McDonald’s Growth Stall is Deadly

McDonald’s Growth Stall is Deadly

McDonald’s is in a Growth Stall.  Even though the stock is less than 10% off its recent 52 week high (which is about the same high it’s had since the start of 2012,) the odds of McDonald’s equity going down are nearly 10x the odds of it achieving new highs.

A Growth Stall occurs when a company has 2 consecutive quarters of declining sales or earnings, or 2 consecutive quarters of lower sales or earnings than the previous year.  And our research, in conjunction with The Conference Board, proved that when this happens the future becomes fairly easy to predict.

Growth Stalls are Deadly

Growth Stalls are Deadly

 

When companies hit a growth Stall, 93% of the time they are unable to maintain even a 2% growth rate. 55% fall into a consistent revenue decline of more than 2%. 1 in 5 drop into a negative 6%/year revenue slide. 69% of Growth Stalled companies will lose at least half their market capitalization in just a few years. 95% will lose more than 25% of their market value.

Back in February, McDonalds sales in USA stores open at least 13 months fell 1.4%.  By May these same stores reported reported their 7th consecutive month (now more than 2 quarters) of declining revenues. And in July McDonald’s reported the worst sales decline in over a decade – with stores globally selling 2.5% less (USA stores were down 3.2% for the month.)  McDonald’s leadership is now warning that annual sales will be weaker than forecast – and could well be a reported decline.

While McDonald’s has been saying that Asian store revenue growth had offset the USA declines, we now can see that the USA drop is the key signal of a stall.  There was no specific program in Asia to indicate that offshore revenues could create a renewed uptick in USA sales.  Now with offshore sales plummeting we can see that McDonald’s American performance is the lead indicator of a company with serious performance issues.

Growth Stalls are a great forecasting tool because they indicate when a company has become “out of step” with its marketplace.  While management, and in fact many analysts, will claim that this performance deficit is a short term aberration which will be repaired in coming months, historical evidence — and a plethora of case stories – tell us that in fact by the time a Growth Stall shows itself (especially in a company as large as McDonald’s) the situation is far more dire (and systemic) than management would like investors to believe.

Something fundamental has happened in the marketplace, and company leadership is busy trying to defend its historical business in the face of a major change that is pulling customers toward substitute solutions.  Frequently this defend & extend approach exacerbates the problems as retrenchment efforts further hurt revenues.

McDonald’s has reached this inflection point as the result of a long string of leadership decisions which have worked to submarine long-term value.

Back in 2006 McDonald’s sold its fast growing Chipotle chain in order to raise additional funds to close some McDonald’s stores, and undertake an overhaul of the supply chain as well as many remaining stores.  This one-time event was initially good for McDonald’s, but it hurt shareholders by letting go of an enormously successful revenue growth machine.

Since that sale Chipotle has outperformed McDonalds by 3x, and it was clear in 2011 that investors were better off with the faster growing Chipotle than the operationally focused McDonald’s.  Desperate for revenues as its products lagged changing customer tastes, by December, 2012 McDonald’s was urging franchisees to stay open on Christmas Day in order to add just a bit more to the top line.  However, such operational tactics cannot overcome a product line that is fat-and-carb-heavy and off current customer food trends, and by this July was ranked the worst burger in the marketplace.  Meanwhile McDonald’s customer service this June ranked dead last in the industry.  All telltale signs of the problems creating the emergent Growth Stall.

Meanwhile, McDonald’s is facing a significant attack on its business model as trends turn toward higher minimum wages.  By August, 2013 the first signs of the trend were clear – and the impact on McDonald’s long-term fortunes were put in question.  By February, 2014 the trend was accelerating, yet McDonald’s continued ignoring the situation.  And this month the issue has become a front-and-center problem for McDonald’s investors as the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has said it will not separate McDonald’s from its franchisees in pay and hours disputes – something which opens McDonald’s deep pockets to litigants looking to build on the living wage trend.

The McDonald’s CEO is somewhat “under seige” due to the poor revenue and earnings reports.  Yet, the company continues to ascribe its Growth Stall to short-term problems such as a meat processing scandal in China.  But this inverts the real situation. Such scandals are not the cause of current poor results.  Rather, they are the outcome of actions taken to meet goals set by leadership pushing too hard, trying to achieve too much, by defending and extending an outdated success formula desperately in need of change to meet new competitive market conditions.

