Buy Into Trends – Buy Chipotle Sell McDonald’s


Revenue growth is a wonderful thing.  It is so much more fun to work in a growing company than one that isn’t.  And high growth is possible, even in this struggling economy, if leaders focus on trends.

Take for example Chipotle.  Whether you eat there or not, Chipotle has grown rather spectacularly.  From 16 units in 1998 it grew to 500 by 2005 and has 1,100 company owned and operated stores today.  Revenues have more than doubled since 2005, to about $2B, while sales/store increased almost 12% in 2010.  And investors have been well rewarded, with a market cap increase of 6x in the last 5 years!

Chipotle chart 12.12.11
Chart source Yahoo.com 12.12.11

Chipotle hit on a trend it called “Food with Integrity.”  While that is far from explicit, Chipotle has made a practice of talking about being “natural.”  Chipotle often buys local produce for its units, claims to use “natural” meat, presumably with fewer additives, and brags about having no hormones in its dairy products.  Such claims have tied into customer trends for better nutrition, higher food safety and improved taste.  This allows Chipotle to grow in the most intensely competitive of industries, even during a struggling economic time.

Compare this with McDonald’s.  This is not a random selection, as McDonald’s was a 1998 investor in Chipotle, and put around $360M into the chain fueling early growth.  McDonald’s was handsomely rewarded for this, receiving around $1.5B (4x) return on its investment when selling Chipotle to the public in 2006.

At the time, McDonald’s was in a horrible situation. It’s stock had dropped from a high of $50 in 2000 to a low of $14 in 2004.  McDonald’s took the money from the Chipotle sale and invested all of it in new capital expenditures to defend the McDonald franchise.  The good news was that “turnaround” worked and McDonald’s has recaptured its value, roughly doubling market capitalization the last 5 years.

One could consider both of these success stories, unless you look deeper. 

Chipotle increased its valued by 6x, McDonald’s by 2x – so investors in the former did fully 3x better than the latter.  And where Chipotle is expected to increase the number of its stores by at least another 1/3 in the next few years, McDonald’s struggles to find growth markets. Clearly, investors that swapped their McDonald’s stock for Chipotle’s stock in 2006 did far better – and have prospects of continuing to do even better still with at least some analysts expecting Chipotle to hit $400/share within a year, for another 20% pop.

Chipotle v McD chart 12.12.11
Source: Yahoo.com 12.12.11

McDonald’s strategy was built on a 1960s trend for speed and consistency in food.  That trend served McDonald’s well for 2 decades, but is far less interesting today.  In its effort to generate revenues recently McDonald’s brought us a re-introduced 20 year old product called McRib this October – a product who’s ingredients have people asking questions about health and safety (TheWeek.com “What’s the McRib made of, anyway?) as we learn its mostly high fat pig innards and salt.  While McDonald’s has recovered from 2004, is it a platform for growth?

Chipotle is using trends to find new products, new marketing themes, and even a new store concept, Shophouse Southeast Asian Grill, for organic growth.  Where McDonald’s is fixated on defending its historical business irrespective of trends, Chipotle is busy investing in current trends.

One has to wonder, what if instead of selling Chipotle, McDonald’s leadership had turned upside down?  What if all that management attention had gone into exploding Chipotle’s footprint faster?  Introducing even more products? And what if McDonald’s had accepted the trends propelling Chipotle growth and applied them to McDonald’s to give that chain a different customer value proposition and real new products?

McDonald’s could have acted more like Apple.  Where McDonald’s has at its core fried meat sandwiches and deep fried potatoes, Apple had its “core” the Macintosh.  But instead of investing its resources into defending its core, Apple invested in new products and markets where the trend was more favorable.  As a result its market cap grew by 4.5x during the last 5 years, compared to the more subdued 2x at McDonalds – and Apple demonstrated that even very large market cap companies can grow at very high rates when they adopt growth strategies tied to trends.

Chipotle v McD v AAPL 12.12.11
Source: Yahoo.com 12.12.11

There are a lot of businesses struggling to grow today.  But most aren’t really trying.  They keep doing more of what they’ve always done, and hoping for a better result! They don’t accept that trends go in new directions, causing markets to shift.  When markets shift, those who follow the trends do far better than those stuck trying to defend their past strategies.  It’s smart to act like, and invest in, Chipotle while avoiding the rut that is McDonald’s.


