by Adam Hartung | May 25, 2012 | Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Web/Tech
Things are bad at HP these days. CEO and Board changes have confused the management team and investors alike. Despite a heritage based on innovation, the company is now mired in low-growth PC markets with little differentiation. Investors have dumped the stock, dropping company value some 60% over two years, from $52/share to $22 – a loss of about $60billion.
Reacting to the lousy revenue growth prospects as customers shift from PCs to tablets and smartphones, CEO Meg Whitman announced plans to eliminate 27,000 jobs; about 8% of the workforce. This is supposedly the first step in a turnaround of the company that has flailed ever since buying Compaq and changing the company course into head-to-head PC competition a decade ago. But, will it work?
Not a chance.
Fixing HP requires understanding what went wrong at HP. Simply, Carly Fiorina took a company long on innovation and new product development and turned it into the most industrial-era sort of company. Rather than having HP pursue new technologies and products in the development of new markets, like the company had done since its founding creating the market for electronic testing equipment, she plunged HP into a generic manufacturing war.
Pursuing the PC business Ms. Fiorina gave up R&D in favor of adopting the R&D of Microsoft, Intel and others while spending management resources, and money, on cost management. PCs offered no differentiation, and HP was plunged into a gladiator war with Dell, Lenovo and others to make ever cheaper, undifferentiated machines. The strategy was entirely based upon obtaining volume to make money, at a time when anyone could buy manufacturing scale with a phone call to a plethora of Asian suppliers.
Quickly the Board realized this was a cutthroat business primarily requiring supply chain skills, so they dumped Ms. Fiorina in favor of Mr. Hurd. He was relentless in his ability to apply industrial-era tactics at HP, drastically cutting R&D, new product development, marketing and sales as well as fixating on matching the supply chain savings of companies like Dell in manufacturing, and WalMart in retail distribution.
Unfortunately, this strategy was out of date before Ms. Fiorina ever set it in motion. And all Mr. Hurd accomplished was short-term cuts that shored up immediate earnings while sacrificing any opportunities for creating long-term profitable new market development. By the time he was forced out HP had no growth direction. It's PC business fortunes are controlled by its suppliers, and the PC-based printer business is dying. Both primary markets are the victim of a major market shift away from PC use toward mobile devices, where HP has nothing.
HPs commitment to an outdated industrial era supply-side manufacturing strategy can be seen in its acquisitions. What was once the world's leading IT services company, EDS, was bought in 2008 after falling into financial disarray as that market shifted offshore. After HP spent nearly $14B on the purchase, HP used that business to try defending and extending PC product sales, but to little avail. The services group has been downsized regularly as growth evaporated in the face of global trends toward services offshoring and mobile use.
In 2009 HP spent almost $3B on networking gear manufacturer 3Com. But this was after the market had already started shifting to mobile devices and common carriers, leaving a very tough business that even market-leading Cisco has struggled to maintain. Growth again stagnated, and profits evaporated as HP was unable to bring any innovation to the solution set and unable to create any new markets.
In 2010 HP spent $1B on the company that created the hand-held PDA (personal digital assistant) market – the forerunner of our wirelessly connected smartphones – Palm. But that became an enormous fiasco as its WebOS products were late to market, didn't work well and were wholly uncompetitive with superior solutions from Apple and Android suppliers. Again, the industrial-era strategy left HP short on innovation, long on supply chain, and resulted in big write-offs.
Clearly what HP needs is a new strategy. One aligned with the information era in which we live. Think like Apple, which instead of chasing Macs a decade ago shifted into new markets. By creating new products that enhanced mobility Apple came back from the brink of complete failure to spectacular highs. HP needs to learn from this, and pursue an entirely new direction.
But, Meg Whitman is certainly no Steve Jobs. Her career at eBay was far from that of an innovator. eBay rode the growth of internet retailing, but was not Amazon. Rather, instead of focusing on buyers, and what they want, eBay focused on sellers – a classic industrial-era approach. eBay has not been a leader in launching any new technologies (such as Kindle or Fire at Amazon) and has not even been a leader in mobile applications or mobile retail.
