by Adam Hartung | Jun 18, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Web/Tech
While there is an appropriately high interest in the Win8 Tablet announcement from Microsoft today, there is no way it is going to be a game changer. Simply because it was never intended to be.
Game changers meet newly emerging, unmet needs, in new ways. People are usually happy enough, until they see the new product/solution and realize "hey, this helps me do something I couldn't do before" or "this helps me solve my problem a lot better." Game changers aren't a simple improvement, they allow customers to do something radically different. And although at first they may well appear to not work too well, or appear too expensive, they meet needs so uniquely, and better, that they cause people to change their behavior.
Motorola invented the smart phone. But Motorola thought it was too expensive to be a cell phone, and not powerful enough to be a PC. Believing it didn't fit existing markets well, Motorola shelved the product.
Apple realized people wanted to be mobile. Cell phones did talk and text OK – and RIM had pretty good email. But it was limited use. Laptops had great use, but were too big, heavy and cumbersome to be really mobile. So Apple figured out how to add apps to the phone, and use cloud services support, in order to make the smart phone fill some pretty useful needs – like navigation, being a flashlight, picking up tweets – and a few hundred thousand other things – like doctors checking x-rays or MRI results. Not as good as a PC, and somewhat on the expensive side for the device and the AT&T connection, but a whole lot more convenient. And that was a game changer.
From the beginning, Windows 8 has been – by design – intended to defend and extend the Windows product line. Rather than designed to resolve unmet needs, or do things nobody else could do, or dramatically improve productivity over all other possible solutions, Windows 8 was designed to simply extend Windows so (hopefully) people would not shift to the game changer technology offered by Apple and later Google.
The problem with trying to extend old products into new markets is it rarely works. Take for example Windows 7. It was designed to replace Windows Vista, which was quite unpopular as an upgrade from Windows XP. By most accounts, Windows 7 is a lot better. But, it didn't offer users anything that that made them excited to buy Windows 7. It didn't solve any unmet needs, or offer any radically better solutions. It was just Windows better and faster (some just said "fixed.")
Nothing wrong with that, except Windows 7 did not address the most critical issue in the personal technology marketplace. Windows 7 did not stop the transition from using PCs to using mobile devices. As a result, while sales of app-enabled smartphones and tablets exploded, sales of PCs stalled:
Chart reproduced with permission of Business Insider Intelligence 6/12/12 courtesy of Alex Cocotas
People are moving to the mobility provided by apps, cloud services and the really easy to use interface on modern mobile devices. Market leading cell phone maker, Nokia, decided it needed to enter smartphones, and did so by wholesale committing to Windows7. But now the CEO, Mr. Elop (formerly a Microsoft executive,) is admitting Windows phones simply don't sell well. Nobody cares about Microsoft, or Windows, now that the game has changed to mobility – and Windows 7 simply doesn't offer the solutions that Apple and Android does. Not even Nokia's massive brand image, distribution or ad spending can help when a product is late, and doesn't greatly exceed the market leader's performance. Just last week Nokia announced it was laying off another 10,000 employees.
Reviews of Win8 have been mixed. And that should not be surprising. Microsoft has made the mistake of trying to make Win8 something nobody really wants. On the one hand it has a new interface called Metro that is supposed to be more iOS/Android "like" by using tiles, touch screen, etc. But it's not a breakthrough, just an effort to be like the existing competition. Maybe a little better, but everyone believes the leaders will be better still with new updates soon. By definition, that is not game changing.
Simultaneously, with Win8 users can find their way into a more historical Windows inteface. But this is not obvious, or intuitive. And it has some pretty "clunky" features for those who like Windows. So it's not a "great" Windows solution that would attract developers today focused on other platforms.
Win8 tries to be the old, and the new, without being great at either, and without offering anything that solves new problems, or creates breakthroughs in simplicity or performance.
Do you know the story about the Ford Edsel?
By focusing on playing catch up, and trying to defend & extend the Windows history, Microsoft missed what was most important about mobility – and that is the thousands of apps. The product line is years late to market, short on apps, short on app developers and short on giving anyone a reason to really create apps for Win8.
