nowhere to tied as the #1 Android tablet
Source: BusinessInsider.com
The Kindle Fire is squarely targeted at growing retail sales for Amazon, making it easier than ever for customers to ignore the brick-and-mortar store in favor of on-line retailers.
On top of this, according to Pew Research 52% of in-store shoppers now use a mobile device to check price and availability on-line of products as they look in the store. Thus a customer can look at products in Wal-Mart, and while standing in the aisle look for that same product, or comparable, in another store on-line. They can decide they like the work boots at Wal-Mart, and even try them on for size. Then they can order from Zappos or another on-line retailer to have those boots shipped to their home at an even lower price, or better warranty, even before leaving the Wal-Mart store.
It's no wonder then that Wal-Mart has struggled to grow its revenues. Wal-Mart has been a victim of intense competition that found ways to attack its success formula effectively.
Then Wal-Mart implemented its "Shoot Yourself in the Head" strategy
What did Wal-Mart recently do? According to Reuters Wal-Mart decided to transfer its entire marketing department to work for merchandising. Marketing was moved from reporting to the CEO, to reporting into Sales. The objective was to put all the energy of marketing into trying to further defend the Wal-Mart business, and drive up same-store sales. In other words, to make sure marketing was fully focused on better executing the old, struggling success formula.
The marketing department at Wal-Mart does all the market research on customers, trends and advertising – traditional and on-line. Marketing is the organization charged with looking outside, learning and adapting the organization to any market shifts. In this role marketing is expected to identify new competitors, new market solutions that are working better, and adapt the organization to shifting market needs. It is responsible to be the eyes and ears of the organization, and then think up new solutions addressing these external inputs. That's why it needs to report to the CEO, so it can drive toward new solutions that can revitalize the organization and keep it growing with new market trends.
But now, it's been shot. Reporting to sales, marketing's role directed at driving same store sales is purely limiting the function to defending and extending the success formula that has produced lackluster results for 12 years. Marketing is no longer in a position to adapt Wal-Mart. Instead, it is tasked to find ways to do more, better, faster, cheaper under the leadership of the sales organization.
When faced with market shifts, winning companies adapt. Look at how skillfully Amazon has moved from book seller to general merchandise seller to offering a consumer electronic device.
Unfortunately, too many businesses react to market shifts like Wal-Mart. They hunker down, do more of the same and re-organize to "increase focus" on the traditional business as results suffer. Instead of adapting the company hopes more focus on execution will somehow improve results.
Not likely. Expect results to go the other direction. There might be a short-term improvement from the massive influx of resource, but long term the trends are taking customers to new solutions. Regardless of the industry leader's size. Don't expect Wal-Mart to be a long-term winner. Better to invest in competitors taking advantage of trends.
by Adam Hartung | Jan 4, 2012 | Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
The S&P 500 ended 2011 almost exactly where it started. If ever there was a year when being invested in the right companies, and selling the dogs, mattered for higher portfolio returns it was 2011. The good news is that many of the 2011 dogs were easy to spot, and easy to sell before ruining your portfolio.
There were many bad performers. However, there was a common theme. Most simply did not adjust to market shifts. Environmental changes, from technology to regulations, made them less competitive thus producing declining returns as newer competitors benefitted. Additionally, these companies chose – often over the course of several years – to eschew innovation and new product launches. They chose to keep investing in efforts to defend and extend historical, but troubled, businesses rather than innovate toward a more successful future.
Looking at the trends that put these companies into trouble we can recognize the need to continue avoiding these companies, even though many analysts are starting to say they may be "value stocks." Instead we can invest in the trends by buying companies likely to grow and increase portfolio returns in 2012.
Avoid Kodak – Buy Apple or Google
Few companies are as iconic as Eastman Kodak, inventor of amateur photography and creator of the star product in the hit 1973 Paul Simon song "Kodachrome." However, it was clear in the late 1980s that digital cameras were going to change photography. Kodak itself was one of the primary inventors of the core technology, but licensed it to others in order to generate cash it invested trying to defend and extend photographic film and paper sales. In my 2008 book "Create Marketplace Disruption" I highlighted Kodak as a company so locked-in to film sales that it was unwilling to even consider moving into new markets.
In 2011 EK lost almost all its value, falling from $3.85 share to about 60 cents. The whole company is now worth only $175M as it rapidly moves toward NYSE delisting and bankruptcy, and complete failure. The trend that doomed EK has been 2 decades in the making, yet like an ocean freighter collision management simply let momentum kill the company. The long slide has gone on for years, and will not reverse. If you want to invest in photography your best plays are smart phone suppliers Apple, and Google for not only the Android software but the Chrome apps that are being used to photoshop images right inside browser windows.
Avoid Sears – Buy Amazon
When hedge fund manager Ed Lampert took over KMart by buying their bonds in bankruptcy, then used that platform to buy Sears back in 2006 the Wall Street folks hailed him as a genius. "Mad Money" Jim Cramer said "Fast Eddie" Lampert was his former college roommate, and that was all he needed to recommend buying the stock. On the strength of such spurrious recommendations, Sears Holdings initially did quite well.
However, I was quoted in The Chicago Tribune the day of the Sears acquisition announcement saying the merged company was doomed – because the trends were clear. Wal-Mart was in pitched battle with Target to "own" the discount market which had crushed KMart. Sears was pinched by them on the low end, and by better operators of vertically focused companies such as Kohl's for clothing, Best Buy for appliances and Home Depot for repair and landscape tools. Sears was swimming against the trends, and Ed Lampert had no plans to re-invent the company. What lay ahead was cost-cutting and store closings which would kill both brands in a market already overly saturated with traditional brick-and-mortar retailers as long-term more sales moved on-line.
Now Sears Holdings has gone full circle. In the last 12 months the stock has dropped from $95 to $31.50 – a decline of more than two thirds (a loss of over $7B in investor value.) Sears and KMart have no future, nor do the Craftsman or Kenmore brands. After Christmas management announced a new round of store closings as same stores sales continues its never-ending slide, and finally most industry analysts are saying Sears has nowhere to go but down.
The retail future belongs to Amazon.com – which is where you should invest if you want to grow portfolio value in 2012. Look to Kindle Fire and other tablets to accelerate the retail movement on-line, while out-of-date Sears becomes even less relevant and of lower value.
Stay out of Nokia and Research in Motion – Buy Apple
On February 15 I wrote that Nokia had made a horrible CEO selection, and was a stock to avoid. Nokia invesors lost about $18B of value in 2001 as the stock lost 50% of its market cap in 2011 (62% peak to trough.) May 20 I pounded the table to sell RIMM, which lost nearly 80% of its investor value in 2011 – nearly $60B!
Both companies simply missed the market shift in smart phones. Nokia did its best Motorola imitation, which missed the shift from analog to digital cell phones – and then completely missed the shift to smart phones – driving the company to near bankruptcy and acquisition by Google for its patent library. With no game at all, the Nokia Board hired a former Microsoft executive to arrange a shotgun wedding for launching a new platform – 3 years too late. Now Apple and Android have over 400,000 apps each, growing weekly, while Microsoft is struggling with 50k apps, no compelling reason to switch and struggles to build a developer network. Nokia's road to oblivion appears clear.
RIM was first to the smartphone market, and had it locked up for years. Unfortunately, top management and many investors felt that the huge installed base of corporate accounts, using Blackberry secure servers, would protect the company from competition. Now the New York Times has reported RIM leadership as one of the worst in 2011, because an installed base is no longer the competitive entry barrier Michael Porter waxed about in the early 1980s. Corporations are following their users to better productivty by moving fast as possible to the iOS and Android worlds.