 

Why Dell Won’t Grow – SELL DELL


Dell is a dog.  From $25/share a decade ago the company rose to around $40/share around 2005, only to collapse.  The stock now trades around $15, rising from recent lows of about $10.  The company’s value is only $30B, only half revenues of $61B, instead of the revenue multiple obtained by most growth stocks. But then, revenues have been flat for the last 4 years — so maybe it’s time to say Dell isn’t a growth stock any longer. 

And that would be correct.

In the 1990s Dell was a darling.  The company could do no wrong as its revenues and valuation soared.  Founder and CEO Michael Dell was a highly desired speaker at fees of $100,000+.  Michael Dell was quick to tell people his success formula, which was pretty simple:

  • Do no R&D.  Outsource product development to key vendors (Intel and Microsoft).  Focus on price and cost.  Be operationally excellent!  Be the best, most focused manufacturer/assembler.
  • Genericize the product.  Make it easy to buy, thus cheap and easy to sell.
  • Sell direct rather than through distributors so you lower sales cost.
  • Use supply chain practices to drive down parts cost and inventory, making it possible to compete on price and collect your funds before paying vendors.

In short, focus on operational excellence to be really fast and cheap.  Faster and cheaper than anyone else. 

And this success formula worked!! As long as folks wanted personal computers, Dell was the game to beat.  And the company reaped the reward of PC market growth, expanding as the PC – especially the Wintel PC – market exploded.

Dell’s problems today aren’t the result of bad management.  Dell has been focused, diligent, hard working and very cost conscientuous.  Dell made no horrible decisions, and made no serious mistakes in its strategy or tactics.  Although for a while it was vilified for weaker support from outsourced vendors in India (again, a tactic used in all parts of Dell’s strategy) that was rectified.  Largely for 2 decades Dell has continued to perform better and better at its internal metrics – its success formula. 

Dell’s fall from grace was due to the market shifting.  Firstly, competitors figured out how to do what Dell did pretty much as good as Dell did it.  No operationally oriented strategy is immune from copy-cats, and Dell discovered other companies could do pretty much what they did. It becomes a dog-eat-dog world quickly when your discussions are all “price, delivery, service” and you can’t offer something truly unique.  It may not be obvious when markets are growing, and there’s plenty of business for everyone, but oh how quickly it shows up in declining margins when growth slows.

Secondly, and more importantly, the market shifted away from Dell’s primary products.  PC sales are now flat to declining, depending on marketplace, as customers shift from Wintel platforms to smartphones and tablets.  Despite big acquisitions in data storage and services (to the tune of $5B the last couple of years) Dell still has 70% of its revenues in PCs (55% hardware, 15% software and services.)  Most of that money was spent attempting to shore up the Dell success formula by extending its core offerings to core customers.  Now all future forecasts show the market will continue to move away from PCs and toward new platforms, making it impossible to create organic growth, and pinching margins in all sectors.

So, were Dell’s executives dumb, incompetent, lethargic or some combination of all 3?  Actually, none of those things – as CNNMoney.com points out in “Dell’s Dilemma“.  They were simply stuck.  Stuck with their own best practices, doing what they do really well, and continuing to do more of it. Unable to move forward, because most attention was focused on defending and extending the old core.

Nobody knows the Dell core better than Michael Dell.  His return spells only less likelihood of success for Dell.  As opportunities emerged in smartphones and other markets he found it simply easier, faster, cheaper and more consistent to wait on those markets while defending the core PC business.  Key vendors Intel and Microsoft, critical to historical success, were not offering new solutions for these markets, or promoting sales in them.  Key customers, the IT departments in government and corporate accounts, weren’t clamoring for these new products.  They wanted more PCs that were better, faster and cheaper.  Dell was looking for the divine light of perfect future understanding to change the company investments – and when it didn’t emerge he kept right on plunking money into the business headed for decline.

