For the last decade, Wal-Mart has been "dead money" in investor parlance. After a big jump between 1995 and 2000, the stock today is still worth less than it was in 2000. There has been volatility, which might have benefited some traders. But for most of the decade Wal-Mart's price has been lower. There has been excitement because recently the price has been catching up with where it was in 2002, even though there have been no real gains for long term investors.
What happened to Wal-Mart was the market shifted. For many years being the market leader with every day low pricing was a winning strategy. Wal-Mart was able to expand from town to town opening new stores, all pretty much alike, doing the same thing and making really good money.
Then competitors took aim at Wal-Mart, and found out they could beat the giant.
Eventually the number of towns that both needed, and justified, a new Wal-Mart (or Sam's Club) dried up. Wal-Mart reacted by expanding many stores, making them "bigger and better," even adding groceries to some. But that added only marginally to revenue, and even less marginally to profits.
And Wal-Mart tried exporting its stores internationally, but that flopped as local market competitors found ways to better attract local customers than Wal-Mart's success formula offered.
Other U.S. discounters, like Target and Kohl's, offered nicer stores with more varieties or classier merchandise – and often their pricing was not much higher, or even the same. And a new category of retailer, called "dollar stores" emerged that beat Wal-Mart's price on almost everything for the true price shopper. These 99 cent stores became really popular, and the fastest growing traditional retail concept in America. Simultaneously, big box retailers like Best Buy expanded their merchandise and footprint into more locations, dramatically increasing the competition against local Wal-Mart's stores.
But, even more dramatically, the whole retail market began shifting on-line.
Amazon, and its brethren, kept selling more and more products. And at prices even lower than Wal-Mart. And again, for price shoppers, the growth of eBay, Craigslist and vertical market sites made it possible for shoppers to find slightly used, or even new, products at prices lower than Wal-Mart, and shipped right into the customer's home. With each year, people found less need to buy at Wal-Mart as the on-line options exploded.
More recently, traditional price-focused retailers have been attacked by mobile devices. Firstly, there's the new Kindle Fire. In just one quarter it has gone from nowhere to tied as the #1 Android tablet
The Kindle Fire is squarely targeted at growing retail sales for Amazon, making it easier than ever for customers to ignore the brick-and-mortar store in favor of on-line retailers.
On top of this, according to Pew Research 52% of in-store shoppers now use a mobile device to check price and availability on-line of products as they look in the store. Thus a customer can look at products in Wal-Mart, and while standing in the aisle look for that same product, or comparable, in another store on-line. They can decide they like the work boots at Wal-Mart, and even try them on for size. Then they can order from Zappos or another on-line retailer to have those boots shipped to their home at an even lower price, or better warranty, even before leaving the Wal-Mart store.
It's no wonder then that Wal-Mart has struggled to grow its revenues. Wal-Mart has been a victim of intense competition that found ways to attack its success formula effectively.
Then Wal-Mart implemented its "Shoot Yourself in the Head" strategy
What did Wal-Mart recently do? According to Reuters Wal-Mart decided to transfer its entire marketing department to work for merchandising. Marketing was moved from reporting to the CEO, to reporting into Sales. The objective was to put all the energy of marketing into trying to further defend the Wal-Mart business, and drive up same-store sales. In other words, to make sure marketing was fully focused on better executing the old, struggling success formula.
The marketing department at Wal-Mart does all the market research on customers, trends and advertising – traditional and on-line. Marketing is the organization charged with looking outside, learning and adapting the organization to any market shifts. In this role marketing is expected to identify new competitors, new market solutions that are working better, and adapt the organization to shifting market needs. It is responsible to be the eyes and ears of the organization, and then think up new solutions addressing these external inputs. That's why it needs to report to the CEO, so it can drive toward new solutions that can revitalize the organization and keep it growing with new market trends.
But now, it's been shot. Reporting to sales, marketing's role directed at driving same store sales is purely limiting the function to defending and extending the success formula that has produced lackluster results for 12 years. Marketing is no longer in a position to adapt Wal-Mart. Instead, it is tasked to find ways to do more, better, faster, cheaper under the leadership of the sales organization.
When faced with market shifts, winning companies adapt. Look at how skillfully Amazon has moved from book seller to general merchandise seller to offering a consumer electronic device.
Unfortunately, too many businesses react to market shifts like Wal-Mart. They hunker down, do more of the same and re-organize to "increase focus" on the traditional business as results suffer. Instead of adapting the company hopes more focus on execution will somehow improve results.
Not likely. Expect results to go the other direction. There might be a short-term improvement from the massive influx of resource, but long term the trends are taking customers to new solutions. Regardless of the industry leader's size. Don't expect Wal-Mart to be a long-term winner. Better to invest in competitors taking advantage of trends.
What both share is a willingness to focus their companies on the future. Both have introduced major new products, targeted at developing new markets and entirely new revenue streams for their companies. Both have significantly sacrificed short-term profits seeking long-term strategic positioning for sustainable, higher future returns. Both have, and continue to, spend vast sums of money in search of competitive advantage for their organizations.
And both have seen their stock value clobbered. In 2011 Amazon rose from $150/share low to almost $250 before collapsing at year's end to about $175 – actually lower than it started the calendar year. Google's stock dropped from $625/share to below $475 before recovering all the way to $670 – only to crater all the way to $585 last week. Clearly the analysts awarding these CEOs were looking way beyond short-term investor returns when making their selections. So it is more important than ever we understand what both have done, and are planning to do in the future, if we are to support either, or both, as award winners. Or buy their stock.
Google participates in great growth markets
The good news for Google is its participation in high growth markets. Search ads continue growing, supplying the bulk of revenues and profits for the company. Its Android product gives Google great position in mobile devices, and supporting Chrome applications help clients move from traditional architectures and applications to cloud-based solutions at lower cost and frequently higher user satisfaction. Additionally, Google is growing internet display ad sales, a fast growing market, by increasing participation in social networks.