Some think it is good if Microsoft makes its own tablet – like it has done with xBox. But that really doesn't matter. What matters is whether Microsoft gives users and developers something that causes them to really, really want a new platform that is late and doesn't have the app base, or the app store, or the interfaces to social media or all the other great thinks they already have come to expect and like about their tablet (or smartphone.)
When iOS came out it was new, unique and had people flocking to buy it. Developers could only be mobile by joining with Apple, and users could only be mobile by buying Apple. That made it a game changer by leading the trend toward mobility.
Google soon joined the competition, built a very large, respectable following by chasing Apple and offering manufacturers an option for competing with Apple.
But Microsoft's new entry gives nobody a reason to develop for, or buy, a Win8 tablet – regardless of who manufactures it. Microsoft does not deliver a huge, untapped market. Microsoft doesn't solve some large, unmet need. Microsoft doesn't promise to change the game to some new, major trend that would drive early adopters to change platforms and bring along the rest of the market.
And making a deal so a dying company, on the edge of bankruptcy – Barnes & Noble – uses your technology is not a "big win." Amazon is killing Barnes & Noble, and Microsoft Windows 8 won't change that. No more than the Nook is going to take out Kindle, Kindle Fire, Galaxy Tab or the iPad. Microsoft can throw away $300million trying to convince people Win8 has value, but spending investor money on a dying businesses as a PR ploy is just stupid.
Microsoft is playing catch up. Catch up with the user interface. Catch up with the format. Catch up with the device size and portability. Catch up with the usability (apps). Just catch up.
Microsoft's problem is that it did not accept the PC market was going to stall back in 2008 or 2009. When it should have seen that mobility was a game changing trend, and required retooling the Microsoft solution suite. Microsoft dabbled with music mobility with Zune, but quickly dropped the effort as it refocused on its "core" Windows. Microsoft dabbled with mobile phones across different solutions including Kin – which it dropped along with Microsoft Mobility. Back again to focusing on operating systems. By maintaining its focus on Windows Microsoft hoped it could stop the trend, and refused to accept the market shift that was destined to stall its sales.
Microsoft stock has been flat for a decade. It's recent value improvement as Win8 approaches launch indicates that hope beats eternally in some investors' breasts for a return of Microsoft software dominance. But those days are long past. PC sales have stalled, and Windows is a product headed toward obsolescence as competitors make ever better, more powerful mobile platforms and ecosystems. If you haven't sold Microsoft yet, this may well be your last chance above $30. Ever.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 4, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
Understand your core strength, and protect it. Sounds like the key to success, and a simple motto. It's the mantra of many a management guru. Only, far too often, it's the road to ruin.
The last week 3 big announcements showed just how damning the "strategy" of building on historical momentum can be.
Start with Research in Motion's revenue and earnings announcement. Both metrics fell short of expectations as Blackberry sales continue to slide. Not many investors were actually surprised about this, to be honest. iOS and Android products have been taking away share from RIM for several months, and the trend remains clear. And investors have paid a heavy price.
Source: BusinessInsider.com
There is no doubt the executives at RIM are very aware of this performance, and desperately would like the results to be different. RIM has known for months that iOS and Android handhelds have been taking share. The executives aren't unaware, nor stupid. But, they have not been able to change the internal momentum at RIM to the right issues.
The success formula at RIM has long been to "own" the enterprise marketplace with the Blackberry server products, offering easy to connect and secure network access for email, texting and enterprise applications. Handsets came along with the server and network sales. All the momentum at RIM has been to focus on the needs of IT departments; largely security and internal connectivity to legacy systems and email. And, honestly, even today there is probably nobody better at that than RIM.
But the market shifted. Individual user needs and productivity began to trump the legacy issues. People wanted to leave their laptops at home, and do everything with their smartphones. Apps took on a far more dominant role, as did ease of use. Because these were not part of the internal momentum at RIM the company ignored those issues, maintaining its focus on what it believed was the core strength, especially amongst its core customers.