RIM's doomed effort to launch an ill-devised, weakly performing tablet against the Apple iPod juggernaut only served to embarrass the company, at great expense. At this point, there's little reason to think RIM will do any better than Palm did when the technology shifted, and anyone holding RIMM will likely end up with nothing (as did holders of PALM.) If you want to be in mobile your best pick is market leading and profitably growing Apple, with a second position in Google as it builds up ancillary products like Chrome to leverage its growing Android base.
Avoid HP and Sony – Buy Apple
Speaking of Palm, to paraphrase Senator Dirkson "that billion here, a billion there" that added up to some real money lost for HP. Mark Hurd consolidated HP into a company focused on building volume largely in other people's technology – otherwise known as PCs. As printing declines, and people shift to tablets and cloud apps, HP has less and less ability to build its profit base. The trends were all going in the wrong direction as market shifts make HP less and less relevant to consumer and corporate customers.
Selecting Mr. Apotheker was a disastrous choice, and I called for investors to dump the stock when he was hired in January. An ERP executive, he was firmly planted in the technology of the 1990s. With a diminished R&D, and an atrophied new product development organization HP is nothing like the organization of its founders, and the newest CEO has offered no clear path for finding the trends and re-igniting growth at HP. If you want to grow in what we used to call the PC business you need to be in tablets now – and that gets you back, once again, to Apple first, and Google second.
Which opens the door for discussing what in the 1960s through 1980s was the most innovative of all consumer electronics companies, Sony. But when Mr. Morita was replaced by an MBA CEO that began focusing the company on the bottom line, instead of new gadgets, the pipeline rapidly dried. Acquisitions, such as a music label, replaced R&D and new product development. Allegiance to protecting the CD and DVD business, and the players Sony made – along with traditional TVs and PCs – meant Sony missed the wave to MP3, to mobile digital entertainment devices, to DVRs and the emerging market for interactive TV. What was once a leader is now a follower.
As a result Sony has lost $4.5B in investor value the last 3 year, and in 2011 lost half its value falling from $37 to $18/share. As Apple emerges as the top consumer electronics technology leader and profit creator, closely chased by Google, it is unlikely Sony will ever recover that lost value.
Buying Apple, Amazon, Google and Netflix
This column has already made the case for Apple. It is almost incomprehensible how far a lead Apple has over its competition, causing investors to fear for its revenue growth prospects. As a result, the companies P/E multiple is a remarkably low single-digit number, even though its growth is well into the double digits! But its existing position in growth markets, technology leadership and well oiled new product development capability nearly assures continued profitbale growth for at least 5 years. Even though the stock, which I recommended as my number 1 buy in January, 2011, has risen some 30% maintaining a big position is remains an investors best portfolio enhancer.
Amazon was a wild ride in 2011, and today is worth almost the same as it was one year ago. Given that the company is now larger, has a more dominant position in publishing and is the world leader on the trend to on-line retail it is a very good stock to own. The choice to think long-term and build its user links through sales of Kindle Fire at cost has limited short-term profits, but every action Amazon has taken to grow has paid off handsomely because they accelerate the natural trends and position Amazon as the leader. Remaining with the trends, and the growth, offers the potential for big payoff this year and for years to come.
Google remains #2 in most markets, but remains aligned with the trends. It was disappointing that the company cancelled so many great products in 2011 – such as Gear and Wave. And it faces stiff competition in its historical ad markets from the shift toward social media and Facebook's emergence. However, Google is the best positioned company to displace Microsoft on all those tablets out there with its Chrome apps, and it still is a competitor with the potential for long-term value creation. It's just hard to be as excited about Google as Apple and Amazon.
Netflix started 2011 great, but then stumbled. Starting the year at $190, Netflix rose to $305 before falling to $75. Investors have seen an 80% decline from the peak, and a 60% decline from beginning of the year. But this was notably not because company revenues or profits fell, because they didn't. Rather concerns about price changes and long-term competition caused the stock to drop. And that's why I remain bullish for owning Netflix in 2012.
Growth can hide a multitude of sins, as I pointed out when making the case to buy in October. And Netflix has done a spectacular job of preparing itself to transition from physical DVDs to video downloads. The "game" is not over, and there is a lot of content warring left. But Netflix was first, and has the largest user base. Techcrunch recently reported on a Citi survey that found Netflix still has nearly twice the viewership of #2 Hulu (27% vs. 15%.)
Those who worry about Amazon, Google or Apple taking the Netflix position forget that those companies are making huge bets to compete in other markets and have shown less interest in making the big investments to compete on the content that is critical in the download market. AOL and Yahoo are also bound up trying to define new strategies, and look unlikely to ever be the content companies they once were.
For those who are banking on competitive war with Comcast and other cable companies to kill off Netflix look no further than how they define themselves (cable operators,) and their horrific customer relationship scores to realize that they are more interested in trying to preserve their old business than rapidly enter a new one. Perhaps one will try to buy Netflix, but they don't have the management teams or organization to compete effectively.
The fact is that Netflix still has the best strategy for its market, which is still growing exponentially, has the best pricing and is rapidly growing its content to remain in the top position. That makes it a likely pick for "turnaround of the year" by end of 2012 (at least in the tech/media industry) – even as investments rise over the next 12 months.
by Adam Hartung | Dec 22, 2011 | In the Swamp, Leadership, Lifecycle, Web/Tech
It’s a wise person who knows never to be the last person at a business holiday party. Things never go well for those who stay too late.
Yet, far too many businesses stay way, way too long at their market party, focusing on the same strategy when they should have moved into new competition a whole lot earlier.
This week Oracle missed earnings estimates, and the stock fell some 14%, from $30 to under $26. For the year, Oracle is down about a third, from it’s high of $37. The question any investor needs to ask is the one headlined by ZDnet.com “Oracle Earnings: An Aberration or Trend?“
Oracle is very, very poorly positioned for future earnings growth. Like most big software companies, including Microsoft and SAP, Oracle built its business on the formula of large data centers running large “enterprise applications” supporting lots of independent corporate PC users.
And it was clear fully a year (or 2) ago that market simply isn’t growing. Organizations are rapidly shifting away from hard to use, one-size-fits-all (at very high cost) enterprise software applications. Users are moving away from PCs to mobile devices, and refusing to use clunky enterprise interfaces. Worse, software is moving away from data centers in client-server configurations tied to PCs. Instead, companies small and large are rapidly shifting to software-as-service (SAS) environments where the company can pay “by the use” for software maintained in the “cloud.” These solutions are scalable, cheaper to buy, cheaper to implement, vastly more flexible and operate on mobile devices a whole lot better. If you’ve ever used Salesforce.com you’ve experienced the benefit compared to more clunky enterprise Customer Resource Management (CRM) applications.
Oracle missed this trend. Despite all the dozens of acquisitions Oracle has made – such as buying Unix hardware provider Sun Microsystems, it largely missed the shift to cloud architectures. It has remained far, far too long at its party, enjoying the profit-laden punch, and hoping the market would never shift. As the customer base shrank to fewer, and ever larger, big corporations Oracle did not prepare for changes in its business the next day. Oracle has stayed too long, and its ability to compete in new markets against more flexible solution providers such as IFS with better user interface capabilities looks really weak.
Somehow, Best Buy fell into the same trap. In early December the country’s largest “big box” retailer announced lower earnings after cutting prices to shore up revenues. As a result the stock dropped 20%, from about $28 to $22 – continuing a pretty much downhill slide all year of nearly 40% from its high of $36.
Best Buy felt like it was doing great after Circuit City failed. Circuit City had been a darling of the infamous “Good to Great” text. But Circuit City demonstrated that in a market dominated by a long-term trend away from fixed stores and toward on-line purchases, every retailer is bound to struggle.
When Circuit City failed in 2008 investors worried that a weak economy would tank Best Buy as well. But as all that Circuit City capacity disappeared, Best Buy was a short-term winner.