Because Google is in high growth markets, its revenues keep growing healthily. But CEO Page's "focus" leadership has led to the killing of several products, retrenching from several markets, and remarkably huge bets in 2 markets where Google's revenues and profits lag dramatically – mobile devices and search.
Because Android produces no revenue Google bought near-bankrupt Motorola to enter the hardware and applications business becoming similar to Apple – a big bet using some old technology against what is the #1 technology company on the planet. Whether this will be a market share winner for Google, and whether it will make or lose money, is far from certain.
Simultaneously, the Google+ launch is an attempt to take on the King Kong of social – Facebook – which has 800million users and remarkable success. The Google+ effort has been (and will continue to be) very expensive and far from convincing. Its product efforts have even angered some people as Google tried steering social networkers rather heavy-handidly toward Google products – as it did with "Search plus Your World" recently.
Mr. Page has positioned Google as a gladiator in some serious "battles to the death" that are investment intensive. Google must keep fighting the wounded, hurting and desperate Microsoft in search against Bing+Yahoo. While Google is the clear winner, desperate but well funded competitors are known to behave suicidally, and Google will find the competition intensive. Meanwhile, its offerings in mobile and social are not unique. Google is going toe-to-toe with Apple and Facebook with products which show no great superiority. And the market leaders are wildly profitable while continuously introducing new innovations. It will be tough fighting in these markets, consuming lots of resources.
Entering 3 gladiator battles simultaneously is ambitious, to say the least. Whether Google can afford the cost, and can win, is debatable. As a result it only takes a small miss, comparing actual results to analyst expectations, for investors to run – as they did last week.
Amazon redefines competition in its markets
CEO Bezos' leadership at Amazon is very different. Rather than gladiator wars, Amazon brings out products that are very different and avoids head-to-head competition. Amazon expands new markets by meeting under- or unserved needs with products that change the way customers behave – and keeps competitors from attacking Amazon head-on:
Amazon moved from simply selling books to selling a vast array of products on the web. It changed retail buying not by competing directly with traditional retailers, but by offering better (and different) on-line solutions which traditional retailers ignored or adopted far too slowly. Amazon was very early to offer web solutions for independent retailers to use the Amazon site, and was very early to offer a mobile interface making shopping from smartphones fast and easy. Because it wasn't trying to defend and extend a traditional brick-and-mortar retail model, like Wal-Mart, Amazon has redefined retail and dramatically expanded shopping on-line.
Amazon changed the book market with Kindle. It utilized new technology to do what publishers, locked into traditional mindsets (and business models) would not do. As the print market struggled, Amazon moved fast to take the lead in digital publishing and media sales, something nobody else was doing, producing fast revenue growth with higher margins.
When retailers were loath to adopt tablets as a primary interface for shoppers, Amazon brought out Kindle Fire. Cleverly the Kindle Fire is not directly positioned against the king of all tablets – iPad – but rather as a product that does less, but does things like published media and retail very well — and at a significantly lower price. It brings the new user on-line fast, if they've been an Amazon customer, and makes life simple and easy for them. Perhaps even easier than the famously easy Apple products.
In all markets Amazon moves early and deftly to fulfill unmet needs at a very good price. And then it captures more and more customers as the solution becomes more powerful. Amazon finds ways to compete with giants, but not head-on, and thus rapidly grow revenues and market position while positioning itself as the long term winner. Amazon has destroyed all the big booksellers – with the exception of Barnes & Noble which doesn't look too great – and one can only wonder what its impact in 5 years will be on traditional retailers like Kohl's, Penney's and even Wal-Mart. Amazon doesn't have to "win" a battle with Apple's iPad to have a wildly successful, and profitable, Kindle offering.
The successful CEO's role is different than many expect
A recent RHR International poll of 83 mid-tier company CEOs (reported at Business Insider) discovered that while most felt prepared for the job, most simultaneously discovered the requirements were not what they expected. In the past we used to think of a CEO as a steward, someone to be very careful with investor money. And someone expected to know the business' core strengths, then be very selective to constantly reinforce those strengths without venturing into unknown businesses.
But today markets shift quickly. Technology and global competition means all businesses are subject to market changes, with big moves in pricing, costs and customer expectations, very fast. Caretaker CEOs are being crushed – look at Kodak, Hostess and Sears. Successful CEOs have to guide their businesses away from investing in money-losing businesses, even if they are part of the company's history, and toward rapidly growing opportunities created by being part of the shift. Disruptors are now leading the success curve, while followers are often sucking up a lot of profit-killing dust.
Amazon bears similarities to the Apple of a decade ago. Introducing new products that are very different, and changing markets. It is competing against traditional giants, but with very untraditional solutions. It finds unmet needs, and fills them in unique ways to capture new customers – and creates market shifts.
Google, on the other hand, looks a lot like the lumbering Microsoft. It has a near monopoly in a growing market, but its investments in new markets come late, and don't offer a lot of innovation. Google's products end up competing directly, somewhat like xBox did with other game consoles, in very, very expensive – usually money-losing – competition that can go on for years. Google looks like a company trying to use money rather than innovation to topple an existing market leader, and killing a lot of good product ideas to keep pouring money into markets where it is late and not terribly creative.
Which CEO do you think will be the winner in 2015? Into which company are you prepared to invest? Both are in high growth markets, but they are being led very, very differently. And their strategies could not be more different. Which one you choose to own – as a product customer or investor – will have significant consequences for you (and them) in 3 years.
It's worth taking the time to decide which you think is the right leadership today. And be sure you know what leadership principles you are adopting, and following in your organization.
A lot of excitement was generated this week when Mitt Romney said the words "I like to fire people." I'm sure he wishes he could rephrase his comment, as he easily could have made his point about changing service providers without those words. Nonetheless, the aftermath turned to a discussion of job losses, and why Bain Capital has eliminated jobs while simultaneously creating some.
Unfortunately, that argument is simply not true. The only thing that allows "creative destruction" to kill a company is a lack of good leadership. Any company can find a growth path if its leaders are willing to learn from trends and steer in the growing direction.