Now RIM is toast. It's share will keep falling, until its handhelds become as popular as Palm devices. Perhaps there will be a market for its server products, but only via an acquisition at a very low price. Momentum to protect the core business killed RIM because its leaders failed to recognize a critical market shift.
Turn next to Yahoo's announcement that it is laying off 1 out of 7 employees, and that this is not likely to be the last round of cuts. Yahoo has become so irrelevant that analysts now depicct its "core" markets as "worthless."
Source: SiliconAlleyInsider.com
Yahoo was an internet pioneer. At one time in the 1990s it was estimated that over 90% of browser home pages were set to Yahoo! But the need for content aggregation largely disappeared as users learned to use search and social media to find what they wanted. Ad placement revenue for keywords transferred to the leading search provider (Google) and for display ads to the leading social media provider (Facebook.)
But Yahoo steadfastly worked to defend and extend its traditional business. It enhanced its homepage with a multitude of specialty pages, such as YahooFinance. But each of these has been outdone by specialist web sites, such as Marketwatch.com, that deliver everyhing Yahoo does only better, attracting more advertisers. Yahoo's momentum caused it to miss shifting with the internet market. Under CEO Bartz the company focused on operational improvements and efforts at enhancing its sales, while market shifts made its offerings less and less relevant.
Now, Yahoo is worth only the value of its outside stockholdings, and it appears the new CEO lacks any strategy for saving the enterprise. The company appears ready to split up, and become another internet artifact for Wikipedia. Largely because it kept doing more of what it knew how to do and was unable to overcome momentum to do anything new.
Last, but surely not least, was the Dell announced acquisition of Wyse.
Dell is synonymous with PC. But the growth has left PCs, and Dell missed the markets for mobile entertainment devices (like iPods or Zunes,) smartphones (like iPhone or Evo) and tablets (like iPads and Galaxy Tab.) Dell slavisly kept to its success formula of doing no product development, leaving that to vendors Microsoft and Intel, as it focused on hardware manufacturing and supply chain excellence. As the market shifted from the technologies it knew Dell kept trying to cut costs and product prices, hoping that somehow people would be dissuaded from changing technologies. Only it hasn't worked, and Dell's growth in sales and profits has evaporated.
Don't be confused. Buying Wyse has not changed Dell's "core." In Wyse Dell found another hardware manufacturer, only one that makes old-fashioned "dumb" terminals for large companies (interpret that as "enterprise,") mostly in health care. This is another acquisition, like Perot Systems, in an effort to copy the 1980s IBM brand extension into other products and services that are in like markets – a classic effort at extending the original Dell success formula with minimal changes.
Wyse is not a "cloud" company. Rackspace, Apple and Amazon provide cloud services, and Wyse is nothing like those two market leaders. Buying Wyse is Dell's effort to keep chasing HP for market share, and trying to pick up other pieces of revenue as it extends is hardware sales into more low-margin markets. The historical momentum has not changed, just been slightly redirected. By letting momentum guide its investments, Dell is buying another old technology company it hopes it can can extend its "supply chain" strenths into – and maybe find new revenues and higher margins. Not likely.
Over and again we see companies falter due to momentum. Why? Markets shift. Faster and more often than most business leaders want to admit. For years leaders have been told to understand core strengths, and protect them. But this approach fails when your core strength loses its value due to changes in technologies, user preferences, competition and markets. Then the only thing that can keep a company successful is to shift. Often very far from the core – and very fast.
Success actually requires overcoming internal momentum, built on the historical success formula, by putting resources into new solutions that fulfill emerging needs. Being agile, flexible and actually able to pivot into new markets creates success. Forget the past, and the momentum it generates. That can kill you.
by Adam Hartung | Feb 29, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Web/Tech
This week people are having their first look at Windows 8 via the Barcelona, Spain Mobile World Congress. This better be the most exciting Microsoft product since Windows was created, or Microsoft is going to fail.
Why? Because Microsoft made the fatal mistake of "focusing on its core" and "investing in what it knew" – time worn "best practices" that are proving disastrous!
