Trends Really Matter – Ask Safeway and Aldi

On 11 October Safeway announced it was going to either sell or close its 79 Dominick's brand grocery stores in Chicago.  After 80 years in Chicago, San Francisco based Safeway leadership felt  it was simply time for Dominick's to call it quits. 

The grocery industry is truly global, because everyone eats and almost nobody grows their own food.  It moves like a giant crude oil carrier, much slower than technology, so identifying trends takes more patience than, say, monitoring annual smartphone  cycles.  Yet, there are clearly pronounced trends which make a huge difference in performance. 

Good for those who recognize them.  Bad for those who don't.

Safeway, like a lot of the dominant grocers from the 1970s-1990s, clearly missed the trends. 

Coming out of WWII large grocers replaced independent neighborhood corner grocers by partnering with emerging consumer goods giants (Kraft, P&G, Coke, etc.) to bring customers an enormous range of products very efficiently.  They offered a larger selection at lower prices.  Even though margins were under 10% (think 2% often) volume helped these new grocery chains make good returns on their assets. Dillon's (originally of Hutchinson, Kansas and later purchased by Kroger) became a 1970s textbook, case study model of effective financial management for superior returns by Harvard Business School guru William Fruhan.

But times changed.

Looking at the trend toward low prices, Aldi from Germany came to the U.S. market with a strategy that defines the ultimate in low cost.  Often there is only one brand of any product in the store, and that is likely to be the chain's private label.  And often it is only available in one size.  And customers must be ready to use a quarter to borrow the shopping cart (returned if you replace the cart.) And customers pay for their sacks.  Stores are remarkably small and efficient, frequently with only 2 or 3 employees. And with execution so well done that the Aldi brand became #1 in "simple brands" according to a study by brand consultancy Seigal+Gale.

Of course, we also know that big discount chains like WalMart and Target started cherry picking the traditional grocer's enormous SKU (stock keeping units) list, limiting selection but offering lower prices due to lower cost. 

Looking at  the quality trend, Whole Foods and its brethren demonstrated that people would pay more for better perceived quality.  Even though filling the aisles with organic
products and the ultimate in freshness led to higher prices, and someone nicknaming the chain
"whole paycheck," customers payed up to shop there, leading to superior
returns.

Connected to quality has been the trend, which began 30 years ago, to "artisanal" products.  Shoppers pay more to buy what are considered limited edition products that are perceived as superior due to a range of "artisanal quality" features; from ingredients used to age of product (or "freshness,") location of manufacture ("local,") extent to which it is considered "organic," quantity of added ingredients for preservation or vitamin enhancement ("less is more,") ecological friendliness of packaging and even producer policies regarding corporate social and ecological responsibility. 

But after decades of partnership, traditional grocers today remain dependant on large consumer goods companies to survive.  Large CPGs supply a massive number of SKUs in a limited number of contracts, making life easy for grocery store buyers.  Big CPGs pay grocers for shelf space, coupons to promote customer purchases, rebates, ads in local store circulars, discounts for local market promotions, sales volumes exceeding commitments and even planograms which instruct employees how to place products on shelves — all saving money for the traditional grocer. In some cases payments and rebates equalling more than total grocer profits. 

Additionally, in some cases big CPG firms even deliver their products into the store and stock shelves at no charge to the grocer (called store-door-delivery as a substitute for grocer warehouse and distribution.) And the big CPG firms spend billions of dollars on product advertising to seemingly assure sales for the traditional grocer.

These practices emerged to support the bi-directionally beneficial historically which tied the traditional grocer to the large CPG companies.  For decades they made money for both the CPG suppliers and their distributors.  Customers were happy. 

But the market shifted, and Safeway (including its employees, customers, suppliers and investors) is the loser.

The old retail adage "location, location, location" is no longer enough in grocery.  Traditional grocery stores can be located next to good neighborhoods, and execute that old business model really well, and, unfortunately, not make any money.  New trends gutted the old Safeway/Dominick's business model (and most of the other traditional grocers) even though that model was based on decades of successful history.

The trend to low price for customers with the least funds led them to shop at the new low-price leaders. And companies that followed this trend, like Aldi, WalMart and Target are the winners. 

The trend to higher perceived quality and artisanal products led other customers to retailers offering a different range of products.  In Chicago the winners include fast growing Whole Foods, but additionally the highly successful Marianno's division of Roundy's (out of Milwaukee.)  And even some independents have become astutely profitable competitors.  Such as Joe Caputo & Sons, with only 3 stores in suburban Chicago, which packs its parking lots daily by offering products appealing to these trendy shoppers.

And then there's the Trader Joe's brand. Instead of being all things to all people, Aldi created a new store chain designed to appeal to customers desiring upscale products, and named it Trader Joe's.  It bares scance resemblance to an Aldi store.  Because it is focused on the other trend toward artisinal and quality.  And it too brings in more customers, at higher margin, than Dominick's.

