by Adam Hartung | Jun 1, 2012 | Current Affairs, In the Rapids, Innovation, Leadership, Television, Web/Tech
On May 18 Facebook went public with an opening price of $38/share. Now, after just 2 weeks, it's more like $28. Ouch – a 25%+ drop in such a short time makes nobody happy. Except buyers. And if you are interested in capturing a high rate of return with little risk, this is your lucky break!
The values of publicly traded companies change, often dramatically, based upon changes in performance and investor expectations about the future. Trying to profit off fast price changes is the world of traders – and the vast majority of them lose fortunes rather than create them. Knowing how to ignore whipsaw events, and invest in good companies when they are out of favor is important to long-term wealth creation.
Investors make money by understanding product markets and the companies supplying them, then investing in companies that build upon trends to create revenue growth with high rates of return over several years. In the forgettable 1999 movie "Blast from the Past" (Brendan Fraser, Christopher Walken, Sissy Spacek) a family moves into its nuclear blast shelter in 1960 during a panic, and doesn't come out for 35 years. Fortunately, the father had bought shares of AT&T and other companies aligned with 1960 trends, and the family discovers upon re-emergence it is quite wealthy.
Creating investment wealth means acting like them, buying shares in companies building on trends so you can hold shares for years without much worry.
If ever there was a company aligned with trends, it is Facebook. The company did not create 900million users in 8 years by being lucky. Facebook is the ultimate information era company. Facebook is not a fad – any more than television or telephones were fads in 1960. Just like they provided fundamental new ways of acquiring and disseminating information Facebook is the newest, most efficient and effective way for connecting and communicating in 2012.
When television appeared the mass population said "why?" There was radio, which was cheap, and older users said TV reduced the use of imagination. And television was not available many hours per day. But it didn't take long for CBS and its brethren to prove it could attract eyeballs, and soon Proctor & Gamble started paying for programming so it could promote its soaps (remember "soap operas?") Soon other companies developed programs strictly so they could promote their products. The "Ted Mack Amateur Hour" was sponsored by Geritol, and viewers were reminded of that over and over for 30 minutes every week. Eventually the TV ad model changed, but the lesson is clear - when you can attract eyeballs it has value and there will be businesses creative enough to take advantage.
Now television watching is declining. Instead, people are spending more time on the internet – including via mobile devices. And the location attracting the most people, and by far for the most minutes per day, is Facebook. Facebook's access to so many people, so often, creates an audience many businesses and non-profits want to tap.
Further, in the networked world Facebook not only has eyeballs, it delivers up to those eyeballs some 9 million apps, and knows what everyone wants, where they come from and where they go next. Beyond the industrial-era business of selling ads (like Google,) Facebook's information business has significant value for anyone trying to promote or sell a solution. Facebook is a repository of information about people, and their behavior, never before seen, understood or developed for use.
Around the IPO, General Motors decided to drop its Facebook advertising. That freaked some investors. Cries arose that social media is somehow broken, and unable to develop a business model.
Let's keep in mind who we're talking about here – GM. Not the most innovative, forward thinking company, to put it mildly. GM, like a lot of other plodding, but big spending, large companies has approached social media like it is just television on the web – and would prefer to simply put up a television ad on a Facebook like link. Whoa! That would be akin to a 1960s TV ad that was simply the text from a newspaper ad. Nobody would read it, and it simply wouldn't work.
Television required a new kind of communication to reach customers – and social media does as well. TV required the ad be entertaining, with movement, product use demonstrations, and video plus audio to go with the words. Connecting with users was harder, but the message (and connection) could be far more robust. And that is what advertisers are being forced to learn about Facebook/Social. It has new requirements, but once understood companies can be remarkably successful at connecting with potential customers – far more than the traditional one-way approach of historical advertising.
Paid promotion on Facebook is just the tip of the iceberg – a one-way approach to advertising sure to create short-term revenue but not terribly robust. Beyond that, social media changes everything. Retail, for example, is fast shifting from pushing inventory to being all about understanding the customer and offering them what they need in an anticipatory way (think Amazon rather than Best Buy.) And nowhere can you better understand customer needs than by social media participation. By being an information company, rather than an industrial company, FB is remarkably well positioned to create growth – for everybody that figures out how to use this remarkable platform.
As Facebook's shares kept falling this week, more attention was paid to whether traditional advertisers would buy FB. And much was made about whether the "metrics" were there to justify social media investments. This micro-management approach clearly misses the main point. People are already on Facebook, their numbers are growing, their uses are growing, their time on the site is growing, and the benefits of using Facebook are growing. Trying to measure Facebook use the way you would measure a print ad – or even a Google Adword buy – is simply using the wrong tool.
When P&G first started producing television "soaps" their competition sat back and said "look at what television advertising costs, compared to print and compared to pushing products into the local stores. What is the return for each of those television shows? Can it be justified? I think it is smarter to keep doing what we've done while P&G throws money at ads you can't measure." By moving beyond the historically myopic view of trying to find returns at the micro level P&G quickly became (at the time) the world's largest consumer goods company. Early TV advertisers followed the trend, knowing their participation would create returns far in excess of doing more of the old thing. And that is the direction of social media.
There was a lot of anticipatory excitement for the Facebook IPO. Lots of people wanted shares, and couldn't buy them in advance. The public, and the Morgan Stanley investment bankers, clearly thought the shares would go up. Oops. But that's a lucky thing for investors. Especially small investors, usually unable to participate in a "hot" IPO. Now anybody can buy FB shares at a 25% discount to the offering price – a better deal than the institutional buyers that usually get the "sweet" deal little guys never see.
If you are an employee, short term you might be unhappy. But if you are an investor, be happy that worries about Greece, the Euro's future, domestic politics, a lousy jobs report and simple myths like "sell in May and go away" have been a drag on equities this month – and diminished interest in Facebook.
Buy FB shares, then forget about them for a while. What you care about isn't the value of FB shares in 4 days, 4 weeks or 4 months – you care about 4 years. If you missed the chance to buy Microsoft in 1986, or Amazon in 1997, or Apple in 2000, or Google in 2004 then don't miss this one. There will be volatility, but the trends are all in your favor.
by Adam Hartung | May 25, 2012 | Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Web/Tech
Things are bad at HP these days. CEO and Board changes have confused the management team and investors alike. Despite a heritage based on innovation, the company is now mired in low-growth PC markets with little differentiation. Investors have dumped the stock, dropping company value some 60% over two years, from $52/share to $22 – a loss of about $60billion.
Reacting to the lousy revenue growth prospects as customers shift from PCs to tablets and smartphones, CEO Meg Whitman announced plans to eliminate 27,000 jobs; about 8% of the workforce. This is supposedly the first step in a turnaround of the company that has flailed ever since buying Compaq and changing the company course into head-to-head PC competition a decade ago. But, will it work?
Not a chance.
Fixing HP requires understanding what went wrong at HP. Simply, Carly Fiorina took a company long on innovation and new product development and turned it into the most industrial-era sort of company. Rather than having HP pursue new technologies and products in the development of new markets, like the company had done since its founding creating the market for electronic testing equipment, she plunged HP into a generic manufacturing war.
