by Adam Hartung | Jul 28, 2011 | Books, Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, eBooks, In the Rapids, Innovation, Leadership, Television, Web/Tech
“It’s easier to succeed in the Amazon than on the polar tundra” Bruce Henderson, famed founder of The Boston Consulting Group, once told me. “In the arctic resources are few, and there aren’t many ways to compete. You are constantly depleting resources in life-or-death struggles with competitors. Contrarily, in the Amazon there are multiple opportunities to grow, and multiple ways to compete, dramatically increasing your chances for success. You don’t have to fight a battle of survival every day, so you can really grow.”
Today, Amazon(.com) is the place to be. As the financial markets droop, fearful about the economy and America’s debt ceiling “crisis,” Amazon is achieving its highest valuation ever. While the economy, and most companies, struggle to grow, Amazon is hitting record growth:
Source: BusinessInsider.com
Sales are up 50% versus last year! The result of this impressive sales growth has been a remarkable valuation increase – comparable to Apple!
- Since 2009, valuation is up 5.5x
- Over 5 years valuation is up 8x
- Over the last decade Amazon’s value has risen 15x
How did Amazon do this? Not by “sticking to its knitting” or being very careful to manage its “core.” In 2001 Amazon was still largely an on-line book seller.
The company’s impressive growth has come by moving far from its “core” into new markets and new businesses – most far removed from its expertise. Despite its “roots” and “DNA” being in U.S. books and retailing, the company has pioneered off-shore businesses and high-tech products that help customers take advantage of big trends.
Amazon’s earnings release provided insight to its fantastic growth. Almost 50% of revenues lie outside the U.S. Traditional retailers such as WalMart, Target, Kohl’s, Sears, etc. have struggled in foreign markets, and blamed poor performance on weak infrastructure and complex legal/tax issues. But where competitors have seen obstacles, Amazon created opportunity to change the way customers buy, and change the industry using its game-changing technology and capabilities. For its next move, according to Silicon Alley Insider, “Amazon is About to Invade India,” a huge retail market, in an economy growing at over 7%/year, with rising affluence and spendable income – but almost universally overlooked by most retailers due to weak infrastructure and complex distribution.
Amazon’s remarkable growth has occurred even though its “core” business of books has been declining – rather dramatically – the last decade. Book readership declines have driven most independents, and large chains such as B. Dalton and more recently Borders, out of business. But rather than use this as an excuse for weak results, Amazon invested heavily in the trends toward digitization and mobility to launch the wildly successful Kindle e-Reader. Today about half of all Amazon book sales are digital, creating growth where most competitors (hell-bent on trying to defend the old business) have dealt with stagnation and decline.
Amazon did this without a background as a technology company, an electronics company, or a consumer goods company. Additionally, Amazon invested in Kindle – and is now developing a tablet – even as these products cannibalized the historically “core” paper-based book sales. And Amazon has pursued these market shifts, even though these new products create a significant threat to Amazon’s largest traditional suppliers – book publishers.
Rather than trying to defend its old core business, Amazon has invested heavily in trends – even when these investments were in areas where Amazon had no history, capability or expertise!
Amazon has now followed the trends into a leading position delivering profitable “cloud” services. Amazon Web Services (AWS) generated $500M revenue last year, is reportedly up 50% to $750M this year, and will likely hit $1B or more before next year. In addition to simple data storage Amazon offers cloud-based Oracle database services, and even ERP (enterprise resource planning) solutions from SAP. In cloud computing services Amazon now leads historically dominant IT services companies like Accenture, CSC, HP and Dell. By offering solutions that fulfill the emerging trends, rather than competing head-to-head in traditional service areas, Amazon is growing dramatically and avoiding a gladiator war. And capturing big sales and profits as the marketplace explodes.
Amazon created 5,300 U.S. jobs last quarter. Organic revenue growth was 44%. Cash flow increased 25%. All because the company continued expanding into new markets, including not only new retail markets, and digital publishing, but video downloads and television streaming – including making a deal to deliver CBS shows and archive.