While CEO at eBay Ms. Whitman purchased PayPal. But rather than build that platform into the next generation transaction system for web or mobile use, Paypal was used to defend and extend the eBay seller platform. Even though PayPal was the first leader in on-line payments, the market is now crowded with solutions like Google Wallets (Google,) Square (from a Twitter co-founder,) GoPayment (Intuit) and Isis (collection of mobile companies.)
Had Ms. Whitman applied an information-era strategy Paypal could have been a global platform changing the way payment processing is handled. Instead its use and growth has been limited to supporting an historical on-line retail platform. This does not bode well for the future of HP.
HP cannot save its way to prosperity. That never works. Try to think of one turnaround where it did – GM? Tribune Corp? Circuit City? Sears? Best Buy? Kodak? To successfully turn around HP must move – FAST – to innovate new solutions and enter new markets. It must change its strategy to behave a lot more like the company that created the oscilliscope and usher in the electronics age, and a lot less like the industrial-era company it has become – destroying shareholder value along the way.
Is HP so cheap that it's a safe bet. Not hardly. HP is on the same road as DEC, Wang, Lanier, Gateway Computers, Sun Microsystems and Silicon Graphics right now. And that's lousy for investors and employees alike.
by Adam Hartung | Feb 29, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Web/Tech
This week people are having their first look at Windows 8 via the Barcelona, Spain Mobile World Congress. This better be the most exciting Microsoft product since Windows was created, or Microsoft is going to fail.
Why? Because Microsoft made the fatal mistake of "focusing on its core" and "investing in what it knew" – time worn "best practices" that are proving disastrous!
Everyone knows that Microsoft has returned almost nothing to shareholders the last decade. Simultaneously, all the "partner" companies that were in the "PC" (the Windows + Intel, or Wintel, platform) "ecosystem" have done poorly. Look beyond Microsoft at returns to shareholders for Intel, Dell (which recently blew its earings) and Hewlett Packard (HP – which says it will need 5 years to turn around the company.) All have been forced to trim headcount and undertake deep cost cutting as revenues have stagnated since 2000, at times falling, and margins have been decimated.
This happened despite deep investments in their "core" PC business. In 2009 Microsoft spent almost $9B on PC R&D; over 14% of revenues. In the last few years Microsoft has launched Vista, Windows 7, Office 2009 and Office 2010 all in its effort to defend and extend PC sales. Likewise all the PC manufacturers have spent considerably on new, smaller, more powerful and even cheaper PC laptop and desktop models.
Unfortunately, these investments in their core expertise and markets have not excited users, nor created much growth.
On the other hand, Apple spent all of the last decade investing in what it didn't know much about in 2000. Rather than investing in its "core" Macintosh business, Apple invested in the trend toward mobility, being an early leader with 3 platforms – the iPod, iPhone and iPad. All product categories far removed from its "core" and what it new well. But, all targeted at the trend toward enhanced mobility.
Don't forget, Microsoft launched the Zune and the Windows CE phones in the last decade. But, because these were not "core" products in "core" markets Microsoft, and its partners, did not invest much in these markets. Microsoft even brought to market tablets, but leadership felt they were inferior to the PC, so investments were maintained in traditional PC products. The Zune, Windows phone and early Windows tablets all died because Microsoft and its partner companies stuck to investing their most important, and best known, PC business.
Where are we now? Sales of PC's are stagnating, and going to decline. While sales of mobile devices are skyrocketing.
Source: Business Insider 2/14/12
Today tablet sales are about 50% of the ~300M unit PC sales. But they are growing so fast they will catch up by 2014, and be larger by 2015. And, that depends on PC sales maintaining. Look around your next meeting, commuter flight or coffee shop experience and see how many tablets are being used compared to laptops. Think about that ratio a year ago, and then make your own assessment as to how many new PCs people will buy, versus tablets. Can you imagine the PC market actually shrinking? Like, say, the traditional cell phone business is doing?
By focusing on Windows, and specifically each generation leading to Windows 8, Microsoft took a crazy bet. It bet it could improve windows to keep the PC relevant, in the face of the evident trend toward mobility and ease of use. Instead of investing in new technologies, new products and new markets – things it didn't know much about – Microsoft chose to invest in what it new, and hoped it could control the trend.
