by Adam Hartung | Jul 25, 2015 | Current Affairs, In the Whirlpool, Leadership
This week an important event happened on Wall Street. The value of Amazon (~$248B) exceeded the value of Walmart (~$233B.) Given that Walmart is world’s largest retailer, it is pretty amazing that a company launched as an on-line book seller by a former banker only 21 years ago could now exceed what has long been retailing’s juggernaut.
WalMart redefined retail. Prior to Sam Walton’s dynasty retailing was an industry of department stores and independent retailers. Retailing was a lot of small operators, primarily highly regional. Most retailers specialized, and shoppers would visit several stores to obtain things they needed.
But WalMart changed that. Sam Walton had a vision of consolidating products into larger stores, and opening these larger stores in every town across America. He set out to create scale advantages in purchasing everything from goods for resale to materials for store construction. And with those advantages he offered customers lower prices, to lure them away from the small retailers they formerly visited.
And customers were lured. Today there are very few independent retailers. WalMart has ~$488B in annual revenues. That is more than 4 times the size of #2 in USA CostCo, or #1 in France (#3 in world) Carrefour, or #1 in Germany (#4 in world) Schwarz, or #1 in U.K. (#5 in world) Tesco. Walmart directly employes ~.5% of the entire USA population (about 1 in every 200 people work for Walmart.) And it is a given that nobody living in America is unaware of Walmart, and very, very few have never shopped there.
But, Walmart has stopped growing. Since 2011, its revenues have grown unevenly, and on average less than 4%/year. Worse, it’s profits have grown only 1%/year. Walmart generates ~$220,000 revenue/employee, while Costco achieves ~$595,000. Thus its need to keep wages and benefits low, and chronically hammer on suppliers for lower prices as it strives to improve margins.
And worse, the market is shifting away from WalMart’s huge, plentiful stores toward on-line shopping. And this could have devastating consequences for WalMart, due to what economists call “marginal economics.”
As a retailer, Walmart spends 75 cents out of every $1 revenue on the stuff it sells (cost of goods sold.) That leaves it a gross margin of 25 cents – or 25%. But, all those stores, distribution centers and trucks create a huge fixed cost, representing 20% of revenue. Thus, the net profit margin before taxes is a mere 5% (Walmart today makes about 5 cents on every $1 revenue.)
But, as sales go from brick-and-mortar to on-line, this threatens that revenue base. At Sears, for example, revenues per store have been declining for over 4 years. Suppose that starts to happen at Walmart; a slow decline in revenues. If revenues drop by 10% then every $100 of revenue shrinks to $90. And the gross margin (25%) declines to $22.50. But those pesky store costs remain stubbornly fixed at $20. Now profits to $2.50 – a 50% decline from what they were before.
A relatively small decline in revenue (10%) has a 5x impact on the bottom line (50% decline.) The “marginal revenue”, is that last 10%. What the company achieves “on the margin.” It has enormous impact on profits. And now you know why retailers are open 7 days a week, and 18 to 24 hours per day. They all desperately want those last few “marginal revenues” because they are what makes – or breaks – their profitability.
All those scale advantages Sam Walton created go into reverse if revenues decline. Now the big centralized purchasing, the huge distribution centers, and all those big stores suddenly become a cost Walmart cannot avoid. Without growing revenues, Walmart, like has happened at Sears, could go into a terrible profit tailspin.
And that is what Amazon is trying to do. Amazon is changing the way Americans shop. From stores to on-line. And the key to understanding why this is deadly to Walmart and other big traditional retailers is understanding that all Amazon (and its brethren on line) need to do is chip away at a few percentage points of the market. They don’t have to obtain half of retail. By stealing just 5-10% they put many retailers, they ones who are weak, right out of business. Like Radio Shack and Circuit City. And they suck the profits out of others like Sears and Best Buy. And they pose a serious threat to WalMart.
And Amazon is succeeding. It has grown at almost 30%/year since 2010. That growth has not been due to market growth, it has been created by stealing sales from traditional retailers. And Amazon achieves $621,000 revenue per employee, while having a far less fixed cost footprint.
What the marketplace looks for is that point at which the shift to on-line is dramatic enough, when on-line retailers have enough share, that suddenly the fixed cost heavy traditional retail business model is no longer supportable. When brick-and-mortar retailers lose just enough share that their profits start the big slide backward toward losses. Simultaneously, the profits of on-line retailers will start to gain significant upward momentum.