Amazon’s willingness to go beyond conventional wisdom has been critical to its success. GeekWire.com gives insight into how Amazon makes these critical resource decisions in “Jeff Bezos on Innovation” (taken from comments at a shareholder meeting June 7, 2011):
- “you just have to place a bet. If you place enough of those bets, and if you place them early enough, none of them are ever betting the company”
- “By the time you are betting the company, it means you haven’t invented for too long”
- “If you invent frequently and are willing to fail, then you never get to the point where you really need to bet the whole company”
- “We are planting more seeds…everything we do will not work…I am never concerned about that”
- “my mind never lets me get in a place where I think we can’t afford to take these bets”
- “A big piece of the story we tell ourselves about who we are, is that we are willing to invent”
If you want to succeed, there are ample lessons at Amazon. Be willing to enter new markets, be willing to experiment and learn, don’t play “bet the company” by waiting too long, and be willing to invest in trends – especially when existing competitors (and suppliers) are hesitant.
by Adam Hartung | Jul 14, 2011 | Investing, Leadership, Trends
When you go after competitors, does it more resemble a gladiator war – or a David vs. Goliath battle? The answer will likely determine your profitability. As a company, and as an investor.
After they achieve some success, most companies fall into a success formula – constantly tyring to improve execution. And if the market is growing quickly, this can work out OK. But eventually, competitors figure out how to copy your formula, and as growth slows many will catch you. Just think about how easily long distance companies caught the monopolist AT&T after deregulation. Or how quickly many competitors have been able to match Dell’s supply chain costs in PCs. Or how quickly dollar retailers – and even chains like Target – have been able to match the low prices at Wal-Mart.
These competitors end up in a gladiator war. They swing their price cuts, extended terms and other promotional weapons, leaving each other very bloody as they battle for sales and market share. Often, one or more competitors end up dead – like the old AT&T. Or Compaq. Or Circuit City. These gladiator wars are not a good thing for investors, because resources are chewed up in all the fighting, leaving no gains for higher dividends – nor any stock price appreciation. Like we’ve seen at Wal-Mart and Dell.
The old story of David and Goliath gives us a different approach. Instead of going “toe-to-toe” in battle, David came at the fight from a different direction – adopting his sling to throw stones while he remained safely out of Goliath’s reach. After enough peppering, he wore down the giant and eventually popped him in the head.
And that’s how much smarter people compete.
- When everyone was keen on retail stores to rent DVDs, Netflix avoided the gladiator war with Blockbuster by using mail delivery.
- While United, American, Continental, Delta, etc. fought each other toe-to-toe for customers in the hub-and-spoke airline wars (none making any money by the way) Southwest ferried people cheaply between smaller airports on direct flights. Southwest has made more money than all the “major” airlines combined.
- While Hertz, Avis, National, Thrifty, etc. spent billions competing for rental car customers at airports Enterprise went into the local communities with small offices, and now has twice their revenues and much higher profitability.
- When internet popularity started growing in the 1990s Netscape traded axe hits wtih Microsoft and was destroyed. Another browser pioneer, Spyglass, transitioned from PCs to avoid Microsoft, and started making browsers for mobile phones, TVs and other devices creating billions for investors.
- While GM, Ford and Chrysler were in a grinding battle for auto customers, spending billions on new models and sales programs, Honda brought to market small motorcycles and very practical, reliable small cars. Honda is now very profitable in several major markets, while the old gladiators struggle to survive.
As an investor, we should avoid buying stocks of companies, and management teams that allow themselves to be drug into gladiator wars. No matter what promises they make to succeed, their success is uncertain, and will be costly to obtain. What’s worse, they could win the gladiator war only to find themselves facing David – after they are exhausted and resources are spent!
- Research in Motion became embroiled in battles with traditional cell phone manufacturers like Nokia and Ericdson, and now is late to the smartphone app market – and with dwindling resources.
- Motorola fought the gladiator war trying to keep Razr phones competitive, only to completely miss its early lead in smartphones. Now it has limited resources to develop its Android smart phone line.