Pursuing the PC business Ms. Fiorina gave up R&D in favor of adopting the R&D of Microsoft, Intel and others while spending management resources, and money, on cost management. PCs offered no differentiation, and HP was plunged into a gladiator war with Dell, Lenovo and others to make ever cheaper, undifferentiated machines. The strategy was entirely based upon obtaining volume to make money, at a time when anyone could buy manufacturing scale with a phone call to a plethora of Asian suppliers.
Quickly the Board realized this was a cutthroat business primarily requiring supply chain skills, so they dumped Ms. Fiorina in favor of Mr. Hurd. He was relentless in his ability to apply industrial-era tactics at HP, drastically cutting R&D, new product development, marketing and sales as well as fixating on matching the supply chain savings of companies like Dell in manufacturing, and WalMart in retail distribution.
Unfortunately, this strategy was out of date before Ms. Fiorina ever set it in motion. And all Mr. Hurd accomplished was short-term cuts that shored up immediate earnings while sacrificing any opportunities for creating long-term profitable new market development. By the time he was forced out HP had no growth direction. It's PC business fortunes are controlled by its suppliers, and the PC-based printer business is dying. Both primary markets are the victim of a major market shift away from PC use toward mobile devices, where HP has nothing.
HPs commitment to an outdated industrial era supply-side manufacturing strategy can be seen in its acquisitions. What was once the world's leading IT services company, EDS, was bought in 2008 after falling into financial disarray as that market shifted offshore. After HP spent nearly $14B on the purchase, HP used that business to try defending and extending PC product sales, but to little avail. The services group has been downsized regularly as growth evaporated in the face of global trends toward services offshoring and mobile use.
In 2009 HP spent almost $3B on networking gear manufacturer 3Com. But this was after the market had already started shifting to mobile devices and common carriers, leaving a very tough business that even market-leading Cisco has struggled to maintain. Growth again stagnated, and profits evaporated as HP was unable to bring any innovation to the solution set and unable to create any new markets.
In 2010 HP spent $1B on the company that created the hand-held PDA (personal digital assistant) market – the forerunner of our wirelessly connected smartphones – Palm. But that became an enormous fiasco as its WebOS products were late to market, didn't work well and were wholly uncompetitive with superior solutions from Apple and Android suppliers. Again, the industrial-era strategy left HP short on innovation, long on supply chain, and resulted in big write-offs.
Clearly what HP needs is a new strategy. One aligned with the information era in which we live. Think like Apple, which instead of chasing Macs a decade ago shifted into new markets. By creating new products that enhanced mobility Apple came back from the brink of complete failure to spectacular highs. HP needs to learn from this, and pursue an entirely new direction.
But, Meg Whitman is certainly no Steve Jobs. Her career at eBay was far from that of an innovator. eBay rode the growth of internet retailing, but was not Amazon. Rather, instead of focusing on buyers, and what they want, eBay focused on sellers – a classic industrial-era approach. eBay has not been a leader in launching any new technologies (such as Kindle or Fire at Amazon) and has not even been a leader in mobile applications or mobile retail.
While CEO at eBay Ms. Whitman purchased PayPal. But rather than build that platform into the next generation transaction system for web or mobile use, Paypal was used to defend and extend the eBay seller platform. Even though PayPal was the first leader in on-line payments, the market is now crowded with solutions like Google Wallets (Google,) Square (from a Twitter co-founder,) GoPayment (Intuit) and Isis (collection of mobile companies.)
Had Ms. Whitman applied an information-era strategy Paypal could have been a global platform changing the way payment processing is handled. Instead its use and growth has been limited to supporting an historical on-line retail platform. This does not bode well for the future of HP.
HP cannot save its way to prosperity. That never works. Try to think of one turnaround where it did – GM? Tribune Corp? Circuit City? Sears? Best Buy? Kodak? To successfully turn around HP must move – FAST – to innovate new solutions and enter new markets. It must change its strategy to behave a lot more like the company that created the oscilliscope and usher in the electronics age, and a lot less like the industrial-era company it has become – destroying shareholder value along the way.
Is HP so cheap that it's a safe bet. Not hardly. HP is on the same road as DEC, Wang, Lanier, Gateway Computers, Sun Microsystems and Silicon Graphics right now. And that's lousy for investors and employees alike.
by Adam Hartung | May 12, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Web/Tech
This has been quite the week for CEO mistakes. First was all the hubbub about Scott Thompson, CEO of Yahoo, inflating his resume to include a computer science degree he did not actually receive. According to Mr. Thompson someone at a recruiting firm added that degree claim in 2005, he didn't know it and he's never read his bio since. A simple oversight, if you can believe he hasn't once read his bio in 7 years, and he didn't think it was ever important to correct someone who introduced him or mentioned it. OOPS – the easy answer for someone making several million dollars per year, and trying to guide a very troubled company from the brink of failure. Hopefully he is more persistent about checking company facts.
But luckily for him, his errors were trumped on Thursday when Jamie Dimon, CEO of J.P.MorganChase notified the world that the bank's hedging operation messed up and lost $2B!! OOPS! According to Mr. Dimon this is really no big deal. Which reminded me of the apocryphal Senator Everett Dirksen statement "a billion here, a billion there and pretty soon it all adds up to real money!"
Interesting "little" mistake from a guy who paid himself some $50M a few years ago, and benefitted greatly from the government TARP program. He said this would be "fodder for pundits," as if we all should simply overlook losing $2B? He also said this was "unfortunate timing." As if there's a good time to lose $2B?
But neither of these problems will likely result in the CEOs losing their jobs. As obviously damaging as both mistakes are, which would naturally have caused us mere employees to instantly lose our jobs – and potentially be prosecuted – CEOs are a rare breed who are allowed wide lattitude in their behavior. These are "one off" events that gain a lot of attention, but the media will have forgotten within a few days, and everyone else within a few months.
By comparison, there are at least 5 CEOs that make these 2 mistakes appear pretty small. For these 5, frequently honored for their position, control of resources and personal wealth, they are doing horrific damage to their companies, hurting investors, employees, suppliers and the communities that rely on their organizations. They should have been fired long before this week.
#5 – John Chambers, Cisco Systems. Mr. Chambers is the longest serving CEO on this list, having led Cisco since 1995 and championed much of its rapid growth as corporations around the world began installing networks. Cisco's stock reached $70/share in 2001. But since then a combination of recessions that cut corporate IT budgets and a market shift to cloud computing has left Cisco scrambling for a strategy, and growth.
Mr. Chambers appears to have been great at operating Cisco as long as he was in a growth market. But since customers turned to cloud computing and greater use of mobile telephony networks Cisco has been unable to innovate, launch and grow new markets for cloud storage, services or applications. Mr. Chambers has reorganized the company 3 times – but it has been much like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. Lots of confusion, but no improvement in results.
Between 2001 and 2007 the stock lost half its value, falling to $35. Continuing its slide, since 2007 the stock has halved again, now trading around $17. And there is no sign of new life for Cisco – as each earnings call reinforces a company lacking a strategy in a shifting market. If ever there was a need for replacing a stayed-in-the-job too long CEO it would be Cisco.
#4 – Jeffrey Immelt, General Electric (GE). GE has only had 9 CEOs in its 100+ year life. But this last one has been a doozy. After more than a decade of rapid growth in revenue, profits and valuation under the disruptive "neutron" Jack Welch, GE stock reached $60 in 2000. Which turns out to have been the peak, as GE's value has gone nowhere but down since Mr. Immelt took the top job.
