by Adam Hartung | Jun 4, 2009 | Uncategorized
This week marks the 20th anniversary of the Chinese student uprising in Tiananmen Square, and its brutal put-down by the Chinese leadership. Ironically, the same week GM agrees to sell its Hummer division to a Chinese company. Quite a contrast in outcomes over 20 years. China was then a backwater nation having very little business with the USA, and GM was still considered a dominant U.S. industrial power.
We all know what China has accomplished in the last 20 years. From struggling poverty, the country is now the third largest economy – and the single largest offshore holder of America's debt. China is poised to be a superpower, and the world's largest economy within another 20 years. How?
Within months of the Tiananmen event, in which the Chinese military slaughtered thousands of its own citizens, the Berlin Wall tumbled. The Soviet Union evaporated, leaving behind a series of independent states poorly capitalized and ill prepared to compete internationally. The Chinese leadership recognized this as a major market shift, and wasted no time taking action.
Step 1 was recognizing that future scenarios no longer required investing massive funds defending the world's longest contested border. More tanks were on the Chinese/Soviet border than all the rest of the world combined – and the replacement of those tanks suddenly became non-essential. And the Chinese recognized this, and changed. With speed exceeding anything anybody imagined, the Chinese changed all their scenarios about the future. Instead of spending massive funds on military works, those funds could be spent elsewhere. By reworking their future scenarios, they realized they could undertake different opportunities. No longer were they required to do "more of the same" as they'd done for several decades.
Step 2 was recognizing the new competition. Instead of fighting a traditional war, the Chinese would be in an economic war with the smaller eastern European nations, and India. Dissolving the USSR meant the Indians, who had long sparred with the Soviets while also taking aid, suddenly knew they had to rely completely on the USA – and trade. And that meant the Chinese had a new #1 competitor, but in the new battle for trade rather than old fashioned aid. Where before China wanted money for armaments, now they needed to invest money in production to pull dollars from U.S. business. The new objective became competing with India, rather than the Russians.
Thirdly, they Disrupted their approach to world diplomacy. Instead of a closed country, they became open. Instead of investing in guns, they invested in power plants, roads and infrastructure. On the world stage, China wanted to become the biggest winner of foreign exchange. And the road to that win came through participating with American capitalists. The leadership realized it needed to totally change the country's investment patterns in order to make the country's low cost labor available, and it did so. Almost overnight. How, by recognizing and undertaking a Disruption in their investment patterns.
Fourth, China implemented White Space for job creation. Suddenly, almost every city had a development zone. They didn't need to figure out what infrastructure to buy. All they had to do was invite the Americans in and we'd tell them what we wanted. We'd describe the airports, power plants, telecom systems, roadways – everything we wanted to give them the work (and foreign exchange). All they had to do was listen and do it.
China is an example in doing things differently, changing how you
compete to be very efffective, without really changing values.
People often tell me they worry that The Phoenix Principle means you
have to give up your ideals. I disagree. Being a Phoenix organization
means you're willing to adapt to market requirements, and doing so does
not mean you have to change your "ethos," religion or personal values.
You merely have to adapt. If you want to be "green" or "sustainable" or "ethical" or even "religious" you can do so. You just have to make sure you are connected to the marketplace in ways that allows you to develop a Success Formula which creates growth.
Compared to India, the Chinese have been wildly successful. And that's saying lot, given how incredibly successful India has been. There is no doubt that India, too, has used outsourcing to raise foreign exchange, create jobs and grow. But compared to China, well there's no comparison. The Indian government is still trying to figure out how to build a highway, expand major (overcrowded) airports and provide consistent electricity to business parks in major cities. The Indian leaders don't suffer from a lack of smart – no way – but the government keeps trying to operate the way it always has. And that has held them back from making the investments and taking the actions which have catapulted the Chinese into the lead. While India had a head start in 1989 (largely English speaking leadership and a strong investment in education for the elite), China has eclipsed their growth and is chasing Japan and the USA.
