by Adam Hartung | Jan 30, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lock-in
For the last decade, Wal-Mart has been "dead money" in investor parlance. After a big jump between 1995 and 2000, the stock today is still worth less than it was in 2000. There has been volatility, which might have benefited some traders. But for most of the decade Wal-Mart's price has been lower. There has been excitement because recently the price has been catching up with where it was in 2002, even though there have been no real gains for long term investors.
Source: YahooFinance 1/30/12
What happened to Wal-Mart was the market shifted. For many years being the market leader with every day low pricing was a winning strategy. Wal-Mart was able to expand from town to town opening new stores, all pretty much alike, doing the same thing and making really good money.
Then competitors took aim at Wal-Mart, and found out they could beat the giant.
Eventually the number of towns that both needed, and justified, a new Wal-Mart (or Sam's Club) dried up. Wal-Mart reacted by expanding many stores, making them "bigger and better," even adding groceries to some. But that added only marginally to revenue, and even less marginally to profits.
And Wal-Mart tried exporting its stores internationally, but that flopped as local market competitors found ways to better attract local customers than Wal-Mart's success formula offered.
Other U.S. discounters, like Target and Kohl's, offered nicer stores with more varieties or classier merchandise – and often their pricing was not much higher, or even the same. And a new category of retailer, called "dollar stores" emerged that beat Wal-Mart's price on almost everything for the true price shopper. These 99 cent stores became really popular, and the fastest growing traditional retail concept in America. Simultaneously, big box retailers like Best Buy expanded their merchandise and footprint into more locations, dramatically increasing the competition against local Wal-Mart's stores.
But, even more dramatically, the whole retail market began shifting on-line.
Amazon, and its brethren, kept selling more and more products. And at prices even lower than Wal-Mart. And again, for price shoppers, the growth of eBay, Craigslist and vertical market sites made it possible for shoppers to find slightly used, or even new, products at prices lower than Wal-Mart, and shipped right into the customer's home. With each year, people found less need to buy at Wal-Mart as the on-line options exploded.
More recently, traditional price-focused retailers have been attacked by mobile devices. Firstly, there's the new Kindle Fire. In just one quarter it has gone from nowhere to tied as the #1 Android tablet
Source: BusinessInsider.com
The Kindle Fire is squarely targeted at growing retail sales for Amazon, making it easier than ever for customers to ignore the brick-and-mortar store in favor of on-line retailers.
On top of this, according to Pew Research 52% of in-store shoppers now use a mobile device to check price and availability on-line of products as they look in the store. Thus a customer can look at products in Wal-Mart, and while standing in the aisle look for that same product, or comparable, in another store on-line. They can decide they like the work boots at Wal-Mart, and even try them on for size. Then they can order from Zappos or another on-line retailer to have those boots shipped to their home at an even lower price, or better warranty, even before leaving the Wal-Mart store.
It's no wonder then that Wal-Mart has struggled to grow its revenues. Wal-Mart has been a victim of intense competition that found ways to attack its success formula effectively.
Then Wal-Mart implemented its "Shoot Yourself in the Head" strategy
What did Wal-Mart recently do? According to Reuters Wal-Mart decided to transfer its entire marketing department to work for merchandising. Marketing was moved from reporting to the CEO, to reporting into Sales. The objective was to put all the energy of marketing into trying to further defend the Wal-Mart business, and drive up same-store sales. In other words, to make sure marketing was fully focused on better executing the old, struggling success formula.
The marketing department at Wal-Mart does all the market research on customers, trends and advertising – traditional and on-line. Marketing is the organization charged with looking outside, learning and adapting the organization to any market shifts. In this role marketing is expected to identify new competitors, new market solutions that are working better, and adapt the organization to shifting market needs. It is responsible to be the eyes and ears of the organization, and then think up new solutions addressing these external inputs. That's why it needs to report to the CEO, so it can drive toward new solutions that can revitalize the organization and keep it growing with new market trends.
But now, it's been shot. Reporting to sales, marketing's role directed at driving same store sales is purely limiting the function to defending and extending the success formula that has produced lackluster results for 12 years. Marketing is no longer in a position to adapt Wal-Mart. Instead, it is tasked to find ways to do more, better, faster, cheaper under the leadership of the sales organization.