Start by looking at recent events surrounding Kodak and Hostess, both quickly heading for Chapter 11. Neither needed to fail. Management made the decisions which steered them into the whirlpool of failure.
Kodak watched the market for amateur photography shrink for 30 years – drying up profits for film and paper. Yet, management consistently – quarter after quarter and year after year – made the decision to try defending and extending the historical market rather than move the company into faster growing, more profitable opportunities. Kodak even invented much of the technology for digital photography, but chose to license it to others rather than develop the market because Kodak feared cannibalizing existing sales – as they became increasingly at risk!
Hostess is making a return trip to Chapter 11 this decade. But it's not like the trend away from highly processed, shelf stable white bread and sugary pastry snacks is anything new. While 1960s parents and youth might have enjoyed the vitamin enriched Wonder Bread "helping grow bodies 12 ways" the trend toward fresher, and healthier, staples has been happening for 40 years. In the 1980s when the company was known as Continental Baking profits were problematic, and it was clear that to keep what was then the nation's largest truck fleet profitable required new products as consumers were shifting to fresher "bake off" goods in the grocery store as well as brands promising more fiber and taste. But despite these obvious trends, leadership continued trying to defend and extend the business rather than shift it.
These stories weren't "creative destruction." They were simply bad leadership. Decisions were made to do more of the same, when clearly something desperately different was needed! At the Harvard Business School Working Knowledge web site famed strategiest Michael Porter states "the granddaddy of all mistakes is competing to be the best, going down the same path as everybody else and thinking that somehow you can achieve better results." Failure happened because the leaders were so internally focused they chose to ignore external inputs, trends, which would have driven better decisions!
In the 1980s Singer realized that the sewing machine market was destined to decline as women left homemaking for paying jobs, and as textile industry advances made purchased clothing cheaper than self-made. Over a few years the company transitioned out of the traditional, but dying, business and became a very successful defense industry contractor! Rather than letting itself be "creatively destroyed" Singer identified the market trends and moved from decline to growth!
Similarly, IBM almost failed as the computer market shifted from mainframes to PCs, but before all was lost (including jobs as well as investor value) leaders changed company focus from hardware to services and vertical market solutions allowing IBM to grow and thrive.
The failure of Digital Equipment (DEC) at the same time was not "creative destruction" but company leadership unwillingness to shift from declining mini-computer and high priced workstation sales into new businesses.
More recently, over the last decade a nearly dead Apple resurrected itself by tying into the large trend for mobility, rather than focusing on its niche Mac product sales. Company leaders took the company into consumer electronics (ipod, ipod touch,) tablet computing and cloud-based solutions (iPad) and mobile telephony with digital apps (iPhone.) Apple had no legacy in any of these markets, but by linking to trends rather than fixating on past businesses "creative destruction" was avoided.
There are many businesses today that are in trouble because leaders simply won't pay attention to trends. Avon, Sears and Barnes & Noble are three companies with limited futures simply because leaders seem unable to pull their heads out of the internal strategic planning sand and look at environmental trends in order to shift.
My favorite target is, of course, Microsoft. Nobody thinks we will be carrying laptop PCs around in 5 years. Yet, Microsoft has been unable to recognize the trend away from PCs and do anything effective. Its efforts in music (Zune) and mobile handsets have been indifferent, insufficiently supported and mostly dropped. Mr. Ballmer continues to speak about a long future for PC sales even as Q4 volume dropped 1.4% according to IDC and Gartner. Even though everyone knows this trend is due to limited PC innovation and rapidly accelerating mobile-based solutions, Microsoft blamed the problem on, of all things, floods in Thailand that restricted manufacturing output. Really.
We'll learn soon enough just how many jobs Bain Capital created, and killed. But those lost were not due to "creative destruction." They were due to leadership decisions to discontinue the business rather than invest in trends and transitioning to new markets. Creative destruction is an easy excuse to avoid blaming leaders for failures caused by their unwillingness to recognize trends and take actions to invest in them which will create winning businesses.
The S&P 500 ended 2011 almost exactly where it started. If ever there was a year when being invested in the right companies, and selling the dogs, mattered for higher portfolio returns it was 2011. The good news is that many of the 2011 dogs were easy to spot, and easy to sell before ruining your portfolio.
There were many bad performers. However, there was a common theme. Most simply did not adjust to market shifts. Environmental changes, from technology to regulations, made them less competitive thus producing declining returns as newer competitors benefitted. Additionally, these companies chose – often over the course of several years – to eschew innovation and new product launches. They chose to keep investing in efforts to defend and extend historical, but troubled, businesses rather than innovate toward a more successful future.
Looking at the trends that put these companies into trouble we can recognize the need to continue avoiding these companies, even though many analysts are starting to say they may be "value stocks." Instead we can invest in the trends by buying companies likely to grow and increase portfolio returns in 2012.
Avoid Kodak – Buy Apple or Google
Few companies are as iconic as Eastman Kodak, inventor of amateur photography and creator of the star product in the hit 1973 Paul Simon song "Kodachrome." However, it was clear in the late 1980s that digital cameras were going to change photography. Kodak itself was one of the primary inventors of the core technology, but licensed it to others in order to generate cash it invested trying to defend and extend photographic film and paper sales. In my 2008 book "Create Marketplace Disruption" I highlighted Kodak as a company so locked-in to film sales that it was unwilling to even consider moving into new markets.
In 2011 EK lost almost all its value, falling from $3.85 share to about 60 cents. The whole company is now worth only $175M as it rapidly moves toward NYSE delisting and bankruptcy, and complete failure. The trend that doomed EK has been 2 decades in the making, yet like an ocean freighter collision management simply let momentum kill the company. The long slide has gone on for years, and will not reverse. If you want to invest in photography your best plays are smart phone suppliers Apple, and Google for not only the Android software but the Chrome apps that are being used to photoshop images right inside browser windows.