And this week, the marketplace started saying that time could be quite near. Amazon had a small profit, surprising many analysts. It’s revenues are now almost as big as Costco, Tesco – and bigger than Target and Home Depot. If it’s pace of growth continues, then the value which was once captured in Walmart stock will shift, along with the marketplace, to Amazon.
In May, 2010 Apple’s value eclipsed Microsoft. Five years later, Apple is now worth double Microsoft – even though its earnings multiple (stock Price/Earnings) is only half (AAPL P/E = 14.4, MSFT = 31.) And Apple’s revenues are double Microsoft’s. And Apple’s revenues/employee are $2.4million, 3 times Microsoft’s $731k.
While Microsoft has about doubled in value since the valuation pinnacle transferred to Apple, investors would have done better holding Apple stock as it has more than tripled. And, again, if the multiple equalizes between the companies (Apple’s goes up, or Microsoft’s goes down,) Apple investors will be 6 times better off than Microsoft’s.
Market shifts are a bit like earthquakes. Lots of pressure builds up over a long time. There are small tremors, but for the most part nobody notices much change. The land may actually have risen or fallen a few feet, but it is not noticeable due to small changes over a long time. But then, things pop. And the world quickly changes.
This week investors started telling us that the time for big change could be happening very soon in retail. And if it does, Walmart’s size will be more of a disadvantage than benefit.
by Adam Hartung | Nov 5, 2012 | Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Innovation, Lock-in, Science
Many people equate spending on R&D with investing in innovation. The logic goes that R&D spending is lab spending, and out of labs come innovations. Hence, those that spend a lot on R&D are innovative.
That is faulty logic.
This chart shows R&D spending from the top 20 companies in 2011:
Chart reproduced with permission of Business Insider
Think of your own list of companies that are providing innovations which change your work, or life. Would you include Apple? Amazon? Facebook? Google? Genentech? (Here's the link to Fast Company's 50 most innovative for 2012). Note that none of these companies appear on the list of top R&D spenders.
On the other hand, as you look at the big spender list some things might be apparent:
- Microsoft is #5, spending $9B and nearly 13% of revenue. Yet, for this money in 2012 the world received updates to their aging operating system and office automation software. Both of which failed to register favorable reviews by industry gurus, and are considered far from innovative. And Nokia, which is so floundering some consider it a likely bankruptcy candidate soon, is #7! Despite spending nearly $8B on R&D Nokia is now completely reliant on Microsoft if it is to even survive.
- Autos make up a big part of the group. Toyota, GM, Volkswagen, Honda and Daimler are all on the list, spending a whopping $36B. Yet, even though they give us improvements nobody considers them (especially GM) very innovative. That award would go to little Tesla Motors. Or maybe Tata Motors in India.
- Pharmaceuticals make up the dominant industry. Novartis, Roche, Pfizer, Merck, Johnson & Johnson, Sanofi, GlaxoSmithKline and AstraZeneca are all here – spending a cumulative $54B! Yet, they have all failed to give the world any incredible new drugs, all have profit struggles, and the industry is rife with discussions about weak product pipelines. The future of modern medicine increasingly is shifting to genetic solutions, biologics and more specific alternatives to the historical drug regimes from these aging pharma R&D programs.
Do you see the obvious pattern? Most big R&D spenders are not really seeking innovations. They are spending money on historical programs, following historical patterns and trying to defend and extend the historical business. In other words, they are spending vast sums attempting to sustain (or recapture) historical success. And, as the list shows, largely doing a pretty lousy job of it.
If you were given $10,000 to invest would you select these top 20 R&D spenders – or would you look for other, more innovative companies. From a profitability, rate of return and trend perspective, most of these companies look weak – or downright horrible.
Innovators don't focus on what they spend, but where they spend it.
The companies most known for innovation don't keep spending money year after year on their old business. Instead of digging deeper into what they already know, they invest laterally. They spend money putting the pieces together in new, unique ways. They try to find new solutions to old problems, using new – even fringe – technologies. They try to develop disruptive solutions that actually change the marketplace, rather than trying to make something that already exists better, faster or cheaper.
Lots of people like to think there is "scale" in research. Bigger is better. What's more important, for investors, is that there is "diminishing returns." The more you research an area the more you have to spend to find anything new. The costs keep escalating, as the gains shrink. After investing for a while, continuing to research an area is not a good investment (although it may be very intellectually interesting.)