When faced with market shifts, winning companies adapt. Look at how skillfully Amazon has moved from book seller to general merchandise seller to offering a consumer electronic device.
Unfortunately, too many businesses react to market shifts like Wal-Mart. They hunker down, do more of the same and re-organize to "increase focus" on the traditional business as results suffer. Instead of adapting the company hopes more focus on execution will somehow improve results.
Not likely. Expect results to go the other direction. There might be a short-term improvement from the massive influx of resource, but long term the trends are taking customers to new solutions. Regardless of the industry leader's size. Don't expect Wal-Mart to be a long-term winner. Better to invest in competitors taking advantage of trends.
by Adam Hartung | Oct 27, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Web/Tech
There is a big cry for innovation these days. Unfortunately, despite spending a lot of money on it, most innovation simply isn't. And that's why companies don't grow.
The giant consulting firm Booz & Co. just completed its most recent survey on innovation. Like most analysts, they tried using R&D spending as yardstick for measuring innovation. Unfortunately, as a lot of us already knew, there is no correlation:
"There is no statistically significant relationship between financial performance and innovation spending, in terms of either total R&D dollars or R&D as a percentage of revenues. Many companies — notably, Apple — consistently underspend their peers on R&D investments while outperforming them on a broad range of measures of corporate success, such as revenue growth, profit growth, margins, and total shareholder return. Meanwhile, entire industries, such as pharmaceuticals, continue to devote relatively large shares of their resources to innovation, yet end up with much less to show for it than they — and their shareholders — might hope for."
(Uh-hum, did you hear about this Abbott? Pfizer? Readers that missed it might want to glance at last week's blog about Abbott, and why it is a sell after announcing plans to split the company.)
Far too often, companies spend most of their R&D dollars on making their products cheaper, operate better, faster or do more. Clayton Christensen pointed this out some 15 years ago in his groundbreaking book "The Innovator's Dilemma" (HBS Press, 1997). Most R&D, in most industries, and for most companies, is spent trying to sustain an existing technology – not identify or develop a disruptive technology that would have far higher rates of return.
While this is easy to conceptualize, it is much harder to understand. Until we look at a storied company like Kodak – which has received a lot of news this last month.
Kodak invented amateur photography, and was rewarded with decades of profitable revenue growth as its string of cheap cameras, film products and photographic papers changed the way people thought about photographs. Kodak was the world leader in photographic film and paper sales, at great margins, and its value grew exponentially!
Of course, we all know what happened. Amateur photography went digital. No more film, and no more film developing. Even camera sales have disappeared as most folks simply use mobile phones.
But what most people don't know is that Kodak invented digital photography! Really! They were the first to create the technology, and the first to apply it. But they didn't really market it, largely because of fears they would cannibalize their film sales. In an effort to defend & extend their old business, Kodak licensed digital photography patents to camera manufacturers, abandoned R&D in the product line and maintained its focus on its core business. Kodak kept making amateur film better, faster and cheaper – until nobody cared any more.
Of course, Kodak wasn't the first to fall into this trap. Xerox invented desktop publishing but let that market go to Apple, Wintel suppliers and HP printers as it worked diligently trying to defend & extend its copier business. With no click meter on the desktop publishing equipment, Xerox wasn't sure how to make money with it. So they licensed it away.
DEC pretty much created and owned the CAD/CAM business before losing it to AutoCad. Sears created at home shopping, a market now dominated by Amazon. What's your favorite story?
It's a pattern we see a lot. And nowhere worse than at Microsoft.
Do you remember that Microsoft had the Zune player at least as early as the iPod, but didn't bother to develop the technology, or market, letting Apple take the lead in digital music and video devices? Did you remember that the Windows CE smartphone (built by HTC) beat the iPhone to market by years? But Microsoft didn't really develop an app base, didn't really invest in the smartphone technology or market – and let first RIM and later Apple run away with that market as well.
Now, several years too late Microsoft hopes its Nokia partnership will help it capture a piece of that market – despite its still rather apparent lack of an app base or breakthrough advantage.
Microsoft is a textbook example of over-investing in existing technology, in an effort to defend & extend an existing product line, to the point of "over-serving" customer needs. What new extensions do you want from your PC or office software?