People didn't want a PC to be mobile, they wanted mobility. Apple invested in the trend, making the MP3 player a winner with its iPod ease of use and iTunes market. Then it made smartphones, which were largely an email device, incredibly popular by innovating the app marketplace which gave people the mobility they really desired. Recognizing that people didn't really want a PC, they wanted mobility, Apple pioneered the tablet marketplace with its iPad and large app market. The result was an explosion in revenue by investing outside its core, in technologies and markets about which it initially knew nothing.
Apple would not have grown had it focused its investment on its "core" Mac business. In the last year alone Apple sold more iOS devices than it sold Macs in its entire 28 year history!
Source: Business Insider 2/17/2012
Today, the iPhone business itself is bigger than all of Microsoft. The iPad business is bigger than the desktop PC business, and if included in the larger market for personal computing represents 17% of the PC market. And, of course, Apple is now worth almost twice the value of Microsoft.
We hear, all the time, to invest in what we know. But it turns out that is NOT the best strategy. Trends develop, and markets shift. By constantly investing in what we know we become farther and farther removed from trends. In the end, like Microsoft, we make massive investments trying to defend and extend our past products when we would be much, much smarter to invest in new technologies and markets that are on the trend, even if we don't know much, if anything, about them.
The odds are now stacked against Microsoft. Apple has a huge lead in product sales, market position and apps. It's closest challenger is Google's Android, which is attracting many of the former Microsoft partners (such as LG's recent defection) as they strive to catch up. Company's such as Nokia are struggling as the technology leadership, and market position, has shifted away from Microsoft as mobility changed the market.
Microsoft's technology sales used to be based upon convincing IT departments to use its platform. But today users largely buy mobile devices with their own money, and eschew the recommendations of the IT department. Just look at how users drove the demise of Research In Motion's Blackberry. IT needs to provide users with tools they like, and use platforms which are easy and low-cost to leverage with big app bases. That favors Apple and Android, not Microsoft with its far, far too late entry.
You can be smarter than Microsoft. Don't take the crazy bet of always doubling down on what you know. Put your focus on the marketplace, and identify shifts. It's cheaper, and smarter, to bet early on trends than constantly trying to fight the trend by investing – usually at an ever higher amount – in what you know.
by Adam Hartung | Jan 4, 2012 | Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
The S&P 500 ended 2011 almost exactly where it started. If ever there was a year when being invested in the right companies, and selling the dogs, mattered for higher portfolio returns it was 2011. The good news is that many of the 2011 dogs were easy to spot, and easy to sell before ruining your portfolio.
There were many bad performers. However, there was a common theme. Most simply did not adjust to market shifts. Environmental changes, from technology to regulations, made them less competitive thus producing declining returns as newer competitors benefitted. Additionally, these companies chose – often over the course of several years – to eschew innovation and new product launches. They chose to keep investing in efforts to defend and extend historical, but troubled, businesses rather than innovate toward a more successful future.
Looking at the trends that put these companies into trouble we can recognize the need to continue avoiding these companies, even though many analysts are starting to say they may be "value stocks." Instead we can invest in the trends by buying companies likely to grow and increase portfolio returns in 2012.
Avoid Kodak – Buy Apple or Google
Few companies are as iconic as Eastman Kodak, inventor of amateur photography and creator of the star product in the hit 1973 Paul Simon song "Kodachrome." However, it was clear in the late 1980s that digital cameras were going to change photography. Kodak itself was one of the primary inventors of the core technology, but licensed it to others in order to generate cash it invested trying to defend and extend photographic film and paper sales. In my 2008 book "Create Marketplace Disruption" I highlighted Kodak as a company so locked-in to film sales that it was unwilling to even consider moving into new markets.
In 2011 EK lost almost all its value, falling from $3.85 share to about 60 cents. The whole company is now worth only $175M as it rapidly moves toward NYSE delisting and bankruptcy, and complete failure. The trend that doomed EK has been 2 decades in the making, yet like an ocean freighter collision management simply let momentum kill the company. The long slide has gone on for years, and will not reverse. If you want to invest in photography your best plays are smart phone suppliers Apple, and Google for not only the Android software but the Chrome apps that are being used to photoshop images right inside browser windows.
