by Adam Hartung | Nov 22, 2013 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Television
Do you really think in 2020 you’ll watch television the way people did in the 1960s? I would doubt it.
In today’s world if you want entertainment you have a plethora of ways to download or live stream exactly what you want, when you want, from companies like Netflix, Hulu, Pandora, Spotify, Streamhunter, Viewster and TVWeb. Why would you even want someone else to program you entertainment if you can get it yourself?
Additionally, we increasingly live in a world unaccepting of one-way communication. We want to not only receive what entertains us, but share it with others, comment on it and give real-time feedback. The days when we willingly accepted having information thrust at us are quickly dissipating as we demand interactivity with what comes across our screen – regardless of size.
These 2 big trends (what I want, when I want; and 2-way over 1-way) have already changed the way we accept entertaining. We use USB drives and smartphones to provide static information. DVDs are nearly obsolete. And we demand 24×7 mobile for everything dynamic.
Yet, the CEO of Charter Cable company wass surprised to learn that the growth in cable-only customers is greater than the growth of video customers. Really?
It was about 3 years ago when my college son said he needed broadband access to his apartment, but he didn’t want any TV. He commented that he and his 3 roommates didn’t have any televisions any more. They watched entertainment and gamed on screens around his apartment connected to various devices. He never watched live TV. Instead they downloaded their favorite programs to watch between (or along with) gaming sessions, picked up the news from live web sites (more current and accurate he said) and for sports they either bought live streams or went to a local bar.
To save money he contacted Comcast and said he wanted the premier internet broadband service. Even business-level service. But he didn’t want TV. Comcast told him it was impossible. If he wanted internet he had to buy TV. “That’s really, really stupid” was the way he explained it to me. “Why do I have to buy something I don’t want at all to get what I really, really want?”
Then, last year, I helped a friend move. As a favor I volunteered to return her cable box to Comcast, since there was a facility near my home. I dreaded my volunteerism when I arrived at Comcast, because there were about 30 people in line. But, I was committed, so I waited.
The next half-hour was amazingly instructive. One after another people walked up to the window and said they were having problems paying their bills, or that they had trouble with their devices, or wanted a change in service. And one after the other they said “I don’t really want TV, just internet, so how cheaply can I get it?”
These were not busy college students, or sophisticated managers. These were every day people, most of whom were having some sort of trouble coming up with the monthly money for their Comcast bill. They didn’t mind handing back the cable box with TV service, but they were loath to give up broadband internet access.
Again and again I listened as the patient Comcast people explained that internet-only service was not available in Chicagoland. People had to buy a TV package to obtain broad-band internet. It was force-feeding a product people really didn’t want. Sort of like making them buy an entree in order to buy desert.
As I retold this story my friends told me several stories about people who banned together in apartments to buy one Comcast service. They would buy a high-powered router, maybe with sub-routers, and spread that signal across several apartments. Sometimes this was done in dense housing divisions and condos. These folks cut the cost for internet to a fraction of what Comcast charged, and were happy to live without “TV.”
But that is just the beginning of the market shift which will likely gut cable companies. These customers will eventually hunt down internet service from an alternative supplier, like the old phone company or AT&T. Some will give up on old screens, and just use their mobile device, abandoning large monitors. Some will power entertainment to their larger screens (or speakers) by mobile bluetooth, or by turning their mobile device into a “hotspot.”
And, eventually, we will all have wireless for free – or nearly so. Google has started running fiber cable in cities including Austin, TX, Kansas City, MO and Provo, Utah. Anyone who doesn’t see this becoming city-wide wireless has their eyes very tightly closed. From Albuquerque, NM to Ponca City, OK to Mountain View, CA (courtesy of Google) cities already have free city-wide wireless broadband. And bigger cities like Los Angeles and Chicago are trying to set up free wireless infrastructure.
And if the USA ever invests in another big “public works infrastructure” program will it be to rebuild the old bridges and roads? Or is it inevitable that someone will push through a national bill to connect everyone wirelessly – like we did to build highways and the first broadcast TV.
So, what will Charter and Comcast sell customers then?
It is very, very easy today to end up with a $300/month bill from a major cable provider. Install 3 HD (high definition) sets in your home, buy into the premium movie packages, perhaps one sports network and high speed internet and before you know it you’ve agreed to spend more on cable service than you do on home insurance. Or your car payment. Once customers have the ability to bypass that “cable cost” the incentive is already intensive to “cut the cord” and set that supplier free.