Application of Growth Stall analysis has historically been very valuable.  In May, 2009 I reported on the Growth Stall at Motorola which threatened to dramatically lower company value.  Subsequently Motorola spun off its money losing phone business, sold other assets and businesses, and is now a very small remnant of the business prior to its Growth Stall; which was brought on by an overwhelming market shift to smartphones from 2-way radios and traditional cell phones.

In February, 2008 a Growth Stall at General Electric indicated the company would struggle to reach historical performance for long-term investors.  The stock peaked at $57.80 in 2000, then at $41.40 in July, 2007.  By January, 2009 (post Stall) the company had crashed to only $10, and even recent higher valuations ($28 in 10/2013) are still far from the all-time highs – or even highs in the last decade.

In May, 2008 the Growth Stall at AIG portended big problems for the Dow Jones Industrial (DJIA) giant as financial markets continued to shift radically and quickly.  By the end of 2008 AIG stock cratered and the company was forced to wipe out shareholders completely in a government-backed restructuring.

Perhaps the most compelling case has been Microsoft.  By February, 2010 a Growth Stall was impending (and confirmed by May, 2011) warning of big changes for the tech giant.  Mobile device sales exploded, sending Apple and Google stocks soaring, while Microsoft’s primary, core market for PCs (and software for PCs) has fallen into decline.  Windows 8 subsequently had a tepid market acceptance, and gained no traction in mobile devices, causing Microsoft to write-off its investment in the Surface tablet.  Recent announcements about enormous lay-offs, with vast cuts in the acquired Nokia handheld unit, do not bode well for long-term revenue growth at the decaying (yet cash rich) giant.

As the Dow has surged to record highs, it has lifted all boats.  Including those companies which are showing serious problems.  It is easy to look at the ubiquity of McDonald’s stores and expect the chain to remain forever dominant.  But, the company is facing serious strategic problems with its products, service and business model which leadership has shown no sign of addressing.  The recent Growth Stall serves as a key long-term indicator that McDonald’s is facing serious problems which will most likely seriously jeopardize investors’ (as well as employees’, suppliers’ and supporting communities’) potential returns.

Disrupt to Thrive in 2011 – Model Facebook, Groupon, Twitter


Summary:

  • Communication is now global, instantaneous and free
  • As a result people, and businesses, now adopt innovation more quickly than ever
  • Competitors adapt much quicker, and react much stronger than ever in history
  • Profits are squeezed by competitors rapidly adopting innovations
  • But many business leaders avoid disruptions, leading to slower growth and declining returns
  • To maintain, and grow, revenues and profits you must be willing to implement disruptions in order to stay ahead of fast moving competitors
  • Amidst fast shifting markets, greatest value (P/E multiple and market cap) is given to those companies that create disruptions (like Facebook, Groupon, Twitter)

All business leaders know the pace of competitive change has increased. 

It took decades for everyone to obtain an old-fashioned land line telephone. Decades for everyone to buy a TV.  And likewise, decades for color TV adoption.  Microwave ovens took more than a decade. Thirty years ago the words “long distance” implied a very big cost, even if it was a call from just a single interchange away (not even an area code away – just a different set of “prefix” numbers.) People actually wrote letters, and waited days for responses! Social change, and technology adoption, took a lot longer – and was considered expensive.

Now we assume communications at no cost with colleagues, peers, even competitors not only across town state, or nation, but across the globe!  Communication – whether email, or texting, or old fashioned voice calls – has become free and immediate. (Consider Skype if you want free phone calls [including video no less] and use a PC at your local library or school building if you don’t own one.) Factoring inflation, it is possible to provide every member of a family of 5 with instant phone, email and text communication real-time, wirelessly, 24×7, globally for less than my parents paid for a single land-line, local-exchange only (no long distance) phone 50 years ago! And these mobile devices can send pictures!