GE was once known for entering and changing markets, unafraid to disrupt how the market performed with innovation in products, supply chain and operations. There was no market too distant, or too locked-in for GE to not find a way to change to its advantage – and profit. But what was the last market we saw GE develop? What has Mr. Immelt, in his decade at the top of GE, done to keep GE as one of the world's most innovative, high growth companies? He has steered the ship away from trouble, but it's only gone in circles as it's used up fuel.
From that high in 2001, GE fell to a low of $8 in 2009 as the financial crisis revealed that under Mr. Immelt GE had largely transitioned from a manufacturing and products company into a financial house. He had taken what was then the easy road to managing money, rather than managing a products and services company. Saved from bankruptcy by a lucrative Berkshire Hathaway, GE lived on. But it's stock is still only $19, down 2/3 from when Mr. Immelt took the CEO position.
"Stewardship" is insufficient leadership in 2012. Today markets shift rapidly, incur intensive global competition and require constant innovation. Mr. Immelt has no vision to propel GE's growth, and should have been gone by 2010, rather than allowed to muddle along with middling performance.
#3 – Mike Duke, WalMart. Mr. Duke has been CEO since 2009, but prior to that he was head of WalMart International. We now know Mr. Duke's business unit saw no problems with bribing foreign officials to grow its business. Just on the basis of knowing about illegal activity, not doing anything about it (and probably condoning and recommending more,) and then trying to change U.S. law to diminish the legal repurcussions, Mr. Duke should have long ago been fired.
It's clear that internally the company and its Board new Mr. Duke was willing to do anything to try and grow WalMart, even if unethical and potentially illegal. Recollections of Enron's Jeff Skilling, Worldcom's Bernie Ebbers and Hollinger's Conrdad Black should be in our heads. How far do we allow leaders to go before holding them accountable?
But worse, not even bribes will save WalMart as Mr. Duke follows a worn-out strategy unfit for competition in 2012. The entire retail market is shifting, with much lower cost on-line companies offering more selection at lower prices. And increasingly these companies are pioneering new technologies to accelerate on-line shopping with easy to use mobile devices, and new apps that make shopping, paying and tracking deliveries easier all the time. But WalMart has largely eschewed the on-line world as its CEO has doggedly sticks with WalMart doing more of the same. That pursuit has limited WalMart's growth, and margins, while the company files further behind competitively.
Unfortunately, WalMart peaked at about $70 in 2000, and has been flat ever since. Investors have gained nothing from this strategy, while employees often work for wages that leave them on the poverty line and without benefits. Scandals across all management layers are embarrassing. Communities find Walmart a mixed bag, initially lowering prices on some goods, but inevitably gutting the local retailers and leaving the community with no local market suppliers. WalMart needs an entirely new strategy to remain viable – and that will not come from Mr. Duke. He should have been gone long before the recent scandal, and surely now.
#2 Edward Lampert, Sears Holdings. OK, Mr. Lampert is the Chairman and not the CEO – but there is no doubt who calls the shots at Sears. And as Mr. Lampert has called the shots, nobody has gained.
Once the most critical force in retailing, since Mr. Lampert took over Sears has become wholly irrelevant. Hoping that Mr. Lampert could make hay out of the vast real estate holdings, and once glorious brands Craftsman, Kenmore and Diehard to turn around the struggling giant, the stock initially took off rising from $30 in 2004 to $170 in 2007 as Jim Cramer of "Mad Money" fame flogged the stock over and over on his rant-a-thon show. But when it was clear results were constantly worsening, as revenues and same-store-sales kept declining, the stock fell out of bed dropping into the $30s in 2009 and again in 2012.
Hope springs eternal in the micro-managing Mr. Lampert. Everyone knows of his personal fortune (#367 on Forbes list of billionaires.) But Mr. Lampert has destroyed Sears. The company may already be so far gone as to be unsavable. The stock price is based upon speculation of asset sales. Mr. Lampert had no idea, from the beginning, how to create value from Sears and he surely should have been gone many months ago as the hyped expectations demonstrably never happened.
#1 – Steve Ballmer, Microsoft. Without a doubt, Mr. Ballmer is the worst CEO of a large publicly traded American company. Not only has he singlehandedly steered Microsoft out of some of the fastest growing and most lucrative tech markets (mobile music, handsets and tablets) but in the process he has sacrificed the growth and profits of not only his company but "ecosystem" companies such as Dell, Hewlett Packard and even Nokia. The reach of his bad leadership has extended far beyond Microsoft when it comes to destroying shareholder value – and jobs.
Microsoft peaked at $60/share in 2000, just as Mr. Ballmer took the reigns. By 2002 it had fallen into the $20s, and has only rarely made it back to its current low $30s value. And no wonder, since execution of new rollouts were constantly delayed, and ended up with products so lacking in any enhanced value that they left customers scrambling to find ways to avoid upgrades. By Mr. Ballmer's own admission Vista had over 200 man-years too much cost, and its launch still, years late, has users avoiding upgrades. Microsoft 7 and Office 2012 did nothing to excite tech users, in corporations or at home, as Apple took the leadership position in personal technology.
So today Microsoft, after dumping Zune, dumping its tablet, dumping Windows CE and other mobile products, is still the same company Mr. Ballmer took control over a decade ago. Microsoft is PC company, nothing more, as demand for PCs shifts to mobile. Years late to market, he has bet the company on Windows 8 – as well as the future of Dell, HP, Nokia and others. An insane bet for any CEO – and one that would have been avoided entirely had the Microsoft Board replaced Mr. Ballmer years ago with a CEO that understands the fast pace of technology shifts and would have kept Microsoft current with market trends.
Although he's #19 on Forbes list of billionaires, Mr. Ballmer should not be allowed to take such incredible risks with investor money and employee jobs. Best he be retired to enjoy his fortune rather than deprive investors and employees of building theirs.
There were a lot of notable CEO changes already in 2012. Research in Motion, Best Buy and American Airlines are just three examples. But the 5 CEOs in this column are well on the way to leading their companies into the kind of problems those 3 have already discovered. Hopefully the Boards will start to pay closer attention, and take action before things worsen.
by Adam Hartung | May 3, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Innovation, Leadership, Web/Tech
With revenues up 39% last quarter, it's far too soon to declare the death of Google. Even in techville, where things happen quickly, the multi-year string of double-digit higher revenues insures survival – at least for a while.
However, there are a lot of problems at Google which indicate it is not a good long-term hold for investors. For traders there is probably money to be made, as this long-term chart indicates:
Source: Yahoo Finance May 3, 2012
While there has been enormous volatility, Google has yet to return to its 2007 highs and struggles to climb out of the low $600/share price range. And there's good reason, because Google management has done more to circle the wagons in self-defense than it has done to create new product markets.