Through all of this, China never changed its politics. Some people who go to China return talking about how "capitalistic" the country is. They forget the lessons of Tiananmen Square. China has been and remains a tightly controlled, Communist, centrally-planned country. "China scholars see little chance for political reform" is the headline describing how the politics of China are unchanged since the days when they shot thousands of their own students, and imprisoned thousands more. Several students taken prisoner have never been heard from again. Those that fled the country are not allowed to return – and their families were subsequently required to consider them bad Chinese. Many were held in prisons for years, and others are still in remote work camps. China is still China, deep inside. No more a market/capitalistic country than it ever was. It just learned to adapt to a changing world. (Something Chairman Mao tried to avoid – almost destroying the country.)
Coincidentally, my 21 year old son returned from a month in China yesterday evening. He was visiting manufacturing plants and engineering schools. We talked, and will talk more, about what the Chinese businesses and schools are doing. Why, and exactly HOW do these schools and factories affect competition? Competition to be a world-class engineer (he's a mechanical engineer prepping for his civil engineering master's degree), and competition for building things. As he summed it up before crashing to sleep "they do things entirely differently than we do in America – and I can easily see why they get things done cheaply. They do things in a uniquely Chinese way, but it meets the needs of American companies who want lower costs and market access. This may have been my first trip to China, but it won't be my last. It can't be if I want to remain competitive. Maybe I need to learn Mandarin or Cantonese so I can go to one of their schools for a year."
We all have to learn to adapt. The world changes. Every year. If we try to resist those changes, to Defend & Extend what we like to do, we grow further out of touch with market requirements and lose the ability to compete. You don't have to "sell your soul" to adapt. But you must adapt if you want to continue succeeding. You have to make your investments based upon what will make you a winner in the future – not what made you a winner in the past. You have to study competitors, and do those things that will make you a winner. You have to accept Disruptions by attacking old Lock-ins, and use White Space to develop new solutions. If you do that, even at the scale of the Chinese economy, you can have unbelievably successful results. Or at the level of an individual engineer. If you don't the results aren't pretty. Not pretty at all. Just ask the employees at GM.
by Adam Hartung | Jun 2, 2009 | Current Affairs, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Openness
How appropriate. "GM strikes deal to sell Hummer" headlines a Marketwatch.com article. A day after declaring bankruptcy, Hummer with all its branding and product drawings is going to China. It seems everything about GM is iconic – including its movement of an operating auto businesses to China.
Is this bad for America, or good? I'd rather say it's inevitable. In a global economy, industrial production will move to the lowest cost location. And with a low valued currency, a very lowly paid workforce, and access to very inexpensive capital that puts China at the top of the list. Unless you want to bring back Chairman Mao and wall-in China, the population density and government programs make it inevitable that the country will be a leader in manufacturing.
But that doesn't equate to high value.
America is the world's largest agricultural nation. But has that made America wealthy? Not since the 1800s has it been true that land ownership for agricultural uses made Americans – and the nation – wealthy. As the value of agriculture declined – largely due to dramatic increases in production – America's wealth shifted to industrial production. It was by being the largest and most productive industrial nation that America prospered during the Industrial economy.
But now, industrial production has razor thin margins. Much like agriculture. Over-invest in capacity, and you can end up with under-utilized (or closed) plants and not much margin from other businesses to cover the cost. Not since the 1990s has America operated anywhere near "full capacity" on its manufacturing base. The "good" years of the last decade were unable to produce industrial jobs, or wealth for industrial companies (i.e. – GM's bankruptcy.)
In the great battle for economic leadership, the next wave is about information. How to obtain, use and manipulate information is where value is now created. Steel traders can make more than steel producers today. If you want to improve your profitability, and your longevity, you have to change your thinking from "how do I make and sell more stuff" to "what do I know they don't know, and how do I turn that into value?"