Yet, the cable companies really don’t seem to see it. They remain unimpressed at how much customers dislike their service. And respond very slowly despite how much customers complain about slow internet speeds. And even worse, customer incredulous outcries when the cable company slows down access (or cuts it) to streaming entertainment or video downloads are left unheeded.
Cable companies say the problem is “content.” So they want better “programming.” And Comcast has gone so far as to buy NBC/Universal so they can spend a LOT more money on programming. Even as advertising dollars are dropping faster than the market share of old-fashioned broadcast channels.
Blaming content flies in the face of the major trends. There is no shortage of content today. We can find all the content we want globally, from millions of web sites. For entertainment we have thousands of options, from shows and movies we can buy to what is for free (don’t forget the hours of fun on YouTube!)
It’s not “quality programming” which cable needs. That just reflects industry deafness to the roar of a market shift. In short order, cable companies will lack a reason to exist. Like land-line phones, Philco radios and those old TV antennas outside, there simply won’t be a need for cable boxes in your home.
Too often business leaders become deaf to big trends. They are so busy executing on an old success formula, looking for reasons to defend & extend it, that they fail to evaluate its relevancy. Rather than listen to market shifts, and embrace the need for change, they turn a deaf ear and keep doing what they’ve always done – a little better, with a little more of the same product (do you really want 650 cable channels?,) perhaps a little faster and always seeking a way to do it cheaper – even if the monthly bill somehow keeps going up.
But execution makes no difference when you’re basic value proposition becomes obsolete. And that’s how companies end up like Kodak, Smith-Corona, Blackberry, Hostess, Continental Bus Lines and pretty soon Charter and Comcast.
by Adam Hartung | Nov 6, 2013 | Defend & Extend, Innovation, Leadership, Web/Tech
Can you believe it has been only 12 years since Apple introduced the iPod? Since then Apple’s value has risen from about $11 (January, 2001) to over $500 (today) – an astounding 45X increase.
With all that success it is easy to forget that it was not a “gimme” that the iPod would succeed. At that time Sony dominated the personal music world with its Walkman hardware products and massive distribution through consumer electronics chains such as Best Buy, and broad-line retailers like Wal-Mart. Additionally, Sony had its own CD label, from its acquisition of Columbia Records (renamed CBS Records,) producing music. Sony’s leadership looked impenetrable.
But, despite all the data pointing to Sony’s inevitable long-term domination, Apple launched the iPod. Derided as lacking CD quality, due to MP3’s compression algorithms, industry leaders felt that nobody wanted MP3 products. Sony said it tried MP3, but customers didn’t want it.
All the iPod had going for it was a trend. Millions of people had downloaded MP3 songs from Napster. Napster was illegal, and users knew it. Some heavy users were even prosecuted. But, worse, the site was riddled with viruses creating havoc with all users as they downloaded hundreds of millions of songs.
Eventually Napster was closed by the government for widespread copyright infreingement. Sony, et.al., felt the threat of low-priced MP3 music was gone, as people would keep buying $20 CDs. But Apple’s new iPod provided mobility in a way that was previously unattainable. Combined with legal downloads, including the emerging Apple Store, meant people could buy music at lower prices, buy only what they wanted and literally listen to it anywhere, remarkably conveniently.
The forecasted “numbers” did not predict Apple’s iPod success. If anything, good analysis led experts to expect the iPod to be a limited success, or possibly failure. (Interestingly, all predictions by experts such as IDC and Gartner for iPhone and iPad sales dramatically underestimated their success, as well – more later.) It was leadership at Apple (led by the returned Steve Jobs) that recognized the trend toward mobility was more important than historical sales analysis, and the new product would not only sell well but change the game on historical leaders.
Which takes us to the mistake Intel made by focusing on “the numbers” when given the opportunity to build chips for the iPhone. Intel was a very successful company, making key components for all Microsoft PCs (the famous WinTel [for Windows+Intel] platform) as well as the Macintosh. So when Apple asked Intel to make new processors for its mobile iPhone, Intel’s leaders looked at the history of what it cost to make chips, and the most likely future volumes. When told Apple’s price target, Intel’s leaders decided they would pass. “The numbers” said it didn’t make sense.