What was the last exciting product you can think of from Google? Something that was truly new, innovative and being developed into a market changer? Most likely, whatever you named is something that has recently been killed, or receiving precious little management attention. For a company that prided itself on innovation – even reportedly giving all employees 20% of their time to do whatever they wanted – we see management actions that are decidedly not about promoting innovation into the market, or making sustainable efforts to create new markets:
- killed Google Powermeter, a project that could have redefined how we buy and use electricity
- killed Google Wave, a product that offered considerable group productivity improvement
- killed Google Flu Vaccine Finder offering new insights for health care from data analysis
- killed Google Related which could have helped all of us search beyond keywords
- killed Google synch for Blackberry as it focuses on selling Android
- killed Google Talk mobile app
- killed the OnePass Google payment platform for publishers
- killed Google Labs – once its innovation engine
- and there are rumors it is going to kill Google Finance
All of these had opportunities to redefine markets. So what did Google do with these redeployed resources:
- Bought Motorola for $12.5billion, which it hopes to take toe-to-toe with Apple's market leading iPhone, and possibly the iPad. And in the process has aggravated all the companies who licensed Android and developed products which will now compete with Google's own products. Like the #1 global handset manufacturer Samsung. And which offers no clear advantage to the Apple products, but is being offered at a lower price.
- Google+, which has become an internal obsession – and according to employees consumes far more resources than anyone outside Google knows. Google+ is a product going toe-to-toe with Facebook, only with no clear advantages. Despite all the investment, Google continues refusing to publish any statistics indicating that Google+ is growing substantially, or producing any profits, in its catch-up competition with Facebook.
In both markets, mobile phones and social media, Google has acted very unlike the Google of 2000 that innovated its way to the top of web revenues, and profits. Instead of developing new markets, Google has chosen to undertaking 2 Goliath battles with enormously successful market leaders, but without any real advantage.
Google has actually proven, since peaking in 2007, that its leadership is remarkably old-fashioned, in the worst kind of way. Instead of focusing on developing new markets and opportunities, management keeps focusing on defending and extending its traditional search business – and has proven completely inept at developing any new revenue streams. Google bought both YouTube and Blogger, which have enormous user bases and attract incredible volumes of page views – but has yet to figure out how to monetize either, after several years.
For its new market innovations, rather than setting up teams dedicated to turning its innovations into profitable revenue growth engines Google leadership keeps making binary decisions. Messrs. Page and Brin either decide the product and market aren't self-developing, and kill the products, or simply ignore the business opportunity and lets it drift. Much like Microsoft – which has remained focused on Windows and Office while letting its Zune, mobile and other products drift into oblivion – or lose huge amounts of money like Bing and for years XBox.
I personalized that last comment onto the Google founders intentionally. The biggest news out of Google lately has been a pure financial machination done for purely political reasons. Announcing a stock dividend that effectively creates a 2-for-1 split, only creating a new class of non-voting "C" stock to make sure the founders never lose voting control. This was adding belt to suspenders, because the founders already own the Class B stock giving them 66% voting control. The purpose was purely to make sure nobody every tries to buy, or otherwise take over Google, because the founders will always have enough votes to make such an action impossible.
The founders explained this as necessary so they could retain control and make "big bets." If "big bets" means dumping billions into also-ran products as late entrants, then they have good reason to fear losing company control. Making big bets isn't how you win in the information technology industry. You win by creating new markets, with new solutions, before the competition does it.
Apple's huge wins in iPod, iTouch, iTunes, iPhone and iPad weren't "big bets." The Apple R&D budget is 1/8 Microsoft's. It's not big bets that win, its developing innovation, putting it into the market, shepharding it through a series of learning cycles to make it better and better and meeting previously unmet – often unidentified – needs. And that's not what the enormous investments in mobile handsets and Google+ are about.
Although this stock split has no real impact on Google today, it is a signal. A signal of a leadership team more obsessed with their own control than doing good for investors. It is clearly a diversion from creating new products, and opening new markets. But it was the centerpiece of communication at the last earnings call. And that is a avery bad signal for investors. A signal that the leaders see things likely to become much worse, with cash going out and revenue struggling, before too long. So they are acting now to protect themselves.
Meanwhile, even as revenues grew 39% last quarter, there are signs of problems in Google's "core" market leadership is so fixated on defending. As this chart shows, while volume of paid ads is going up, the price is now going down. 
Source: Silicon Alley Insider
Prices go down when your product loses value. You have to chase revenue. Remember Proctor & Gamble's "Basics" product line launch? Chasing revenue by cutting price. In the short-term it can be helpful, but long-term it is not in your best interest. Google isn't just cutting price on its incremental sales, but on all sales. Increasingly advertisers are becoming savvy about what they can expect from search ads, and what they can expect from other venues – like Facebook – and the prices are reflecting expectations. In a recent Strata survey the top 2 focus for ad executives were "social" (69%) and "display" (71%) – categories where Facebook leads – and both are ahead of "search."
At Facebook, we know the user base is around 800million. We also know it's now the #1 site on the internet – more hits than Google. And Facebook has much longer average user times on site. All things attractive to advertisers. Facebook is acquiring Instagram, which positions it much stronger on mobile devices, thus growing its market. And while Google was talking about share splits, Facebook recently announced it was making Facebook email integrated into the Facebook platform much easier to use (which is a threat to Gmail) and it was adding a new analytics suite to help advertisers understand ad performance – like they are accustomed to at Google. All of which increases Facebook's competitiveness with Google, as customers shift increasingly to social platforms.
As said at the top of this article, Google won't be gone soon. But all signs point to a rough road for investors. The company is ditching its game changing products and dumping enormous sums into me-too efforts trying to catch well healed and well managed market leaders. The company has not created an ability to take new innovations to market, and remains stuck defending and extending its existing business lines. And the top leaders just signaled that they weren't comfortable they could lead the company successfully, so they implemented new programs to make sure nobody could challenge their leadership.
There are big fires burning at Google. Unfortunately, burning those resources is producing a lot of heat – but not much light on a successful future. It's time to sell Google.
by Adam Hartung | May 2, 2012 | Defend & Extend, Lock-in, Web/Tech
My latest bi-monthly column for CIO magazine came out in print this week. In it I challenge CIOs to think hard about what made the role successful in the 1970s – then in the 1990s – and how it is transitioning today. Far too many CIOs are locked in on old notions about what made them successful – usually controlling both hardware and software and forcing managers to behave in ways acceptable to IT. But today cloud computing, mobile devices and apps make it possible for many "users" to obviate the IT department entirely – skip the enterprise applications – and find an easy route for their information needs.
I encourage you to click through to the article on CIO.com, or ComputerWorld.com – if you're in IT it should give you something to think about regarding your role. If you are an investor it should give you some new thoughts about what IT companies are worth your money (time to rethink Oracle and SAP, for example.) And if you're a manager it just might embolden you to focus on your needs and fight back on IT solutions that don't work for you.
CIO Mag – http://www.cio.com/article/704934/CIOs_Will_You_Be_Relevant_in_2017_
ComputerWorld – http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9226722/CIOs_Will_You_Be_Relevant_in_2017_
by Adam Hartung | Apr 26, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
WalMart's been accused of bribing officials in Mexico to grow its business. But by and large, few in America seem to care. The stock fell only modestly from its highs of last week, and today the stock recovered from the drop off to the lows of February.
But WalMart is going to fail. WalMart is trying to defend and extend a horribly outdated industrial strategy.
Sam Walton opened his original five and dime stores in the rural countryside, and competed just like small retailers had done for decades. But quickly he recognized that industrialization offered the opportunity to shift the retail market. By applying industrial concepts like scale, automation and volume buying he could do for retailing what Ford and GM had done for auto manufacturing. And his strategy, designed for an industrial marketplace, worked extremely well. Like it or not, WalMart outperformed retailers still trying to compete like they had in the 1800s, and WalMart was spectacularly successful.