Inside consultants (Bain and Co. is well known to be the primary strategists and tacticians at Dell) and employee experts had never-ending opportunities to improve the Dell systems, in their efforts to defend the Dell sales against other PC competitors and seek out additional expansion opportunities in targeted offshore or niche markets.  Suppliers wanted Dell to keep building and promoting PCs.  And customers locked-in to old platforms were just experimenting with new solutions – far from adopting anything new in the volumes that would match historical PC sales.  “If just the economy comes around, I’m sure sales will return” it’s easy to imagine everyone at Dell saying.

Now Dell is in declining products, with an outdated strategy chasing a larger competitor as margins continue to remain squeezed.  Nobody wants to exit this business quickly, so prices are under ever greater pressure – especially since Android tablets are cheaper than laptops already – and smartphones can be had for free from the right wireless supplier. 

It’s too late for Dell.  The time to act was 5 years ago.  Then Dell could have set up a team to explore the market for new solutions.  Dell could have been the first to offer an Android phone or tablet – the company has plenty of smart folks who could experiment and figure it out.  They could have championed the Zune, and created a download store for the product to compete with iPods and iTunes (the Zune is no longer supported by Microsoft.)  But there were no resources, and no permission given to try changing the success formula.

As Chromebooks are launched (“The First Google Chromebooks are On Sale Now, Here’s Everything You Need to KnowBusinessInsider.com) Dell could have been the market leader, instead of Acer and Samsung.  There’s even a chance that Dell might have blunted the huge market lead Apple created since 2005 if management had just created a team with the opportunity to really discover what people would do with these new solutions.  There was a time a “strategic partnership” between Dell and Google could have been a big threat to Apple.  But no longer. 

Apple, which put its resources into pioneering new markets the last decade has seen its value explode many-fold.  It’s value is over 10x Dell.  Apple has enough cash to buy Dell outright.  But why would it?  Dell has become a niche player – and due to its lock-in to historical best practices and its old success formula has no opportunities to grow.

All companies risk becoming marginalized.  Focusing on your core products, core technology vendors and core customers leads to blindness about the possibility of market shifts.  You can work yourself to death, be focused and diligent, and remain dedicated to constant improvement — even excellence!  But when markets shift it’s easy to become obsolete, and fall into margin killing price wars as growth stagnates.  Just look at Dell.  From darling to dog in just 10 years.

If you still own DELL, the recent price rise makes this a great time to SELL.  Dell has no new products, and no idea how to move into new markets.  It’s commitment to its core is a death knell.  And without white space to do anything new, it can/t (and won’t) transform itself into a winner.

Profit from growth markets, not “core” markets – Virgin & Nike vs. Dell & Sears


Summary:

  • We are biased toward doing what we know how to do, rather than something new
  • We like to think we can forever grow by keeping close to what we know – that’s a myth
  • Growth only comes from entering growth markets – whether we know much about them or not
  • To grow you have to keep yourself in growth markets, and it is dangerous to limit your prospects to projects/markets that are “core” or “adjacent to core”

Recently a popular business book has been Profit from the Core.  This book proposes the theory that if you want to succeed in business you should do projects that are either in your “core,” or “adjacent to your core.”  Don’t go off trying to do something new.  The further you move from your “core” the less likely you will succeed.  Talk about an innovation killer!  CEOs that like this book are folks who don’t want much new from their employees. 

I was greatly heartened by a well written blog article at Growth Science International  (www.GrowthSci.com) “Profit from Your Core, or Not.. The Myth of Adjacencies.”  Author Thomas Thurston does a masterful job of pointing out that the book authors fall into the same deadly trap as Jim Collins and Tom Peters.  They use hindsight primarily as the tool to claim success.  Their analysis looks backward – trying to explain only past events.  In doing so they cleverly defined terms so their stories seemed to prove their points.  But they are wholly unable to be predictive.  And, if their theory isn’t predictive, then what good is it?  If you can’t use their approach to give a 98% or 99% likelihood of success, then why bother?  According to Mr. Thurston, when he tested the theory with some academic rigor he was unable to find a correlation between success and keeping all projects at, or adjacent to, core.