Uh oh. The cost and volume estimates were wrong. Intel made its assessments expecting PCs to remain strong indefinitely, and its costs and prices to remain consistent based on historical trends. Intel used hard, engineering and MBA-style analysis to build forecasts based on models of the past. Intel’s leaders did not anticipate that the new mobile trend, which had decimated Sony’s profits in music as the iPod took off, would have the same impact on future sales of new phones (and eventually tablets) running very thin apps.
Harvard innovation guru Clayton Christensen tells audiences that we have complete knowledge about the past. And absolutely no knowledge about the future. Those who love numbers and analysis can wallow in reams and reams of historical information. Today we love the “Big Data” movement which uses the world’s most powerful computers to rip through unbelievable quantities of historical data to look for links in an effort to more accurately predict the future. We take comfort in thinking the future will look like the past, and if we just study the past hard enough we can have a very predictible future.
But that isn’t the way the business world works. Business markets are incredibly dynamic, subject to multiple variables all changing simultaneously. Chaos Theory lecturers love telling us how a butterfly flapping its wings in China can cause severe thunderstorms in America’s midwest. In business, small trends can suddenly blossom, becoming major trends; trends which are easily missed, or overlooked, possibly as “rounding errors” by planners fixated on past markets and historical trends.
Markets shift – and do so much, much faster than we anticipate. Old winners can drop remarkably fast, while new competitors that adopt the trends become “game changers” that capture the market growth.
In 2000 Apple was the “Mac” company. Pretty much a one-product company in a niche market. And Apple could easily have kept trying to defend & extend that niche, with ever more problems as Wintel products improved.
But by understanding the emerging mobility trend leadership changed Apple’s investment portfolio to capture the new trend. First was the iPod, a product wholly outside the “core strengths” of Apple and requiring new engineering, new distribution and new branding. And a product few people wanted, and industry leaders rejected.
Then Apple’s leaders showed this talent again, by launching the iPhone in a market where it had no history, and was dominated by Motorola and RIMM/BlackBerry. Where, again, analysts and industry leaders felt the product was unlikely to succeed because it lacked a keyboard interface, was priced too high and had no “enterprise” resources. The incumbents focused on their past success to predict the future, rather than understanding trends and how they can change a market.
Too bad for Intel. And Blackberry, which this week failed in its effort to sell itself, and once again changed CEOs as the stock hit new lows.
Then Apple did it again. Years after Microsoft attempted to launch a tablet, and gave up, Apple built on the mobility trend to launch the iPad. Analysts again said the product would have limited acceptance. Looking at history, market leaders claimed the iPad was a product lacking usability due to insufficient office productivity software and enterprise integration. The numbers just did not support the notion of investing in a tablet.
Anyone can analyze numbers. And today, we have more numbers than ever. But, numbers analysis without insight can be devastating. Understanding the past, in grave detail, and with insight as to what used to work, can lead to incredibly bad decisions. Because what really matters is vision. Vision to understand how trends – even small trends – can make an enormous difference leading to major market shifts — often before there is much, if any, data.
by Adam Hartung | Sep 19, 2013 | Current Affairs, In the Swamp, Innovation, Leadership, Television, Web/Tech
Apple announced the new iPhones recently. And mostly, nobody cared.
Remember when users waited anxiously for new products from Apple? Even the media became addicted to a new round of Apple products every few months. Apple announcements seemed a sure-fire way to excite folks with new possibilities for getting things done in a fast changing world.
But the new iPhones, and the underlying new iPhone software called iOS7, has almost nobody excited.
Instead of the product launches speaking for themselves, the CEO (Tim Cook) and his top product development lieutenants (Jony Ive and Craig Federighi) have been making the media rounds at BloombergBusinessWeek and USAToday telling us that Apple is still a really innovative place. Unfortunately, their words aren't that convincing. Not nearly as convincing as former product launches.
CEO Cook is trying to convince us that Apple's big loss of market share should not be troubling. iPhone owners still use their smartphones more than Android owners, and that's all we should care about. Unfortunately, Apple profits come from unit sales (and app sales) rather than minutes used. So the chronic share loss is quite concerning.
Especially since unit sales are now growing barely in single digits, and revenue growth quarter-over-quarter, which sailed through 2012 in the 50-75% range, have suddenly gone completely flat (less than 1% last quarter.) And margins have plunged from nearly 50% to about 35% – more like 2009 (and briefly in 2010) than what investors had grown accustomed to during Apple's great value rise. The numbers do not align with executive optimism.