- Is it smart for Google to take on a gladiator war in social media against Facebook, when it doesn’t seem to have any special tool for the battle? What will this cost, while it simultaneously fights Apple in Android wars and Microsoft for Chrome sales?
On the other hand, it’s smart to invest in companies that enter growth markets, but have a new approach to drive customer conversion. For example, Zip Car rents autos by the hour for urban users. Most cars are very high mileage, which appeals to customers, but they also are pretty inexpensive to buy. Their approach doesn’t take-on the traditional car rental company, but is growing quite handily.
This same logic applies to internal company investments as well. Far too often the corporate reource allocation process is designed to fight a gladiator war. Constantly spending to do more of the same. Projects become over-funded to fight battles considered “necessity,” while new projects are unfunded despite having the opportunity for much higher rates of return.
In 2000, Apple could have chosen to keep pouring money into the Mac. Instead it radically cut spending, reduced Mac platforms, and started looking for new markets where it could bring in new solutions. IPods, iTunes, IPhones, iPads and iCloud are now driving growth for the company – all new approaches that avoided gladiator battles with old market competitors. Very profitable growth. Apple has enough cash on hand to buy every phone maker, except Samsung – or Apple could buy Dell – if it wanted to. Apple’s market cap is worth more than Microsoft and Intel combined.
If you want to make more money, it’s best to avoid gladiator wars. They are great spectator events – but terrible places to be a participant. Instead, set your organization to find new ways of competing, and invest where you are doing what competitors are not. That will earn the greatest rate of return.
by Adam Hartung | Jun 16, 2011 | Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
Dell is a dog. From $25/share a decade ago the company rose to around $40/share around 2005, only to collapse. The stock now trades around $15, rising from recent lows of about $10. The company’s value is only $30B, only half revenues of $61B, instead of the revenue multiple obtained by most growth stocks. But then, revenues have been flat for the last 4 years — so maybe it’s time to say Dell isn’t a growth stock any longer.
And that would be correct.
In the 1990s Dell was a darling. The company could do no wrong as its revenues and valuation soared. Founder and CEO Michael Dell was a highly desired speaker at fees of $100,000+. Michael Dell was quick to tell people his success formula, which was pretty simple:
- Do no R&D. Outsource product development to key vendors (Intel and Microsoft). Focus on price and cost. Be operationally excellent! Be the best, most focused manufacturer/assembler.
- Genericize the product. Make it easy to buy, thus cheap and easy to sell.
- Sell direct rather than through distributors so you lower sales cost.
- Use supply chain practices to drive down parts cost and inventory, making it possible to compete on price and collect your funds before paying vendors.
In short, focus on operational excellence to be really fast and cheap. Faster and cheaper than anyone else.
And this success formula worked!! As long as folks wanted personal computers, Dell was the game to beat. And the company reaped the reward of PC market growth, expanding as the PC – especially the Wintel PC – market exploded.
Dell’s problems today aren’t the result of bad management. Dell has been focused, diligent, hard working and very cost conscientuous. Dell made no horrible decisions, and made no serious mistakes in its strategy or tactics. Although for a while it was vilified for weaker support from outsourced vendors in India (again, a tactic used in all parts of Dell’s strategy) that was rectified. Largely for 2 decades Dell has continued to perform better and better at its internal metrics – its success formula.
Dell’s fall from grace was due to the market shifting. Firstly, competitors figured out how to do what Dell did pretty much as good as Dell did it. No operationally oriented strategy is immune from copy-cats, and Dell discovered other companies could do pretty much what they did. It becomes a dog-eat-dog world quickly when your discussions are all “price, delivery, service” and you can’t offer something truly unique. It may not be obvious when markets are growing, and there’s plenty of business for everyone, but oh how quickly it shows up in declining margins when growth slows.
Secondly, and more importantly, the market shifted away from Dell’s primary products. PC sales are now flat to declining, depending on marketplace, as customers shift from Wintel platforms to smartphones and tablets. Despite big acquisitions in data storage and services (to the tune of $5B the last couple of years) Dell still has 70% of its revenues in PCs (55% hardware, 15% software and services.) Most of that money was spent attempting to shore up the Dell success formula by extending its core offerings to core customers. Now all future forecasts show the market will continue to move away from PCs and toward new platforms, making it impossible to create organic growth, and pinching margins in all sectors.