Unfortunately, Best Buy leadership confused short-term sales re-allocation with long-term trends. They, along with a lot of other locked-in brick-and-mortar retailers, felt that things would quickly “return to normal” and Circuit City was the company caught out in the cold when the music stopped. Best Buy chose to stay at its party too long – hoping the dancing would never stop. Its leaders chose to ignore the long-term trend away from traditional retail toward on-line shopping. No wonder BusinessInsider.com headlined a famed investor “Marc Andreessen: Retailers Should Be Scared About 2012.”
What’s surprising is how many people in business think the party will simply never end. That everyone can keep drinking and dancing and rolling in the profits. Even when the trends are obvious.
This 2011 holiday season, every business team should be asking itself “are we staying at the party too long? What trends are affecting our business – and likely to bring this party to a crashing end? What are we doing to prepare for a tough competition tomorrow.”
If you don’t, it’s far too easy you could end up on the downhill slide, with one heck of a horrible hangover – like Oracle and Best Buy – in 2012.
by Adam Hartung | Dec 12, 2011 | Defend & Extend, In the Rapids, In the Swamp, Leadership
Revenue growth is a wonderful thing. It is so much more fun to work in a growing company than one that isn’t. And high growth is possible, even in this struggling economy, if leaders focus on trends.
Take for example Chipotle. Whether you eat there or not, Chipotle has grown rather spectacularly. From 16 units in 1998 it grew to 500 by 2005 and has 1,100 company owned and operated stores today. Revenues have more than doubled since 2005, to about $2B, while sales/store increased almost 12% in 2010. And investors have been well rewarded, with a market cap increase of 6x in the last 5 years!
Chart source Yahoo.com 12.12.11
Chipotle hit on a trend it called “Food with Integrity.” While that is far from explicit, Chipotle has made a practice of talking about being “natural.” Chipotle often buys local produce for its units, claims to use “natural” meat, presumably with fewer additives, and brags about having no hormones in its dairy products. Such claims have tied into customer trends for better nutrition, higher food safety and improved taste. This allows Chipotle to grow in the most intensely competitive of industries, even during a struggling economic time.
Compare this with McDonald’s. This is not a random selection, as McDonald’s was a 1998 investor in Chipotle, and put around $360M into the chain fueling early growth. McDonald’s was handsomely rewarded for this, receiving around $1.5B (4x) return on its investment when selling Chipotle to the public in 2006.
At the time, McDonald’s was in a horrible situation. It’s stock had dropped from a high of $50 in 2000 to a low of $14 in 2004. McDonald’s took the money from the Chipotle sale and invested all of it in new capital expenditures to defend the McDonald franchise. The good news was that “turnaround” worked and McDonald’s has recaptured its value, roughly doubling market capitalization the last 5 years.
One could consider both of these success stories, unless you look deeper.
Chipotle increased its valued by 6x, McDonald’s by 2x – so investors in the former did fully 3x better than the latter. And where Chipotle is expected to increase the number of its stores by at least another 1/3 in the next few years, McDonald’s struggles to find growth markets. Clearly, investors that swapped their McDonald’s stock for Chipotle’s stock in 2006 did far better – and have prospects of continuing to do even better still with at least some analysts expecting Chipotle to hit $400/share within a year, for another 20% pop.
Source: Yahoo.com 12.12.11
McDonald’s strategy was built on a 1960s trend for speed and consistency in food. That trend served McDonald’s well for 2 decades, but is far less interesting today. In its effort to generate revenues recently McDonald’s brought us a re-introduced 20 year old product called McRib this October – a product who’s ingredients have people asking questions about health and safety (TheWeek.com “What’s the McRib made of, anyway?) as we learn its mostly high fat pig innards and salt. While McDonald’s has recovered from 2004, is it a platform for growth?
Chipotle is using trends to find new products, new marketing themes, and even a new store concept, Shophouse Southeast Asian Grill, for organic growth. Where McDonald’s is fixated on defending its historical business irrespective of trends, Chipotle is busy investing in current trends.
One has to wonder, what if instead of selling Chipotle, McDonald’s leadership had turned upside down? What if all that management attention had gone into exploding Chipotle’s footprint faster? Introducing even more products? And what if McDonald’s had accepted the trends propelling Chipotle growth and applied them to McDonald’s to give that chain a different customer value proposition and real new products?
McDonald’s could have acted more like Apple. Where McDonald’s has at its core fried meat sandwiches and deep fried potatoes, Apple had its “core” the Macintosh. But instead of investing its resources into defending its core, Apple invested in new products and markets where the trend was more favorable. As a result its market cap grew by 4.5x during the last 5 years, compared to the more subdued 2x at McDonalds – and Apple demonstrated that even very large market cap companies can grow at very high rates when they adopt growth strategies tied to trends.
Source: Yahoo.com 12.12.11
There are a lot of businesses struggling to grow today. But most aren’t really trying. They keep doing more of what they’ve always done, and hoping for a better result! They don’t accept that trends go in new directions, causing markets to shift. When markets shift, those who follow the trends do far better than those stuck trying to defend their past strategies. It’s smart to act like, and invest in, Chipotle while avoiding the rut that is McDonald’s.
by Adam Hartung | Oct 19, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lock-in, Science
The giant pharmaceutical company Abbott Labs announced today it was splitting itself. Abbott will sell baby formula, supplements (vitamins,) generic drugs and additional products. The pharmaceutical company, (gee, I thought that's what Abbott was?) yet to be named, will spin out on its own. Chairman and CEO Miles White will continue at the new non-pharma Abbott, and the Newco pharma company will be headed by the company's former COO, being brought back out of retirement for the job.
The big question is, "why?" The CEO gamely has described the businesses as having different profiles, and therefore they should be split. But this is from the fellow that has been the most acquisitive CEO in his industry, and one of the most acquisitive in business, putting this collection together. He spent $10B on acquisitions as recently as 2009, including dropping $6.6B on Belgian drug company Solvay – which will now be espunged from Abbott. Why did he spend all that money if it didn't make sense? And how does this break-up help investors, employees and all us healthcare customers?
Or is this action just confusion, to leave us wondering what's going on in the company – and why it hasn't done much for any constituency the last decade. Except the CEO – who's been the highest paid in the industry, and one of the highest paid in America during his tenure.
Mr. White became CEO in 1998, and Chairman in 1999. Just as the stock peaked. Since then, investors have received almost nothing for holding the stock. Dividend increases have not covered inflation for the last decade, and despite ups and downs the share price is just about where it was back then – $50
Source: Yahoo Finance 10/19/11
Abbott has not increased in value because the company has had almost no organic growth. Growth by acquisition takes a lot of capital, and because purchases have multiple bidders it is really tough to buy them at a price which will earn a high rate of return. All academic studies show that when big companies buy, they always overpay. And that's the only growth Abbott has had – overly expensive acquisitions.
Mr. White hid an inability to grow behind a flurry of ongoing acquisitions (and some divestitures) that made it incredibly difficult to realize that the company itself was actually stagnant. Internally in a growth stall, with no idea how to come out of it. Hoping, again and again, that one of these acquisitions would refire the stalled engines.
This latest action is another round in Abbott's 3 card monte routine. Where's that bloody queen Mr. White keeps promising investors, as he keeps mixing the cards – and turning them over?
Because his acquisitions didn't work he's upping the financial machinations. By splitting the company he will make it impossible for anyone to figure out what all that exasperating activity has been for the last decade! He won't be compared to all those pesky historically weak results, or asked about how he's managing all those big investments, or even held accountable for the tens of billions that he spent at the "old Abbott" when he's asked questions about the "new Abbott."