Everyone knows that Microsoft has returned almost nothing to shareholders the last decade. Simultaneously, all the "partner" companies that were in the "PC" (the Windows + Intel, or Wintel, platform) "ecosystem" have done poorly. Look beyond Microsoft at returns to shareholders for Intel, Dell (which recently blew its earings) and Hewlett Packard (HP – which says it will need 5 years to turn around the company.) All have been forced to trim headcount and undertake deep cost cutting as revenues have stagnated since 2000, at times falling, and margins have been decimated.
This happened despite deep investments in their "core" PC business. In 2009 Microsoft spent almost $9B on PC R&D; over 14% of revenues. In the last few years Microsoft has launched Vista, Windows 7, Office 2009 and Office 2010 all in its effort to defend and extend PC sales. Likewise all the PC manufacturers have spent considerably on new, smaller, more powerful and even cheaper PC laptop and desktop models.
Unfortunately, these investments in their core expertise and markets have not excited users, nor created much growth.
On the other hand, Apple spent all of the last decade investing in what it didn't know much about in 2000. Rather than investing in its "core" Macintosh business, Apple invested in the trend toward mobility, being an early leader with 3 platforms – the iPod, iPhone and iPad. All product categories far removed from its "core" and what it new well. But, all targeted at the trend toward enhanced mobility.
Don't forget, Microsoft launched the Zune and the Windows CE phones in the last decade. But, because these were not "core" products in "core" markets Microsoft, and its partners, did not invest much in these markets. Microsoft even brought to market tablets, but leadership felt they were inferior to the PC, so investments were maintained in traditional PC products. The Zune, Windows phone and early Windows tablets all died because Microsoft and its partner companies stuck to investing their most important, and best known, PC business.
Where are we now? Sales of PC's are stagnating, and going to decline. While sales of mobile devices are skyrocketing.
Source: Business Insider 2/14/12
Today tablet sales are about 50% of the ~300M unit PC sales. But they are growing so fast they will catch up by 2014, and be larger by 2015. And, that depends on PC sales maintaining. Look around your next meeting, commuter flight or coffee shop experience and see how many tablets are being used compared to laptops. Think about that ratio a year ago, and then make your own assessment as to how many new PCs people will buy, versus tablets. Can you imagine the PC market actually shrinking? Like, say, the traditional cell phone business is doing?
By focusing on Windows, and specifically each generation leading to Windows 8, Microsoft took a crazy bet. It bet it could improve windows to keep the PC relevant, in the face of the evident trend toward mobility and ease of use. Instead of investing in new technologies, new products and new markets – things it didn't know much about – Microsoft chose to invest in what it new, and hoped it could control the trend.
People didn't want a PC to be mobile, they wanted mobility. Apple invested in the trend, making the MP3 player a winner with its iPod ease of use and iTunes market. Then it made smartphones, which were largely an email device, incredibly popular by innovating the app marketplace which gave people the mobility they really desired. Recognizing that people didn't really want a PC, they wanted mobility, Apple pioneered the tablet marketplace with its iPad and large app market. The result was an explosion in revenue by investing outside its core, in technologies and markets about which it initially knew nothing.
Apple would not have grown had it focused its investment on its "core" Mac business. In the last year alone Apple sold more iOS devices than it sold Macs in its entire 28 year history!
Source: Business Insider 2/17/2012
Today, the iPhone business itself is bigger than all of Microsoft. The iPad business is bigger than the desktop PC business, and if included in the larger market for personal computing represents 17% of the PC market. And, of course, Apple is now worth almost twice the value of Microsoft.
We hear, all the time, to invest in what we know. But it turns out that is NOT the best strategy. Trends develop, and markets shift. By constantly investing in what we know we become farther and farther removed from trends. In the end, like Microsoft, we make massive investments trying to defend and extend our past products when we would be much, much smarter to invest in new technologies and markets that are on the trend, even if we don't know much, if anything, about them.
The odds are now stacked against Microsoft. Apple has a huge lead in product sales, market position and apps. It's closest challenger is Google's Android, which is attracting many of the former Microsoft partners (such as LG's recent defection) as they strive to catch up. Company's such as Nokia are struggling as the technology leadership, and market position, has shifted away from Microsoft as mobility changed the market.