For industry aficianados iOS7 is a big deal. Forbes Haydn Shaughnessy does a great job of laying out why Apple will benefit from giving its ecosystem of suppliers a new operating system on which to build enhanced features and functionality. Such product updates will keep many developers writing for the iOS devices, and keep the battle tight with Samsung and others using Google's Android OS while making it ever more difficult for Microsoft to gain Windows8 traction in mobile.
And that is good for Apple. It insures ongoing sales, and ongoing profits. In the slog-through-the-tech-trench-warfare Apple is continuing to bring new guns to the battle, making sure it doesn't get blown up.
But that isn't why Apple became the most valuable publicly traded company in America.
We became addicted to a company that brought us things which were great, even when we didn't know we wanted them – much less think we needed them. We were happy with CDs and Walkmen until we discovered much smaller, lighter iPods and 99cent iTunes. We were happy with our Blackberries until we learned the great benefits of apps, and all the things we could do with a simple smartphone. We were happy working on laptops until we discovered smaller, lighter tablets could accomplish almost everything we couldn't do on our iPhone, while keeping us 24×7 connected to the cloud (that we didn't even know or care about before,) allowing us to leave the laptop at the office.
Now we hear about upgrades. A better operating system (sort of sounds like Microsoft talking, to be honest.) Great for hard core techies, but what do users care? A better Siri; which we aren't yet sure we really like, or trust. A new fingerprint reader which may be better security, but leaves us wondering if it will have Siri-like problems actually working. New cheaper color cases – which don't matter at all unless you are trying to downgrade your product (sounds sort of like P&G trying to convince us that cheaper, less good "Basic" Bounty was an innovation.)
More (upgrades) Better (voice interface, camera capability, security) and Cheaper (plastic cases) is not innovation. It is defending and extending your past success. There's nothing wrong with that, but it doesn't excite us. And it doesn't make your brand something people can't live without. And, while it keeps the battle for sales going, it doesn't grow your margin, or dramatically grow your sales (it has declining marginal returns, in fact.)
And it won't get your stock price from $450-$475/share back to $700.
We all know what we want from Apple. We long for the days when the old CEO would have said "You like Google Glass? Look at this……. This will change the way you work forever!!"
We've been waiting for an Apple TV that let's us bypass clunky remote controls, rapidly find favorite shows and helps us avoid unwanted ads and clutter. But we've been getting a tease of Dick Tracy-esque smart watches.
From the world's #1 tech brand (in market cap – and probably user opinion) we want something disruptive! Something that changes the game on old companies we less than love like Comcast and DirecTV. Something that helps us get rid of annoying problems like expensive and bad electric service, or routers in our basements and bedrooms, or navigation devices in our cars, or thumb drives hooked up to our flat screen TVs —- or doctor visits. We want something Game Changing!
Apple's new CEO seems to be great at the Sustaining Innovation game. And that pretty much assures Apple of at least a few more years of nicely profitable sales. But it won't keep Apple on top of the tech, or market cap, heap. For that Apple needs to bring the market something big. We've waited 2 years, which is an eternity in tech and financial markets. If something doesn't happen soon, Apple investors deserve to be worried, and wary.
by Adam Hartung | Sep 4, 2013 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
Just over a week after Microsoft announces plans to replace CEO Steve Ballmer the company announced it will spend $7.2B to buy the Nokia phone/tablet business. For those looking forward to big changes at Microsoft this was like sticking a pin in the big party balloon!
Everyone knows that Microsoft's future is at risk now that PC sales are declining globally at nearly 10% – with developing markets shifting even faster to mobile devices than the USA. And Microsoft has been the perpetual loser in mobile devices; late to market and with a product that is not a game changer and has only 3% share in the USA.
But, despite this grim reality, Microsoft has doubled-down (that's doubled its bet for non-gamblers) on its Windows 8 OS strategy, and continues to play "bet the company". Nokia's global market share has shriveled to 15% (from 40%) since former Microsoft exec-turned-Nokia-CEO Stephen Elop committed the company to Windows 8. Because other Microsoft ecosystem companies like HP, Acer and HP have been slow to bring out Win 8 devices, Nokia has 90% of the miniscule market that is Win 8 phones. So this acquisition brings in-house a much deeper commitment to spending on an effort to defend & extend Microsoft's declining O/S products.