But re-arranging the deck chairs does not fix the ship, and there's nothing – absolutely nothing – in this action which creates more growth, and higher profits, for Abbott shareholders. Because there's nothing in this that produces new solutions for health care customers.
And look out employees – because now there's 2 CEOs looking for ways to cut costs and create layoffs – like the ones implemented in early 2011! Expect the big knife to come out even harder as both companies struggle to show higher profits, with limited growth prospects.
Along the way, like any good 3 card monte routine, Abbott's CEO has had shills ready to encourage us that the flurry of activity is good for investors. Chronically, they talked about how picking up this business or that was going to grow revenues – almost regardless of the price paid or whether Abbott had any plan for enhancing the acquisition's value. Today, most analysts applauded his actions as "making sense." Of course these were all financial analysts, MBAs like Mr. White, more interested in accounting than actually developing new products. Working mostly for investment banks, they had (and have) a vested interest in promoting the executive's actions – even if it hasn't created any value.
Meanwhile, those betting for the queen to finally show up in this game will just have to keep waiting.
Abbott, like most pharmaceutical companies, has painted itself into a corner. There are more lawyers, accountants, marketers, salespeople and PR folks at Abbott (like all its competitors, by the way) than there are real scientists developing new solutions. Blaming regulators and dysfunctional health care processes, Abbott has insisted on building an enormous hierarchy of people focused on a handful of potential "blockbuster" solutions. It's a bit like the king and his court, filling the castle with those making announcements, arguing about the value of the king's court, sending out messages decrying the barbarians at the gate – while the number of people actually growing corn and creating value keeps dwindling!
Barely 100 years ago most "medicine" was sold based on labels and claims – and practically no science. Quackery dominated the profession. If you wanted something to help your ails, you hoped the local chemist had the skills to mix something up in his apothecary shop, using his mortar and pestle. Often it was best to just take a good shot of opiate (often included in the druggist's powder;) at least you felt a whole lot better even if it didn't cure your illness.
But Alexander Fleming discovered Penicillin (1928), and we realized there was the possibility of massive life improvement from chemistry – specifically what we call pharmacology. Jonas Salk sort of founded the "modern medicine" industry with his polio vaccine in 1955 – eliminating polio epidemics. Science could lead to breakthroughs capable of saving millions of lives! The creation of those injections – and later little pills- changed everything for humanity. And that created the industry.
But now pharmacology is a technology that has mostly run its course. Like all inventions, in the early days the gains were rapid and far, far outweighed the risks. A few might suffer illness, even death, from the drugs – but literally millions were saved. A more than fair trade-off. But after decades, those "easy hits" are gone.
Today we know that every incremental pharmacological innovation is increasingly valuable in a narrower and narrower context. 10% may see huge improvement, 30% some improvement, 30% marginal to no improvement, 20% have negative reactions, and 10% hugely negative reactions. And increasingly, due to science, we know that is because as we trace down the chemical path we are interacting with individuals – and their DNA has a lot to do with how they will react to any drug. Pharmacology isn't nearly as simple as penicillin any more. It's almost one-on-one application to genetic maps.
But Abbott failed (like most of its industry competitors) to evolve. Even though the human genome has been mapped for some 10 years, and even though we now know that future breakthroughs will come from a deeper understanding of gene reactions, there has been precious little research into the new forms of medicine this entails. Abbott remained stuck trying to develop new products on the same path it had taken before, and as the costs rose (almost asymptotically astronomically) the results grew slimmer. Billions were going in, and a lot less discovery was coming out! But the leaders did not change their R&D path.
Today we all hear about patients that have remarkable recoveries from new forms of biologic medicines. We know we are on the cusp of entirely new solutions, that will make the brute force of pharmacology look as medieval as a civil war surgeon's amputation solution to bullet wounds. But Abbott is not there developing those solutions, because it has been trying to defend & extend its old business model with acquisitions like Solvay – and a plethora of financial transactions that hide the abysmal performance of its R&D and new product development.
Mr. White is not a visionary. Never was. He wasn't a research scientist, deep into solving health issues. He wasn't a leader in trying to solve America's health care issues during the last decade. He never exhibited a keen understanding of his customer's needs, trends in the industry, or presience as to future scenarios that would help his markets and thus Abbott's growth.
Mr. White has been an expert in shuffling the cards – moving around the pieces. Misdirecting attention to something new in the middle of the game. Amidst the split announcement today it was easy to overlook that Abbott is setting aside $1.5B for settling charges that it broke regulations by illegally marketing the drug Depakote. Changing investments, changing executives, changing the message – now even changing the company – has been the hallmark of Mr. White's leadership.
Now Abbott joins the list of companies, and CEOs, that when unable to grow their companies lean on misdirection. Kraft and Sara Lee, both Chicago area companies like Abbott, have announced split-ups after failing to create increased shareholder value and laying off thousands of employees. These efforts almost always lead to more problems as organic growth remains stalled, and investors are bamboozled by snake oil claims regarding the future. Hopefully the remaining Abbott investors won't be fooled this time, and they'll find better places for their money than Abbott – or its Newco.
Postscript – the day after publishing this blog 24×7 Wall Street published its annual list of most overpaid CEOs in America. #4 was Miles White, for taking $25.5M in compensation despite a valuation decline of 11.3%!
by Adam Hartung | Sep 15, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Science, Web/Tech, Weblogs
Carol Bartz was unceremoniously fired as CEO by Yahoo’s Board last week. Fearing their decision might leak, the Chairman called Ms. Bartz and fired her over the phone. Expeditious, but not too tactful. Ms. Bartz then informed the company employees of this action via an email from her smartphone – and the next day called the Board of Directors a bunch of doofusses in a media interview. Salacious fodder for the news media, but a distraction from fixing the real problems affecting Yahoo!
Unfortunately, the Yahoo Board seems to have no idea what to do now. A small executive committee is running the company – which assures no bold actions. And a pair of investment banks have been hired to provide advice – which can only lead to recommendations for selling all, or pieces, of the company. Most people seem to think Yahoo’s value is worth more sold off in chunks than it is as an operating company. Wow – what went so wrong? Can Yahoo not be “fixed”?
There was a time, a decade or so back, when Yahoo was the #1 home page for browsers. Yahoo! was the #1 internet location for reading news, and for doing internet searches. And, it pioneered the model of selling internet ads to support the content aggregation and search functions. Yahoo was early in the market, and was a tremendous success.
Like most companies, Yahoo kept doing more of the same as its market shifted. Alta Vista, Microsoft and others made runs at Yahoo’s business, but it was Google primarily that changed the game on Yahoo! Google invested heavily in technology to create superior searches, offered a superior user experience for visitors, gave unique content (Google Maps as an example) and created a tremendously superior engine for advertisers to place their ads on searches – or web pages.
Google was run by technologists who used technology to dramatically improve what Yahoo started – seeing a future which would take advantage of an explosion in users and advertisers as well as web pages and internet use. Yahoo had been run by advertising folks who missed the technology upgrades. Yahoo’s leadership was locked-in to what it new (advertising) and they were slow with new solutions and products, falling further behind Google every year.
In an effort to turn the tide, Yahoo hired what they thought was a technologist in Carol Bartz to run the company. She had previously led AutoCad, which famously ran companies like IBM, Intergraph, DEC (Digital Equipment) and General Electric owned CALMA out of the CAD/CAM (computer aided design and manufacturing) business. She had been the CEO of a big technology winner – so she looked to many like the salvation for Yahoo!
But Ms. Bartz really wasn’t familiar with how to turn an ad agency into a tech company – nor was she particularly skilled at new product development. Her skills were mostly in operations, and developing next generation software. AutoCad was one of the first PC-based CAD products, and over 2 decades AutoCad leveraged the increasing power of PCs to make its products better, faster and relatively cheaper. This constant improvement, and close attention to cost control, made it possible for AutoCad on a PC to come closer and closer to doing what the $250,000 workstations had done. Users switched to the cheaper AutoCad not because it suddenly changed the game, but because PC enhancements made the older, more costly technology obsolete.