So, were Dell’s executives dumb, incompetent, lethargic or some combination of all 3? Actually, none of those things – as CNNMoney.com points out in “Dell’s Dilemma“. They were simply stuck. Stuck with their own best practices, doing what they do really well, and continuing to do more of it. Unable to move forward, because most attention was focused on defending and extending the old core.
Nobody knows the Dell core better than Michael Dell. His return spells only less likelihood of success for Dell. As opportunities emerged in smartphones and other markets he found it simply easier, faster, cheaper and more consistent to wait on those markets while defending the core PC business. Key vendors Intel and Microsoft, critical to historical success, were not offering new solutions for these markets, or promoting sales in them. Key customers, the IT departments in government and corporate accounts, weren’t clamoring for these new products. They wanted more PCs that were better, faster and cheaper. Dell was looking for the divine light of perfect future understanding to change the company investments – and when it didn’t emerge he kept right on plunking money into the business headed for decline.
Inside consultants (Bain and Co. is well known to be the primary strategists and tacticians at Dell) and employee experts had never-ending opportunities to improve the Dell systems, in their efforts to defend the Dell sales against other PC competitors and seek out additional expansion opportunities in targeted offshore or niche markets. Suppliers wanted Dell to keep building and promoting PCs. And customers locked-in to old platforms were just experimenting with new solutions – far from adopting anything new in the volumes that would match historical PC sales. “If just the economy comes around, I’m sure sales will return” it’s easy to imagine everyone at Dell saying.
Now Dell is in declining products, with an outdated strategy chasing a larger competitor as margins continue to remain squeezed. Nobody wants to exit this business quickly, so prices are under ever greater pressure – especially since Android tablets are cheaper than laptops already – and smartphones can be had for free from the right wireless supplier.
It’s too late for Dell. The time to act was 5 years ago. Then Dell could have set up a team to explore the market for new solutions. Dell could have been the first to offer an Android phone or tablet – the company has plenty of smart folks who could experiment and figure it out. They could have championed the Zune, and created a download store for the product to compete with iPods and iTunes (the Zune is no longer supported by Microsoft.) But there were no resources, and no permission given to try changing the success formula.
As Chromebooks are launched (“The First Google Chromebooks are On Sale Now, Here’s Everything You Need to Know” BusinessInsider.com) Dell could have been the market leader, instead of Acer and Samsung. There’s even a chance that Dell might have blunted the huge market lead Apple created since 2005 if management had just created a team with the opportunity to really discover what people would do with these new solutions. There was a time a “strategic partnership” between Dell and Google could have been a big threat to Apple. But no longer.
Apple, which put its resources into pioneering new markets the last decade has seen its value explode many-fold. It’s value is over 10x Dell. Apple has enough cash to buy Dell outright. But why would it? Dell has become a niche player – and due to its lock-in to historical best practices and its old success formula has no opportunities to grow.
All companies risk becoming marginalized. Focusing on your core products, core technology vendors and core customers leads to blindness about the possibility of market shifts. You can work yourself to death, be focused and diligent, and remain dedicated to constant improvement — even excellence! But when markets shift it’s easy to become obsolete, and fall into margin killing price wars as growth stagnates. Just look at Dell. From darling to dog in just 10 years.
If you still own DELL, the recent price rise makes this a great time to SELL. Dell has no new products, and no idea how to move into new markets. It’s commitment to its core is a death knell. And without white space to do anything new, it can/t (and won’t) transform itself into a winner.
by Adam Hartung | May 16, 2011 | Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lifecycle, Lock-in, Web/Tech
In “Screening Large Cap Value Stocks” 24x7WallSt.com tries making the investment case for Dell. And backhandedly, for Hewlett Packard. The argument is as simple as both companies were once growing, but growth slowed and now they are more mature companies migrating from products into services. They have mounds of cash, and will soon start paying a big, fat dividend. So investors can rest comfortably that these big companies are a good value, sitting on big businesses, and less risky than growth stocks.