As I predicted in January, the #1 action we could expect from a Ballmer-led Microsoft is pouring more resources into fighting market leaders iOS and Android – an unwinnable war. Previously there was the $8.5B Skype and the $400M Nook, and now a $7.2B Nokia. And as 32,000 Nokia employees join Microsoft losses will surely continue to rise. While Microsoft has a lot of cash – spending it at this rate, it won't last long!
Some folks think this acquisition will make Microsoft more like Apple, because it now will have both hardware and software which in some ways is like Apple's iPhone. The hope is for Apple-like sales and margins soon. But, unfortunately, Google bought Motorola months ago and we've seen that such revenue and profit growth are much harder to achieve than simply making an acquisition. And Android products are much more popular than Win8. Simply combining Microsoft and Nokia does not change the fact that Win8 products are very late to market, and not very desirable.
Some have postulated that buying Nokia was a way to solve the Microsoft CEO succession question, positioning Mr. Elop for Mr. Ballmer's job. While that outcome does seem likely, it would be one of the most expensive recruiting efforts of all time. The only reason for Mr. Elop to be made Microsoft CEO is his historical company relationship, not performance. And that makes Mr. Elop is exactly the wrong person for the Microsoft CEO job!
In October, 2010 when Mr. Elop took over Nokia I pointed out that he was the wrong person for that job – and he would destroy Nokia by making it a "Microsoft shop" with a Microsoft strategy. Since then sales are down, profits have evaporated, shareholders are in revolt and the only good news has been selling the dying company to Microsoft! That's not exactly the best CEO legacy.
Mr. Elop's job today is to sell more Win8 mobile devices. Were he to be made Microsoft CEO it is likely he would continue to think that is his primary job – just as Mr. Ballmer has believed. Neither CEO has shown any ability to realize that the market has already shifted, that there are two leaders far, far in front with brand image, products, apps, developers, partners, distribution, market share, sales and profits. And it is impossible for Microsoft to now catch up.
It is for good reason that short-term traders pushed down Microsoft's share value after the acquisition was announced. It is clear that current CEO Ballmer and Microsoft's Board are still stuck fighting the last war. Still trying to resurrect the Windows and Office businesses to previous glory. Many market anallysts see this as the last great effort to make Ballmer's bet-the-company on Windows 8 pay off. But that's a bet which every month is showing longer and longer odds.
Microsoft is not dead. And Microsoft is not without the ability to turn around. But it won't happen unless the Board recognizes it needs to steer Microsoft in a vastly different direction, reduce (rather than increase) investments in Win8 (and its devices,) and create a vision for 2020 where Microsoft is highly relevant to customers. So far, we're seeing all the wrong moves.
by Adam Hartung | Jun 5, 2013 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Web/Tech
Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer appears to be planning a major reorganization. The apparent objective is to help the company move toward becoming a "devices and services company" as presented in the company's annual shareholder letter last October.
But, the question for investors is whether this is a crafty move that will help Microsoft launch renewed profitable growth, or is it leadership further confusing customers and analysts while leaving Microsoft languishing in stalled markets? After all, the shares are up some 31% the last 6 months and it is a good time to decide if an investor should buy, hold or sell.
There are a lot of things not going well for Microsoft right now.
Everyone knows PC sales have started dropping. IDC recently lowered its forecast for 2013 from a decline of 1.3% to negative 7.8%. The mobile market is already larger than PC sales, and IDC now expects tablet sales (excluding smartphones) will surpass PCs in 2015. Because the PC is Microsoft's "core" market – producing almost all the company's profitability – declining sales are not a good thing.
Microsoft hoped Windows 8 would reverse the trend. That has not happened. Unfortunately, ever since being launched Windows 8 has underperformed the horrific sales of Vista. Eight months into the new product it is selling at about half the rate Vista did back in 2007 – which was the worst launch in company history. Win8 still has fewer users than Vista, and at 4% share 1/10th the share of market leaders Windows 7 and XP.
Microsoft is launching an update to Windows 8, called Windows 8.1 or "blue." But rather than offering a slew of new features to please an admiring audience the release looks more like an early "fix" of things users simply don't like, such as bringing back the old "start" button. Reviewers aren't talking about how exciting the update is, but rather wondering if these admissions of poor initial design will slow conversion to tablets.
And tablets are still the market where Microsoft isn't – even if it did pioneer the product years before the iPad. Bloomberg reported that Microsoft has been forced to cut the price of RT. So far historical partners such as HP and HTC have shunned Windows tablets, leaving Acer the lone company putting out Windows a mini-tab, and Dell (itself struggling with its efforts to go private) the only company declaring a commitment to future products.