Avoid Sears – Buy Amazon
When hedge fund manager Ed Lampert took over KMart by buying their bonds in bankruptcy, then used that platform to buy Sears back in 2006 the Wall Street folks hailed him as a genius. "Mad Money" Jim Cramer said "Fast Eddie" Lampert was his former college roommate, and that was all he needed to recommend buying the stock. On the strength of such spurrious recommendations, Sears Holdings initially did quite well.
However, I was quoted in The Chicago Tribune the day of the Sears acquisition announcement saying the merged company was doomed – because the trends were clear. Wal-Mart was in pitched battle with Target to "own" the discount market which had crushed KMart. Sears was pinched by them on the low end, and by better operators of vertically focused companies such as Kohl's for clothing, Best Buy for appliances and Home Depot for repair and landscape tools. Sears was swimming against the trends, and Ed Lampert had no plans to re-invent the company. What lay ahead was cost-cutting and store closings which would kill both brands in a market already overly saturated with traditional brick-and-mortar retailers as long-term more sales moved on-line.
The retail future belongs to Amazon.com – which is where you should invest if you want to grow portfolio value in 2012. Look to Kindle Fire and other tablets to accelerate the retail movement on-line, while out-of-date Sears becomes even less relevant and of lower value.
Stay out of Nokia and Research in Motion – Buy Apple
Both companies simply missed the market shift in smart phones. Nokia did its best Motorola imitation, which missed the shift from analog to digital cell phones – and then completely missed the shift to smart phones – driving the company to near bankruptcy and acquisition by Google for its patent library. With no game at all, the Nokia Board hired a former Microsoft executive to arrange a shotgun wedding for launching a new platform – 3 years too late. Now Apple and Android have over 400,000 apps each, growing weekly, while Microsoft is struggling with 50k apps, no compelling reason to switch and struggles to build a developer network. Nokia's road to oblivion appears clear.
RIM was first to the smartphone market, and had it locked up for years. Unfortunately, top management and many investors felt that the huge installed base of corporate accounts, using Blackberry secure servers, would protect the company from competition. Now the New York Times has reported RIM leadership as one of the worst in 2011, because an installed base is no longer the competitive entry barrier Michael Porter waxed about in the early 1980s. Corporations are following their users to better productivty by moving fast as possible to the iOS and Android worlds.
RIM's doomed effort to launch an ill-devised, weakly performing tablet against the Apple iPod juggernaut only served to embarrass the company, at great expense. At this point, there's little reason to think RIM will do any better than Palm did when the technology shifted, and anyone holding RIMM will likely end up with nothing (as did holders of PALM.) If you want to be in mobile your best pick is market leading and profitably growing Apple, with a second position in Google as it builds up ancillary products like Chrome to leverage its growing Android base.
Avoid HP and Sony – Buy Apple
Speaking of Palm, to paraphrase Senator Dirkson "that billion here, a billion there" that added up to some real money lost for HP. Mark Hurd consolidated HP into a company focused on building volume largely in other people's technology – otherwise known as PCs. As printing declines, and people shift to tablets and cloud apps, HP has less and less ability to build its profit base. The trends were all going in the wrong direction as market shifts make HP less and less relevant to consumer and corporate customers.
Selecting Mr. Apotheker was a disastrous choice, and I called for investors to dump the stock when he was hired in January. An ERP executive, he was firmly planted in the technology of the 1990s. With a diminished R&D, and an atrophied new product development organization HP is nothing like the organization of its founders, and the newest CEO has offered no clear path for finding the trends and re-igniting growth at HP. If you want to grow in what we used to call the PC business you need to be in tablets now – and that gets you back, once again, to Apple first, and Google second.
Which opens the door for discussing what in the 1960s through 1980s was the most innovative of all consumer electronics companies, Sony. But when Mr. Morita was replaced by an MBA CEO that began focusing the company on the bottom line, instead of new gadgets, the pipeline rapidly dried. Acquisitions, such as a music label, replaced R&D and new product development. Allegiance to protecting the CD and DVD business, and the players Sony made – along with traditional TVs and PCs – meant Sony missed the wave to MP3, to mobile digital entertainment devices, to DVRs and the emerging market for interactive TV. What was once a leader is now a follower.
As a result Sony has lost $4.5B in investor value the last 3 year, and in 2011 lost half its value falling from $37 to $18/share. As Apple emerges as the top consumer electronics technology leader and profit creator, closely chased by Google, it is unlikely Sony will ever recover that lost value.
Buying Apple, Amazon, Google and Netflix
This column has already made the case for Apple. It is almost incomprehensible how far a lead Apple has over its competition, causing investors to fear for its revenue growth prospects. As a result, the companies P/E multiple is a remarkably low single-digit number, even though its growth is well into the double digits! But its existing position in growth markets, technology leadership and well oiled new product development capability nearly assures continued profitbale growth for at least 5 years. Even though the stock, which I recommended as my number 1 buy in January, 2011, has risen some 30% maintaining a big position is remains an investors best portfolio enhancer.
Amazon was a wild ride in 2011, and today is worth almost the same as it was one year ago. Given that the company is now larger, has a more dominant position in publishing and is the world leader on the trend to on-line retail it is a very good stock to own. The choice to think long-term and build its user links through sales of Kindle Fire at cost has limited short-term profits, but every action Amazon has taken to grow has paid off handsomely because they accelerate the natural trends and position Amazon as the leader. Remaining with the trends, and the growth, offers the potential for big payoff this year and for years to come.
Google remains #2 in most markets, but remains aligned with the trends. It was disappointing that the company cancelled so many great products in 2011 – such as Gear and Wave. And it faces stiff competition in its historical ad markets from the shift toward social media and Facebook's emergence. However, Google is the best positioned company to displace Microsoft on all those tablets out there with its Chrome apps, and it still is a competitor with the potential for long-term value creation. It's just hard to be as excited about Google as Apple and Amazon.
Netflix started 2011 great, but then stumbled. Starting the year at $190, Netflix rose to $305 before falling to $75. Investors have seen an 80% decline from the peak, and a 60% decline from beginning of the year. But this was notably not because company revenues or profits fell, because they didn't. Rather concerns about price changes and long-term competition caused the stock to drop. And that's why I remain bullish for owning Netflix in 2012.