For somebody selling autos, it's becoming a lot more important to understand customer wants and preferences than to be good at making cars. Toyota and Honda can identify opportunities first, and put products into the market faster than anyone else. They can maximize their product development and short-run capability to reach targets fast, and gain advantages over competitors. Don't forget, Honda made money not just on small, high mileage cars but on a full-size pick-up called the Ridgeline (and Toyota on the Tundra). These companies are better at using scenarios to recognize early market shifts, and clearer about competitor moves so they can position products to fulfill unique customers needs. Even if it means launching products not traditional to their "core" – like Honda's Ridgeline, it's manufacturing robotics, and its new jet airplanes.
In the industrial era, people sought scale advantages and tried to build entry barriers against competitors. In the information economy flexibility is equally (or more) important than size. Recognizing customer needs and competitor actions early is more important than catering to old, devoted customer groups. Willingness to Disrupt, and do what you must do to change the market by using White Space test projects keeps you ahead of the competition – rather than trying to Defend & Extend your "core."
For the industry, having Hummer production in China could turn out to be a good thing. It will lower product cost. If the distribution in the USA can gain control of the market, by recognizing customer needs and directing the production, the distributors can grab all the value away from the Chinese manufacturer. If, on the other hand, the dealers try to act like old fashioned dealers who merely keep stock and negotiate price — then they won't create value and margins will stink. There are ways to make money in the information economy, even for traditional players, but it requires changing your Success Formula from industrial-era behaviors to the needs of an information-based economy. You can follow GM – or you can try to be like Cisco.
by Adam Hartung | Jun 1, 2009 | Current Affairs, Disruptions, In the Rapids, Leadership, Openness
June 1, 2009 will be remembered for a really long time. As I last blogged, I think the iconic impact of GM as one of the most successful and profitable of all industrial companies makes its bankruptcy more important than almost any other company.
As GM loses its market value, it was forced off the Dow Jones Industrial Average. In "What's behind the Dow changes?" (Marketwatch.com) we can read about how the Wall Street Journal editors selected Cisco to replace GM. I've long been a detractor of GM for its slavik devotion to its outdated Success Formula. For an equally long time I've long been a fan of Cisco and how it keeps its Success Formula evergreen. Cisco reflects the behaviors needed to succeed in an information economy, and its addition to the DJIA is a big improvement in measuring the American economy and its potential for growth.
What I most admire about Cisco is management's requirement to obsolete the company's own products. This one element has proven to be critical to Cisco's ongoing growth – and the company's ability to avoid being another Sun Microsystems. By forcing themselves to obsolete their own products, Cisco doesn't get trapped in "cannibalization" arguments. Management doesn't get trapped into listening to big customers who want Cisco to slow its product introduction cycle. Leaders end up Disrupting the company internally to do new things that will replace outdated revenues. It sounds so simple, yet it's been so incredibly powerful. "Obsolete your own products" is a statement that has helped keep Cisco a long-term winner.
Since even before writing "Create Marketplace Disruption" I've espoused that Cisco is a Phoenix Principle kind of company. One that uses extensive scenario planning to plan for the future, one that obsesses about competitors in order to never have second-place products, willing to Disrupt its product plans and markets to continue growing, and loaded with White Space developing new solutions for new markets. It's a great choice to be on the Dow – which will eventually have to replace all the outdated companies (like Kraft) with companies that rely on information – rather than industrial production – to make money.
by Adam Hartung | May 29, 2009 | Current Affairs, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lifecycle
GM will file bankruptcy next week ("GM reaches swap deal, but bankruptcy still lies ahead" Marketwatch). It's likely historians will look back on this event as a major turning point in the change away from an industrial world (away from making money on "hard" assets like factories). GM was considered invincible. As were all the auto companies. The reorganizing of Ford, and bankruptcy of Chrysler will be remembered, but not likely with the impact of GM filing bankruptcy. Pick up any book on America post WWII and you'll find a discussion of General Motors. The quintessential industrial company. Destined to live forever due to its massive revenues and assets. After next week, history books will change. Altered by the previously unimaginable bankruptcy of GM. If "What's good for GM is good for America" is no longer true, what does it mean for America when GM declares Bankruptcy?