But today, the world has shifted again. Only WalMart is putting all its resources into trying to defend and extend its industrial era strategy, rather than modify to compete in the information age. Because its strategy doesn't work, the company keeps wandering into spectacular failures, and horrible leadership problems.
- In 2005 WalMart's Vice Chairman and a corporate Vice President tried to use the company's size to wring more out of gift card and merchandise suppliers. Both were caught and fired for fraud.
- In 2006 WalMart hired a new head of marketing to update the strategy, and improve the stores and merchandise. But upon realizing her recommendations violated the existing WalMart industrial strategy the company fired her after only a few months, and went public with character besmirching allegations that she and an ad agency executive were having an affair. Like that (even if true, which is hotly disputed) somehow mattered to the changes WalMart needed. Changes which were abruptly terminated upon firing her.
- In 2008 a WalMart employee became an invalid in a truck accident. When the employee won a lawsuit related to the accident, WalMart sued the invalid employee to return $470,000 in insurance payments made by WalMart. As if WalMart's future depended on the return of that money.
- In a cost saving move, WalMart moved its marketing group under merchandising, in order to reduce employees and the breadth of merchandise, as well as keep the company more tightly focused on its strategy.
All 3 of these incidents show a leadership team that is so entrenched in history it will do anything – anything – to keep from evolving forward. And sd that history developed it paved a pathway where it was only a very small step to paying bribes in order to open more stores in Mexico. Such bribes could easily be seen as just doing "whatever it takes" to keep defending the existing business model, extending it into new markets, even though it is at the end of its life.
It has come to light that after paying the bribes, the leadership team did about everything it could to cover them up. And that included spending millions on lobbying efforts to hopefully change the laws before anyone was caught, and possibly prosecuted. The goal was to keep the stores open, and open more. If that meant a little bribing went on, then it was best to not let people know. And instead of saying what WalMart did was wrong, change the rules so it doesn't look like it was wrong.
At WalMart right and wrong are no longer based on societal norms, they are based on whether or not it lets WalMart defend its existing business by doing more of what it wants to do.
WalMart's industrial strategy is similar to the Titanic strategy. Build a boat so big it can't sink. And if any retailer could be that big, then WalMart was it. But these scandals keep showing us that the water is increasingly full of icebergs. Each scandal points out that WalMart's strategy is harder to navigate, and is running into big problems. Even though the damage isn't visible to most of us, it is nonetheless clear to WalMart executives that doing more of the same is leading to less good results. WalMart is taking on water, and it has no solution. In their effort to prop up results executives keep doing things that are less and less ethical – sometimes even illegal – and guiding people down through all levels of management and employment to do the same.
WalMart's problems aren't unions, or city zoning councils, or women's rights and fair pay organizations. WalMart's problem is an out of date retail strategy. Consumers have a lot of options besides going to stores that look like airplane hangers, and frequently without paying a premium. There is wider selection, in attractive stores, with better quality and a better shopping experience. And beyond traditional retail, consumers can now buy almost anything 24×7 on-line, frequently at a better price than WalMart – despite its enormous and automated distribution centers and stores, with tight inventory and expense control.
But WalMart is completely unable to admit its strategy is outdated, and unwilling to make any changes. This week, amidst the scandal, WalMart rolled out its latest and greatest innovation for on-line shopping. WalMart will now allow an on-line customer to pay with cash. After placing an order on-line they can trot down to the store and pay the cash, then WalMart will recognize the order and ship the product.
Really. Now, if this is targeted at customers that are so out of the modern loop that they have no credit card, no debit card, no on-line checking capability and no Paypal account tied to checking – do you think they have a PC to place an online order? And if they did go to the local library to use a computer, why would they go pay at the store only to have the item shipped – rather than simply buy it in the store and take it home immediately?
Clearly, once again, WalMart isn't trying to change its strategy. This is an effort to extend the old WalMart, in a bizarre way, online. The company keeps trying to keep people coming into the store.
Amazingly, despite the fact that there's a 50/50 (or better) chance that the CEO and a number of WalMart execs will have to be removed from their position – and could well go to jail for Foreign Corrupt Practice Act violations – most people are unmoved. The stock has barely flinched, and option traders see the stock remaining at 55 or higher out into September. Nobody seems to believe that all these hits WalMart is taking really matters.
A famous Titanic line is "and the band played on." This refers to the band continuing to play song after song, oblivious to disaster, until the ship suddenly broke, heaved up and dove into the ocean leaving only those in life boats to survive. As the Titanic was taking on water not the captain, the officers, the crew, the passengers or those listening over the airwaves wanted to accept that the Titanic would sink.
But it did.
So how long will you hold onto WalMart shares? WalMarts growth has been declining for a decade, and even went negative in 2009. Same store sales have declined for 2 years. Scandals are now commonplace. Online retailers such as Amazon and Overstock.com are stripping out all the retail growth, leaving traditionalists in decline. WalMart may be doing better than Sears, or Best Buy, but for how long?
WalMart has no ability to stop the economic shift from an industrial to an information age. It could choose to adapt, but instead its leaders have done the opposite. The retailers now succeeding are those eschewing almost all the WalMart practices in favor of using customer information to offer what people want (out of their much wider selection) when customers want it, often at surprisingly good prices. This is the current carrying emerging retailers to better profitability – and it is the current WalMart remains intent on fighting. Even as its executives face prison.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 20, 2012 | Current Affairs, In the Swamp, Lifecycle, Lock-in, Television, Web/Tech
Who can forget what a great company Sony was, and the enormous impact it had on our lives? With its heritage, it is hard to believe that Sony hasn't made a profit in 4 consecutive years, just recently announced it will double its expected loss for this year to $6.4 billion, has only 15% of its capital left as equity (debt/equity ration of 5.67x) and is only worth 1/4 of its value 10 years ago!
After World War II Sony was the company that took the transistor technology invented by Texas Instruments (TI) and made the popular, soon to become ubiquitous, transistor radio. Under co-founder Akio Morita Sony kept looking for advances in technology, and its leadership spent countless hours innovatively thinking about how to apply these advances to improve lives. With a passion for creating new markets, Sony was an early creator, and dominator, of what we now call "consumer electronics:"
- Sony improved solid state transistor radios until they surpassed the quality of tubes, making good quality sound available very reliably, and inexpensively
- Sony developed the solid state television, replacing tubes to make TVs more reliable, better working and use less energy
- Sony developed the Triniton television tube, which dramatically improved the quality of color (yes Virginia, once TV was all in black & white) and enticed an entire generation to switch. Sony also expanded the size of Trinitron to make larger sets that better fit larger homes.
- Sony was an early developer of videotape technology, pioneering the market with Betamax before losing a battle with JVC to be the standard (yes Virginia, we once watched movies on tape)
- Sony pioneered the development of camcorders, for the first time turning parents – and everyone – into home movie creators
- Sony pioneered the development of independent mobile entertainment by creating the Walkman, which allowed – for the first time – people to take their own recorded music with them, via cassette tapes
- Sony pioneered the development of compact discs for music, and developed the Walkman CD for portable use
- Sony gave us the Playstation, which went far beyond Nintendo in creating the products that excited users and made "home gaming" a market.