Microsoft's technology sales used to be based upon convincing IT departments to use its platform. But today users largely buy mobile devices with their own money, and eschew the recommendations of the IT department. Just look at how users drove the demise of Research In Motion's Blackberry. IT needs to provide users with tools they like, and use platforms which are easy and low-cost to leverage with big app bases. That favors Apple and Android, not Microsoft with its far, far too late entry.
You can be smarter than Microsoft. Don't take the crazy bet of always doubling down on what you know. Put your focus on the marketplace, and identify shifts. It's cheaper, and smarter, to bet early on trends than constantly trying to fight the trend by investing – usually at an ever higher amount – in what you know.
by Adam Hartung | Jan 4, 2012 | Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
The S&P 500 ended 2011 almost exactly where it started. If ever there was a year when being invested in the right companies, and selling the dogs, mattered for higher portfolio returns it was 2011. The good news is that many of the 2011 dogs were easy to spot, and easy to sell before ruining your portfolio.
There were many bad performers. However, there was a common theme. Most simply did not adjust to market shifts. Environmental changes, from technology to regulations, made them less competitive thus producing declining returns as newer competitors benefitted. Additionally, these companies chose – often over the course of several years – to eschew innovation and new product launches. They chose to keep investing in efforts to defend and extend historical, but troubled, businesses rather than innovate toward a more successful future.
Looking at the trends that put these companies into trouble we can recognize the need to continue avoiding these companies, even though many analysts are starting to say they may be "value stocks." Instead we can invest in the trends by buying companies likely to grow and increase portfolio returns in 2012.
Avoid Kodak – Buy Apple or Google
Few companies are as iconic as Eastman Kodak, inventor of amateur photography and creator of the star product in the hit 1973 Paul Simon song "Kodachrome." However, it was clear in the late 1980s that digital cameras were going to change photography. Kodak itself was one of the primary inventors of the core technology, but licensed it to others in order to generate cash it invested trying to defend and extend photographic film and paper sales. In my 2008 book "Create Marketplace Disruption" I highlighted Kodak as a company so locked-in to film sales that it was unwilling to even consider moving into new markets.
In 2011 EK lost almost all its value, falling from $3.85 share to about 60 cents. The whole company is now worth only $175M as it rapidly moves toward NYSE delisting and bankruptcy, and complete failure. The trend that doomed EK has been 2 decades in the making, yet like an ocean freighter collision management simply let momentum kill the company. The long slide has gone on for years, and will not reverse. If you want to invest in photography your best plays are smart phone suppliers Apple, and Google for not only the Android software but the Chrome apps that are being used to photoshop images right inside browser windows.
Avoid Sears – Buy Amazon
When hedge fund manager Ed Lampert took over KMart by buying their bonds in bankruptcy, then used that platform to buy Sears back in 2006 the Wall Street folks hailed him as a genius. "Mad Money" Jim Cramer said "Fast Eddie" Lampert was his former college roommate, and that was all he needed to recommend buying the stock. On the strength of such spurrious recommendations, Sears Holdings initially did quite well.
However, I was quoted in The Chicago Tribune the day of the Sears acquisition announcement saying the merged company was doomed – because the trends were clear. Wal-Mart was in pitched battle with Target to "own" the discount market which had crushed KMart. Sears was pinched by them on the low end, and by better operators of vertically focused companies such as Kohl's for clothing, Best Buy for appliances and Home Depot for repair and landscape tools. Sears was swimming against the trends, and Ed Lampert had no plans to re-invent the company. What lay ahead was cost-cutting and store closings which would kill both brands in a market already overly saturated with traditional brick-and-mortar retailers as long-term more sales moved on-line.
Now Sears Holdings has gone full circle. In the last 12 months the stock has dropped from $95 to $31.50 – a decline of more than two thirds (a loss of over $7B in investor value.) Sears and KMart have no future, nor do the Craftsman or Kenmore brands. After Christmas management announced a new round of store closings as same stores sales continues its never-ending slide, and finally most industry analysts are saying Sears has nowhere to go but down.