As a result, competitors know more about each other a whole lot faster, and take action much more quickly, than ever in history.  Facebook, for example, is now connecting hundreds of millions of people with billions of communications every day.  According to statistics published on Facebook.com, every 20 minutes the Facebook website produces:

  • 1,000,000 shared links
  • 1,323,000 tagged photos
  • 1,484,000 event invitations
  • 1,587,000 Wall posts
  • 1,851,000 Status updates
  • 1,972,000 Friend requests accepted
  • 2,716,000 photos uploaded
  • 4,632,000 messages
  • 10,208,000 comments

Multiply those numbers by 3 to get hourly. By 72 to get daily. Big numbers!  Alexander Graham Bell had to invent the hardware and string thousands of miles of cable to help people communicate with his disruption. His early “software” were thousands of “operators” connecting calls through central switchboards. Mark Zuckerberg and friends only had to create a web site using existing infrastructure and existing tools to create theirs.  Rapidly adopting, and using, existing innovations allowed Facebook’s founders to create a disruptive innovation of their own!  Disruption has allowed Facebook to thrive!

Facebook has disrupted the way we communicate, learn, buy and sell.  “Word of mouth” referrals are now possible from friends – and total strangers.  Product benefits and problems are known instantaneously.  Networks of people arguably have more influence that TV networks!  Many employees are likely to make more facebook communications in a day than have conversations with co-workers!  Facebook (or twitter) is rapidly becoming the new “water cooler.” Only it is global and has inputs from anyone.  Yet only a fraction of businesses have any plans for using Facebook – internally or to be more competitive!

Far too many business leaders are unwilling to accept, adopt, invest in or implement disruptions.

InnovateOnPurpose.com highlights why in “Why Innovation Makes Executives Uncomfortable:”

  1. Innovation is part art, and not all science.  Many execs would like to think they can run a business like engineering a bridge. They ignore the fact that businesses implement in society, and innovation is where we use the social sciences to help us gain insight into the future.  Success requires more than just extending the past – because market shifts happen.  If you can’t move beyond engineering principles you can’t lead or manage effectively in a fast-changing world where the rules are not fixed.
  2. Innovation requires qualitative insights not just quantitative statistics. Somewhere in the last 50 years the finance pros, and a lot of expensive strategy consultants, led business leaders to believe that if they simply did enough number crunching they could eliminate all risk and plan a guaranteed great future.  Despite hundreds of math PhDs, that approach did not work out so well for derivative investors – and killed Lehman Brothers (and would have killed AIG insurance had the government not bailed it out.) Math is a great science, and numbers are cool, but they are insufficient for success when the premises keep changing.
  3. Innovation requires hunches, not facts.  Well, let’s say more than a hunch.  Innovation requires we do more scenario planning about the future, rather than just pouring over historical numbers and expecting projections to come true.  We don’t need crystal balls to recognize there will be change, and to develop scenario plans that help us prepare for change.  Innovation helps us succeed in a dynamic world, and implementation requires a willingness to understand that change is inevitable, and opportunistic.
  4. Innovation requires risks, not certainties.  Unfortunately, there are NO certainties in business.  Even the status quo plan is filled with risk. It’s not that innovation is risky, but rather that planning systems (ERP systems, CRM systems, all systems) are heavily biased toward doing more of the same – not something new! Markets can shift incredibly fast, and make any success formula obsolete.  But most executives would rather fail doing the same thing faster, working harder, doing what used to work, than implement changes targeted at future market needs.  Leaders perceive following the old strategy is less risky, when in reality it’s loaded with risk too!  Too many businesses have failed at the hands of low-risk, certainty seeking leadership unable to shift with changing markets (GM, Chrysler, Circuit City, Fannie Mae, Brach’s, Sun Microsystems, Quest, the old AT&T, Lucent, AOL, Silicon Graphics, Yahoo, to name a few.)

Markets are shifting all around us.  Faster than imaginable just 2 decades ago.  Leaders, strategists and planners that enter 2011 hoping they can win by doing more, better, faster, cheaper will have a very tough time.  That is the world of execution, and modern communication makes execution incredibly easy to copy, incredibly fast.  Even Wal-Mart, ostensibly one of the best execution-oriented companies of all time, has struggled to grow revenue and profit for a decade.  Today, companies that thrive embrace disruption.  They are willing to disrupt within their organizations to create new ideas, and they are willing to take disruptive opportunities to market. Compare Apple to Dell, or Netflix to Blockbuster.

Recent investments have valued Facebook at $50B, Groupon at $6B and Twitter at almost $4B. Apple is now the second most valuable company (measured by market capitalization).  Why? Because they are disrupting the way we do things. To thrive (perhaps survive by 2015) requires moving beyond the status quo, overcoming the perceived risk of innovation (and change) and taking the actions necessary to provide customers what they want in the future!  Any company can thrive if it embraces the disruptions around it, and uses them to create a few disruptions of its own.