Same conclusion we came to when looking at the theories proposed by Jim Collins and Tom Peters.  It sounds good to be focused on your core, but when we look hard at many companies it’s easy to find large numbers that simply do not succeed even though they put a lot of effort into understanding their core, and pouring resources into protecting that core with new core projects and adjacency projects.  Markets don’t care about whatever you define as core or adjacent.

It feels good, feels right, to think that “core” or “adjacent to core” projects are the ones to do.  But that feeling is really a bias.  We perceive things we don’t know as more risky than thing we know.  Whether that’s true or not.  We perceive bottled water to be more pure than tap water, but all studies have shown that in most cities tap water is actually lower in free particles and bacteria than bottled – especially if the bottle has sat around a while. 

What we perceive as risk is based upon our background and experience, not what the real, actual risk may be.  Many people still think flying is riskier than driving, but every piece of transportation analysis has shown that commercial flying is about the safest of all transportation methods – certainly much safer than anything on the roadway.  We also now know that computer flown aircraft are much safer than pilot flown aircraft – yet few people like the idea of a commercial drone which has no pilot as their transportation.  Even though almost all commercial flight accidents turn out to be pilot error – and something a computer would most likely have overcome.  We just perceive autos as less risky, because they are under our control, and we perceive pilots as less risky because we understand a pilot much better than we understand a computer.

We are biased to do what we’ve always done – to perpetuate our past.  And our businesses are like that as well.  So we LOVE to read a book that says “stick close to your known technology, known customers, known distribution system – stick close to what you know.”  It reinforces our bias.  It justifies us not doing what we perceive as being risky.  Even though it is really, really, really lousy advice.  It just feels so good – like sugary cereal for breakfast – that we justify it in our minds – like saying “breakfast is the most important meal of the day” as we consume food that’s probably less healthy than the box it came in!

There is no correlation between investing in your core, or close to core, projects and high rates of return.  Mr. Thurston again points this out.  High rates of return come from investing in projects in growth markets.  Businesses in growth markets do better, even when poorly managed, than businesses in flat or declining markets.  Where there are lots of customers wanting to buy a solution you simply do better than when there are lots of competitors fighting over dwindling customer revenues.  Regardless of how well you don’t know the former or do know the latter.  Market growth is a much better predictor of success than understanding your “core” and whatever you consider “adjacent.”

Virgin didn’t know anything about airlines before opening one – but international travel from London was set to boom and Virgin did well (as it has done in many new markets.)  Apple didn’t know anything about retail music before launching the iPhone and iTunes, but digital music had started booming at Napster and Apple cleaned up.  Nike was a shoe company that didn’t know anything about golf merchandise, but it entered the market for all things golf (first with just one club – the driver – followed by other things) by hooking up with Tiger Woods just as he helped promote the sport into dramatic growth.  

Success comes from entering new markets where there is growth.  Growth can overcome a world of bad management choices.  When there are lots of customers with needs to fill, you can make a lot of mistakes and still succeed.  To restrict yourself to “core” and “adjacent” invites failure, because your “core” and the “adjacent” markets that you know well simply may not grow.  Leaving you in a tough spot seeking higher profits in the face of stiff competition — like Dell today in PCs.  Or GM in autos.  Sears in retailing.  They may know their “core” but that isn’t giving them the growth they want, and need, to succeed in 2010.

Creating the “Best of Times” – Apple, Cisco, Virgin


Summary:

  • Your view of today will be determined by your future success
  • Conventional wisdom – often called “best practices” – will lead businesses to cut costs in today’s economy, leading to a vicious cycle of reductions and value destruction.  “Best Practice” application does not improve results
  • Winning companies don’t focus on past behavior, but instead seek out new markets where they can grow – Apple, Google, Virgin, etc.

To paraphrase Charles Dickens (A Tale of Two Cities) are these “the best of times” or “the worst of times?”  Few new jobs are being created in the USA, its hard to obtain credit if you’re a borrower, but there’s very little return to saving, the stock market has been sideways for a decade, asset values (in particular real estate) have plummeted while health care costs are skyrocketing.  Look in the rear view mirror at the last decade and you could say it is the worst of times. 