Avoid Sears – Buy Amazon
When hedge fund manager Ed Lampert took over KMart by buying their bonds in bankruptcy, then used that platform to buy Sears back in 2006 the Wall Street folks hailed him as a genius. "Mad Money" Jim Cramer said "Fast Eddie" Lampert was his former college roommate, and that was all he needed to recommend buying the stock. On the strength of such spurrious recommendations, Sears Holdings initially did quite well.
However, I was quoted in The Chicago Tribune the day of the Sears acquisition announcement saying the merged company was doomed – because the trends were clear. Wal-Mart was in pitched battle with Target to "own" the discount market which had crushed KMart. Sears was pinched by them on the low end, and by better operators of vertically focused companies such as Kohl's for clothing, Best Buy for appliances and Home Depot for repair and landscape tools. Sears was swimming against the trends, and Ed Lampert had no plans to re-invent the company. What lay ahead was cost-cutting and store closings which would kill both brands in a market already overly saturated with traditional brick-and-mortar retailers as long-term more sales moved on-line.
Now Sears Holdings has gone full circle. In the last 12 months the stock has dropped from $95 to $31.50 – a decline of more than two thirds (a loss of over $7B in investor value.) Sears and KMart have no future, nor do the Craftsman or Kenmore brands. After Christmas management announced a new round of store closings as same stores sales continues its never-ending slide, and finally most industry analysts are saying Sears has nowhere to go but down.
The retail future belongs to Amazon.com – which is where you should invest if you want to grow portfolio value in 2012. Look to Kindle Fire and other tablets to accelerate the retail movement on-line, while out-of-date Sears becomes even less relevant and of lower value.
Stay out of Nokia and Research in Motion – Buy Apple
On February 15 I wrote that Nokia had made a horrible CEO selection, and was a stock to avoid. Nokia invesors lost about $18B of value in 2001 as the stock lost 50% of its market cap in 2011 (62% peak to trough.) May 20 I pounded the table to sell RIMM, which lost nearly 80% of its investor value in 2011 – nearly $60B!
Both companies simply missed the market shift in smart phones. Nokia did its best Motorola imitation, which missed the shift from analog to digital cell phones – and then completely missed the shift to smart phones – driving the company to near bankruptcy and acquisition by Google for its patent library. With no game at all, the Nokia Board hired a former Microsoft executive to arrange a shotgun wedding for launching a new platform – 3 years too late. Now Apple and Android have over 400,000 apps each, growing weekly, while Microsoft is struggling with 50k apps, no compelling reason to switch and struggles to build a developer network. Nokia's road to oblivion appears clear.
RIM was first to the smartphone market, and had it locked up for years. Unfortunately, top management and many investors felt that the huge installed base of corporate accounts, using Blackberry secure servers, would protect the company from competition. Now the New York Times has reported RIM leadership as one of the worst in 2011, because an installed base is no longer the competitive entry barrier Michael Porter waxed about in the early 1980s. Corporations are following their users to better productivty by moving fast as possible to the iOS and Android worlds.
RIM's doomed effort to launch an ill-devised, weakly performing tablet against the Apple iPod juggernaut only served to embarrass the company, at great expense. At this point, there's little reason to think RIM will do any better than Palm did when the technology shifted, and anyone holding RIMM will likely end up with nothing (as did holders of PALM.) If you want to be in mobile your best pick is market leading and profitably growing Apple, with a second position in Google as it builds up ancillary products like Chrome to leverage its growing Android base.
Avoid HP and Sony – Buy Apple
Speaking of Palm, to paraphrase Senator Dirkson "that billion here, a billion there" that added up to some real money lost for HP. Mark Hurd consolidated HP into a company focused on building volume largely in other people's technology – otherwise known as PCs. As printing declines, and people shift to tablets and cloud apps, HP has less and less ability to build its profit base. The trends were all going in the wrong direction as market shifts make HP less and less relevant to consumer and corporate customers.