Most of the companies on this list would be smarter to scrap their existing R&D programs, cut the budget in half (at least,) and then invest it somewhere very different. Instead of looking deeper, they need to look wider – broader. They need to investigate alternative solutions, rather than more of the same. They need to be putting more money on fringe opportunities, and a lot less into the core.
Until they do, few on this list are very good investment bets. You'll do better investing like, and in, the real innovators.
by Adam Hartung | Aug 24, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
“You’ve got to be kidding me” was the line tennis great John McEnroe made famous. He would yell it at officials when he thought they made a bad decision. I can’t think of a better line to yell at Leo Apotheker after last week’s announcements to shut down the tablet/WebOS business, spin-off (or sell) the PC business and buy Autonomy for $10.2B. Really. You’ve got to be kidding me.
HP has suffered mightily from a string of 3 really lousy CEOs. And, in a real way, they all have the same failing. They were wedded to their history and old-fashioned business notions, drove the company looking in the rear view mirror and were unable to direct HP along major trends toward future markets where the company could profitably grow!
Being fair, Mr. Apotheker inherited a bad situation at HP. His predecessors did a pretty good job of screwing up the company before he arrived. He’s just managing to follow the new HP tradition, and make the company worse.
HP was once an excellent market sensing company that invested in R&D and new product development, creating highly profitable market leading products. HP was one of the first “Silicon Valley” companies, creating enormous shareholder value by making and selling equipment (oscilliscopes for example) for the soon-to-explode computer industry. It was a leader in patent applications, new product launches and being first with products that engineers needed, and wanted.
Then Carly Fiorina decided the smart move in 2001 was to buy Compaq for $25B. Compaq was getting creamed by Dell, so Carly hoped to merge it with HP’s retail PC business and let “scale” create profits. Only, the PC business had long been a commodity industry with competitors competing on cost, and the profits largely going to Intel and Microsoft! The “synergistic” profits didn’t happen, and Carly got fired.
But she paved the way for HPs downfall. She was the first to cut R&D and new product development in favor of seeking market share in largely undifferentiated products. Why file 3,500 patents a year – especially when you were largely becoming a piece-assembly company of other people’s technology? To get the cash for acquisitions, supply chain investments and retail discounts Carly started a whole new tradition of doing less innovation, and spending a lot being a copy-cat.
But in an information economy, where almost all competitors have market access and can achieve highly efficient supply chains at low cost, there was no profit to the volume Carly sought. HP became HPQ – but the price paid was an internal shift away from investing in new markets and innovation, and heading straight toward commoditization and volume! The most valuable liquid in all creation – HP ink – was able to fund a lot of the company’s efforts, but it was rapidly becoming the “golden goose” receiving a paltry amount of feed. And itself entirely off the trend as people kept moving away from printed documents!
Mark Hurd replaced Carly, And he was willing to go her one better. If she was willing to reduce R&D and product development – well he was ready to outright slash it! And all the better, so he could buy other worn out companies with limited profits, declining share and management mis-aligned with market trends – like his 2008 $13.9B acquisition of EDS! Once a great services company, offshore outsourcing and rabid price competition had driven EDS nearly to the point of bankruptcy. It had gone through its own cost slashing, and was a break-even company with almost no growth prospects – leading many analysts to pan the acquisition idea. But Mr. Hurd believed in the old success formula of selling services (gee, it worked 20 years before for IBM, could it work again?) and volume. He simply believed that if he kept adding revenue and cutting cost, surely somewhere in there he’d find a pony!
And patent applications just kept falling. By the end of his cost-cutting reign, the once great R&D department at HP was a ghost of its former self. From 9%+ of revenues on new products, expenditures were down to under 2%! And patent applications had fallen by 2/3rds
Chart Source: AllThingsD.com “Is Innovation Dead at HP?“
The patent decline continued under Mr. Apotheker. The latest CEO intent on implementing an outdated, industrial success formula. But wait, he has committed to going even further! Now, HP will completely evacuate the PC business. Seems the easy answer is to say that consumer businesses simply aren’t profitable (MediaPost.com “Low Margin Consumers Do It Again, This Time to HP“) so HP has to shift its business entirely into the B-2-B realm. Wow, that worked so well for Sun Microsystems.
I guess somebody forgot to tell consumer produccts lacked profits to Apple, Amazon and NetFlix.