Ms. Bartz was stuck on her success formula. Constantly trying to improve. At Yahoo she implemented cost controls, like at AutoCad. But she didn’t create anything significantly new. She didn’t pioneer any new platforms (software or hardware) nor any dramatically new advertising or search products. She tried to do deals, such as with Bing, to somehow partner into better competitiveness, but each year Yahoo fell further behind Google. In a real way, Ms. Bartz fell victim to Google just as DEC had fallen victim to AutoCad. Trying to Defend & Extend Yahoo was insufficient to compete with the game changing Google.
The Board was right to fire Ms. Bartz. She simply did what she knew how to do, and what she had done at AutoCad. But it was not what Yahoo needed – nor what Yahoo needs now. Cost cutting and improvements are not going to catch the ad markets now driven by Google (search and adwords) and Facebook (display ads.) Yahoo is now out of the rapidly growing market – social media – that is driving the next big advertising wave.
Breaking up Yahoo is the easy answer. If the Board can get enough money for the pieces, it fulfills its fiduciary responsibility. The stock has traded near $15/share for 3 years, and the Board can likely obtain the $18B market value for investors. But “another one bites the dust” as the song lyrics go – and Yahoo will follow DEC, Atari, Cray, Compaq, Silicon Graphics and Sun Microsystems into the technology history on Wikipedia. And those Yahoo employees will have to find jobs elsewhere (oh yeah, that pesky jobs problem leading to 9%+ U.S. unemployment comes up again.)
A better answer would be to turn around Yahoo! Yahoo isn’t in any worse condition than Apple was when Steve Jobs took over as CEO. It’s in no worse condition than IBM was when Louis Gerstner took over as its CEO. It can be done. If done, as those examples have shown, the return for shareholders could be far higher than breaking Yahoo apart.
So here’s what Yahoo needs to do now if it really wants to create shareholder value:
- Put in place a CEO that is future oriented. Yahoo doesn’t need a superb cost-cutter. It doesn’t need a hatchet wielder, like the old “Chainsaw Al Dunlap” that tore up Scott Paper. Yahoo needs a leader that can understand trends, develop future scenarios and direct resources into developing new products that people want and need. A CEO who knows that investing in innovation is critical.
- Quit trying to win the last war with Google. That one is lost, and Google isn’t going to give up its position. Specifically, the just announced Yahoo+AOL+Microsoft venture to sell ad remnants is NOT where Yahoo needs to spend its resources. Every one of these 3 companies has its own problems dealing with market shifts (AOL with content management as dial-up revenues die, Microsoft with PC market declines and mobile device growth.) None is good at competing against Google, and together its a bit like asking 3 losers in a 100 meter dash if they think by forming a relay team they could somehow suddenly become a “world class” group. This project is doomed to failure, and a diversion Yahoo cannot afford now.
- In that same vein, quit trying to figure out if AOL or Microsoft will buy Yahoo. Microsoft could probably afford it – but like I said – Microsoft has its hands full trying to deal with the shift from PCs to tablets and smartphones. Buying Yahoo would be a resource sink that could possibly kill Microsoft – and it’s assured Microsoft would end up shutting down the company piecemeal (as it does all acquisitions.) AOL has seen its value plummet because investors are unsure if it will turn the corner before it runs out of cash. While there are new signs of life since buying Huffington Post, ongoing struggles like firing the head of TechCrunch keep AOL fully occupied fighting to find its future. Any deal with either company should send investors quickly to the sell post, and probably escalate the Yahoo demise with the lowest possible value.
- Give business heads the permission to develop markets as they see fit. Ms. Bartz was far too controlling of the business units, and many good ideas were not implemented. Specifically, for example, Right Media should be given permission to really advance its technology base and go after customers unencumbered by the Yahoo brand and organization. Right Media has a chance of being really valuable – that’s why people would ostensibly buy it – so give the leaders the chance to make it successful. Maybe then the revolving door of execs at Right (and other Yahoo business units) would stop and something good would happen.
- Hold existing business units “feet to the fire” on results. Yahoo has notoriously not delivered on new ad platforms and other products – missing development targets and revenue goals. Innovation does not succeed if those in leadership are not compelled to achieve results. Being lax on performance has killed new product development – and those things that aren’t achieving results need to stop. Specifically, it’s probably time to stop the APT platform that is now years behind, and because it’s targeted against Google unlikely to ever succeed.
- Invest in new solutions. Take all that wonderful trend data that Yahoo has (maybe not as much as Google – but a lot more than most companies) and figure out what Yahoo needs to do next. Rip off a page from Apple, which flattened spending on the Mac in order to invest in the iPod. Learn from Amazon, which followed the trends in retail to new storefronts, expanded offerings, a mobile interface and Kindle launch. Yahoo needs to quit trying to gladiator fight with Google – where it can’t win – and identify new markets and solutions where it can. Yahoo must quit being a hostage to its history, and go do the next big thing! Create some white space in the company to invest in new solutions on the trends!
Of course, this is harder than just giving up and selling the company. But the potential returns are much, much higher. Yahoo’s predicament is tough, but it’s been a management failure that got it here. If management changes course, and focuses on the future, Yahoo can once again become a market leading company. Sure would like to see that kind of leadership. It’s how America creates jobs.
by Adam Hartung | Aug 24, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
“You’ve got to be kidding me” was the line tennis great John McEnroe made famous. He would yell it at officials when he thought they made a bad decision. I can’t think of a better line to yell at Leo Apotheker after last week’s announcements to shut down the tablet/WebOS business, spin-off (or sell) the PC business and buy Autonomy for $10.2B. Really. You’ve got to be kidding me.
HP has suffered mightily from a string of 3 really lousy CEOs. And, in a real way, they all have the same failing. They were wedded to their history and old-fashioned business notions, drove the company looking in the rear view mirror and were unable to direct HP along major trends toward future markets where the company could profitably grow!
Being fair, Mr. Apotheker inherited a bad situation at HP. His predecessors did a pretty good job of screwing up the company before he arrived. He’s just managing to follow the new HP tradition, and make the company worse.
HP was once an excellent market sensing company that invested in R&D and new product development, creating highly profitable market leading products. HP was one of the first “Silicon Valley” companies, creating enormous shareholder value by making and selling equipment (oscilliscopes for example) for the soon-to-explode computer industry. It was a leader in patent applications, new product launches and being first with products that engineers needed, and wanted.
Then Carly Fiorina decided the smart move in 2001 was to buy Compaq for $25B. Compaq was getting creamed by Dell, so Carly hoped to merge it with HP’s retail PC business and let “scale” create profits. Only, the PC business had long been a commodity industry with competitors competing on cost, and the profits largely going to Intel and Microsoft! The “synergistic” profits didn’t happen, and Carly got fired.
But she paved the way for HPs downfall. She was the first to cut R&D and new product development in favor of seeking market share in largely undifferentiated products. Why file 3,500 patents a year – especially when you were largely becoming a piece-assembly company of other people’s technology? To get the cash for acquisitions, supply chain investments and retail discounts Carly started a whole new tradition of doing less innovation, and spending a lot being a copy-cat.
But in an information economy, where almost all competitors have market access and can achieve highly efficient supply chains at low cost, there was no profit to the volume Carly sought. HP became HPQ – but the price paid was an internal shift away from investing in new markets and innovation, and heading straight toward commoditization and volume! The most valuable liquid in all creation – HP ink – was able to fund a lot of the company’s efforts, but it was rapidly becoming the “golden goose” receiving a paltry amount of feed. And itself entirely off the trend as people kept moving away from printed documents!