Selecting Mr. Apotheker was a disastrous choice, and I called for investors to dump the stock when he was hired in January. An ERP executive, he was firmly planted in the technology of the 1990s. With a diminished R&D, and an atrophied new product development organization HP is nothing like the organization of its founders, and the newest CEO has offered no clear path for finding the trends and re-igniting growth at HP. If you want to grow in what we used to call the PC business you need to be in tablets now – and that gets you back, once again, to Apple first, and Google second.
Which opens the door for discussing what in the 1960s through 1980s was the most innovative of all consumer electronics companies, Sony. But when Mr. Morita was replaced by an MBA CEO that began focusing the company on the bottom line, instead of new gadgets, the pipeline rapidly dried. Acquisitions, such as a music label, replaced R&D and new product development. Allegiance to protecting the CD and DVD business, and the players Sony made – along with traditional TVs and PCs – meant Sony missed the wave to MP3, to mobile digital entertainment devices, to DVRs and the emerging market for interactive TV. What was once a leader is now a follower.
As a result Sony has lost $4.5B in investor value the last 3 year, and in 2011 lost half its value falling from $37 to $18/share. As Apple emerges as the top consumer electronics technology leader and profit creator, closely chased by Google, it is unlikely Sony will ever recover that lost value.
Buying Apple, Amazon, Google and Netflix
This column has already made the case for Apple. It is almost incomprehensible how far a lead Apple has over its competition, causing investors to fear for its revenue growth prospects. As a result, the companies P/E multiple is a remarkably low single-digit number, even though its growth is well into the double digits! But its existing position in growth markets, technology leadership and well oiled new product development capability nearly assures continued profitbale growth for at least 5 years. Even though the stock, which I recommended as my number 1 buy in January, 2011, has risen some 30% maintaining a big position is remains an investors best portfolio enhancer.
Amazon was a wild ride in 2011, and today is worth almost the same as it was one year ago. Given that the company is now larger, has a more dominant position in publishing and is the world leader on the trend to on-line retail it is a very good stock to own. The choice to think long-term and build its user links through sales of Kindle Fire at cost has limited short-term profits, but every action Amazon has taken to grow has paid off handsomely because they accelerate the natural trends and position Amazon as the leader. Remaining with the trends, and the growth, offers the potential for big payoff this year and for years to come.
Google remains #2 in most markets, but remains aligned with the trends. It was disappointing that the company cancelled so many great products in 2011 – such as Gear and Wave. And it faces stiff competition in its historical ad markets from the shift toward social media and Facebook's emergence. However, Google is the best positioned company to displace Microsoft on all those tablets out there with its Chrome apps, and it still is a competitor with the potential for long-term value creation. It's just hard to be as excited about Google as Apple and Amazon.
Netflix started 2011 great, but then stumbled. Starting the year at $190, Netflix rose to $305 before falling to $75. Investors have seen an 80% decline from the peak, and a 60% decline from beginning of the year. But this was notably not because company revenues or profits fell, because they didn't. Rather concerns about price changes and long-term competition caused the stock to drop. And that's why I remain bullish for owning Netflix in 2012.
Growth can hide a multitude of sins, as I pointed out when making the case to buy in October. And Netflix has done a spectacular job of preparing itself to transition from physical DVDs to video downloads. The "game" is not over, and there is a lot of content warring left. But Netflix was first, and has the largest user base. Techcrunch recently reported on a Citi survey that found Netflix still has nearly twice the viewership of #2 Hulu (27% vs. 15%.)
Those who worry about Amazon, Google or Apple taking the Netflix position forget that those companies are making huge bets to compete in other markets and have shown less interest in making the big investments to compete on the content that is critical in the download market. AOL and Yahoo are also bound up trying to define new strategies, and look unlikely to ever be the content companies they once were.
For those who are banking on competitive war with Comcast and other cable companies to kill off Netflix look no further than how they define themselves (cable operators,) and their horrific customer relationship scores to realize that they are more interested in trying to preserve their old business than rapidly enter a new one. Perhaps one will try to buy Netflix, but they don't have the management teams or organization to compete effectively.