There’s no doubt Palm was a dumb acquisition by Mr. Hurd (pay attention Google.) Palm was a leader in PDAs (personal digital assistants,) at one time having over 80% market share! Palm was once as prevalent as RIM Blackberries (ahem.) But Palm did not invest sufficiently in the market shifts to smartphones, and even though it had technology and patents the market shifted away from its “core” and left Palm with outdated technology, products and limited market growth. By the time HP bought Palm it had lost its user base, its techology lead and its relevancy. Mr. Hurd’s ideas that somehow the technology had value without market relevance was another out-of-date industrial thought.
The only mistake Mr. Apotheker made regarding Palm was allowing the Touchpad to go to market at all – he wasted a lot of money and the HP brand by not killing it immediately!
It is pretty clear that the PC business is a waning giant. The remaining question is whether HP can find a buyer! As an investor, who would want a huge business that has marginal profits, declining sales, an extraordinarily dim future, expensive and lethargic suppliers and robust competitors rapidly obsoleting the entire technology? Getting out of PCs isn’t escaping the “consumer” business, because the consumer business is shifting to smartphones and tablets. Those who maintain hope for PCs all think it is the B-2-B market that will keep it alive. Getting out is simply because HP finally realized there just isn’t any profit there.
But, is the answer is to beef up the low-profit “services” business, and move into ERP software sales with a third-tier competitor?
I called Apotheker’s selection as CEO bad in this blog on 5 October, 2010 (HP and Nokia’s Bad CEO Selections). Because it was clear his history as CEO of SAP was not the right background to turn around HP. Today ERP (enterprise resource planning) applications like SAP are being seen for the locked-in, monolithic, buraucracy creating, innovation killing systems they really are. Their intent has always been, and remains, to force companies, functions and employees to replicate previous decisions. Not to learn and do anything new. They are designed to create rigidity, and assist cost cutting – and are antithetical to flexibility, market responsiveness and growth.
But following in the new HP tradition, Mr. Apotheker is reshuffling assets – closing the WebOS business, getting rid of all “consumer” businesses, and buying an ERP company! Imagine that! The former head of SAP is buying an SAP application! Regardless of what creates value in highly dynamic, global markets Mr. Apotheker is implementing what he knows how to do – operate an ERP company that sells “business solutions” while leaving everything else. He just can’t wait to get into the gladiator battle of pitting HP against SAP, Oracle, J.D. Edwards and the slew of other ERP competitors! Even if that market is over-supplied by extremely well funded competitors that have massive investments and enormously large installed client bases!
What HP desperately needs is to connect to the evolving marketplace. Quit looking at the past, and give customers solutions that fit where the market is headed. Customers aren’t moving toward where Apotheker is taking the company.
All 3 of HP’s CEOs have been a testament to just how bad things can go when the CEO is more convinced it is important to do what worked in the past, rather than doing what the market needs. When the CEO is locked-in to old thinking, old market dynamics and old solutions – rather than fixated on understanding trends, future scenarios and the solutions people want and need bad things happen.
There are a raft of unmet needs in the marketplace. For a decade HP has ignored them. Its CEOs have spent their time trying to figure out how to make old solutions work better, faster and cheaper. And in the process they have built large, but not very profitable businesses that are now uninteresting at best and largely at the precipice of failure. They have ignored market shifts in favor of doing more of the same. And the value of HP keeps declining – down 50% this year. For HP to change direction, to increase value, it needs a CEO and leadership team that can understand important trends, fulfill unmet needs and migrate customers to new solutions. HP needs to rediscover innovation.
by Adam Hartung | Aug 8, 2011 | Current Affairs, Food and Drink, In the Swamp, Innovation, Leadership, Quotes
"If you can't dazzle 'em with brilliance – Baffle 'em with Bulls**t" – W. C. Fields
Just 18 months ago Kraft CEO Irene Rosenfeld was working very hard to convince investors she needed to grow Kraft with a $19B acquisition of Cadbury. This was after her expensive acquisition of Lu Biscuits from Danone. Part of her justification for the massive expenditure was an out-of-date industrial manufacturing adage, "Scale is a source of great competitive advantage. " How these acquisitions provided scale advantage was never explained.