Those who worry about Amazon, Google or Apple taking the Netflix position forget that those companies are making huge bets to compete in other markets and have shown less interest in making the big investments to compete on the content that is critical in the download market. AOL and Yahoo are also bound up trying to define new strategies, and look unlikely to ever be the content companies they once were.
For those who are banking on competitive war with Comcast and other cable companies to kill off Netflix look no further than how they define themselves (cable operators,) and their horrific customer relationship scores to realize that they are more interested in trying to preserve their old business than rapidly enter a new one. Perhaps one will try to buy Netflix, but they don't have the management teams or organization to compete effectively.
The fact is that Netflix still has the best strategy for its market, which is still growing exponentially, has the best pricing and is rapidly growing its content to remain in the top position. That makes it a likely pick for "turnaround of the year" by end of 2012 (at least in the tech/media industry) – even as investments rise over the next 12 months.
It’s a wise person who knows never to be the last person at a business holiday party. Things never go well for those who stay too late.
Yet, far too many businesses stay way, way too long at their market party, focusing on the same strategy when they should have moved into new competition a whole lot earlier.
This week Oracle missed earnings estimates, and the stock fell some 14%, from $30 to under $26. For the year, Oracle is down about a third, from it’s high of $37. The question any investor needs to ask is the one headlined by ZDnet.com “Oracle Earnings: An Aberration or Trend?“
Oracle is very, very poorly positioned for future earnings growth. Like most big software companies, including Microsoft and SAP, Oracle built its business on the formula of large data centers running large “enterprise applications” supporting lots of independent corporate PC users.
And it was clear fully a year (or 2) ago that market simply isn’t growing. Organizations are rapidly shifting away from hard to use, one-size-fits-all (at very high cost) enterprise software applications. Users are moving away from PCs to mobile devices, and refusing to use clunky enterprise interfaces. Worse, software is moving away from data centers in client-server configurations tied to PCs. Instead, companies small and large are rapidly shifting to software-as-service (SAS) environments where the company can pay “by the use” for software maintained in the “cloud.” These solutions are scalable, cheaper to buy, cheaper to implement, vastly more flexible and operate on mobile devices a whole lot better. If you’ve ever used Salesforce.com you’ve experienced the benefit compared to more clunky enterprise Customer Resource Management (CRM) applications.
Oracle missed this trend. Despite all the dozens of acquisitions Oracle has made – such as buying Unix hardware provider Sun Microsystems, it largely missed the shift to cloud architectures. It has remained far, far too long at its party, enjoying the profit-laden punch, and hoping the market would never shift. As the customer base shrank to fewer, and ever larger, big corporations Oracle did not prepare for changes in its business the next day. Oracle has stayed too long, and its ability to compete in new markets against more flexible solution providers such as IFS with better user interface capabilities looks really weak.
Somehow, Best Buy fell into the same trap. In early December the country’s largest “big box” retailer announced lower earnings after cutting prices to shore up revenues. As a result the stock dropped 20%, from about $28 to $22 – continuing a pretty much downhill slide all year of nearly 40% from its high of $36.
Best Buy felt like it was doing great after Circuit City failed. Circuit City had been a darling of the infamous “Good to Great” text. But Circuit City demonstrated that in a market dominated by a long-term trend away from fixed stores and toward on-line purchases, every retailer is bound to struggle.
When Circuit City failed in 2008 investors worried that a weak economy would tank Best Buy as well. But as all that Circuit City capacity disappeared, Best Buy was a short-term winner.
Unfortunately, Best Buy leadership confused short-term sales re-allocation with long-term trends. They, along with a lot of other locked-in brick-and-mortar retailers, felt that things would quickly “return to normal” and Circuit City was the company caught out in the cold when the music stopped. Best Buy chose to stay at its party too long – hoping the dancing would never stop. Its leaders chose to ignore the long-term trend away from traditional retail toward on-line shopping. No wonder BusinessInsider.com headlined a famed investor “Marc Andreessen: Retailers Should Be Scared About 2012.”
What’s surprising is how many people in business think the party will simply never end. That everyone can keep drinking and dancing and rolling in the profits. Even when the trends are obvious.
This 2011 holiday season, every business team should be asking itself “are we staying at the party too long? What trends are affecting our business – and likely to bring this party to a crashing end? What are we doing to prepare for a tough competition tomorrow.”
If you don’t, it’s far too easy you could end up on the downhill slide, with one heck of a horrible hangover – like Oracle and Best Buy – in 2012.
Revenue growth is a wonderful thing. It is so much more fun to work in a growing company than one that isn’t. And high growth is possible, even in this struggling economy, if leaders focus on trends.
Take for example Chipotle. Whether you eat there or not, Chipotle has grown rather spectacularly. From 16 units in 1998 it grew to 500 by 2005 and has 1,100 company owned and operated stores today. Revenues have more than doubled since 2005, to about $2B, while sales/store increased almost 12% in 2010. And investors have been well rewarded, with a market cap increase of 6x in the last 5 years!
Chipotle hit on a trend it called “Food with Integrity.” While that is far from explicit, Chipotle has made a practice of talking about being “natural.” Chipotle often buys local produce for its units, claims to use “natural” meat, presumably with fewer additives, and brags about having no hormones in its dairy products. Such claims have tied into customer trends for better nutrition, higher food safety and improved taste. This allows Chipotle to grow in the most intensely competitive of industries, even during a struggling economic time.
Compare this with McDonald’s. This is not a random selection, as McDonald’s was a 1998 investor in Chipotle, and put around $360M into the chain fueling early growth. McDonald’s was handsomely rewarded for this, receiving around $1.5B (4x) return on its investment when selling Chipotle to the public in 2006.