The fact is that Netflix still has the best strategy for its market, which is still growing exponentially, has the best pricing and is rapidly growing its content to remain in the top position. That makes it a likely pick for "turnaround of the year" by end of 2012 (at least in the tech/media industry) – even as investments rise over the next 12 months.
by Adam Hartung | Nov 28, 2011 | Books, Defend & Extend, Disruptions, In the Rapids, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
Not far from each other, in the area around Seattle, are two striking contrasts in leadership. They provide significant insight to what creates success today.
Steve Ballmer leads Microsoft, America's largest software company. Unfortunately, the value of Microsoft has gone nowhere for 10 years. Steve Ballmer has steadfastly defended the Windows and Office products, telling anyone who will listen that he is confident Windows will be part of computing's future landscape. Looking backward, he reminds people that Windows has had a 20 year run, and because of that past he is certain it will continue to dominate.
Unfortunately, far too many investors see things differently. They recognize that nearly all areas of Microsoft are struggling to maintain sales. It is quite clear that the shift to mobile devices and cloud architectures are reducing the need, and desire, for PCs in homes, offices and data centers. Microsoft appears years late recognizing the market shift, and too often CEO Ballmer seems in denial it is happening – or at least that it is happening so quickly. His fixation on past success appears to blind him to how people will use technology in 2014, and investors are seriously concerned that Microsoft could topple as quickly DEC., Sun, Palm and RIM.
Comparatively, across town, Mr. Bezos leads the largest on-line retailer Amazon. That company's value has skyrocketed to a near 90 times earnings! Over the last decade, investors have captured an astounding 10x capital gain! Contrary to Mr. Ballmer, Mr. Bezos talks rarely about the past, and almost almost exclusively about the future. He regularly discusses how markets are shifting, and how Amazon is going to change the way people do things.
Mr. Bezos' fixation on the future has created incredible growth for Amazon. In its "core" book business, when publishers did not move quickly toward trends for digitization Amazon created and launched Kindle, forever altering publishing. When large retailers did not address the trend toward on-line shopping Amazon expanded its retail presence far beyond books, including more products and a small armyt of supplier/partners. When large PC manufacturers did not capitalize on the trend toward mobility with tablets for daily use Amazon launched Kindle Fire, which is projected to sell as many as 12 million units next year (AllThingsD.com).
Where Mr. Ballmer remains fixated on the past, constantly reinvesting in defending and extending what worked 20 years ago for Microsoft, Mr. Bezos is investing heavily in the future. Where Mr. Ballmer increasingly looks like a CEO in denial about market shift, Mr. Bezos has embraced the shifts and is pushing them forward.
Clearly, the latter is much better at producing revenue growth and higher valuation than the former.
As we look around, a number of companies need to heed the insight of this Seattle comparison:
- At AOL it is unclear that Mr. Armstrong has a clear view of how AOL will change markets to become a content powerhouse. AOL's various investments are incoherent, and managers struggle to see a strong future for AOL. On the other hand, Ms. Huffington does have a clear sense of the future, and the insight for an entirely different business model at AOL. The Board would be well advised to consider handing the reigns to Ms. Huffington, and pushing AOL much more rapidly toward a different, and more competitive future.
- Dell's chronic inability to identify new products and markets has left it, at best, uninteresting. It's supply chain focused strategy has been copied, leaving the company with practically no cost/price advantage. Mr. Dell remains fixated on what worked for his initial launch 30 years ago, and offers no exciting description of how Dell will remain viable as PC sales diminish. Unless new leadership takes the helm at Dell, the company's future 5 years hence looks bleak.
- HP's new CEO Meg Whitman is less than reassuring as she projects a terrible 2012 for HP, and a commitment to remaining in PCs – but with some amorphous pledge toward more internal innovation. Lacking a clear sense of what Ms. Whitman thinks the world will look like in 2017, and how HP will be impactful, it's hard for investors, managers or customers to become excited about the company. HP needs rapid acceleration toward shifting customer needs, not a relaxed, lethargic year of internal analysis while competitors continue moving demand further away from HP offerings.