Now she wants to convince investors Kraft needs to be split into two companies, saying the acquisition trail has left her with "different portfolios." (Quotes from the Wall Street Journal, "Activists Pressed for Kraft Spinoff") For some reason, scale is now less important than portfolio focus. And the scale advantages that justified the acquisition premiums are now – unimportant?
If Ms. Rosenfeld was a politician, she might be accused of being a "flip-flopper." Remember John Kerry?
Ms. Rosenfeld would like to break Kraft into 2 parts. Some brands would be in a new "grocery," or "domestic" business (Oscar Mayer, Cool Whip, Maxwell House, Jell-O, Philadelphia Cream Cheese, Kool Aid, Miracle Whip is a partial list.) The rest of the company would be a "snack" or "international" business. Although the latter would still include the North American snacks and confectionary brands. (More detail in the Wall Street Journal "Kraft: Breaking Down the Breakup.")
We will ignore the obvious questions about why the acquisitions if your strategy was to split up the company. Instead, looking forward, the critical questions to have answered would be "How will this break-up help Kraft grow? And what is the benefit for investors, employees and shareholders of this massive, and costly, change?"
Kraft was split off from Altria at the end of 2006, with Ms. Rosenfeld at the helm. At its rebirth, Kraft became a Dow Jones Industrial member. Rich in revenues and resources, at the time, Kraft was valued at about $35/share. Now, 5 years and all the M&A machinations later, Kraft is valued (with optimism about the breakup value) at about $35/share! Between the two dates the company's value was almost always lower. So investors have gained nothing for their 5 years of waiting for Ms. Rosenfeld to "transform" Kraft.
The big winners at Kraft have been their investment bankers. They received enormous multi-million dollar fees for helping Ms. Rosenfeld buy and sell businesses. And they will receive massive additional fees if the company is split in two. In fact, given her focus on M&A as opposed to actually growing Kraft, one could well assess Ms. Rosenfeld's tenure as more investment banker than Chief Executive Officer. She didn't really do anything to improve Kraft. She just moved around the pieces, and swapped some.
Kraft has had no growth, other than from the expensive purchased acquisition revenues. Despite its massive $50B revenue stream, what new innovation – what exciting new product – can you recall Kraft introducing? Go ahead, take your time. We can wait.
What's that – you can't think of any. Nor can anybody else.
In Kraft's historical businesses, volume declined 1.5% over the last couple of years. The company has been shrinking. According to Crain's Chicago Business in "Kraft's Rosenfeld's About Face Spurred by Dwindling Options," the only reason revenues grew in the base business was due to rising commodity prices, which were passed along, with a premium added, in retail price increases to consumers! A business doesn't have a sparkling future when it keeps selling less, and raising prices, on products that consumers largely could care less about.
When was the last time you asked for a Velveeta sandwich? Interestly, Tang now seems to have outlived even NASA and the American space program. Have you enjoyed that sugar-laden breakfast delight lately? Or when did you last look for that special opportunity to use artificial ice-cream (Cool Whip) in your desert?
BusinessInsider.com tried valiantly to make the case "The Kraft Foods Split is the Grand Finale of an Epic Transformation." But as the author takes readers through the myriad re-organizations, in the end we realize that all these changes did nothing to actually improve the business – and managed to tick off Kraft's largest investor, Warren Buffet of Berkshire Hathaway, who has been selling shares!
The argument that Kraft has 2 portfolios as a justification for splitting the company makes no sense. Every investor is taught to have a wide portfolio in order to maximize returns at lowest risk. That Kraft has multiple product lines is a benefit to investors, not a negative!
Unless the leaders have no idea how to use the resources from these businesses to innovate, and bring out new products building on market trends and creating growth! And that's the one thing most lacking at Kraft. It's not a portfolio issue – it's a complete lack of innovation issue! As Burt Flickingerof Strategic Resources Group pointed out, Kraft has been losing .5% to 1% market share every year for the last decade in its "core" business, and he understatedly commente that Kraft has "very little innovation."
Markets have shifted dramatically the last 5 years, and food is no exception. People want fewer carbs, and fewer fats. They want easily prepared foods, but without additives like sugar (or high fructose corn syrup,) salt and oil that have negative long-term health implications for blood pressure, heart disease and diabetes. Also, they don't want hidden calories that make ease of preparation a trade-off with their wastelines! Further, most families have changed from the traditional 3 times per day standard meals to more grazing habits, and from large portions to smaller portions with greater variety.