None of America's car companies will ever again be strong, vibrant auto companies. They are in the Whirlpook and can't get out. It's simply impossible. GM is now worth about $450million (at current prices of about $.80/share). It already owes the federal government $20billion – which is supposed to be converted to equity, with more equity owned by employees and converted bondholders. For most of the time since the 1970s, the average value of GM has been only $15billion (split adjusted average price $25). To again become viable GM wants the government to increase its investment to $60billion ("GM bondholders may recoup $14Billion" Marketwatch.com. That means for GM to ever be worth just the amount being supplied by the government bailout it would have to be worth $116/share – which is $20/share more than it was worth at its peak in the market blowout of 2000! (Chart here).
That means it is impossible to conceive of any way GM could ever be successful enough to achieve enough value as a car company to repay the government – and thus it has no future ability to provide dividends to private investors. Even though GM says it will be repositioned to be healthy, that simply is not true. It's no more healthy or attractive than Quasimodo, the hunchback of Notre Dame, could have ever hoped to be – or the elephant man. Helping them is charity, not a business proposition. When a company has no conceivable hope of making enough money to repay its investors it cannot attract management talent, or additional capital as assets wear out, and it eventually fails. It won't be long before the people running GM realize their future are as bureaucrats in a non-profit – but with far less psychic value than working at, for example, the Red Cross.
Meanwhile, Chrysler is downsizing dramatically as it looks for its way out of bankruptcy. As it tries to give the company to Italians to run, the company is dropping obligations it has carried for years. Even the venerable Lee Iacocca, who literally saved the company 20some years ago, will lose his pension and even his company car ("Iacocca losing pension, car in Chrysler bankruptcy" Reuters).
Ford, which restructured before this latest market shift, has not asked for bailout money. But its market share is dropping fast. Its vendors (including Visteon) are going bankrupt and Ford is guaranteeing their debt to keep them in business – with an open-ended cost not yet reflected in Ford's P&L. Even though it restructured, Ford's balance sheet is shot ("What About Ford?" 24/7 Wall Street). It has no money to design a new line of competitive vehicles.
None of these 3 companies have the wherewithal as operating businesses to replace assets. And they are competing with Japanese, Korean and Indian companies that have lower operating costs, lower fixed asset investments, higher quality and newer product lines, better customer satisfaction rates, higher profits and stronger balance sheets. Without competition it's hard to expect America's car companies to do well. When you look at competitors you realize this game can still have several more moves (especially with market intervention by government players with public policy objectives) – but the end is predicatable. Only for reasons of public policy, rather than business investment, would you continue to fund any of these American competitors.
Even though the switch from an industrial economy to an information economy began in the 1990s, historians will likely link the switch to June, 2009. (I guess that's fair, since the shift from an agrarian economy to an industrial economy began in the 1920s but wasn't recognized until the late 1940s.) Just as GM was the company that epitomized the success of industial business models, it will be the company that becomes the icon for the end of industrial models. It failed much faster, and worse, than anyone expected.
If "What's good for GM" (as in the government bailout) isn't good for America any longer – what is? For many people, this is shift is conceptually easy to understand – but hard to do anything about. They don't know what to do next; what to do differently. They fully expect to continue focusing on balance sheets and assets and the tools we used to analyze industrial companies. And those people will see their money drift away. Just like you can't make decent returns farming in a post-agrarian economy, you won't be able to make money on assets in a post-industrial economy. From here on, it's all about the information value and learning how to maximize it. It's not about old-style execution, its about adaptability to rapidly shifting markets built on information.
Let's consider CDW – a 1990s marvel of growth shipping computers to businsesses around America. CDW has pushed hardware and software onto its customers for 2 decades in its chase with Dell. But every year, making money as a push distributor gets harder and harder. And that's because buyers have so many different sources for products that the value of the salesperson/distributor keeps declining. Finding the product, the product info, inventory, low shipping and low price is now very easily accomplished with a PC on the web. Every year you need CDW less and less. Just like we've seen distributors squeezed out of travel we're seeing them squeezed out of industry after industry – including computer componentry. If CDW keeps thinking of itself as a "
;push" company selling products – a very industrial view of its business – it's future profitability is highly jeapardized.