- Groupon has had an explosive start. But the company is attacked on all fronts by the media. There is consistent questioning of how leadership will maintain growth as reports emerge about founders cashing out their shares, highly uneconomic deals offered by customers, lack of operating scale leverage, and increasing competition from more established management teams like Google and Amazon. After having its IPO challenged by the press, the stock has performed poorly and now sells for less than the offering price. Groupon desperately needs leadership that can explain what the markets of 2015 will look like, and how Groupon will remain successful.
What investors, customers, suppliers and employees want from leadership is clarity around what leaders see as the future markets and competition. They want to know how the company is going to be successful in 2 or 5 years. In today's rapidly shifting, global markets it is not enough to talk about historical results, and to exhibit confidence that what brought the company to this point will propel it forward successfully. And everyone recognizes that managing quarter to quarter will not create long term success.
Leaders must demonstrate a keen eye for market shifts, and invest in opportunities to participate in game changers. Leaders must recognize trends, be clear about how those trends are shaping future markets and competitors, and align investments with those trends. Leadership is not about what the company did before, but is entirely about what their organization is going to do next.
Update 30 Nov, 2011
In the latest defend & extend action at Microsoft Ballmer has decided to port Office onto the iPad (TheDaily.com). Short term likely to increase revenue. But clearly at the expense of long-term competitiveness in tablet platforms. And, it misses the fact that people are already switching to cloud-based apps which obviate the need for Office. This will extend the dying period for Office, but does not come close to being an innovative solution which will propel revenues over the next decade.
by Adam Hartung | Sep 26, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, Disruptions, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Transparency, Web/Tech
The media has enjoyed a field day last week amidst the ouster of Leo Apotheker as Hewlett Packard’s CEO and appointments of former Oracle executive Ray Lane as Executive Chairman and former eBay CEO Meg Whitman as CEO. There have been plenty of jabs at the Board, which apparently hired Mr. Apotheker without everyone even meeting him (New York Times), and plenty of complaining about HP’s deteriorating performance and stock price. But the big question is, will Meg Whitman be able to turn around HP?
Ms. Whitman is the 7th HP CEO in a mere 12 years. Of those CEOs, the only one pointed to with any attraction was Mark Hurd. He did not take any strategic actions, but merely slashed costs – which immediately improved the profit line and drove up the short-term stock price. Actions taken at the expense of R&D, new product development and creating new markets, leaving HP short on a future strategy when he was summarily let go by the Baord that hired Apotheker.
And that indicates the strategy problem at HP – which is pretty much a lack of strategy.
HP was once a highly innovative company. We all can thank HP for a world of color. Before HP brought us the low-priced ink-jet printer all office printing was black. HP unleashed the color in desktop publishing, and was critical to the growth of office and home printing, as well as faxing with their all-in-one, integrated devices.
But then someone – largely Ms. Fiorina – had the idea to expand on the HP presence in desktop publishing by expanding into PC manufacturing and sales, even though there was no HP innovation in that market. Mr. Hurd expanded that direction by buying a service organization to support field-based PCs.
This approach of expanding on HPs “core” printer business, almost all by acquisition, cost HP a lot of money. Further, supply chain and retail program investments to sell largely undifferentiated products and services in a hotly contested PC market sucked all the money out of new products development. Every year HP was spending more to grow sales of products becoming increasingly generic, while falling farther behind in any sort of new market creation.
Into that innovation void jumped Apple, Google and Amazon. They pushed new mobile solutions to market in smartphones and tablets. And now PCs, and the printers they used, are seeing declining growth. All future projections show an increase in mobile devices, and a sales cliff emerging for PCs and their supporting devices. Simultaneously as mobile devices have become more popular the trend away from printing has grown, with users in business and consumer markets finding digital devices less costly, more user friendly and more adaptable than printed material (just compare Kindle sales and printed book sales – or the volume of tablet newspaper and magazine subscriptions to printed subscriptions.) HP invested heavily in PC products, and now that market is dying.
Now HP is in big trouble. There are plenty of skeptics that think Ms. Whitman is not right for the job. What should HP under Ms. Whitman do next? Keep doubling down on investments in existing markets? That direction looks pretty dangerous. IBM jumped out years ago, selling its laptop line to Lenovo for a tidy profit before sales slackened. With all the growth in smartphones and tablets, it’s hard to imagine that strategy would work. Even Mr. Apotheker took action to deal with the market shift by redirecting HP away from PCs with his announced intention to spin off that business while buying an ERP (enterprise ressource planning) software company to take HP into a new direction. But that backfired on him, and investors.