Very few companies could ever boast a string of such successful products. Stories about Sony management meetings revealed a company where executives spent 85% of their time on technology, products and new applications/markets, 10% on human resource issues and 5% on finance. To Mr. Morita financial results were just that – results – of doing a good job developing new products and markets. If Sony did the first part right, the results would be good. And they were.
By the middle 1980s, America was panicked over the absolute domination of companies like Sony in product manufacturing. Not only consumer electronics, but automobiles, motorcycles, kitchen electronics and a growing number of markets. Politicians referred to Japanese competitors, like the wildly successful Sony, as "Japan Inc." – and discussed how the powerful Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) effectively shuttled resources around to "beat" American manufacturers. Even as rising petroleum costs seemed to cripple U.S. companies, Japanese manufacturers were able to turn innovations (often American) into very successful low-cost products growing sales and profits.
So what went wrong for Sony?
Firstly was the national obsession with industrial economics. W. Edward Deming in 1950s Japan institutionalized manufacturing quality and optimization. Using a combination of process improvements and arithmetic, Deming convinced Japanese leaders to focus, focus, focus on making things better, faster and cheaper. Taking advantage of Japanese post war dependence on foreign capital, and foreign markets, this U.S. citizen directed Japanese industry into an obsession with industrialization as practiced in the 1940s — and was credited for creating the rapid massive military equipment build-up that allowed the U.S. to defeat Japan.
Unfortunately, this narrow obsession left Japanese business leaders, buy and large, with little skill set for developing and implementing R&D, or innovation, in any other area. As time passed, Sony fell victim to developing products for manufacturing, rather than pioneering new markets.
The Vaio, as good as it was, had little technology for which Sony could take credit. Sony ended up in a cost/price/manufacturing war with Dell, HP, Lenovo and others to make cheap PCs – rather than exciting products. Sony's evolved a distinctly Industrial strategy, focused on manufacturing and volume, rather than trying to develop uniquely new products that were head-and-shoulders better than competitors.
In mobile phones Sony hooked up with, and eventually acquired, Ericsson. Again, no new technology or effort to make a wildly superior mobile device (like Apple did.) Instead Sony sought to build volume in order to manufacture more phones and compete on price/features/functions against Nokia, Motorola and Samsung. Lacking any product or technology advantage, Samsung clobbered Sony's Industrial strategy with lower cost via non-Japanese manufacturing.
When Sony updated its competition in home movies by introducing Blue Ray, the strategy was again an Industrial one – about how to sell Blue Ray recorders and players. Sony didn't sell the Blue Ray software technology in hopes people would use it. Instead it kept it proprietary so only Sony could make and sell Blue Ray products (hardware). Just as it did in MP3, creating a proprietary version usable only on Sony devices. In an information economy, this approach didn't fly with consumers, and Blue Ray was a money loser largely irrelevant to the market – as is the now-gone Sony MP3 product line.
We see this across practically all the Sony businesses. In televisions, for example, Sony has lost the technological advantage it had with Trinitron cathode ray tubes. In flat screens Sony has applied a predictable, but money losing Industrial strategy trying to compete on volume and cost. Up against competitors sourcing from lower cost labor, and capital, countries Sony has now lost over $10B over the last 8 years in televisions. Yet, Sony won't give up and intends to stay with its Industrial strategy even as it loses more money.
Why did Sony's management go along with this? As mentioned, Akio Morita was an innovator and new market creator. But, Mr. Morita lived through WWII, and developed his business approach before Deming. Under Mr. Morita, Sony used the industrial knowledge Deming and his American peers offered to make Sony's products highly competitive against older technologies. The products led, with industrial-era tactics used to lower cost.
But after Mr. Morita other leaders were trained, like American-minted MBAs, to implement Industrial strategies. Their minds put products, and new markets, second. First was a commitment to volume and production – regardless of the products or the technology. The fundamental belief was that if you had enough volume, and you cut costs low enough, you would eventually succeed.
By 2005 Sony reached the pinnacle of this strategic approach by installing a non-Japanese to run the company. Sir Howard Stringer made his fame running Sony's American business, where he exemplified Industrial strategy by cutting 9,000 of 30,000 U.S. jobs (almost a full third.) To Mr. Stringer, strategy was not about innovation, technology, products or new markets.
Mr. Stringer's Industrial strategy was to be obsessive about costs. Where Mr. Morita's meetings were 85% about innovation and market application, Mr. Stringer brought a "modern" MBA approach to the Sony business, where numbers – especially financial projections – came first. The leadership, and management, at Sony became a model of MBA training post-1960. Focus on a narrow product set to increase volume, eschew costly development of new technologies in favor of seeking high-volume manufacturing of someone else's technology, reduce product introductions in order to extend product life, tooling amortization and run lengths, and constantly look for new ways to cut costs. Be zealous about cost cutting, and reward it in meetings and with bonuses.
Thus, during his brief tenure running Sony Mr. Stringer will not be known for new products. Rather, he will be remembered for initiating 2 waves of layoffs in what was historically a lifetime employment company (and country.) And now, in a nod to Chairman Stringer the new CEO at Sony has indicated he will react to ongoing losses by – you guessed it – another round of layoffs. This time it is estimated to be another 10,000 workers, or 6% of the employment. The new CEO, Mr. Hirai, trained at the hand of Mr. Stringer, demonstrates as he announces ever greater losses that Sony hopes to – somehow – save its way to prosperity with an Industrial strategy.
Japanese equity laws are very different that the USA. Companies often have much higher debt levels. And companies can even operate with negative equity values – which would be technical bankruptcy almost everywhere else. So it is not likely Sony will fill bankruptcy any time soon.
But should you invest in Sony? After 4 years of losses, and entrenched Industrial strategy with MBA-style leadership focused on "numbers" rather than markets, there is no reason to think the trajectory of sales or profits will change any time soon.
As an employee, facing ongoing layoffs why would you wish to work at Sony? A "me too" product strategy with little technical innovation that puts all attention on cost reduction would not be a fun place. And offers little promotional growth.
And for suppliers, it is assured that each and every meeting will be about how to lower price – over, and over, and over.
Every company today can learn from the Sony experience. Sony was once a company to watch. It was an innovative leader, that pioneered new markets. Not unlike Apple today. But with its Industrial strategy and MBA numbers- focused leadership it is now time to say, sayonara. Sell Sony, there are more interesting companies to watch and more profitable places to invest.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 14, 2012 | Current Affairs, Leadership, Transparency, Web/Tech
Apple's amazing increase in value is more than just a "rah-rah" story for a turnaround. Fundamentally, Apple is telling everyone – globally – that there has been a tectonic shift in markets. And if leaders don't understand this shift, and incorporate it into their strategy and tactics, their organizations are going to have a very difficult future.
Recently Apple's value peaked at $600B. Yes, that is an astounding number, for it reflects not only 50% greater value than the oil giant Exxon/Mobil (~$390B), but more than the entire value of the stock markets in Spain, Greece and Portugal combined!
Source: Business Insider.com
This astounding valuation causes many to be reticent about owning Apple shares, for it seems implausible that any one company – especially a tech company with so few employees – could be worth so much.