At the time, McDonald’s was in a horrible situation. It’s stock had dropped from a high of $50 in 2000 to a low of $14 in 2004. McDonald’s took the money from the Chipotle sale and invested all of it in new capital expenditures to defend the McDonald franchise. The good news was that “turnaround” worked and McDonald’s has recaptured its value, roughly doubling market capitalization the last 5 years.
One could consider both of these success stories, unless you look deeper.
Chipotle increased its valued by 6x, McDonald’s by 2x – so investors in the former did fully 3x better than the latter. And where Chipotle is expected to increase the number of its stores by at least another 1/3 in the next few years, McDonald’s struggles to find growth markets. Clearly, investors that swapped their McDonald’s stock for Chipotle’s stock in 2006 did far better – and have prospects of continuing to do even better still with at least some analysts expecting Chipotle to hit $400/share within a year, for another 20% pop.
McDonald’s strategy was built on a 1960s trend for speed and consistency in food. That trend served McDonald’s well for 2 decades, but is far less interesting today. In its effort to generate revenues recently McDonald’s brought us a re-introduced 20 year old product called McRib this October – a product who’s ingredients have people asking questions about health and safety (TheWeek.com“What’s the McRib made of, anyway?) as we learn its mostly high fat pig innards and salt. While McDonald’s has recovered from 2004, is it a platform for growth?
Chipotle is using trends to find new products, new marketing themes, and even a new store concept, Shophouse Southeast Asian Grill, for organic growth. Where McDonald’s is fixated on defending its historical business irrespective of trends, Chipotle is busy investing in current trends.
One has to wonder, what if instead of selling Chipotle, McDonald’s leadership had turned upside down? What if all that management attention had gone into exploding Chipotle’s footprint faster? Introducing even more products? And what if McDonald’s had accepted the trends propelling Chipotle growth and applied them to McDonald’s to give that chain a different customer value proposition and real new products?
McDonald’s could have acted more like Apple. Where McDonald’s has at its core fried meat sandwiches and deep fried potatoes, Apple had its “core” the Macintosh. But instead of investing its resources into defending its core, Apple invested in new products and markets where the trend was more favorable. As a result its market cap grew by 4.5x during the last 5 years, compared to the more subdued 2x at McDonalds – and Apple demonstrated that even very large market cap companies can grow at very high rates when they adopt growth strategies tied to trends.
There are a lot of businesses struggling to grow today. But most aren’t really trying. They keep doing more of what they’ve always done, and hoping for a better result! They don’t accept that trends go in new directions, causing markets to shift. When markets shift, those who follow the trends do far better than those stuck trying to defend their past strategies. It’s smart to act like, and invest in, Chipotle while avoiding the rut that is McDonald’s.
Think about the Post Office’s value proposition. They send someone to almost every single home and business in the entire United States 6 days/week on the hope that there will be a demand for their service – sold at a starting price of 44 cents! For that mere $.44 they will deliver your hand crafted, signed message anywhere else in the entire United States! And, if you want it delivered fairly close they will actually deliver your physical document the very next day! All for 44 cents! And, if you are a large volume customer rates can be even cheaper.
And the Post Office has been a remarkably operationally innovative organizations. Literally billions of items are processed every week (about 700million/day😉 picked up, sorted and distributed across one of the physically largest countries in the world. The distance from Anchorage to Miami (let’s ignore Hawaii for now) is a staggering 5,100 miles, which works out to a miniscule .009 cent/mile for a first class letter! Compare that to the Pony Express cost (in 1860 $10/oz and 10 days Missouri to California,) and adjusted for inflation you’ll be hard pressed to find any business that has continually improved its service, at ever lower (constantly declining when adjusted for inflation) prices.
And while AMR is filing bankruptcy largely to force a new union contract, the Post Office has accomplished its record improvements wtih an almost entirely union workforce.
Executive compensation is surprisingly low. The CEO makes about $800,000/year. Competitor CEOs make much more. At Fedex (the Post Office delivers more items every day that Fedex does in a whole year) the CEO made over $7,400,000, and at UPS (the Post Office delivers more items each week than UPS does annually) the CEO made $9,500,000. So, despite this remarkable effectiveness, the CEO makes only about 1/10th CEOs of much smaller organizations.
The Post Office understands what it must do, and does it extremely efficiently. It knows its “hedgehog concept” and relentlessly pursues it to unparalleled performance. Yet, it is barred from raising prices, is losing money, and is now planning to close 3,700 locations and dramatically curtail services – such as overnight and Saturday delivery in a radical cost reduction effort.
Simply put, the U.S. Postal Service is becoming irrelevant. In the 1980s faxing was the first attack on the mail, but the big market shift began 15 years ago with the advent of email. Now with mobile devices, texting and social media the shift away from physical letters is accelerating. Fewer people write letters, send bills or even pay bills via physical mail. Are you mailing any physical holiday cards this year? How many?
Even the veritable “junk mail” is far less viable these days. Coupons are used less and less – and to the extent they are used they have to be much more immediate and compelling – such as offerings from GroupOn and FourSquare et.al. which arrive at consumers by email and social media usually through a smartphone or tablet mobile device.
The Post Office didn’t really do anything wrong. The market shifted. The Post Office value proposition simply isn’t as valuable. We don’t really care if the mail delivery comes daily, in fact many people forget to check their mailbox for several consecutive day. We don’t much care that a physical letter can transit the continent overnight, because we usually want to communicate immediately. And we don’t need a physical legacy for 99.99% of our communications.
The Post Office is really good at what it does, we just don’t need it. Not any more than we need a good horse shoe or small offset printing press.
The Post Office saw this coming. Over a decade ago the Post Office asked if it could enter new businesses in record retention (medical, income, taxation), automated bill payment, social security check administration and a raft of other opportunities that would provide government delivery and storage services to various agencies and to under-served users such as low-income and the elderly. But its mandate did not include these services, and expansion into new markets required a change in charter which was not approved by Congress. Thus, USPS was stuck doing what it has always done, as market shift pushed the Post Office increasingly into irrelevancy.