Do you remember Clippy? That was the little paper clip that came up in Windows applications to help you do your job better. It annoyed everyone, and was disabled by everyone. A product development that nobody wanted, yet was created and marketed anyway. It didn't sell any additional software products – but it did cost money. That's defend & extend spending.
How much a company spends on innovation doesn't matter, because what's important is what the company spends on real breakthroughs rather than sustaining ideas. Microsoft spends a lot on Windows and Office – it doesn't spend enough on breakthrough innovation for mobile products or games.
And it doesn't spend nearly enough on marketing non-PC innovations. We are already well into the back end of the PC lifecycle. Today more bandwidth is consumed from mobile devices than PC laptops and desktops. Purchase rates of mobile devices are growing at double digits, while companies (and individuals) are curtailing PC purchases. But Microsoft missed the boat because it chose to defend & extend PCs years ago, rather than really try to develop the technology and markets for CE and Zune.
Just look at where Microsoft spends money today. It's hottest innovation is Kinect. But that investment is dwarfed by spending on Skype – intended to extend PC life – and ads promoting the use of PC technologies for families this holiday season.
Unfortunately, there are almost no examples of companies that miss the transition to a new technology thriving. And that's why it is really important to revisit the Kodak chart, and then look at a Microsoft chart.
(Chart 10/27/11)
Do you think Microsoft, after this long period of no value increase, is more likely to go up in value, or more likely to follow Kodak? Unfortunately, there are few companies that make the transition. But there have been thousands that have not. Companies that had very high market share, once made a lot of money, but fell into failure because they invested in better, faster, cheaper rather than innovation.
If you are still holding Kodak, why? If you're still holding Microsoft, Abbott, Kraft, Sara Lee, Sears or Wal-Mart — why?
by Adam Hartung | Oct 4, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, Film, In the Rapids, Innovation, Leadership, Television, Transparency, Web/Tech
Reed Hastings, the CEO of Netflix, has long been considered a pretty good CEO. In January, 2009 his approval ranking, from Glassdoor, was an astounding 93%. In January, 2010 he was still on the top 25 list, with a 75% approval rating. And it's not surprising, given that he had happy employees, happy customers, and with Netflix's successful trashing of Blockbuster the company's stock had risen dramaticall,y leading to very happy investors.
But that was before Mr. Hastings made a series of changes in July and September. First Netflix raised the price on DVD rentals, and on packages that had DVD rentals and streaming download, by about $$6/month. Not a big increase in dollar terms, but it was a 60% jump, and it caught a lot of media attention (New York Times article). Many customers were seriously upset, and in September Netflix let investors know it had lost about 4% of its streaming subscribers, and possibly as many as 5% of its DVD subscribers (Daily Mail).
No investor wants that kind of customer news from a growth company, and the stock price went into a nosedive. The decline was augmented when the CEO announced Netflix was splitting into 2 companies. Netflix would focus on streaming video, and Quikster would focus on DVDs. Nobody understood the price changes – or why the company split – and investors quickly concluded Netflix was a company out of control and likely to flame out, ruined by its own tactics in competition with Amazon, et.al.
(Source: Yahoo Finance 3 October, 2011)
This has to be about the worst company communication disaster by a market leader in a very, very long time. TVWeek.com said Netflix, and Reed Hastings, exhibited the most self-destructive behavior in 2011 – beyond even the Charlie Sheen fiasco! With everything going its way, why, oh why, did the company raise prices and split? Not even the vaunted New York Times could figure it out.
But let's take a moment to compare Netflix with another company having recent valuation troubles – Kodak.
Kodak invented home photography, leading it to tremendous wealth as amature film sales soared for seveal decades. But last week Kodak announced it was about out of cash, and was reaching into its revolving credit line for some $160million to pay bills. This latest financial machination reinforced to investors that film sales aren't what they used to be, and Kodak is in big trouble – possibly facing bankruptcy. Kodak's stock is down some 80% this year, from $6 to $1 – and quite a decline from the near $80 price it had in the late 1990s.
(Source: Yahoo Finance 10-3-2011)
Why Kodak declined was well described in Forbes. Despite its cash flow and company strengths, Kodak never succeeded beyond its original camera film business. Heck, Kodak invented digital photography, but licensed the technology to others as it rabidly pursued defending film sales. Because Kodak couldn't adapt to the market shift, it now is probably going to fail.