Nice story. Makes for good myth. Reality is that these companies are a lousy value, and very risky.
Dell grew remarkably fast during the PC growth heyday. Dell innovated computer sales, eschewing expensive distribution for direct-to-customer marketing and order-taking. Dell could sell individuals, or corporations, computers off-the-shelf or custom designed machines in minutes, delivered in days. Further, Dell eschewed the costly product development of competitors like Compaq in favor of using a limited number of component suppliers (Microsoft, Intel, etc.) and focusing on assembly. With Wal-Mart style supply chain execution Dell could deliver a custom order and be paid before the bill was due for parts. Quickly Dell was a money-making, high growth machine as it rode the growth of PC sales expansion.
But competitors learned to match Dell’s supply chain cost-cutting capabilities. Manufacturers teamed with retailers like Best Buy to lower distribution cost. As competition copied the use of common components product differences disappeared and prices dropped every month. Dell’s advantages started disappearing, and as they continued to follow the historical cost-cutting success formula with more outsourcing, problems developed across customer services. Competitors wreaked havoc on Dell’s success formula, hurting revenue growth and margins.
HP followed a similar path, chasing Dell down the cost curve and expanding distribution. To gain volume, in hopes that it would create “scale advantages,” HP acquired Compaq. But the longer HP poured printer profits into PCs, the more it fed the price war between the two big companies.
Worst for both, the market started shifting. People bought fewer PCs. Saturation developed, and reasons to buy new ones were few. Users began buying more smartphones, and later tablets. And neither Dell nor HP had any products in development where the market was headed, nor did their “core” suppliers – Microsoft or Intel.
That’s when management started focusing on how to defend and extend the historical business, rather than enter growth markets. Rather than moving rapidly to push suppliers into new products the market wanted, both extended by acquiring large consulting businesses (Dell famously bought Perot Systems and HP bought EDS) in the hopes they could defend their PC installed base and create future sales. Both wanted to do more of what they had always done, rather than shift with emerging market needs.
But not only product sales were stagnating. Services were becoming more intensely competitive – from domestic and offshore services providers – hampering sales growth while driving down margins. Hopes of regaining growth in the “core” business – especially in the “core” enterprise markets – were proving illusory. Buyers didn’t want more PCs, or more PC services. They wanted (and now want) new solutions, and neither Dell nor HP is offering them.
So the big “cash hoard” that 24×7 would like investors to think will become dividends is frittered away by company leadership – spent on acquisitions, or “special projects,” intended to save the “core” business. When allocating resources, forecasts are manipulated to make defensive investments look better than realistic. Then the “business necessity” argument is trotted out to explain why acquisitions, or price reductions, are necessary to remain viable, against competitors, even when “the numbers” are hard to justify – or don’t even add up to investor gains. Instead of investing in growth, money is spent trying to delay the market shift.
Take for example Microsoft’s recent acquisition of Skype for $8.5B. As Arstechnia.com headlined “Why Skype?” This acquisition is another really expensive effort by Microsoft to try keeping people using PCs. Even though Microsoft Live has been in the market for years, Microsoft keeps trying to find ways to invest in what it knows – PCs – rather than invest in solutions where the market is shifting. New smartphone/tablet products come with video capability, and are already hooked into networks. Skype is the old generation technology, now purchased for an enormous sum in an effort to defend and extend the historical base.
There is no doubt people are quickly shifting toward smartphones and tablets rather than PCs. This is an irreversable trend: 
Chart source BusinessInsider.com
Executive teams locked-in to defending their past spend resources over-investing in the old market, hoping they can somehow keep people from shifting. Meanwhile competitors keep bringing out new solutions that make the old obsolete. While Microsoft was betting big on Skype last week Mediapost.com headlined “Google Pushes Chromebook Notebooks.” In a direct attack on the “core” customers of Dell and HP (and Microsoft) Google is offering a product to replace the PC that is far cheaper, easier to use, has fewer breakdowns and higher user satisfaction.