And whether it's too late for mobile Windows is very much a real question. At the last shareholder meeting Nokia's investors cried loud and hard for management to abandon its commitment to Microsoft in favor of returning to old operating systems or moving forward with Android. This many years into the game, and with the Google and Apple ecosystems so far in the lead, Microsoft needed a game changer if it was to grab substantial share. But Win 8 has not proven to be a game changer.
In an effort to develop its own e-reader market Microsoft dumped some $300million into Barnes & Noble's Nook last year. But the e-reader market is fast disappearing as it is overtaken by more general-purpose tablets such as the Kindle Fire. Yet, Microsoft appears to be pushing good money after bad by upping its investment by another $1B to buy the rest of Nook, apparently hoping to obtain enough content to keep the market alive when Barnes & Noble goes the way of Borders. But chasing content this late, behind Amazon, Apple and Google, is going to be much more costly than $1B – and an even lower probability than winning in hardware or software.
Then there's the new Microsoft Office. In late May Microsoft leadership hoped investors would be charmed to hear that 1M $99 subscriptions had been sold in 3.5 months. However, that was to an installed base of hundreds of millions of PCs – a less than thrilling adoption rate for such a widely used product. Companies that reached 1M subscribers from a standing (no installed base) start include Instagram in 2.5 months, Spotify in 5 months, Dropbox in 7 months and Facebook (which pioneered an entire new marketplace in Social) in only 10 months. One could have easily expected a much better launch for a product already so widely used, and offered at about a third the price of previous licenses.
A new xBox was launched on May 21st. Unfortunately, like all digital markets gaming is moving increasingly mobile, and consoles show all the signs of going the way of desktop computers. Microsoft hopes xBox can become the hub of the family room, but we're now in a market where a quarter of homes lead by people under 50 don't really use "the family room" any longer.
xBox might have had a future as an enterprise networking hub, but so far Kinnect has not even been marketed as a tool for business, and it has not yet incorporated the full network functionality (such as Skype) necessary to succeed at creating this new market against competitors like Cisco.
Thankfully, after more than a decade losing money, xBox reached break-even recently. However, margins are only 15%, compared to historical Microsoft margins of 60% in "core" products. It would take a major growth in gaming, plus a big market share gain, for Microsoft to hope to replace lost PC profits with xBox sales. Microsoft has alluded to xBox being the next iTunes, but lacking mobility, or any other game changer, it is very hard to see how that claim holds water.
The Microsoft re-org has highlighted 3 new divisions focused on servers and tools, Skype/Lync and xBox. What is to happen with the business which has driven three decades of Microsoft growth – operating systems and office software – is, well, unclear. How upping the focus on these three businesses, so late in the market cycle, and with such low profitability will re-invigorate Microsoft's value is, well, unclear.
In fact, given how Microsoft has historically made money it is wholly unclear what being a "devices and services" company means. And this re-organization does nothing to make it clear.
My past columns on Microsoft have led some commenters to call me a "Microsoft hater." That is not true. More apt would be to say I am a Microsoft bear. Its historical core market is shrinking, and Microsoft's leadership invested far too much developing new products for that market in hopes the decline would be delayed – which did not work. By trying to defend and extend the PC world Microsoft's leaders chose to ignore the growing mobile market (smartphones and tablets) until far too late – and with products which were not game changers.
Although Microsoft's leaders invested heavily in acquisitions and other markets (Skype, Nook, xBox recently) those very large investments came far too late, and did little to change markets in Microsoft's favor. None of these have created much excitement, and recently Rick Sherland at Nomura securities came out with a prediction that Microsoft might well sell the xBox division (a call I made in this column back in January.)
As consumers, suppliers and investors we like the idea of a near-monopoly. It gives us comfort to believe we can trust in a market leader to bring out new products upon which we can rely – and which will continue to make long-term profits. But, good as this feels, it has rarely been successful. Markets shift, and historical leaders fall as new competitors emerge; largely because the old leadership continues investing in what they know rather than shifting investments early into new markets.
This Microsoft reorganization appears to be rearranging the chairs on the Titanic. The mobile iceberg has slashed a huge gash in Microsoft's PC hull. Leadership keeps playing familiar songs, but the boat cannot float without those historical PC profits. Investors would be smart to flee in the lifeboat of recent share price gains.