And that’s what happens to most failed businesses. They don’t fail because they are lousy at execution. Or because of lousy, inattentive managers. Or even because of unions and high variable costs such as energy. They fall into trouble because they either don’t recognize, or for some other reason don’t move to take advantage of market shifts. It’s not a lack of focus, management laziness or worker intransigence that kills the business. It’s an inability to do what customers really want and value, and spending too much time and money trying to ever optimize something customers increasingly don’t care about.
To their credit, both FedEx and UPS have shifted their businesses along with the market. Both do much, much more than deliver packages. Fedex bought Kinko’s and offers people their “office away from the office” globally, as well as multiple small business solutions. UPS offers a vast array of corporate transportation and logistics services, including e-commerce solutions for businesses of all sizes. Their ability to move with markets, and meet emerging needs has helped both companies justify higher prices and earn substantially better profitability.
The U.S. Post Office is the poster child for what goes wrong when all a company does is focus on efficiency. More, better, faster, cheaper is NOT enough to compete. Being operationally efficient, even low-cost, is not enough to succeed in fast shifting markets where customers have ever-growing and changing needs. Leadership has to be able to recognize market shifts early, and invest in new growth opportunities allowing the company to remain viable in changing markets.
My generation will wax nostalgic about the post office. We’ll weave in “mail” stories with others about days before ubiquitious air conditioning, when all we had was AM radio in the car and 3 stations of black & white television stations at home. They will be fun to reminisce.
But our children, and certainly grandchildren, simply won’t care. Not at all. And we better remember to keep the stories short, so they can be related in 140 characters or less if we want them saved for posterity!
Most people are so used to everything about airlines sucking that news a major filed bankruptcy simply wasn’t surprising. What they cared most about were two questions: “Is my ticket any good?” and “Do I get to keep my frequent flyer miles?”
Conceptually, business is not hard to understand. Create a product or service that people want. Make it appealing enough so people will pay enough to cover costs and make a profit, allowing you to re-invest in growth and repay your investors. Pretty simple.
But AMR, like most airlines, simply doesn’t understand this concept. Yes, people want to fly. But ever since deregulation, service has become worse and worse. Ask anyone what they think of American (or United or Delta or any “major” airline) and answers are the same. They hate them.
Pricing is incomprehensible. You may pay $800 for a ticket, and the person beside you $200 and the reason is completely unclear.
There is never enough room on the plane for all the carry-on luggage, but that is free while the airline charges for checking bags. What they don’t want (carry-ons) is free, what they want (check your bags) requires you pay?
You are charged for a checked bag, but if the bag is late, damaged or items stolen you have no recourse to the airline
When planes are late or cancelled, nobody cares how much customers are inconvenienced. Literally. You have no recourse to bad, or failed, service.
Planes are cramped and dirty, often looking well worn – or worn out.
Every year planes are becoming smaller and less comfortable.
The food is gone – or wildly expensive. And that little botttle of rum costs as much as a fifth at home.
Empllyees appear uncaring at best, or simply rude. It’s like there are way too many customers, and not enough of them, so “PLEASE stay back and do what we tell you to do!”
This list could go on forever (readers, feel free to comment on your favorite stupid policy or practice of any airline.) Why? Because the airline’s leaders have completely lost track of what business is all about. In the rush to cut prices, trying to sell that last empty seat on that midnight feeder flight to Omaha, the entire industry has driven out all the customer satisfaction, and profitability. Everyone has learned that it doesn’t matter how much you pay, the experience is going to suck. So the industry has taught customers to be price sensitive, above all else.
Shortly after deregulation Robert Crandall became AMR’s Chairman. He was a notorious cost cutter. The Wall Street Journal ran a front page article highlighting his efforts to build American, highlighting how on a flight Mr. Crandall noticed that few customers were eating the 3 black olives on their salad. He claimed to go back to company managers and tell them to remove the olives, thereby saving (ostensibly) $700,000/year. Nobody would notice, he claimed, and money was saved.
And that’s been the trajectory for American ever since. Cut this, cut that. Shave costs everywhere, including employee pay, benefits and pensions. And after 30 years, the sum total is that not only are the olives gone – the whole meal has disappeared! Where working at an airline was once considered a great job (pilot, flight attendant, gate agent or baggage handler, ) today compensation has been cut and complicated (remember tiered compensation that has 2 people doing the same job, but at different pay just because of hire date?) so that employees are largely overworked, under-appreciated and constantly being pushed by management one direction, while pulled by customers in another.
Where once we didn’t mind flying, maybe even enjoyed it,now everyone thinks of flying as the opportunity to learn what life is like as herded, and penned, livestock!
It has been a fallacy of “modern management” that leaders have a primary job to optimize the business – largely by limiting innovation and cutting costs. The famous business guru, Jim Collins (author of Good to Great,) actively advocates (IndustryWeek.com 11/29/2011) that businesses focus exactly on the kind of business optimization that has driven AMR to bankruptcy! His recommendations have inevitably lead businesses down a road of commoditization as they offer less and less to customers, and fall into vicious price wars. Ineveitably a market shift happens that undercuts their ability to compete at all!
Great companies do not fall into this trap. They constantly add customer value, utilizing new technology and business processes to improve performance. They grow revenues, rather than focus on cutting costs.
Think about how Google has made doing research easier, and placing internet advertisements. Or how Apple has improved personal music and mobile information access. Or how Whole Foods has delivered more organic and tasty products. Or how Amazon has made access to books, periodicals and much of retailing a better experience. These companies have seen their market capitalization explode as they eschewed optimization in favor of innovation to make things better – not just cheaper. Where AMR’s value went from $40/share to zero the last 5 years, you would have had big gains in these companies that focused on innovation and delivering better customer results.
AMR’s leaders, and airline industry analysts, can try to put perfume on this bankruptcy pig by saying it is a “strategic action” taken to re-align costs (CuriousCapitalist.com.) That’s code for union-busting, in yet one more effort to ignore the real problem of no innovation. Rather than actually improve the airline this is more of the same old strategy – cut more olives (cost,) chasing the spiral yet further down toward even worse performance.