Mark Hurd replaced Carly, And he was willing to go her one better. If she was willing to reduce R&D and product development – well he was ready to outright slash it! And all the better, so he could buy other worn out companies with limited profits, declining share and management mis-aligned with market trends – like his 2008 $13.9B acquisition of EDS! Once a great services company, offshore outsourcing and rabid price competition had driven EDS nearly to the point of bankruptcy. It had gone through its own cost slashing, and was a break-even company with almost no growth prospects – leading many analysts to pan the acquisition idea. But Mr. Hurd believed in the old success formula of selling services (gee, it worked 20 years before for IBM, could it work again?) and volume. He simply believed that if he kept adding revenue and cutting cost, surely somewhere in there he’d find a pony!
And patent applications just kept falling. By the end of his cost-cutting reign, the once great R&D department at HP was a ghost of its former self. From 9%+ of revenues on new products, expenditures were down to under 2%! And patent applications had fallen by 2/3rds
Chart Source: AllThingsD.com “Is Innovation Dead at HP?“
The patent decline continued under Mr. Apotheker. The latest CEO intent on implementing an outdated, industrial success formula. But wait, he has committed to going even further! Now, HP will completely evacuate the PC business. Seems the easy answer is to say that consumer businesses simply aren’t profitable (MediaPost.com “Low Margin Consumers Do It Again, This Time to HP“) so HP has to shift its business entirely into the B-2-B realm. Wow, that worked so well for Sun Microsystems.
I guess somebody forgot to tell consumer produccts lacked profits to Apple, Amazon and NetFlix.
There’s no doubt Palm was a dumb acquisition by Mr. Hurd (pay attention Google.) Palm was a leader in PDAs (personal digital assistants,) at one time having over 80% market share! Palm was once as prevalent as RIM Blackberries (ahem.) But Palm did not invest sufficiently in the market shifts to smartphones, and even though it had technology and patents the market shifted away from its “core” and left Palm with outdated technology, products and limited market growth. By the time HP bought Palm it had lost its user base, its techology lead and its relevancy. Mr. Hurd’s ideas that somehow the technology had value without market relevance was another out-of-date industrial thought.
The only mistake Mr. Apotheker made regarding Palm was allowing the Touchpad to go to market at all – he wasted a lot of money and the HP brand by not killing it immediately!
It is pretty clear that the PC business is a waning giant. The remaining question is whether HP can find a buyer! As an investor, who would want a huge business that has marginal profits, declining sales, an extraordinarily dim future, expensive and lethargic suppliers and robust competitors rapidly obsoleting the entire technology? Getting out of PCs isn’t escaping the “consumer” business, because the consumer business is shifting to smartphones and tablets. Those who maintain hope for PCs all think it is the B-2-B market that will keep it alive. Getting out is simply because HP finally realized there just isn’t any profit there.
But, is the answer is to beef up the low-profit “services” business, and move into ERP software sales with a third-tier competitor?
I called Apotheker’s selection as CEO bad in this blog on 5 October, 2010 (HP and Nokia’s Bad CEO Selections). Because it was clear his history as CEO of SAP was not the right background to turn around HP. Today ERP (enterprise resource planning) applications like SAP are being seen for the locked-in, monolithic, buraucracy creating, innovation killing systems they really are. Their intent has always been, and remains, to force companies, functions and employees to replicate previous decisions. Not to learn and do anything new. They are designed to create rigidity, and assist cost cutting – and are antithetical to flexibility, market responsiveness and growth.
But following in the new HP tradition, Mr. Apotheker is reshuffling assets – closing the WebOS business, getting rid of all “consumer” businesses, and buying an ERP company! Imagine that! The former head of SAP is buying an SAP application! Regardless of what creates value in highly dynamic, global markets Mr. Apotheker is implementing what he knows how to do – operate an ERP company that sells “business solutions” while leaving everything else. He just can’t wait to get into the gladiator battle of pitting HP against SAP, Oracle, J.D. Edwards and the slew of other ERP competitors! Even if that market is over-supplied by extremely well funded competitors that have massive investments and enormously large installed client bases!
What HP desperately needs is to connect to the evolving marketplace. Quit looking at the past, and give customers solutions that fit where the market is headed. Customers aren’t moving toward where Apotheker is taking the company.
All 3 of HP’s CEOs have been a testament to just how bad things can go when the CEO is more convinced it is important to do what worked in the past, rather than doing what the market needs. When the CEO is locked-in to old thinking, old market dynamics and old solutions – rather than fixated on understanding trends, future scenarios and the solutions people want and need bad things happen.
There are a raft of unmet needs in the marketplace. For a decade HP has ignored them. Its CEOs have spent their time trying to figure out how to make old solutions work better, faster and cheaper. And in the process they have built large, but not very profitable businesses that are now uninteresting at best and largely at the precipice of failure. They have ignored market shifts in favor of doing more of the same. And the value of HP keeps declining – down 50% this year. For HP to change direction, to increase value, it needs a CEO and leadership team that can understand important trends, fulfill unmet needs and migrate customers to new solutions. HP needs to rediscover innovation.
by Adam Hartung | Aug 18, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Innovation, Leadership, Lifecycle, Web/Tech
The business world was surprised this week when Google announced it was acquiring Motorola Mobility for $12.5B – a 63% premium to its trading price (Crain’s Chicago Business). Surprised for 3 reasons:
- because few software companies move into hardware
- effectively Google will now compete with its customers like Samsung and HTC that offer Android-based phones and tablets, and
- because Motorola Mobility had pretty much been written off as a viable long-term competitor in the mobile marketplace. With less than 9% share, Motorola is the last place finisher – behind even crashing RIM.
Truth is, Google had a hard choice. Android doesn’t make much money. Android was launched, and priced for free, as a way for Google to try holding onto search revenues as people migrated from PCs to cloud devices. Android was envisioned as a way to defend the search business, rather than as a profitable growth opportunity. Unfortunately, Google didn’t really think through the ramifications of the product, or its business model, before taking it to market. Sort of like Sun Microsystems giving away Java as a way to defend its Unix server business. Oops.
In early August, Google was slammed when the German courts held that the Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 could not be sold – putting a stop to all sales in Europe (Phandroid.com “Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 Sales Now Blocked in Europe Thanks to Apple.”) Clearly, Android’s future in Europe was now in serious jeapardy – and the same could be true in the USA.
This wasn’t really a surprise. The legal battles had been on for some time, and Tab had already been blocked in Australia. Apple has a well established patent thicket, and after losing its initial Macintosh Graphical User Interface lead to Windows 25 years ago Apple plans on better defending its busiensses these days. It was also well known that Microsoft was on the prowl to buy a set of patents, or licenses, to protect its new Windows Phone O/S planned for launch soon.
Google had to either acquire some patents, or licenses, or serously consider dropping Android (as it did Wave, Google PowerMeter and a number of other products.) It was clear Google had severe intellectual property problems, and would incur big legal expenses trying to keep Android in the market. And it still might well fail if it did not come up with a patent portfolio – and before Microsoft!
So, Google leadership clearly decided “in for penny, in for a pound” and bought Motorola. The acquisition now gives Google some 16-17,000 patents. With that kind of I.P. war chest, it is able to defend Android in the internicine wars of intellectual property courts – where license trading dominates resolutions between behemoth competitors.
Only, what is Google going to do with Motorola (and Android) now? This acquisition doesn’t really fix the business model problem. Android still isn’t making any money for Google. And Motorola’s flat Android product sales don’t make any money either.