And that is why it is worth revisiting Netflix. Although things were poorly explained, and certainly customers were not handled well, last quarter's events are the right move for investors in the shifting at-home video entertainment business:
- DVD sales are going the direction of CD's and audio cassettes. Meaning down. It is important Netflix reap the maximum value out of its strong DVD position in order to fund growth in new markets. For the market leader to raise prices in low growth markets in order to maximize value is a classic strategic step. Netflix should be lauded for taking action to maximize value, rather than trying to defend and extend a business that will most likely disappear faster than any of us anticipate – especially as smart TVs come along.
- It is in Netflix's best interest to promote customer transition to streaming. Netflix is the current leader in streaming, and the profits are better there. Raising DVD prices helps promote customer shifting to the new technology, and is good for Netflix as long as customers don't change to a competitor.
- Although Netflix is currently the leader in streaming it has serious competition from Hulu, Amazon, Apple and others. It needs to build up its customer base rapidly, before people go to competitors, and it needs to fund its streaming business in order to obtain more content. Not only to negotiate with more movie and TV suppliers, but to keep funding its exclusive content like the new Lillyhammer series (more at GigaOm.com). Content is critical to maintaining leadership, and that requires both customers and cash.
- Netflix cannot afford to muddy up its streaming strategy by trying to defend, and protect, its DVD business. Splitting the two businesses allows leaders of each to undertake strategies to maximize sales and profits. Quikster will be able to fight Wal-Mart and Redbox as hard as possible, and Netflix can focus attention on growing streaming. Again, this is a great strategic move to make sure Netflix transitions from its old DVD business into streaming, and doesn't end up like an accelerated Kodak story.
Historically, companies that don't shift with markets end up in big trouble. AB Dick and Multigraphics owned small offset printing, but were crushed when Xerox brought out xerography. Then, afater inventing desktop publishing at Xerox PARC, Xerox was crushed by the market shift from copiers to desktop printers – a shift Xerox created. Pan Am, now receiving attention due to the much hyped TV series launch, failed when it could not make the shift to deregulation. Digital Equipment could not make the shift to PCs. Kodak missed the shift from film to digital. Most failed companies are the result of management's inability to transition with a market shift. Trying to defend and extend the old marketplace is guaranteed to fail.
Today markets shift incredibly fast. The actions at Netflix were explained poorly, and perhaps taken so fast and early that leadership's intentions were hard for anyone to understand. The resulting market cap decline is an unmitigated disaster, and the CEO should be ashamed of his performance. Yet, the actions taken were necessary – and probably the smartest moves Netflix could take to position itself for long-term success.
Perhaps Netflix will fall further. Short-term price predictions are a suckers game. But for long-term investors, now that the value has cratered, give Netflix strong consideration. It is still the leader in DVD and streaming. It has an enormous customer base, and looks like the exodus has stopped. It is now well organized to compete effectively, and seek maximum future growth and value. With a better PR firm, good advertising and ongoing content enhancements Netflix has the opportunity to pull out of this communication nightmare and produce stellar returns.
by Adam Hartung | Jul 28, 2011 | Books, Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, eBooks, In the Rapids, Innovation, Leadership, Television, Web/Tech
“It’s easier to succeed in the Amazon than on the polar tundra” Bruce Henderson, famed founder of The Boston Consulting Group, once told me. “In the arctic resources are few, and there aren’t many ways to compete. You are constantly depleting resources in life-or-death struggles with competitors. Contrarily, in the Amazon there are multiple opportunities to grow, and multiple ways to compete, dramatically increasing your chances for success. You don’t have to fight a battle of survival every day, so you can really grow.”
Today, Amazon(.com) is the place to be. As the financial markets droop, fearful about the economy and America’s debt ceiling “crisis,” Amazon is achieving its highest valuation ever. While the economy, and most companies, struggle to grow, Amazon is hitting record growth:
Source: BusinessInsider.com
Sales are up 50% versus last year! The result of this impressive sales growth has been a remarkable valuation increase – comparable to Apple!