Chromebooks don’t have to replace all PCs, or even a majority, to be horrific for Dell and HP. They just have to keep sucking off all the growth. Even a few percentage points in the market throws the historical competitors into further price warring trying to maintain PC revenues – thus further depleting that cash hoard. While the old gladiators stand in the colliseum, swinging axes at each other becoming increasingly bloody waiting for one to die, the emerging competitors avoid the bloodbath by bringing out new products creating incremental growth.
People love to believe in “value stocks.” It sounds so appealing. They will roll along, making money, paying dividends. But there really is no such thing. New competitors pressure sales, and beat down margins. Markets shift wtih new solutions, leaving fewer customers buying what all the old competitors are selling, further driving down margins. And internal decision mechanisms keep leadership spending money trying to defend old customers, defend old solutions, by making investments and acquisitions into defensive products extending the business but that really have no growth, creating declining margins and simply sucking away all that cash. Long before investors have a chance to get those dreamed-of dividends.
This isn’t just a high-tech story. GM dominated autos, but frittered away its cash for 30 years before going bankrupt. Sears once dominated retailing, now its an irrelevent player using its cash to preserve declining revenues (did you know Woolworth’s was a Dow Jones company until 1997?). AIG kept writing riskier insurance to maintain its position, until it would have failed if not for a buyout. Kodak never quit investing in film (remember 110 cameras? Ektachrome) until competitors made film obsolete. Xerox was the “copier company” long after users switched to desktop publishing and now paperless offices.
All of these were once called “value investments.” However, all were really traps. Although Dell’s stock has gyrated wildly for the last decade, investors have lost money as the stock has gone from $25 to $15. HP investors have fared a bit better, but the long-term trending has only had the company move from about $40 to $45. Dell and HP keep investing cash in trying to find past glory in old markets, but customers shift to the new market and money is wasted.
When companies stop growing, it’s because markets shift. After markets shift, there isn’t any value left. And management efforts to defend the old success formula with investments in extensions simply fritter away investor money. That’s why they are really value traps. They are actually risky investments, because without growth there is little likelihood investors will ever see a higher stock price, and eventually they always collapse – it’s just a matter of when. Meanwhile, riding the swings up and down is best left for day traders – and you sure don’t want to be long the stock when the final downturn hits.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 26, 2011 | Defend & Extend, In the Rapids, In the Swamp, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
Summary:
- Everyone discriminates in hiring – just some is considered bad, and some considered good
- Only “good discrimination” inevitably leads to homogeneity and “group think” leaving the business vulbnerable to market shifts
- Efforts to defend & extend the historical success formula moves beyond hiring to include using internal bias to favor improvement projects and disfavor innovations
- Amazon has grown significantly more than Wal-Mart, and it’s value has quadrupled while Wal-mart’s has been flat, because it has moved beyond its original biases
The long list of people attacking Wal-Mart includes a class-action law suit between former female workers and their employer. The plaintiffs claim Wal-Mart systematically was biased, via its culture, to pay women less and limit their promotion opportunities. The case is prompting headlines like BNet.com‘s “Does Your Company Help You Discriminate?”
Actually, all cultures – and hiring programs – are designed to discriminate. It’s just that some discrimination is legal, and some is not. At Google it’s long been accepted that the bias is toward quant jocks and those with highest IQs. That’s not illegal. Saying that men, or white people, or Christians make better employees is illegal. But there is risk in all hiring bias – even the legal kind. To avoid the illegal discrimination, its smarter to overcome the “natural bias” that cultures create for hiring. And the good news is that this is better for the business’s growth and rate of return!
Successful organizations build a profile of “who did well around here – and why” as they grow. It doesn’t take long until that profile is what they seek. The downside is that quickly there’s not a lot of heterogeneity in the hiring – or the workforce. That leads to “group think,” which reinforces “not invented here.” Everyone becomes self-assured of their past success, and believes that if they keep doing “more of the same” the future will work out fine. Whether Wal-Mart’s hiring biases were legal – or not – it is clear that the group think created at Wal-Mart has kept it from innovating and moving into new markets with more growth.