Source: Business Insider.com
In fact, the Android manufacturers as a group don’t make much money – especially compared to industry leader Apple:
Source: Business Insider.com
There was a lot of speculation that Google would sell the manufacturing business and keep the patents. Only – who would want it? Nobody needs to buy the industry laggard. Regardless of what the McKinsey-styled strategists might like to offer as options, Google really has no choice but to try running Motorola, and figuring out how to make both Android and Motorola profitable.
And that’s where the big problem happens for Google. Already locked into battles to maintain search revenue against Bing and others, Google recently launched Google+ in an all-out war to take on the market-leading Facebook. In cloud computing it has to support Chrome, where it is up against Microsoft, and again Apple. Oh my, but Google is now in some enormously large competitive situations, on multiple fronts, against very well-heeled competitors.
As mentioned before, what will Samsung and HTC do now that Google is making its own phones? Will this push them toward Microsoft’s Windows offering? That would dampen enthusiasm for Android, while breathing life into a currently non-competitor in Microsoft. Late to the game, Microsoft has ample resources to pour into the market, making competition very, very expensive for Google. It shows all the signs of two gladiators willing to fight to the loss-amassing death.
And Google will be going into this battle with less-than-stellar resources. Motorola is the market also ran. Its products are not as good as competitors, and its years of turmoil – and near failure – leading to the split-up of Motorola has left its talent ranks decimated – even though it still has 19,000 employees Google must figure out how to manage (“Motorola Bought a Dysfunctional Company and the Worst Android Handset Maker, says Insider“).
Acquisitions that “work” are ones where the acquirer buys a leader (technology, products, market) usually in a high growth area – then gives that acquisition the permission and resources to keep adapting and growing – what I call White Space. That’s what went right in Google’s acquisitions of YouTube and DoubleClick, for example. With Motorola, the business is so bad that simply giving it permssion and resources will lead to greater losses. It’s hard to disaagree with 24/7 Wall Street.com when divulging “S&P Gives Big Downgrade on Google-Moto Deal.”
Some would like to think of Google as creating some transformative future for mobility and copmuting. Sort of like Apple.
Yea, right.
Google is now stuck defending & extending its old businesses – search, Chrome O/S for laptops, Google+ for mail and social media, and Android for mobility products. And, as is true with all D&E management, its costs are escalating dramatically. In every market except search Google has entered into gladiator battles late against very well resourced competitors with products that are, at best, very similar – lacking game-changing characteristics. Despite Mr. Page’s potentially grand vision, he has mis-positioned Google in almost all markets, taken on market-leading and well funded competition, and set Google up for a diasaster as it burns through resources flailing in efforts to find success.
If you weren’t convinced of selling Google before, strongly consider it now. The upcoming battles will be very, very expensive. This acquisition is just so much chum in the water – confusing but not beneficial.
And if you still don’t own Apple – why not? Nothing in this move threatens the technology, product and market leader which continues bringing game-changers to market every few months.
by Adam Hartung | Aug 8, 2011 | Current Affairs, Food and Drink, In the Swamp, Innovation, Leadership, Quotes
"If you can't dazzle 'em with brilliance – Baffle 'em with Bulls**t" – W. C. Fields
Just 18 months ago Kraft CEO Irene Rosenfeld was working very hard to convince investors she needed to grow Kraft with a $19B acquisition of Cadbury. This was after her expensive acquisition of Lu Biscuits from Danone. Part of her justification for the massive expenditure was an out-of-date industrial manufacturing adage, "Scale is a source of great competitive advantage. " How these acquisitions provided scale advantage was never explained.
Now she wants to convince investors Kraft needs to be split into two companies, saying the acquisition trail has left her with "different portfolios." (Quotes from the Wall Street Journal, "Activists Pressed for Kraft Spinoff") For some reason, scale is now less important than portfolio focus. And the scale advantages that justified the acquisition premiums are now – unimportant?
If Ms. Rosenfeld was a politician, she might be accused of being a "flip-flopper." Remember John Kerry?
Ms. Rosenfeld would like to break Kraft into 2 parts. Some brands would be in a new "grocery," or "domestic" business (Oscar Mayer, Cool Whip, Maxwell House, Jell-O, Philadelphia Cream Cheese, Kool Aid, Miracle Whip is a partial list.) The rest of the company would be a "snack" or "international" business. Although the latter would still include the North American snacks and confectionary brands. (More detail in the Wall Street Journal "Kraft: Breaking Down the Breakup.")
We will ignore the obvious questions about why the acquisitions if your strategy was to split up the company. Instead, looking forward, the critical questions to have answered would be "How will this break-up help Kraft grow? And what is the benefit for investors, employees and shareholders of this massive, and costly, change?"
Kraft was split off from Altria at the end of 2006, with Ms. Rosenfeld at the helm. At its rebirth, Kraft became a Dow Jones Industrial member. Rich in revenues and resources, at the time, Kraft was valued at about $35/share. Now, 5 years and all the M&A machinations later, Kraft is valued (with optimism about the breakup value) at about $35/share! Between the two dates the company's value was almost always lower. So investors have gained nothing for their 5 years of waiting for Ms. Rosenfeld to "transform" Kraft.
The big winners at Kraft have been their investment bankers. They received enormous multi-million dollar fees for helping Ms. Rosenfeld buy and sell businesses. And they will receive massive additional fees if the company is split in two. In fact, given her focus on M&A as opposed to actually growing Kraft, one could well assess Ms. Rosenfeld's tenure as more investment banker than Chief Executive Officer. She didn't really do anything to improve Kraft. She just moved around the pieces, and swapped some.
Kraft has had no growth, other than from the expensive purchased acquisition revenues. Despite its massive $50B revenue stream, what new innovation – what exciting new product – can you recall Kraft introducing? Go ahead, take your time. We can wait.
What's that – you can't think of any. Nor can anybody else.
In Kraft's historical businesses, volume declined 1.5% over the last couple of years. The company has been shrinking. According to Crain's Chicago Business in "Kraft's Rosenfeld's About Face Spurred by Dwindling Options," the only reason revenues grew in the base business was due to rising commodity prices, which were passed along, with a premium added, in retail price increases to consumers! A business doesn't have a sparkling future when it keeps selling less, and raising prices, on products that consumers largely could care less about.
When was the last time you asked for a Velveeta sandwich? Interestly, Tang now seems to have outlived even NASA and the American space program. Have you enjoyed that sugar-laden breakfast delight lately? Or when did you last look for that special opportunity to use artificial ice-cream (Cool Whip) in your desert?
BusinessInsider.com tried valiantly to make the case "The Kraft Foods Split is the Grand Finale of an Epic Transformation." But as the author takes readers through the myriad re-organizations, in the end we realize that all these changes did nothing to actually improve the business – and managed to tick off Kraft's largest investor, Warren Buffet of Berkshire Hathaway, who has been selling shares!
The argument that Kraft has 2 portfolios as a justification for splitting the company makes no sense. Every investor is taught to have a wide portfolio in order to maximize returns at lowest risk. That Kraft has multiple product lines is a benefit to investors, not a negative!
Unless the leaders have no idea how to use the resources from these businesses to innovate, and bring out new products building on market trends and creating growth! And that's the one thing most lacking at Kraft. It's not a portfolio issue – it's a complete lack of innovation issue! As Burt Flickingerof Strategic Resources Group pointed out, Kraft has been losing .5% to 1% market share every year for the last decade in its "core" business, and he understatedly commente that Kraft has "very little innovation."
Markets have shifted dramatically the last 5 years, and food is no exception. People want fewer carbs, and fewer fats. They want easily prepared foods, but without additives like sugar (or high fructose corn syrup,) salt and oil that have negative long-term health implications for blood pressure, heart disease and diabetes. Also, they don't want hidden calories that make ease of preparation a trade-off with their wastelines! Further, most families have changed from the traditional 3 times per day standard meals to more grazing habits, and from large portions to smaller portions with greater variety.