- Since 2009, valuation is up 5.5x
- Over 5 years valuation is up 8x
- Over the last decade Amazon’s value has risen 15x
How did Amazon do this? Not by “sticking to its knitting” or being very careful to manage its “core.” In 2001 Amazon was still largely an on-line book seller.
The company’s impressive growth has come by moving far from its “core” into new markets and new businesses – most far removed from its expertise. Despite its “roots” and “DNA” being in U.S. books and retailing, the company has pioneered off-shore businesses and high-tech products that help customers take advantage of big trends.
Amazon’s earnings release provided insight to its fantastic growth. Almost 50% of revenues lie outside the U.S. Traditional retailers such as WalMart, Target, Kohl’s, Sears, etc. have struggled in foreign markets, and blamed poor performance on weak infrastructure and complex legal/tax issues. But where competitors have seen obstacles, Amazon created opportunity to change the way customers buy, and change the industry using its game-changing technology and capabilities. For its next move, according to Silicon Alley Insider, “Amazon is About to Invade India,” a huge retail market, in an economy growing at over 7%/year, with rising affluence and spendable income – but almost universally overlooked by most retailers due to weak infrastructure and complex distribution.
Amazon’s remarkable growth has occurred even though its “core” business of books has been declining – rather dramatically – the last decade. Book readership declines have driven most independents, and large chains such as B. Dalton and more recently Borders, out of business. But rather than use this as an excuse for weak results, Amazon invested heavily in the trends toward digitization and mobility to launch the wildly successful Kindle e-Reader. Today about half of all Amazon book sales are digital, creating growth where most competitors (hell-bent on trying to defend the old business) have dealt with stagnation and decline.
Amazon did this without a background as a technology company, an electronics company, or a consumer goods company. Additionally, Amazon invested in Kindle – and is now developing a tablet – even as these products cannibalized the historically “core” paper-based book sales. And Amazon has pursued these market shifts, even though these new products create a significant threat to Amazon’s largest traditional suppliers – book publishers.
Rather than trying to defend its old core business, Amazon has invested heavily in trends – even when these investments were in areas where Amazon had no history, capability or expertise!
Amazon has now followed the trends into a leading position delivering profitable “cloud” services. Amazon Web Services (AWS) generated $500M revenue last year, is reportedly up 50% to $750M this year, and will likely hit $1B or more before next year. In addition to simple data storage Amazon offers cloud-based Oracle database services, and even ERP (enterprise resource planning) solutions from SAP. In cloud computing services Amazon now leads historically dominant IT services companies like Accenture, CSC, HP and Dell. By offering solutions that fulfill the emerging trends, rather than competing head-to-head in traditional service areas, Amazon is growing dramatically and avoiding a gladiator war. And capturing big sales and profits as the marketplace explodes.
Amazon created 5,300 U.S. jobs last quarter. Organic revenue growth was 44%. Cash flow increased 25%. All because the company continued expanding into new markets, including not only new retail markets, and digital publishing, but video downloads and television streaming – including making a deal to deliver CBS shows and archive.
Amazon’s willingness to go beyond conventional wisdom has been critical to its success. GeekWire.com gives insight into how Amazon makes these critical resource decisions in “Jeff Bezos on Innovation” (taken from comments at a shareholder meeting June 7, 2011):
- “you just have to place a bet. If you place enough of those bets, and if you place them early enough, none of them are ever betting the company”
- “By the time you are betting the company, it means you haven’t invented for too long”
- “If you invent frequently and are willing to fail, then you never get to the point where you really need to bet the whole company”
- “We are planting more seeds…everything we do will not work…I am never concerned about that”
- “my mind never lets me get in a place where I think we can’t afford to take these bets”
- “A big piece of the story we tell ourselves about who we are, is that we are willing to invent”
If you want to succeed, there are ample lessons at Amazon. Be willing to enter new markets, be willing to experiment and learn, don’t play “bet the company” by waiting too long, and be willing to invest in trends – especially when existing competitors (and suppliers) are hesitant.
by Adam Hartung | Jul 14, 2011 | Investing, Leadership, Trends
When you go after competitors, does it more resemble a gladiator war – or a David vs. Goliath battle? The answer will likely determine your profitability. As a company, and as an investor.