The market has shifted. For CDW to have high value it must find value in the value of the information in its business. Perhaps like the Chicago Mercantile Exchange they could create and trade futures contracts on the value of storage, computing capacity or some other business commodity. The information about their products – production, inventory and consumption – being more profitable than the products themselves (everyone knows more profit is made by Merc commodity traders than all the farmers in America combined). Or CDW needs to develop extensive databases on their customers' behaviors so they can supply them with new things (services or products) before they even realize they need them — sort of like how Google has all those searches stored on computers so they can predict the behavior of you, or a group your identified with, before you even type an internet command. CDW's value as a box pusher is dropping fast. In the future CDW will have to be a lot smarter about the information surrounding products, services and customers if it wants to make money.
A lot of people are very uncomfortable these days. Since the 1990s, markets keep shifting fast – and hard. Nothing seems to stay the same very long. Those trying to follow 1980s business strategy keep trying to find some rock to cling to – some way to build an industrial-era entry barrier to protect themselves from competition. They try using financial statements, which are geared around assets, to run the business. Their uncomfortableness will not diminish, because their approach is hopelessly out of date. GM knew those tools better than anyone – and we can see how that worked out for them.
To regain control of your future you have to recognize that the base of the pyramid has shifted. How we once made money won't work any more. Value doesn't grow from just owning, holding and operating assets. Maximizing utility of assets will not produce high rates of return. We are now in a new economy. One where outdated distribution systems (like the auto dealer structure) simply get in the way of success. One where a focus on the product, rather than its use or customer, won't make high rates of return. With the bankruptcy of GM reliance on the old business model must now be declared over. We've entered the Google age (for lack of a better icon) – and it affects every business and manager in the world.
The future requires companies focus on markets, shifts and adaptable organizations. Successful businesses must have good market sensing systems, rather than rely on powerful six sigma internal quality programs. They have to know their competitors even better than they know customers to deal with rapid changes in market moves. They have to be willing to become what the market needs – not what they want to define as a core competency. They have to accept Disruptions as normal – not something to avoid. And they have to use White Space to learn how to be what they are not, so they remain vital as markets shift. So they can quickly evolve to the next source of value creation.
by Adam Hartung | May 27, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, Disruptions, General, Leadership, Lock-in, Openness, Quotes
"The Need for Failure" is a recent Forbes article on why it is bad – really bad – to prop up failing institutions. The author is an esteemed economics professor at NYU. He says "too big to fail is dangerous. It suggests there is an insurance policy that says, no matter how risky your behavior, we will make sure you stay in business." Rightly said, only it creates a conundrum. Large organizations are not known for taking risky actions. Large organizations are known primarily for lethargic decision-making which weeds out all forms of risk – right down to how people dress and what they can say in the office. When you think of a big bank, like Bank of America or Citibank, you don't think of risk. You think just the opposite. Of risk aversion so great they cannot do anything new or different.
What I'd add to the good professor's article is recognition that large organizations stumble into risk they don't recognize, by trying to do more of the same when that behavior becomes risky due to market changes. My dad said that 100 years ago when my grandfather was first given pills by a doctor he decided to take the whole bottle at once. His logic was "if one pill will help me, I might as well take the whole lot and get better fast." Clearly, an example where doing more of the same was not a good idea. Then there was the boy who loved jumping off the railroad bridge into the river. He did it all the time, year after year. Then one month there was a draught, the river level fell while he was busy at school, and when he next jumped off the bridge he broke his leg. He did what he always did, but the environmental change suddenly made his previous behavior very risky.
Big corporations behave this way. They build Lock-ins around everything they do. They use hierarchy, cultural norm enforcement, sacred cows, rigid decision-making systems, narrow strategy processes, consistency in hiring practices, inflexible IT systems, knowledge silos and dependence on large investments to make sure the organization cannot flex. The intent of these Lock-ins is to make sure that historical decisions are replicated, to make sure past behaviors are repeated again and again with the expectation that those behaviors will consistently produce the same returns.