The Myth of “Maturity” – AT&T and Microsoft


Summary:

  • We like to think of "mature" businesses as good
  • AT&T was a "mature" business, yet it failed
  • "Maturity" leads to inward focus, and an unwillingness to adjust to market shifts
  • Microsoft is trying to reposition itself as a "mature" company
  • Despite its historical strengths, Microsoft has astonishing parallels to AT&T
  • Growth is less risky than "maturity" for investors, employees and customers

Why doesn't your business grow like Apple or Google?  Is it because you think of your business, or the marketplace you serve, as "mature?" Quite a euphanism, maturity.  It sounds so good.  How could being "mature" be bad?  As children we strive to be "mature." The leader is usually the most "mature" person in the group.  Those who like good art have "mature" taste. Surely, we should want to be "mature." And we should want our businesses to reach "maturity" and have "mature" leaders who don't take unnecessary risks.  Once "mature" the business should be safe for investors, employees, suppliers and customers.

That was probably what the folks at AT&T thought.  When judge Greene broke up AT&T in 1984 the company had a near monopoly on long-distance.  AT&T was a "mature" company in a "mature" telephone industry.  It appeared as though all AT&T had to do was keep serving its customers, making regular improvements to its offering, to perpetually maintain its revenue, jobs and profitability.  A very "mature" company, AT&T's "mature" management knew everything there was to know about long distance – about everything related to communications.  And due to its previous ownership of Bell Labs and Western Union, it had deep knowledge about emerging technologies and manufacturing costs allowing AT*T to make "mature" decisions about investing in future markets and products.  This "mature" company would be able to pay out dividends forever!  It seemed ridiculous to think that AT&T would go anywhere but up!

Unfortunately, things didn't work out so well.  The "mature" AT&T saw its market share attacked by upstarts MCI and Sprint.  As a few "early adopters" switched services – largely residential and other very small customers – AT&T was unworried.  It still had most of the market and fat profits.  As these relatively insignificant small users switched, AT&T reinforced its world's largest billing system as an incomparable strength, and reminded everyone that its "enterprise" (corporate) offerings were still #1 (anybody remember AT&T long distance cards issued by your employer for use at pay phones?). 

But unfortunately, what looked like an unassailable market position in 1984 was eventually diminished dramatically as not only homeowners but corporations started shifting to new offerings from competitors.  New pricing plans, "bundled" products and ease of use encouraged people to try a new provider.  And that AT&T had become hard to work with, full of rules and procedures that were impossible for the customer to comprehend, further encouraged people to try an alternative.  Customers simply got fed up with rigid service, outdated products and high prices.

Unexpectedly, for AT&T, new markets started to grow much faster and become more profitable than long distance voice.  Data services started using a lot more capacity, and even residential customers started wanting to log onto the internet.  Even though AT&T had been the leader (and onetime monopolist – did you know broadcast television was distributed over an AT&T network?) with these services, this "mature" company continued to focus on its traditional voice business – and was woefully late to offer commercial or residential customers new products.  Not only were dial-up offerings delayed, but higher speed ISDN and DSL services went almost entirely to competitors.

And, much to the chagrin of AT&T leaders, customers started using their mobile phones a lot more.  Initially viewed as expensive toys, AT&T did not believe that the infrastructure would be built quickly, nor be robust enough, to support a large base of cellular phone users.  Further, AT&T anticipated pricing would keep most people from using these new products.  Not to mention the fact that these new phones simply weren't very good – as compared to land-line services according to the metrics used by AT&T.  The connection quality was wildly inferior to traditional long distance, and frequently calls were completely dropped!  So AT&T was slow to enter this market, half-hearted in its effort, and failed to make any profits.

Along the way a lot of other "non-core" business efforts failed.  There was the acquisition of Paradyne, an early leader in modems, that did not evolve with fast changing technology.  New products made Paradyne's early products obsolete and the division disappeared.  And the acquisition of computer maker NCR failed horribly after AT&T attempted to "improve" management and "synergize" it with the AT&T customer base and offerings. 

AT&T had piles and piles of cash from its early monopoly.  But most of that money was spent trying to defend the long distance business. That didn't work.  Then there was money lost by wheelbarrow loads trying to enter the data and mobile businesses too late, and with little new to offer.  And of course the money spent on acquisitions that AT&T really didn't know how to manage was all down the proverbial drain. 