The retail future belongs to Amazon.com – which is where you should invest if you want to grow portfolio value in 2012. Look to Kindle Fire and other tablets to accelerate the retail movement on-line, while out-of-date Sears becomes even less relevant and of lower value.
Stay out of Nokia and Research in Motion – Buy Apple
On February 15 I wrote that Nokia had made a horrible CEO selection, and was a stock to avoid. Nokia invesors lost about $18B of value in 2001 as the stock lost 50% of its market cap in 2011 (62% peak to trough.) May 20 I pounded the table to sell RIMM, which lost nearly 80% of its investor value in 2011 – nearly $60B!
Both companies simply missed the market shift in smart phones. Nokia did its best Motorola imitation, which missed the shift from analog to digital cell phones – and then completely missed the shift to smart phones – driving the company to near bankruptcy and acquisition by Google for its patent library. With no game at all, the Nokia Board hired a former Microsoft executive to arrange a shotgun wedding for launching a new platform – 3 years too late. Now Apple and Android have over 400,000 apps each, growing weekly, while Microsoft is struggling with 50k apps, no compelling reason to switch and struggles to build a developer network. Nokia's road to oblivion appears clear.
RIM was first to the smartphone market, and had it locked up for years. Unfortunately, top management and many investors felt that the huge installed base of corporate accounts, using Blackberry secure servers, would protect the company from competition. Now the New York Times has reported RIM leadership as one of the worst in 2011, because an installed base is no longer the competitive entry barrier Michael Porter waxed about in the early 1980s. Corporations are following their users to better productivty by moving fast as possible to the iOS and Android worlds.
RIM's doomed effort to launch an ill-devised, weakly performing tablet against the Apple iPod juggernaut only served to embarrass the company, at great expense. At this point, there's little reason to think RIM will do any better than Palm did when the technology shifted, and anyone holding RIMM will likely end up with nothing (as did holders of PALM.) If you want to be in mobile your best pick is market leading and profitably growing Apple, with a second position in Google as it builds up ancillary products like Chrome to leverage its growing Android base.
Avoid HP and Sony – Buy Apple
Speaking of Palm, to paraphrase Senator Dirkson "that billion here, a billion there" that added up to some real money lost for HP. Mark Hurd consolidated HP into a company focused on building volume largely in other people's technology – otherwise known as PCs. As printing declines, and people shift to tablets and cloud apps, HP has less and less ability to build its profit base. The trends were all going in the wrong direction as market shifts make HP less and less relevant to consumer and corporate customers.
Selecting Mr. Apotheker was a disastrous choice, and I called for investors to dump the stock when he was hired in January. An ERP executive, he was firmly planted in the technology of the 1990s. With a diminished R&D, and an atrophied new product development organization HP is nothing like the organization of its founders, and the newest CEO has offered no clear path for finding the trends and re-igniting growth at HP. If you want to grow in what we used to call the PC business you need to be in tablets now – and that gets you back, once again, to Apple first, and Google second.
Which opens the door for discussing what in the 1960s through 1980s was the most innovative of all consumer electronics companies, Sony. But when Mr. Morita was replaced by an MBA CEO that began focusing the company on the bottom line, instead of new gadgets, the pipeline rapidly dried. Acquisitions, such as a music label, replaced R&D and new product development. Allegiance to protecting the CD and DVD business, and the players Sony made – along with traditional TVs and PCs – meant Sony missed the wave to MP3, to mobile digital entertainment devices, to DVRs and the emerging market for interactive TV. What was once a leader is now a follower.
As a result Sony has lost $4.5B in investor value the last 3 year, and in 2011 lost half its value falling from $37 to $18/share. As Apple emerges as the top consumer electronics technology leader and profit creator, closely chased by Google, it is unlikely Sony will ever recover that lost value.