But when the market shifts these Lock-ins create risk that is unseen. Bankers had built systems for generating their own loans, and acquiring loans from others, that were designed to keep growing. They designed various derivative products as their own form of insurance on their assets. But what they did not recognize was that pushing forward in highly unregulated product markets, as the quality of debtors declined, created unexpected risk. In other words, doing more of the same did not reduce risk – it increased the risk! Because the company is designed to undertake these behaviors, there is no one who can recognize that the risk is growing. There is no one who challenges whether doing more of the same is risky – only those who would challenge making a change by saying change is risky!
Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers and AIG all created a much higher risk than they ever anticipated. And they never saw it. Because they were doing what they always did – and expecting the results would take care of themselves. They were measuring their own behaviors, not the behavior of the market. And thus they missed recognizing that the market had moved – and thus doing more of the same was inherently risky.
(The same is true of GM, for example. GM kept doing what it always did, refusing to see the risk it incurred by ignoring market shifts brought on by changing customer behaviors, rising energy costs and offshore competitors.)
That's why big company CEOs feel OK about asking for a bail-out. To them, they did not fail. They did not take risk. They did what they had always done – and something went wrong "out there". Something went wrong "in the market". Not in their company. They need protection from the marketplace.
Of course, this is just the opposite of what free markets are all about. Free markets are intended to allow changes to develop, forcing competitors to adapt to market shifts or fail. But those who run (or ran) our big banks, and many of our big industrial companies, haven't see it that way. They believe their size means they are the market – so they want regulators to change the market back. Back to where they can make money again.
So how is this to to be avoided? It starts by having leaders who can recognize market shifts, and recognize the need for change. In an companion Forbes article "Jamie Dimon's Straight Talk Has A Good Ring" the author takes time to review J.P. Morgan Chase's Chairman's letter to shareholders regarding 2008. In the letter, surprisingly for a big organization, the JPMC Chairman points out market shifts, and then points out that his organization made mistakes by not reacting fast enough – for example by changing practices on acquiring mortgages from independent brokers. He goes no to point out that several changes have happened, and will continue happening, at JPMC to deal with market shifts. And he even comments on future scenarios which he hopes will help protect investors from the hidden risk of companies that take actions based on history.
Mr. Dimon's actions demonstrate a willingness to implement The Phoenix Principle. For those who don't know him, Mr. Dimon has long been one of the more controversial figures in banking. He is well known for exhibiting highly Disruptive behavior, yet he has found his way up the corporate ranks of the traditional banking industry. Now he is not being shy about Disrupting his own bank – JPMC.
- His discussion of future scenarios clearly points to expected changes in the market, from competitor shifts, economic shifts and regulatory shifts which his bank must address.
- He sees competitors changing, and the need for JPMC to compete differently with different sorts of institutions under different regulations. Mr. Dimon clearly has his eyes on competitors, and he intends for JPMC to grow as a result of the market shift, not merely "hang on."
- He is espousing Disruptions for his company, the industry and the regulatory environment. By going public with his views, excoriating insurance regulators as well as unregulated hedge funds, he intends for his employees and investors to think hard about what caused past problems and how important it is to change.
- He keeps trying new and different things to improve growth and performance at the company. It's not merely "more of the same, but hopefully cheaper." He is proposing new approaches for lending as well as investing – and for significant changes in regulations now that banking is global.
Very few leaders recognize the risk from doing more of the same. Leaders often feel it is conservative to not change course. But, when markets shift, not changing course introduces dramatic risk. People just don't perceive it. Because they are looking at the past, not at the future. They are measuring risk based upon what they know – what they've failed to take into account. And the only way to overcome this problem is to spend a lot more time on market scenarios, competitor analysis and using Disruptions to keep the organization vital and connected with the market using White Space projects.