Despite its early monopoly, high cash flow, technology understanding, access to almost every customer and piles of cash, AT&T failed.  Today the company named AT&T is a renamed original regional Bell operatiing company (RBOC) created in the 1984 break-up — Southwestern Bell.  This classically "mature" company, a stock originally considered "safe" for investing in the "widow's and orphan's fund" used up its money and became obsolete.  "Mature" was a misnomer used to allow AT&T to hide within itself; to focus on its past, instead of its future.  By being satisfied with saying it was "mature" and competing in "mature" markets, AT&T allowed itself to ignore important market shifts.  In just 25 years the company that ushered in mass communications, that had an incredibly important history, disappeared.

I was struck today when a Reuters story appeared with the headline "Sleepy in Seattle: Microsoft Learns to Mature."  There's that magic word – "mature."  While the article lays out concerns with Microsoft, there were still analysts quoted as saying that investors didn't need to worry about Microsoft's future.  Investors simply need to change their thinking.  Instead of a "growth" company, they should start thinking of Microsoft as a "mature" company.  It sounds so reassuring.  After all:

  • Microsoft has a near monopoly in its historical business
  • Microsoft has a huge R&D budget, and is familiar with all the technologies
  • Microsoft has piles and piles of cash
  • Microsoft has huge margins in its traditional business – in fact profits in operating systems and office automation exceed 100% of the total because it loses billions of dollars in other things like Bing, MSN and its incredibly expensive foray into gaming systems (xBox)
  • Markets won't shift any time soon – say to this new "cloud computing" – and Microsoft will surely have products when they are needed if there is a market shift
  • While home users may buy these new smartphones, tablets and some Macs, enterprise customers will keep using the technology they've long purchased
  • Microsoft is smart to move slowly into new markets, it shouldn't cannibalize its existing business by encouraging customers to change platforms. Going slow and being late is a good thing for profits
  • Although Microsoft has been late to smartphones and tablets, with all their money and size surely when they do get to market they will beat these upstarts Apple and Google, et. al.

Sure made me think about AT&T.  And the fact that Apple is now worth more than Microsoft.  Made me wonder just how comfortable investors should be with a "mature" Microsoft. Made me wonder how much investors, employees and customers should trust a "mature" CEO Ballmer.

Looking at the last 10 years, it seems like there's a lot more risk in "mature" companies than in "growth" ones.  We can be almost certain that Apple and Google, which have produced huge returns for investors, will grow for the next 3 years, improving cash flow and profitability just by remaining in existing new markets.  But of course both have ample new products pioneering yet more new markets.  And companies like NetApp look pretty safe, building a fast-growing base of customers who are already switching to cloud computing – and producing healthy cash flow in the emerging marketplace. 

Meanwhile, the track record for "mature" companies would leave something to be desired. One could compare Amazon to Circuit City or Sears.  Or just list some names: AT&T, General Motors, Chrysler, Xerox, Kodak, AIG,  Citibank, Dell,  EDS,  Sun Microsystems.  Of course each of these is unique, with its own story.  Yet….

Too big to fail? Overcoming size disadvantages – JPMorgan Chase

"The Need for Failure" is a recent Forbes article on why it is bad – really bad – to prop up failing institutions. The author is an esteemed economics professor at NYU. He says "too big to fail is dangerous.  It suggests there is an insurance policy that says, no matter how risky your behavior, we will make sure you stay in business."  Rightly said, only it creates a conundrumLarge organizations are not known for taking risky actions.  Large organizations are known primarily for lethargic decision-making which weeds out all forms of risk – right down to how people dress and what they can say in the office.  When you think of a big bank, like Bank of America or Citibank, you don't think of risk You think just the opposite.  Of risk aversion so great they cannot do anything new or different.

What I'd add to the good professor's article is recognition that large organizations stumble into risk they don't recognize, by trying to do more of the same when that behavior becomes risky due to market changes.  My dad said that 100 years ago when my grandfather was first given pills by a doctor he decided to take the whole bottle at once.  His logic was "if one pill will help me, I might as well take the whole lot and get better fast."  Clearly, an example where doing more of the same was not a good idea.  Then there was the boy who loved jumping off the railroad bridge into the river.  He did it all the time, year after year.  Then one month there was a draught, the river level fell while he was busy at school, and when he next jumped off the bridge he broke his leg.  He did what he always did, but the environmental change suddenly made his previous behavior very risky.