Buying Apple, Amazon, Google and Netflix
This column has already made the case for Apple. It is almost incomprehensible how far a lead Apple has over its competition, causing investors to fear for its revenue growth prospects. As a result, the companies P/E multiple is a remarkably low single-digit number, even though its growth is well into the double digits! But its existing position in growth markets, technology leadership and well oiled new product development capability nearly assures continued profitbale growth for at least 5 years. Even though the stock, which I recommended as my number 1 buy in January, 2011, has risen some 30% maintaining a big position is remains an investors best portfolio enhancer.
Amazon was a wild ride in 2011, and today is worth almost the same as it was one year ago. Given that the company is now larger, has a more dominant position in publishing and is the world leader on the trend to on-line retail it is a very good stock to own. The choice to think long-term and build its user links through sales of Kindle Fire at cost has limited short-term profits, but every action Amazon has taken to grow has paid off handsomely because they accelerate the natural trends and position Amazon as the leader. Remaining with the trends, and the growth, offers the potential for big payoff this year and for years to come.
Google remains #2 in most markets, but remains aligned with the trends. It was disappointing that the company cancelled so many great products in 2011 – such as Gear and Wave. And it faces stiff competition in its historical ad markets from the shift toward social media and Facebook's emergence. However, Google is the best positioned company to displace Microsoft on all those tablets out there with its Chrome apps, and it still is a competitor with the potential for long-term value creation. It's just hard to be as excited about Google as Apple and Amazon.
Netflix started 2011 great, but then stumbled. Starting the year at $190, Netflix rose to $305 before falling to $75. Investors have seen an 80% decline from the peak, and a 60% decline from beginning of the year. But this was notably not because company revenues or profits fell, because they didn't. Rather concerns about price changes and long-term competition caused the stock to drop. And that's why I remain bullish for owning Netflix in 2012.
Growth can hide a multitude of sins, as I pointed out when making the case to buy in October. And Netflix has done a spectacular job of preparing itself to transition from physical DVDs to video downloads. The "game" is not over, and there is a lot of content warring left. But Netflix was first, and has the largest user base. Techcrunch recently reported on a Citi survey that found Netflix still has nearly twice the viewership of #2 Hulu (27% vs. 15%.)
Those who worry about Amazon, Google or Apple taking the Netflix position forget that those companies are making huge bets to compete in other markets and have shown less interest in making the big investments to compete on the content that is critical in the download market. AOL and Yahoo are also bound up trying to define new strategies, and look unlikely to ever be the content companies they once were.
For those who are banking on competitive war with Comcast and other cable companies to kill off Netflix look no further than how they define themselves (cable operators,) and their horrific customer relationship scores to realize that they are more interested in trying to preserve their old business than rapidly enter a new one. Perhaps one will try to buy Netflix, but they don't have the management teams or organization to compete effectively.
The fact is that Netflix still has the best strategy for its market, which is still growing exponentially, has the best pricing and is rapidly growing its content to remain in the top position. That makes it a likely pick for "turnaround of the year" by end of 2012 (at least in the tech/media industry) – even as investments rise over the next 12 months.
by Adam Hartung | Oct 27, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Web/Tech
There is a big cry for innovation these days. Unfortunately, despite spending a lot of money on it, most innovation simply isn't. And that's why companies don't grow.
The giant consulting firm Booz & Co. just completed its most recent survey on innovation. Like most analysts, they tried using R&D spending as yardstick for measuring innovation. Unfortunately, as a lot of us already knew, there is no correlation:
"There is no statistically significant relationship between financial performance and innovation spending, in terms of either total R&D dollars or R&D as a percentage of revenues. Many companies — notably, Apple — consistently underspend their peers on R&D investments while outperforming them on a broad range of measures of corporate success, such as revenue growth, profit growth, margins, and total shareholder return. Meanwhile, entire industries, such as pharmaceuticals, continue to devote relatively large shares of their resources to innovation, yet end up with much less to show for it than they — and their shareholders — might hope for."
(Uh-hum, did you hear about this Abbott? Pfizer? Readers that missed it might want to glance at last week's blog about Abbott, and why it is a sell after announcing plans to split the company.)
Far too often, companies spend most of their R&D dollars on making their products cheaper, operate better, faster or do more. Clayton Christensen pointed this out some 15 years ago in his groundbreaking book "The Innovator's Dilemma" (HBS Press, 1997). Most R&D, in most industries, and for most companies, is spent trying to sustain an existing technology – not identify or develop a disruptive technology that would have far higher rates of return.