After they achieve some success, most companies fall into a success formula – constantly tyring to improve execution. And if the market is growing quickly, this can work out OK. But eventually, competitors figure out how to copy your formula, and as growth slows many will catch you. Just think about how easily long distance companies caught the monopolist AT&T after deregulation. Or how quickly many competitors have been able to match Dell’s supply chain costs in PCs. Or how quickly dollar retailers – and even chains like Target – have been able to match the low prices at Wal-Mart.
These competitors end up in a gladiator war. They swing their price cuts, extended terms and other promotional weapons, leaving each other very bloody as they battle for sales and market share. Often, one or more competitors end up dead – like the old AT&T. Or Compaq. Or Circuit City. These gladiator wars are not a good thing for investors, because resources are chewed up in all the fighting, leaving no gains for higher dividends – nor any stock price appreciation. Like we’ve seen at Wal-Mart and Dell.
The old story of David and Goliath gives us a different approach. Instead of going “toe-to-toe” in battle, David came at the fight from a different direction – adopting his sling to throw stones while he remained safely out of Goliath’s reach. After enough peppering, he wore down the giant and eventually popped him in the head.
And that’s how much smarter people compete.
- When everyone was keen on retail stores to rent DVDs, Netflix avoided the gladiator war with Blockbuster by using mail delivery.
- While United, American, Continental, Delta, etc. fought each other toe-to-toe for customers in the hub-and-spoke airline wars (none making any money by the way) Southwest ferried people cheaply between smaller airports on direct flights. Southwest has made more money than all the “major” airlines combined.
- While Hertz, Avis, National, Thrifty, etc. spent billions competing for rental car customers at airports Enterprise went into the local communities with small offices, and now has twice their revenues and much higher profitability.
- When internet popularity started growing in the 1990s Netscape traded axe hits wtih Microsoft and was destroyed. Another browser pioneer, Spyglass, transitioned from PCs to avoid Microsoft, and started making browsers for mobile phones, TVs and other devices creating billions for investors.
- While GM, Ford and Chrysler were in a grinding battle for auto customers, spending billions on new models and sales programs, Honda brought to market small motorcycles and very practical, reliable small cars. Honda is now very profitable in several major markets, while the old gladiators struggle to survive.
As an investor, we should avoid buying stocks of companies, and management teams that allow themselves to be drug into gladiator wars. No matter what promises they make to succeed, their success is uncertain, and will be costly to obtain. What’s worse, they could win the gladiator war only to find themselves facing David – after they are exhausted and resources are spent!
- Research in Motion became embroiled in battles with traditional cell phone manufacturers like Nokia and Ericdson, and now is late to the smartphone app market – and with dwindling resources.
- Motorola fought the gladiator war trying to keep Razr phones competitive, only to completely miss its early lead in smartphones. Now it has limited resources to develop its Android smart phone line.
- Is it smart for Google to take on a gladiator war in social media against Facebook, when it doesn’t seem to have any special tool for the battle? What will this cost, while it simultaneously fights Apple in Android wars and Microsoft for Chrome sales?
On the other hand, it’s smart to invest in companies that enter growth markets, but have a new approach to drive customer conversion. For example, Zip Car rents autos by the hour for urban users. Most cars are very high mileage, which appeals to customers, but they also are pretty inexpensive to buy. Their approach doesn’t take-on the traditional car rental company, but is growing quite handily.
This same logic applies to internal company investments as well. Far too often the corporate reource allocation process is designed to fight a gladiator war. Constantly spending to do more of the same. Projects become over-funded to fight battles considered “necessity,” while new projects are unfunded despite having the opportunity for much higher rates of return.
In 2000, Apple could have chosen to keep pouring money into the Mac. Instead it radically cut spending, reduced Mac platforms, and started looking for new markets where it could bring in new solutions. IPods, iTunes, IPhones, iPads and iCloud are now driving growth for the company – all new approaches that avoided gladiator battles with old market competitors. Very profitable growth. Apple has enough cash on hand to buy every phone maker, except Samsung – or Apple could buy Dell – if it wanted to. Apple’s market cap is worth more than Microsoft and Intel combined.
If you want to make more money, it’s best to avoid gladiator wars. They are great spectator events – but terrible places to be a participant. Instead, set your organization to find new ways of competing, and invest where you are doing what competitors are not. That will earn the greatest rate of return.