When you miss a trend, it is very, very painful.  Even if your model worked for 75 years, and is tightly linked to other giant corporations, new trends lead to market shifts making your old success formula obsolete. 

Simultaneously, new trends create opportunities.  Even in enormous industries with historically razor-thin margins – or even losses.  Building on trends allows even small start-up companies to compete, and make good profits, in cutthroat industries – like groceries. 

Trends really matter.  Leaders who ignore the trends will have companies that suffer.  Meanwhile, leaders who identify and build on trends become the new winners.

Buy Into Trends – Buy Chipotle Sell McDonald’s


Revenue growth is a wonderful thing.  It is so much more fun to work in a growing company than one that isn’t.  And high growth is possible, even in this struggling economy, if leaders focus on trends.

Take for example Chipotle.  Whether you eat there or not, Chipotle has grown rather spectacularly.  From 16 units in 1998 it grew to 500 by 2005 and has 1,100 company owned and operated stores today.  Revenues have more than doubled since 2005, to about $2B, while sales/store increased almost 12% in 2010.  And investors have been well rewarded, with a market cap increase of 6x in the last 5 years!

Chipotle chart 12.12.11
Chart source Yahoo.com 12.12.11

Chipotle hit on a trend it called “Food with Integrity.”  While that is far from explicit, Chipotle has made a practice of talking about being “natural.”  Chipotle often buys local produce for its units, claims to use “natural” meat, presumably with fewer additives, and brags about having no hormones in its dairy products.  Such claims have tied into customer trends for better nutrition, higher food safety and improved taste.  This allows Chipotle to grow in the most intensely competitive of industries, even during a struggling economic time.

Compare this with McDonald’s.  This is not a random selection, as McDonald’s was a 1998 investor in Chipotle, and put around $360M into the chain fueling early growth.  McDonald’s was handsomely rewarded for this, receiving around $1.5B (4x) return on its investment when selling Chipotle to the public in 2006.

At the time, McDonald’s was in a horrible situation. It’s stock had dropped from a high of $50 in 2000 to a low of $14 in 2004.  McDonald’s took the money from the Chipotle sale and invested all of it in new capital expenditures to defend the McDonald franchise.  The good news was that “turnaround” worked and McDonald’s has recaptured its value, roughly doubling market capitalization the last 5 years.

One could consider both of these success stories, unless you look deeper. 

Chipotle increased its valued by 6x, McDonald’s by 2x – so investors in the former did fully 3x better than the latter.  And where Chipotle is expected to increase the number of its stores by at least another 1/3 in the next few years, McDonald’s struggles to find growth markets. Clearly, investors that swapped their McDonald’s stock for Chipotle’s stock in 2006 did far better – and have prospects of continuing to do even better still with at least some analysts expecting Chipotle to hit $400/share within a year, for another 20% pop.

Chipotle v McD chart 12.12.11
Source: Yahoo.com 12.12.11

McDonald’s strategy was built on a 1960s trend for speed and consistency in food.  That trend served McDonald’s well for 2 decades, but is far less interesting today.  In its effort to generate revenues recently McDonald’s brought us a re-introduced 20 year old product called McRib this October – a product who’s ingredients have people asking questions about health and safety (TheWeek.com “What’s the McRib made of, anyway?) as we learn its mostly high fat pig innards and salt.  While McDonald’s has recovered from 2004, is it a platform for growth?

Chipotle is using trends to find new products, new marketing themes, and even a new store concept, Shophouse Southeast Asian Grill, for organic growth.  Where McDonald’s is fixated on defending its historical business irrespective of trends, Chipotle is busy investing in current trends.

One has to wonder, what if instead of selling Chipotle, McDonald’s leadership had turned upside down?  What if all that management attention had gone into exploding Chipotle’s footprint faster?  Introducing even more products? And what if McDonald’s had accepted the trends propelling Chipotle growth and applied them to McDonald’s to give that chain a different customer value proposition and real new products?

McDonald’s could have acted more like Apple.  Where McDonald’s has at its core fried meat sandwiches and deep fried potatoes, Apple had its “core” the Macintosh.  But instead of investing its resources into defending its core, Apple invested in new products and markets where the trend was more favorable.  As a result its market cap grew by 4.5x during the last 5 years, compared to the more subdued 2x at McDonalds – and Apple demonstrated that even very large market cap companies can grow at very high rates when they adopt growth strategies tied to trends.

Chipotle v McD v AAPL 12.12.11
Source: Yahoo.com 12.12.11

There are a lot of businesses struggling to grow today.  But most aren’t really trying.  They keep doing more of what they’ve always done, and hoping for a better result! They don’t accept that trends go in new directions, causing markets to shift.  When markets shift, those who follow the trends do far better than those stuck trying to defend their past strategies.  It’s smart to act like, and invest in, Chipotle while avoiding the rut that is McDonald’s.