Markets shift. New products, technologies and business practices emerge. New competitors figure out ways of providing new solutions. Customers drift toward new offerings, and growth slows. Unfortunately, bias keeps the early winner from accepting this market shift – so the company falls into serious growth troubles trying to do more, better, faster, cheaper of what worked before. Look at Dell, still trying to compete in PCs with its supply chain focus long after competitors have matched their pricing and started offering superior customer service and other advantages. Meanwhile, the market growth has moved away from PCs into products (tablets, smartphones) Dell doesn’t even sell.
Wal-Mart excels at its success formula of big, boring, low price stores. And its bias is to keep doing more of the same. Only, that’s not where the growth is in retailing any longer. The market for “cheap” is pretty well saturated, and now filled with competitors that go one step further being cheap (like Dollar General,) or largely match the low prices while offering better store experience (like Target) or better selection and varied merchandise (like Kohl’s). Wal-Mart is stuck, when it needs to shift. But its bias toward “doing what Sam Walton did that made us great” has now made Wal-Mart the target for every other retailer, and stymied Wal-Mart’s growth.
A powerful sign of status quo bias shows itself when leaders and managers start overly relying on “how we’ve done things here” and “the numbers.” The former leads to accepting recommendations fro hiring and promotion based upon similarity with previous “winners.” Investment opportunities to defend and extend what’s always been done sail through reviews, because everyone understands the project and everyone believes that the results will appear.
Nearly all studies of operational improvement projects show that returns rarely achieve the anticipated outcomes. Because these projects reinforce the status quo, they are assumed to be highly accurate projections. But planned efficiences do not emerge. Headcount reductions do not happen. Unanticipated costs emerge. And, most typically, competitors copy the project and achieve the same results, leading to price reductions across the board benefitting customers rather than company profits.
Doing more of the same is easily approved and rarely questioned – whether hiring, or investing. And if things don’t work out as expected results are labeled “business necessity” and everyone remains happy they made the original decision, even if it did nothing for market share, or profit improvement. Or perhaps turns out to have been illegal (remember Enron and Worldcom?)
To really succeed it is important we overcome biases. Look no further than Amazon. Amazon could have been an on-line book retailer. But by overcoming early biases, in hiring and new projects, Amazon has grown more than Wal-Mart the last decade – and has a much brighter future. Amazon now leads in a large number of retail segments, far beyond books. It has products which allow anyone to take almost any product to market – using the Amazon on-line tools, as well as inventory management.
And in publishing Amazon has become a powerhouse by helping self-published authors find distribution which was before unavailable, giving us all a much larger variety of book products. More recently Amazon pioneered e-Readers with Kindle, developing the technology as well as the inventory to make Kindle an enormous success. Simultaneously Amazon now offers a series of technical products providing companies access to the cloud for data and applications.
Where most companies would say “that’s not our business” Amazon has taken the approach of “if people want it, why don’t we supply it?” Where most organizations use numbers to kill projects – saying they are too risky or too small to matter or too low on “risk adjusted” rate of return Amazon creates a team, experiments and obtains real market information. Instead of worrying whether or not the initial project is a success or failure, market input is treated as learning and used to adapt. By continuously looking for new opportunities, and pushing those opportunities, Amazon keeps growing.
Every business develops a bias. Overcoming that bias is critical to success. From hiring to decision making, internal status quo police try to reinforce the bias and limit change. Often on the basis of “too much risk” or “too far from our core.” But that bias inevitably leads to stalled growth. Because new competitors never stop beating down rates of return on old success formulas, and markets never stop shifting.
Wal-Mart should look upon this lawsuit not as a need to defend and extend its past practices, but rather a wake-up call to be more open to diversity – in all aspects of its business. Wal-mart doesn’t need to win this lawsuit neary as badly as it needs to create an ability to adapt. Until then, I’d recommend investors sell Wal-Mart, and buy Amazon.com.
Chart of WMT stock performance compared to AMZN last 5 years (source Yahoo.com)