But the answer doesn’t lie in the rear view mirror – the answer lies in the future.  If you succeed in the next 2 years at achieving your goals, you’ll look back and say this was the best of times.

In “Do You Have the Postrecession Blues” at Harvard Business Review blogs the author tells of two shoe salespeople that show up in a remote African village.  The first sends back the message “No one here wears shoes, will return shortly.”  The second sends the message “No one here wears shoes, send inventory!”

The history of business education has been to teach managers, usually by studying historical case experiences, the “best practices” employed by previous managers. But BPlans.com tells us in an article headlined “The Bad News About Best Practices” that this is a lousy way to make decisions. “..most of the time, they won’t work for you or me. They worked for somebody, some time, in some situation, in the past.” 

The New York Times deals with fallacious best practices recommendations in “From Good to Great… to Below Average.”  Best selling Freakonomics author Steven Levitt points out that most business authors try to push somebody else’s Success Formula as the road to success.  However, the most popular of these are really very inapplicable.  Those held up as “the best practice” have most often ended up with quite poor results.  So why should someone else follow them?  Nine of eleven of Collins’ “great” companies did worse than average!

Best practices has led businesses to cut heads, slash costs, sell assets and in general weaken their businesses the last few years.  Most leaders would prefer to believe that they have somehow improved the business by eliminating workers, the skills they bring and the function they perform.  But the result is less marketing, sales, R&D, etc.  How this ever became “best practice” is now a very good question.  What company can you think about that “saved its way to success?”  The cost cutters I think about – Sears, Scott Paper, Fannie Mae Candies, etc. – ended up a lot worse for their efforts. 

These can be the best of times.  Just ask the people at Apple Cisco Systems, Virgin and Google.  These businesses are growing as if there’s no recession.  Instead of “focusing on their core” business with defend & extend efforts to cut costs, they are entering new markets.  They are going to where growth is.  Amidst all the cost-cutting, best practice applying grief these are examples of success. 

So will you continue to operate as if these are the worst of times, are are you willing to make these the best of times?  You can grow if you use scenarios and competitor analysis to find new markets, embrace disruptions to attack Lock-ins that block innovation, and implement White Space teams that learn how to develop new markets for revenue and profit growth.

Postscript – entire Dickens’ quote: It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of
wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it
was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the
season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of
despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were
all going direct to heaven, we were all going direct the other way – in
short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its
noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for
evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.

Post-postcript – I am trying a new format for the blog.  Please provide your feedback.  I’m dropping the bold enhancements, and replacing their intent with an introductory summary.  Let me know if you like this better.  And thanks to reader Jon Wolf for his specific recommendations for improvement.

Stop Focusing on Your Core – Forbes, Apple, Google


Leadership

Stop Focusing On Your Core Business

It has become the fast track to oblivion.

“Where Have All the Flowers Gone” was a 1960s antiwar hit for Peter,
Paul and Mary. The “flowers” meant soldiers dying in Vietnam. These days we might be tempted to sing,
“Where Have All the Mighty Corporations Gone?”

That is the first paragraph to my latest column for Forbes magazineA laundry list of notable failures the last few years is driving home the point that “focus on your core” is insufficient to even survive – much less thrive!  And don’t blame “the government” for these failures – as all were related to management decisions intended to keep the company “on track.”  Instead, these leadership teams “doubled down” on the old Success Formula until there just wasn’t any more juice left in that orange!

On the other hand, Apple demonstrates the value of seeking out new markets.  “The iPad is Already Bigger than the iPod — and Half as Big as the Mac” is the Business Insider article. 

Apple-rev-by-segment-6-10
Silicon Alley Insider 7-21-10

By distinctly not focusing on its core, and instead entering new markets, Apple — and Google as well — keep right on growing.  Ignoring the “Great Recession.”

So is your business strategy intended to have you keep doing more of the same?  Hoping if you do more, better, faster, cheaper things will return to the sales and profit growth of an earlier time?  Or are you entering new markets, putting out new solutions that meet emerging market needs?  Are you planning for a past era to return, or for the emerging future?  Do you use scenarios, or historical trend lines?  If you are hoping to be glorious by focusing on your core, give this Forbes article a read.  You just may decide to change course.