Mr. Apotheker and Carol Bartz, recently fired CEO of Yahoo, made similar mistakes. They relied heavily on their personal past when taking leadership of a struggling enterprise. They looked to their personal success formulas – what had worked for them in the past – when setting their plans for their new companies. Unfortunately, what worked in the past rarely works in the future, because markets shift. And both of these companies suffered dramatically as the new CEO efforts took them further from market trends.
The job Ms. Whitman is entering at HP is wildly different from her job at eBay. eBay was a small company taking advantage of the internet explosion. It was an early leader in capitalizing on web networking and the capability of low-cost on-line transactions. At eBay Ms. Whitman needed to keep the company focused on investing in new solutions that transformed PC and internet connectivity into value for users. As long as the number of users on the internet, and the time they spent on the web, grew eBay could capitalize on that trend for its own growth. eBay was in the right place at the right time, and Ms. Whitman helped guide the company’s product development so that it helped users enjoy their on-line experience. The trends supported eBay’s early direction, and growth was built opon making on-line selling better, faster and easier.
The situation could not be more different at HP. It’s products are almost all out of the trend. If Ms. Whitman does what she did at eBay, trying to promote more, better and faster PCs, printers and traditional IT services things will not go well. That was Mr. Hurd’s strategy. “Been there, done that” as people like to say. That strategy ran its course, and more cost-cutting will not save HP.
In 2020 if we are to discuss HP the way we now discuss Apple’s dramatic turnaround from the brink of failure, Ms. Whitman will have to behave very differently than her past – and from what her predecessor and Ms. Bartz did. She has to refocus HP on future markets. She has to identify triggers for market change – like Steve Jobs did when he recognized that the growing trend to mobility would explode once WiFi services reached 50% of users – and push HP toward developing solutions which take advantage of those market shifts.
HP has under-invested in new market development for years. It’s acquisition of Palm was supposed to somehow rectify that problem, only Palm was a failing company with a failing platform when HP bought it. And the HP tablet launch with its own proprietary solution was far too late (years too late) in a market that requires thousands of developers and a hundred thousand apps if it is to succeed. The investment in Palm and WebOS was too late, and based on trying to be a “me too” in a market where competitors are rapidly advancing new solutions.
There are a world of market opportunities out there that HP can develop. To reach them Ms. Whitman must take some quick actions:
- Develop future scenarios that define the direction of HP. Not necessarily a “vision” of HP in 2020, but certainly an identification of the big trends that will guide HP’s future direction for product and market development. Globalization (like IBM’s “smarter planet”) or mobility are starts – but HP will have to go beyond the obvious to identify opportunities requiring the resources of a company with HP’s revenue and resources. HP desperately needs a pathway to future markets. It needs to be developing for the emerging trends.
- A recognition of how HP will compete. What is the market gap that HP will fulfill – like Apple did in mobility? And how will it fulfill it? Google and Facebook are emerging giants in software, offering a host of new capabilities every day to better network users and make them more productive. HP must find a way to compete that is not toe-to-toe with existing leaders like Apple that have more market knowledge and extensive resoureces.
- HP needs to dramatically up the ante in new product development. Innovation has been sorely lacking, and the hierarchical structure at HP needs to be changed. White Space projects designed to identify opportunities in market trends need to be created that have permission to rapidly develop new solutions and take them to market – regardless of HP historical strengths. Resources need to shift – rapidly – from supporting the aging, and growth challenged, historical product lines to new opportunities that show greater growth promise.
Apple and IBM were once given almost no chance of survival. But new leadership recognized that there were growth markets, and those leaders altered the resource allocation toward things that could grow. Investments in the old strategy were dropped as money was pushed to new solutions that built on market trends and headed toward future scenarios. HP is not doomed to failure, but Ms. Whitman has to start acting quickly to redirect resources or it could easily be the next Sun Microsystems, Digital Equipment, Wang, Lanier or Cray