While this is easy to conceptualize, it is much harder to understand. Until we look at a storied company like Kodak – which has received a lot of news this last month.
Kodak invented amateur photography, and was rewarded with decades of profitable revenue growth as its string of cheap cameras, film products and photographic papers changed the way people thought about photographs. Kodak was the world leader in photographic film and paper sales, at great margins, and its value grew exponentially!
Of course, we all know what happened. Amateur photography went digital. No more film, and no more film developing. Even camera sales have disappeared as most folks simply use mobile phones.
But what most people don't know is that Kodak invented digital photography! Really! They were the first to create the technology, and the first to apply it. But they didn't really market it, largely because of fears they would cannibalize their film sales. In an effort to defend & extend their old business, Kodak licensed digital photography patents to camera manufacturers, abandoned R&D in the product line and maintained its focus on its core business. Kodak kept making amateur film better, faster and cheaper – until nobody cared any more.
Of course, Kodak wasn't the first to fall into this trap. Xerox invented desktop publishing but let that market go to Apple, Wintel suppliers and HP printers as it worked diligently trying to defend & extend its copier business. With no click meter on the desktop publishing equipment, Xerox wasn't sure how to make money with it. So they licensed it away.
DEC pretty much created and owned the CAD/CAM business before losing it to AutoCad. Sears created at home shopping, a market now dominated by Amazon. What's your favorite story?
It's a pattern we see a lot. And nowhere worse than at Microsoft.
Do you remember that Microsoft had the Zune player at least as early as the iPod, but didn't bother to develop the technology, or market, letting Apple take the lead in digital music and video devices? Did you remember that the Windows CE smartphone (built by HTC) beat the iPhone to market by years? But Microsoft didn't really develop an app base, didn't really invest in the smartphone technology or market – and let first RIM and later Apple run away with that market as well.
Now, several years too late Microsoft hopes its Nokia partnership will help it capture a piece of that market – despite its still rather apparent lack of an app base or breakthrough advantage.
Microsoft is a textbook example of over-investing in existing technology, in an effort to defend & extend an existing product line, to the point of "over-serving" customer needs. What new extensions do you want from your PC or office software?
Do you remember Clippy? That was the little paper clip that came up in Windows applications to help you do your job better. It annoyed everyone, and was disabled by everyone. A product development that nobody wanted, yet was created and marketed anyway. It didn't sell any additional software products – but it did cost money. That's defend & extend spending.
How much a company spends on innovation doesn't matter, because what's important is what the company spends on real breakthroughs rather than sustaining ideas. Microsoft spends a lot on Windows and Office – it doesn't spend enough on breakthrough innovation for mobile products or games.
And it doesn't spend nearly enough on marketing non-PC innovations. We are already well into the back end of the PC lifecycle. Today more bandwidth is consumed from mobile devices than PC laptops and desktops. Purchase rates of mobile devices are growing at double digits, while companies (and individuals) are curtailing PC purchases. But Microsoft missed the boat because it chose to defend & extend PCs years ago, rather than really try to develop the technology and markets for CE and Zune.
Just look at where Microsoft spends money today. It's hottest innovation is Kinect. But that investment is dwarfed by spending on Skype – intended to extend PC life – and ads promoting the use of PC technologies for families this holiday season.
Unfortunately, there are almost no examples of companies that miss the transition to a new technology thriving. And that's why it is really important to revisit the Kodak chart, and then look at a Microsoft chart.
(Chart 10/27/11)
Do you think Microsoft, after this long period of no value increase, is more likely to go up in value, or more likely to follow Kodak? Unfortunately, there are few companies that make the transition. But there have been thousands that have not. Companies that had very high market share, once made a lot of money, but fell into failure because they invested in better, faster, cheaper rather than innovation.
If you are still holding Kodak, why? If you're still holding Microsoft, Abbott, Kraft, Sara Lee, Sears or Wal-Mart — why?