Big corporations behave this way.  They build Lock-ins around everything they do.  They use hierarchy, cultural norm enforcement, sacred cows, rigid decision-making systems, narrow strategy processes, consistency in hiring practices, inflexible IT systems, knowledge silos and dependence on large investments to make sure the organization cannot flex.  The intent of these Lock-ins is to make sure that historical decisions are replicated, to make sure past behaviors are repeated again and again with the expectation that those behaviors will consistently produce the same returns.

But when the market shifts these Lock-ins create risk that is unseen.  Bankers had built systems for generating their own loans, and acquiring loans from others, that were designed to keep growing.  They designed various derivative products as their own form of insurance on their assets.  But what they did not recognize was that pushing forward in highly unregulated product markets, as the quality of debtors declined, created unexpected risk.  In other words, doing more of the same did not reduce risk – it increased the risk!   Because the company is designed to undertake these behaviors, there is no one who can recognize that the risk is growing.  There is no one who challenges whether doing more of the same is risky – only those who would challenge making a change by saying change is risky! 

Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers and AIG all created a much higher risk than they ever anticipated.  And they never saw it.  Because they were doing what they always did – and expecting the results would take care of themselves.  They were measuring their own behaviors, not the behavior of the market.  And thus they missed recognizing that the market had moved – and thus doing more of the same was inherently risky. 

(The same is true of GM, for example.  GM kept doing what it always did, refusing to see  the risk it incurred by ignoring market shifts brought on by changing customer behaviors, rising energy costs and offshore competitors.)

That's why big company CEOs feel OK about asking for a bail-out.  To them, they did not fail.  They did not take risk.  They did what they had always done – and something went wrong "out there".  Something went wrong "in the market".  Not in their company.  They need protection from the marketplace. 

Of course, this is just the opposite of what free markets are all about.  Free markets are intended to allow changes to develop, forcing competitors to adapt to market shifts or fail.  But those who run (or ran) our big banks, and many of our big industrial companies, haven't see it that way.  They believe their size means they are the market – so they want regulators to change the market back.  Back to where they can make money again.

So how is this to to be avoided?  It starts by having leaders who can recognize market shifts, and recognize the need for change.  In an companion Forbes article "Jamie Dimon's Straight Talk Has A Good Ring" the author takes time to review J.P. Morgan Chase's Chairman's letter to shareholders regarding 2008.  In the letter, surprisingly for a big organization, the JPMC Chairman points out market shifts, and then points out that his organization made mistakes by not reacting fast enough – for example by changing practices on acquiring mortgages from independent brokers.  He goes no to point out that several changes have happened, and will continue happening, at JPMC to deal with market shifts.  And he even comments on future scenarios which he hopes will help protect investors from the hidden risk of companies that take actions based on history.

Mr. Dimon's actions demonstrate a willingness to implement The Phoenix Principle.  For those who don't know him, Mr. Dimon has long been one of the more controversial figures in banking.  He is well known for exhibiting highly Disruptive behavior, yet he has found his way up the corporate ranks of the traditional banking industry.  Now he is not being shy about Disrupting his own bank – JPMC. 

  1. His discussion of future scenarios clearly points to expected changes in the market, from competitor shifts, economic shifts and regulatory shifts which his bank must address.
  2. He sees competitors changing, and the need for JPMC to compete differently with different sorts of institutions under different regulations.  Mr. Dimon clearly has his eyes on competitors, and he intends for JPMC to grow as a result of the market shift, not merely "hang on."
  3. He is espousing Disruptions for his company, the industry and the regulatory environment.  By going public with his views, excoriating insurance regulators as well as unregulated hedge funds,  he intends for his employees and investors to think hard about what caused past problems and how important it is to change.
  4. He keeps trying new and different things to improve growth and performance at the company.  It's not merely "more of the same, but hopefully cheaper."  He is proposing new approaches for lending as well as investing – and for significant changes in regulations now that banking is global.