But Kraft addressed none of these shifts with new products. Instead, it kept pouring advertising dollars into the traditional foodstuffs, even as these were finding less and less fit with 2011 dietary needs – or consumer interest! When the most exciting thing anyone can say about a Kraft launch the last 5 years was the re-orientation of the Triscuit line (did you catch that, or did you somehow miss it?) then it's pretty clear innovation has been on the back burner. Or maybe stuck in the shelf with the Cheez Whiz.
It is clear that Ms. Rosenfeld offered no brilliance as Kraft's leader. Uninspiring to consumers, investors and employees. She made very expensive acquisitions to create the illusion of revenue growth; financial machinations that hid declines in the traditional business which suffered from no innovation investment. After all that money was thrown around, and facing very little prospect of any growth, it was time for the biggest baffling bulls**t of all – split the company up so nobody can trace the value destruction!
Andrew Lazar at Barclay's Capital Plc gave a pretty good insight in another Crain's Chicago Business article ("Kraft Jettisons U. S. Brands so Global Snack Biz Can Fly Higher.") He said Kraft (aka Ms. Rosenfeld) is "Taking action before it ever has to potentially disappoint investors in a struggle to reach overly optimistic sales growth targets."
Yes, I think Mr. Fields had it pretty right when it comes to describing the leadership of Ms. Rosenfeld and her team at Kraft. They have been unable to dazzle us with any brilliance. The question is whether we'll be foolish enough to let them baffle us with their ongoing bulls**t. What Kraft needs is not a break-up. What Kraft needs is new leadership that understands how to move beyond the past, tie investments to market needs, and start Kraft growing again!!
This week most people don't really care about Kraft. After the U.S. debt ceiling "crisis," followed by the Friday night announcement of the U.S. debt downgrade, the news has been dominated by mostly economic, rather than company, items. The collapse of the DJIA has been a lot more important than a non-value-adding split-up of a single component. And that is unfortunate, because the leadership of Kraft have been playing chess games with company pieces, rather than actually doing what it takes to help a company grow. With the right leadership, Kraft could be creating the jobs everyone so desperately wants.
by Adam Hartung | Nov 20, 2009 | Current Affairs, General, Leadership, Lifecycle, Lock-in, Weblogs
"The Illusion of Brand Control" is a great article at Harvard Business Publishing. Andrew McAfee, who is a research scientist at the MIT Sloan school Center for Digital Business, offers the insight that in today's market it's not possible for a business to "control" its brand. "New media" like the internet and Facebook are bi-directional. People no longer just absorb a crafted message, they are able to push back. Bloggers and internet commenters can have more influence on a brand than traditional advertising and PR. As a result, a business's brand becomes the result of what others say about it – not just what the owner says.
And this mirrors what is happening across business today. As we've moved from the industrial to the information economy, success is no longer about amassing and controlling assets. Scale advantages have disappeared, with scale accessible to anyone who has a browser and a credit card. Where the business leader of 1965 likely felt success required controlling everything from employees and facilities to the brand message, in 2015 success is about adapting to rapidly shifting market requirements.
If you want your brand, and your business, to grow and be profitable, you have to realize the dramatic limits of "command and control." That approach works in very static, clearly defined environments. Like the military. Businesses today no longer operate in slow moving static environments with high levels of regulation and rigid business limits and significant entry barriers. Businesses today operate in complex, highly adaptive systems. Competitors can move fluidly, quickly, globally to offer new solutions and react to changes.
Today's leaders have to recognize that many of the most important impacts on their business (or brand) come from outside their organization. Completely out of management's control. Being Locked-in on what you know how to do has less and less value when you might well have to react very quickly to an external event in an entirely new way in order to maintain product position and growth. Just ask the leaders at Circuity City, who could not adapt quickly enough and saw their company fail. Adaptability to shifting market requirements becomes key to sustaining growth. Competitive advantage is not created by seeking entry barriers. Rather, competitive advantage now comes from understanding market shifts, and moving rapidly to position yourself in the right place – over and over and over.
Executives who feel like they have "control" of their business are under an illusion in 2009. And that has been demonstrated time and time again as this recession has driven home a plethora of market shifts. There are many things managers can control. But many of the most important things to success are completely out of management's hands. Thus, the ones who succeed aren't trying to control their brand, or business. Instead they are building organizations that have great market sensing and are quick to react. Just compare GM to Google and you'll see the gap between what worked in 1965, and what works 45 years later.