It’s time to be honest. AMR’s bankruptcy is a failure. Leadership’s inability to address customer needs well enough to price at a profit. Gimmicks like loyalty programs, bag charges, reservation fees, change fees, seat location fees and drink charges merely obscure the fact that the leaders cannot profitably run an airline! Their service is so poor that they cannot charge enough to cover costs. Continuing to cut costs, further hindering service, is NOT the answer in a service industry!
It certainly is prossble to make money in service industries. Most do. It is even possible to make money as an airline – just look at Southwest (which has made more profit than all its [much larager] competitors combined.) And the first step is for AMR to recognize that its strategy for 30 years is wrong! The company needs to end the cost-price spiral and introduce some innovation! Change the game AMR, or you’ll forever remain a crappy company for investors, customers and employees.
Not far from each other, in the area around Seattle, are two striking contrasts in leadership. They provide significant insight to what creates success today.
Steve Ballmer leads Microsoft, America's largest software company. Unfortunately, the value of Microsoft has gone nowhere for 10 years. Steve Ballmer has steadfastly defended the Windows and Office products, telling anyone who will listen that he is confident Windows will be part of computing's future landscape. Looking backward, he reminds people that Windows has had a 20 year run, and because of that past he is certain it will continue to dominate.
Unfortunately, far too many investors see things differently. They recognize that nearly all areas of Microsoft are struggling to maintain sales. It is quite clear that the shift to mobile devices and cloud architectures are reducing the need, and desire, for PCs in homes, offices and data centers. Microsoft appears years late recognizing the market shift, and too often CEO Ballmer seems in denial it is happening – or at least that it is happening so quickly. His fixation on past success appears to blind him to how people will use technology in 2014, and investors are seriously concerned that Microsoft could topple as quickly DEC., Sun, Palm and RIM.
Comparatively, across town, Mr. Bezos leads the largest on-line retailer Amazon. That company's value has skyrocketed to a near 90 times earnings! Over the last decade, investors have captured an astounding 10x capital gain! Contrary to Mr. Ballmer, Mr. Bezos talks rarely about the past, and almost almost exclusively about the future. He regularly discusses how markets are shifting, and how Amazon is going to change the way people do things.
Mr. Bezos' fixation on the future has created incredible growth for Amazon. In its "core" book business, when publishers did not move quickly toward trends for digitization Amazon created and launched Kindle, forever altering publishing. When large retailers did not address the trend toward on-line shopping Amazon expanded its retail presence far beyond books, including more products and a small armyt of supplier/partners. When large PC manufacturers did not capitalize on the trend toward mobility with tablets for daily use Amazon launched Kindle Fire, which is projected to sell as many as 12 million units next year (AllThingsD.com).
Where Mr. Ballmer remains fixated on the past, constantly reinvesting in defending and extending what worked 20 years ago for Microsoft, Mr. Bezos is investing heavily in the future. Where Mr. Ballmer increasingly looks like a CEO in denial about market shift, Mr. Bezos has embraced the shifts and is pushing them forward.
Clearly, the latter is much better at producing revenue growth and higher valuation than the former.
As we look around, a number of companies need to heed the insight of this Seattle comparison:
At AOL it is unclear that Mr. Armstrong has a clear view of how AOL will change markets to become a content powerhouse. AOL's various investments are incoherent, and managers struggle to see a strong future for AOL. On the other hand, Ms. Huffington does have a clear sense of the future, and the insight for an entirely different business model at AOL. The Board would be well advised to consider handing the reigns to Ms. Huffington, and pushing AOL much more rapidly toward a different, and more competitive future.
Dell's chronic inability to identify new products and markets has left it, at best, uninteresting. It's supply chain focused strategy has been copied, leaving the company with practically no cost/price advantage. Mr. Dell remains fixated on what worked for his initial launch 30 years ago, and offers no exciting description of how Dell will remain viable as PC sales diminish. Unless new leadership takes the helm at Dell, the company's future 5 years hence looks bleak.
HP's new CEO Meg Whitman is less than reassuring as she projects a terrible 2012 for HP, and a commitment to remaining in PCs – but with some amorphous pledge toward more internal innovation. Lacking a clear sense of what Ms. Whitman thinks the world will look like in 2017, and how HP will be impactful, it's hard for investors, managers or customers to become excited about the company. HP needs rapid acceleration toward shifting customer needs, not a relaxed, lethargic year of internal analysis while competitors continue moving demand further away from HP offerings.
Groupon has had an explosive start. But the company is attacked on all fronts by the media. There is consistent questioning of how leadership will maintain growth as reports emerge about founders cashing out their shares, highly uneconomic deals offered by customers, lack of operating scale leverage, and increasing competition from more established management teams like Google and Amazon. After having its IPO challenged by the press, the stock has performed poorly and now sells for less than the offering price. Groupon desperately needs leadership that can explain what the markets of 2015 will look like, and how Groupon will remain successful.
What investors, customers, suppliers and employees want from leadership is clarity around what leaders see as the future markets and competition. They want to know how the company is going to be successful in 2 or 5 years. In today's rapidly shifting, global markets it is not enough to talk about historical results, and to exhibit confidence that what brought the company to this point will propel it forward successfully. And everyone recognizes that managing quarter to quarter will not create long term success.
Leaders must demonstrate a keen eye for market shifts, and invest in opportunities to participate in game changers. Leaders must recognize trends, be clear about how those trends are shaping future markets and competitors, and align investments with those trends. Leadership is not about what the company did before, but is entirely about what their organization is going to do next.
Update 30 Nov, 2011
In the latest defend & extend action at Microsoft Ballmer has decided to port Office onto the iPad (TheDaily.com). Short term likely to increase revenue. But clearly at the expense of long-term competitiveness in tablet platforms. And, it misses the fact that people are already switching to cloud-based apps which obviate the need for Office. This will extend the dying period for Office, but does not come close to being an innovative solution which will propel revenues over the next decade.