Very few leaders recognize the risk from doing more of the same.  Leaders often feel it is conservative to not change course.  But, when markets shift, not changing course introduces dramatic risk.  People just don't perceive it.  Because they are looking at the past, not at the future.  They are measuring risk based upon what they know – what they've failed to take into account.  And the only way to overcome this problem is to spend a lot more time on market scenarios, competitor analysis and using Disruptions to keep the organization vital and connected with the market using White Space projects.

What’s wrong with bailouts – B of A, Citibank, Wells Fargo,

Good public policy and good management don't always align.  And the banking crisis is a good example.  We now hear "Banks must raise $75billion" if they are to be prepared for ongoing write-downs in a struggling economy.  This is after all the billions already loaned to keep them afloat the last year. 

But the bankers are claiming they will have no problem raising this money as reported in "The rush to raise Capital." "AIG narrows loss" tells how one of the primary contributors to the banking crisis now thinks it will survive.  And as a result of this news, "Bank shares largely higher" is another headline reporting how financial stocks surged today post-announcements.

So regulators are feeling better.  They won't have to pony up as much money as they might have. And politicians feel better, hoping that the bank crisis is over.  And a lot of businesses feel better, hearing that the banks which they've long worked with, and are important to their operations, won't be going under.  Generally, this is all considered good news.  Especially for those worried about how a soft economy was teetering on the brink of getting even worse.

But the problem is we've just extended the life of some pretty seriously ill patients that will probably continue their bad practices.  The bail out probably saved America, and the world, from an economic calamity that would have pushed millions more into unemployment and exacerbated falling asset values.  A global "Great Depression II" would have plunged millions of working poor into horrible circumstances, and dramatically damaged the ability of many blue and white collar workers in developed countries to maintain their homes.  It would have been a calamity.

But this all happened because of bad practices on the part of most of these financial institutionsThey pushed their Success Formulas beyond their capabilities, causing failureOnly because of the bailout were these organizations, and their unhealthy Success Formulas saved.  And that sows the seeds of the next problem.  In evolution, when your Success Formula fails due to an environomental shift you are wiped out.  To be replaced by a stronger, more adaptable and better suited competitor.  Thus, evolution allows those who are best suited to thrive while weeding out the less well suited.  But, the bailout just kept a set of very weak competitors alive – disallowing a change to stronger and better competitors.

These bailed out banks will continue forward mostly as they behaved in the past.  And thus we can expect them to continue to do poorly at servicing "main street" while trying to create risk pass through products that largely create fees rather than economic growth.  These banks that led the economic plunge are now repositioned to be ongoing leaders.  Which almost assures a continuing weak economy.  Newly "saved" from failure, they will Defend & Extend their old Success Formula in the name of "conservative management" when in fact they will perpetuate the behavior that put money into the wrong places and kept money from where it would be most productive.

Free market economists have long discussed how markets have no "brakes".  They move to excess before violently reacting.  Like a swing that goes all one direction until violently turning the opposite direction.  Leaving those at the top and bottom with very upset stomachs and dramatic vertigo.  The only way to avert the excessive tops is market intervention – which is what the government bail-out was.  It intervened in a process that would have wiped out most of the largest U.S. banks.  But, in the wake of that intervention we're left with, well, those same U.S. banks.  And mostly the same leaders.

What's needed now are Disruptions inside these banks which will force a change in their Success Formula. This includes leadership changes, like the ousting of Bank of America's Chairman/CEO.  But it takes more than changing one man, and more than one bank.  It takes Disruption across the industry which will force it to change.  Force it to open White Space in which it redefines the Success Formula to meet the needs of a shifted market – which almost pushed them over the edge – before those same shifts do crush the banks and the economy.

And that is now going to be up to the regulators.  The poor Secretary of Treasury is already eyeball deep in complaints about his policies and practices.  I'm sure he'd love to stand back and avoid more controversy.  But, unless the regulatory apparatus now pushes those leading these banks to behave differently, to Disrupt and implement White Space to redefine their value for a changed marketplace, we can expect a protracted period of bickering and very weak returns for these banks.  We can expect them to walk a line of ups and downs, but with returns that overall are neutral to declining.  And that they will stand in the way of newer competitors who have a better approach to global banking from taking the lead.

So, if you didn't like government intervention to save the banks – you're really going to hate the government intervention intended to change how they operate.  If you are glad the government intervened, then you'll find yourself arguing about why the regulators are just doing what they must do in order to get the banks, and the economy, operating the way it needs to in a shifted, information age.