Unless we look at this information in the context of a major, global economic shift. That what the world values has changed dramatically. And that what investors are telling business (and government) leaders is that in a globalized, fast paced world value is based upon what you know, when you know it – in other words information. Not land, buildings or the ability to make things.
Three hundred years ago the wealthiest people in the world owned land. Wars were fought for centuries to control land. Kings owned land, and controlled everything on the land while capturing the value of everything produced on that land. As changes came along, reducing the role of kings, land barons became the wealthiest people in the world. In an agrarian economy, where most human resources (and all others for that matter) were deployed in food production owning land was the most valuable thing on the planet.
But then some 120 years ago, along came the industrial reveolution. Suddenly, productivity rose dramatically by applying new machines to jobs formerly performed by humans. With this shift, value changed. The great industrialists were able to capture the value of greater productivity – making people like Cyrus McCormick, Henry Ford and Andrew Carnegie the wealthiest of the wealthy. Worth more than most states, and many foreign countries.
The age of manufacturing was based upon the productivity of machines and the application of industrial processes to what formerly was hand labor. Creating tools – from entignes to automobiles to airplanes – created great wealth. Knowing how to make these machines, and making them, created enormous value. And companies like General Motors, General Dynamics and General Electric were worth much more than the land upon which food was produced. And the commodity suppliers, like Exxon/Mobil, feeding industrial companies captured huge value as well.
By the middle 1900s America's farmers were forced to create ever larger farms to remain in business, and were constantly begging for government subsidies to stay alive via price controls (parity programs) and land "set-asides" run by the Agriculture Department. By the 1980s family farms going broke by the thousands, agricultural land values plummeted and the ability to create value by growing or processing food was a struggle. Across the developed world, wealth shifted into the hands of industrial companies from landowners.
Sometime in the 1990s the world shifted again, and that's what the chart above shows us. Countries with little or no technology companies – no information economy – cannot create value. On the other hand, companies that can drive new levels of productivity via the creation, management, use and sale of information can create enormous value.
Think about the incredible shift that has happened in retail. America's largest and most successful retailer from the 1900 turn of the century well into the 1960s was Sears. In an industry that long equated success with "location, location, location" Sears has had, and continues to control, enormous amounts of land and buildings. But the value of Sears has declined like a stone pitched off a bridge, now worth only $6B (1% the Apple value) despite all that real estate!
Simultaneously, America's largest retailer Wal-Mart has seen its value go nowhere for over a decade, despite its thousands of locations that span every state. Even though Wal-Mart keeps adding stores, and enlarging stores, adding more and more land and buildings to its "asset" base the company's customer base, sales and value are mired, unable to rise.
Yet, Amazon – which has no land, and almost no buildings – has used the last 20 years to go from start up to an $86B valuation – doing much better for shareholders than its traditional, industrial thinking competitors. In the last 5 years, Amazon's value has roughly quadrupled!
Source: Yahoo Finance
Yes, Amazon is a retailer. But the company has learned that applying an industrial strategy is far less valuable than applying an information strategy. As an internet leader, first with most browser formats on PCs and smartphones, Amazon has reached far more new customers than any traditional real-estate focused company. By launching Kindle Amazon focused on the information in books, rather than the format (print) revolutionizing the market and capturing enormous value.
By launching Kindle Fire Amazon takes information one step further, making it possible for customers to access new products faster, order faster and build their own retail world without ever going to a building. By becoming a tech company, Amazon is clearly well on the way to dominating retail, as Sears falls into irrelevancy and almost surely bankruptcy, and Wal-Mart stalls under the overhead of all that land, buildings and vast number of minimum-wage, uninsured employees.
We now must realize that value is not created by what accountants have long called "hard assets" – land, buildings and equipment. In fact, the 2 great U.S. recessions since 2000 have demonstrated to everyone that there is no security in these – the value can decline, decline fast, and decline far. Just because these things are easy to see and count does not insure value. They can easily be worth less than they cost to make – or own.
Successful competition in 2012 (and going forward) requires businesses know about customers, products and have the ability to supply solutions fast with great reach. Winning is about what you know, knowing it early, acting upon the information and then being able to disseminate that solution fast to those who have emerging needs.
Which is why you have to be excited about the brilliant move Facebook made to acquire Instagram last week. In one fast, quick step Facebook bought the ability to easily and effectively provide mobile image solutions – across any application – to millions of existing users. Something that every single person, and business, on the planet is either doing now, or will be doing very soon.
Source: Wired
On a cost-per-existing-customer basis, Facebook stole Instagram. And that's before Facebook spreads out the solution to the rest of its 780million users! Forget about how many employees Instagram has, or its historical revenues or its assets. In an innovation economy, if you have a product that 35million people hear about and start using in less than a year, you have something very valuable!
Kudos go to Mark Zuckerberg as CEO, and his team, for making this acquisition so quickly. Before Instagram had a chance to hire bankers, market itself and probably raise its value 10x. That's why Mr. Zuckerberg was Time Magazine's "Man of the Year" at the start of 2011 – and why he's been able to create so much more value for his shareholders than the CEOs of industrial companies – like say GE.
Going forward, no company can plan to survive with an industrial strategy. That approach, and those rules, simply don't create high returns. To be successful you MUST become a tech company. And while this may not feel comfortable, it is reality. Every business must shift, or die.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 4, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
Understand your core strength, and protect it. Sounds like the key to success, and a simple motto. It's the mantra of many a management guru. Only, far too often, it's the road to ruin.
The last week 3 big announcements showed just how damning the "strategy" of building on historical momentum can be.
Start with Research in Motion's revenue and earnings announcement. Both metrics fell short of expectations as Blackberry sales continue to slide. Not many investors were actually surprised about this, to be honest. iOS and Android products have been taking away share from RIM for several months, and the trend remains clear. And investors have paid a heavy price.
Source: BusinessInsider.com
There is no doubt the executives at RIM are very aware of this performance, and desperately would like the results to be different. RIM has known for months that iOS and Android handhelds have been taking share. The executives aren't unaware, nor stupid. But, they have not been able to change the internal momentum at RIM to the right issues.
The success formula at RIM has long been to "own" the enterprise marketplace with the Blackberry server products, offering easy to connect and secure network access for email, texting and enterprise applications. Handsets came along with the server and network sales. All the momentum at RIM has been to focus on the needs of IT departments; largely security and internal connectivity to legacy systems and email. And, honestly, even today there is probably nobody better at that than RIM.
But the market shifted. Individual user needs and productivity began to trump the legacy issues. People wanted to leave their laptops at home, and do everything with their smartphones. Apps took on a far more dominant role, as did ease of use. Because these were not part of the internal momentum at RIM the company ignored those issues, maintaining its focus on what it believed was the core strength, especially amongst its core customers.
Now RIM is toast. It's share will keep falling, until its handhelds become as popular as Palm devices. Perhaps there will be a market for its server products, but only via an acquisition at a very low price. Momentum to protect the core business killed RIM because its leaders failed to recognize a critical market shift.
Turn next to Yahoo's announcement that it is laying off 1 out of 7 employees, and that this is not likely to be the last round of cuts. Yahoo has become so irrelevant that analysts now depicct its "core" markets as "worthless."