But Kraft addressed none of these shifts with new products. Instead, it kept pouring advertising dollars into the traditional foodstuffs, even as these were finding less and less fit with 2011 dietary needs – or consumer interest! When the most exciting thing anyone can say about a Kraft launch the last 5 years was the re-orientation of the Triscuit line (did you catch that, or did you somehow miss it?) then it's pretty clear innovation has been on the back burner. Or maybe stuck in the shelf with the Cheez Whiz.
It is clear that Ms. Rosenfeld offered no brilliance as Kraft's leader. Uninspiring to consumers, investors and employees. She made very expensive acquisitions to create the illusion of revenue growth; financial machinations that hid declines in the traditional business which suffered from no innovation investment. After all that money was thrown around, and facing very little prospect of any growth, it was time for the biggest baffling bulls**t of all – split the company up so nobody can trace the value destruction!
Andrew Lazar at Barclay's Capital Plc gave a pretty good insight in another Crain's Chicago Business article ("Kraft Jettisons U. S. Brands so Global Snack Biz Can Fly Higher.") He said Kraft (aka Ms. Rosenfeld) is "Taking action before it ever has to potentially disappoint investors in a struggle to reach overly optimistic sales growth targets."
Yes, I think Mr. Fields had it pretty right when it comes to describing the leadership of Ms. Rosenfeld and her team at Kraft. They have been unable to dazzle us with any brilliance. The question is whether we'll be foolish enough to let them baffle us with their ongoing bulls**t. What Kraft needs is not a break-up. What Kraft needs is new leadership that understands how to move beyond the past, tie investments to market needs, and start Kraft growing again!!
This week most people don't really care about Kraft. After the U.S. debt ceiling "crisis," followed by the Friday night announcement of the U.S. debt downgrade, the news has been dominated by mostly economic, rather than company, items. The collapse of the DJIA has been a lot more important than a non-value-adding split-up of a single component. And that is unfortunate, because the leadership of Kraft have been playing chess games with company pieces, rather than actually doing what it takes to help a company grow. With the right leadership, Kraft could be creating the jobs everyone so desperately wants.
by Adam Hartung | Jun 30, 2011 | Current Affairs, In the Swamp, Leadership, Web/Tech
Google rolled out its newest social media product this week. Unfortuntately for Google investors, this is not a good thing.
Internet usage is changing. Dramatically. Once the web was the world’s largest library, and simultaneously the world’s biggest shopping mall. In that environment, what everyone needed was to find things. And Google was the world’s best tool for finding things. When the noun, Google, became the verb “googled” (as in “I googled your history” or I googled your brand to see where I could buy it”) it was clear that Google had permanently placed itself in the long history of products that changed the world.
But increasingly the internet is not about just finding things. Today people are using the internet more as a way to network, communicate and cooperatively share information – using sites like Facebook, LInked-in and Twitter. Although web usage is increasing, old style “search-based” use is declining, with all the growth coming from “social-based” use: 
Chart source: AllThingsD.com
This poses a very real threat to Google. Not in 2011, but the indication is that being dominant in search has a limit to Google’s future revenue growth through selling search-based ads. And, in fact, while internet ads continue growing in all ad categories, none is growing as fast as display ads. And of this the Facebook market is growing the fastest, as MediaPost.com pointed out in its headline “On-line Ad Spend up, Facebook soars 22%.” In on-line display ads Facebook is now first, followed by Yahoo! (the original market dominator) and Google is third, as described in “Facebook Serves 25% of Display Ads.”
While Google is not going to become obsolete overnight, the trend is now distinctly moving away from Google’s area of domination and toward the social media marketplace. Products like Facebook are emerging as platforms which can displace your need for a web site (why build a web site when all you need is on their platform?) or even email. Their referral networks have the ability to be more powerful than a generic web search when you seek information. And by tying you together with others like you, they can probably move you to products and buying locations you really want faster than a keyword Google-style search. BNet.com headlined “How Facebook Intends to Supplant Google as the Web’s #1Utility,” and it just might happen – as we see users are increasingly spending more time on Facebook than Google: 
Source: Silicon Alley Insider
So, you would think it’s a good thing for Google to launch Google+. Although earlier efforts to enter this market were unsuccessful (Google Buzz and Google Wave being two well known efforts,) it would, on the surface, seem like Google has no option but to try, try again.
Only, Google + is not a breakthrough in social media. By all accounts its a collection of things already offered by Facebook and others, without any remarkable new packaging (see BusinessInsider.com “Google’s Launch of Google + is, once again, deeply embarrassing” or “Google Plus looks like everything else” or “Wow, Google+ looks EXACTLY like Facebook.”) With Facebook closing in on 1 billion users, it’s probably too late – and will be far too expensive, for Google to ever catch the big lead. Especially with Facebook in China, and Google noticably not.
Like many tech competitors, Google’s had a game-changer come along and move its customers toward a different solution. Google Plus will be in a gladiator war, where everyone gets bloody and several end up dead. NewsCorp is finally exiting social media as it sells MySpace for a $550m loss – clearly a body being drug from the colliseum! Even with its early lead, and big expenditures of time and managerial talent, NewsCorp was thrashed in the gladiator war. 
Source: BusinessInsider.com
Google may have a lot of money to spend on this battle, but shareholders will NOT benefit from the fight. It will be long, costly and inevitably not profitable. Yes, Google needs to find new ways to grow as the market shifts – but trying to do so by engaging such powerful, funded and well-positioned competitors as the big 3 of social media is not a smart investment.
And that leads us to why Google + is really problematic. Resources spent there cannot be spent on other opporunities which have high growth potential, and far fewer competitors. BI‘s headline “Google kills off two of its most ambitious projects” should send shudders of fear down shareholder backs. Google had practically no competitors in its efforts to change how Americans buy and use both healthcare servcies and utilities such as electricty and natural gas. Two enormous markets, where Google was alone in efforts to partner with other companies and rebuild supply chains in ways that would benefit consumers. Neither of these projects are as costly as Google+, and neither has entrenched competition. Both are enormous, and Google was the early entrant, with game-changing solutions, from which it could capture most, if not all, the value — just as it did with its early search and ad-words success.
Additionally, Chromebooks is now coming to market. Android has been a remarkable success, trouncing RIM and with multiple vendors supporting it rapidly taking ground from Apple’s iPhone. Only Google has made almost nothing from this platform. Chromebooks offers a way for Google to improve monetizing its growing – and perhaps someday #1 – platform in the rapidly growing tablet business against a very weak Microsoft. But, with so much attention on Google+ Microsoft is given berth for launching its Office 365 product as a challenger. With so much opportunity in cloud computing, and Google’s early lead in multiple products, Google has a real chance of being bigger than Apple someday. But it’s movement into social media will not allow it to focus on cloud products as it should, and give Microsoft renewed opportunity to compete.
Google is setting itself up for potential disaster. While its historical business slowly starts losing its growth, the company is entering into 3 very expensive gladiator wars. First is the ongoing battle for smartphone users against Apple, where it is spending money on Android that largely benefits handset manufacturers. Secondly it is now facing a battle for enterprise and personal productivity apps based in cloud computing where it has not yet succeeding in taking the lead position, yet faces increasing competition from Apple’s iCloud and Microsoft’s new round of cloud apps. And on top of that Google now tells investors it is going to go toe-to-toe with the fastest growing software companies out there – Facebook, Linked-in, Twitter and a host of other entrants. And to fund this they are abandoning markets where they were practically the only game changing solution.
There’s a lot yet to happen in the fast-moving tech markets. But now is the time for investors to wait and see. Google’s engineers are very talented. But it’s strategy may well be very costly, and unable to compete on all fronts. You may not want to sell Google shares today, but it’s hard to find a reason to buy them.