Source: SiliconAlleyInsider.com
Yahoo was an internet pioneer. At one time in the 1990s it was estimated that over 90% of browser home pages were set to Yahoo! But the need for content aggregation largely disappeared as users learned to use search and social media to find what they wanted. Ad placement revenue for keywords transferred to the leading search provider (Google) and for display ads to the leading social media provider (Facebook.)
But Yahoo steadfastly worked to defend and extend its traditional business. It enhanced its homepage with a multitude of specialty pages, such as YahooFinance. But each of these has been outdone by specialist web sites, such as Marketwatch.com, that deliver everyhing Yahoo does only better, attracting more advertisers. Yahoo's momentum caused it to miss shifting with the internet market. Under CEO Bartz the company focused on operational improvements and efforts at enhancing its sales, while market shifts made its offerings less and less relevant.
Now, Yahoo is worth only the value of its outside stockholdings, and it appears the new CEO lacks any strategy for saving the enterprise. The company appears ready to split up, and become another internet artifact for Wikipedia. Largely because it kept doing more of what it knew how to do and was unable to overcome momentum to do anything new.
Last, but surely not least, was the Dell announced acquisition of Wyse.
Dell is synonymous with PC. But the growth has left PCs, and Dell missed the markets for mobile entertainment devices (like iPods or Zunes,) smartphones (like iPhone or Evo) and tablets (like iPads and Galaxy Tab.) Dell slavisly kept to its success formula of doing no product development, leaving that to vendors Microsoft and Intel, as it focused on hardware manufacturing and supply chain excellence. As the market shifted from the technologies it knew Dell kept trying to cut costs and product prices, hoping that somehow people would be dissuaded from changing technologies. Only it hasn't worked, and Dell's growth in sales and profits has evaporated.
Don't be confused. Buying Wyse has not changed Dell's "core." In Wyse Dell found another hardware manufacturer, only one that makes old-fashioned "dumb" terminals for large companies (interpret that as "enterprise,") mostly in health care. This is another acquisition, like Perot Systems, in an effort to copy the 1980s IBM brand extension into other products and services that are in like markets – a classic effort at extending the original Dell success formula with minimal changes.
Wyse is not a "cloud" company. Rackspace, Apple and Amazon provide cloud services, and Wyse is nothing like those two market leaders. Buying Wyse is Dell's effort to keep chasing HP for market share, and trying to pick up other pieces of revenue as it extends is hardware sales into more low-margin markets. The historical momentum has not changed, just been slightly redirected. By letting momentum guide its investments, Dell is buying another old technology company it hopes it can can extend its "supply chain" strenths into – and maybe find new revenues and higher margins. Not likely.
Over and again we see companies falter due to momentum. Why? Markets shift. Faster and more often than most business leaders want to admit. For years leaders have been told to understand core strengths, and protect them. But this approach fails when your core strength loses its value due to changes in technologies, user preferences, competition and markets. Then the only thing that can keep a company successful is to shift. Often very far from the core – and very fast.
Success actually requires overcoming internal momentum, built on the historical success formula, by putting resources into new solutions that fulfill emerging needs. Being agile, flexible and actually able to pivot into new markets creates success. Forget the past, and the momentum it generates. That can kill you.
by Adam Hartung | Mar 29, 2012 | Current Affairs, Disruptions, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Openness, Transparency
No businessperson thinks the way to solve a business problem is via the courts. And no issue is larger for American business than health care. Despite all the hoopla over the Supreme Court reviews this week, this is a lousy way for America to address an extremely critical area.
The growth of America's economy, and its global competitiveness, has a lot riding on health care costs. Looking at the table, below, it is clear that the U.S. is doing a lousy job at managing what is the fastest growing cost in business (data summarized from 24/7 Wall Street.)
While America is spending about $8,000 per person, the next 9 countries (in per person cost) all are grouped in roughly the $4,000-$5,000 cost — so America is 67-100% more costly than competitors. This affects everything America sells – from tractors to software services – forcing higher prices, or lower margins. And lower margins means less resources for investing in growth!
American health care is limiting the countries overall economic growth capability by consuming dramatically more resources than our competitors. Where American spends 17.4% of GDP (gross domestic product) on health care, our competitors are generally spending only 11-12% of their resources. This means America is "taxing" itself an extra 50% for the same services as our competitive countries. And without demonstrably superior results. That is money which Americans would gain more benefit if spent on infrastructure, R&D, new product development or even global selling!
Americans seem to be fixated on the past. How they used to obtain health care services 50 years ago, and the role of insurance 50 years ago. Looking forward, health care is nothing like it was in 1960. The days of "Dr. Welby, MD" serving a patient's needs are long gone. Now it takes teams of physicians, technicians, nurses, diagnosticians, laboratory analysts and buildings full of equipment to care for patients. And that means America needs a medical delivery system that allows the best use of these resources efficiently and effectively if its citizens are going to be healthier, and move into the life expectancies of competitive countries.
Unfortunately, America seems unwilling to look at its competitors to learn from what they do in order to be more effective. It would seem obvious that policy makers and those delivering health care could all look at the processes in these other 9 countries and ask "what are they doing, how do they do it, and across all 9 what can we see are the best practices?"
By studying the competition we could easily learn not only what is being done better, but how we could improve on those practices to be a world leader (which, clearly, we now are not.) Yet, for the most part those involved in the debate seem adamant to ignore the competition – as if they don't matter. Even though the cost of such blindness is enormous.
Instead, way too much time is spent asking customers what they want. But customers have no idea what health care costs. Either they have insurance, and don't care what specific delivery costs, or they faint dead away when they see the bill for almost any procedure. People just know that health care can be really good, and they want it. To them, the cost is somebody else's problem. That offers no insight for creating an effective yet simultaneously efficient system.
America needs to quit thinking it can gradually evolve toward something better. As Clayton Christensen points out in his book "The Innovator's Prescription: A Disruptive Solution for Health Care" America could implement health care very differently. And, as each year passes America's competitiveness falls further behind – pushing the country closer and closer to no choice but being disruptive in health care implementation. That, or losing its vaunted position as market leader!
Is the "individual mandate" legal? That seems to be arguable. But, it is disruptive. It seems the debate centers more on whether Americans are willing to be disruptive, to do something different, than whether they want to solve the problem. Across a range of possibilities, anything that disrupts the ways of the past seems to be argued to death. That isn't going to solve this big, and growing, problem. Americans must become willing to accept some radical change.
The simple approach would be to look at programs in Oregon, Massachusetts and all the states to see what has worked, and what hasn't worked as well. Instead of judging them in advance, they could be studied to learn. Then America could take on a series of experiments. In isolated locations. Early adopter types could "opt in" on new alternative approaches to payment, and delivery, and see if it makes them happy. And more stories could be promulgated about how alternatives have worked, and why, helping everyone in the country remove their fear of change by seeing the benefits achieved by early leaders.
Health care delivery, and its cost, in America is a big deal. Just like the oil price shocks in the 1970s roiled cost structures and threatened the economy, unmanagable health care delivery and cost threatens the country's economic future. American's surely don't expect a handful of lawyers in black robes to solve the problem.
America needs to learn from its competition, be willing to disrupt past processes and try new approaches that forge a solution which not only delivers better than anyone else (a place where America does seem to still lead) but costs less. If America could be the first on the moon, first to create the PC and first to connect everyone on smartphones this is a problem which can be solved – but not by attorneys or courts!
