by Adam Hartung | May 7, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lock-in
Good public policy and good management don't always align. And the banking crisis is a good example. We now hear "Banks must raise $75billion" if they are to be prepared for ongoing write-downs in a struggling economy. This is after all the billions already loaned to keep them afloat the last year.
But the bankers are claiming they will have no problem raising this money as reported in "The rush to raise Capital." "AIG narrows loss" tells how one of the primary contributors to the banking crisis now thinks it will survive. And as a result of this news, "Bank shares largely higher" is another headline reporting how financial stocks surged today post-announcements.
So regulators are feeling better. They won't have to pony up as much money as they might have. And politicians feel better, hoping that the bank crisis is over. And a lot of businesses feel better, hearing that the banks which they've long worked with, and are important to their operations, won't be going under. Generally, this is all considered good news. Especially for those worried about how a soft economy was teetering on the brink of getting even worse.
But the problem is we've just extended the life of some pretty seriously ill patients that will probably continue their bad practices. The bail out probably saved America, and the world, from an economic calamity that would have pushed millions more into unemployment and exacerbated falling asset values. A global "Great Depression II" would have plunged millions of working poor into horrible circumstances, and dramatically damaged the ability of many blue and white collar workers in developed countries to maintain their homes. It would have been a calamity.
But this all happened because of bad practices on the part of most of these financial institutions. They pushed their Success Formulas beyond their capabilities, causing failure. Only because of the bailout were these organizations, and their unhealthy Success Formulas saved. And that sows the seeds of the next problem. In evolution, when your Success Formula fails due to an environomental shift you are wiped out. To be replaced by a stronger, more adaptable and better suited competitor. Thus, evolution allows those who are best suited to thrive while weeding out the less well suited. But, the bailout just kept a set of very weak competitors alive – disallowing a change to stronger and better competitors.
These bailed out banks will continue forward mostly as they behaved in the past. And thus we can expect them to continue to do poorly at servicing "main street" while trying to create risk pass through products that largely create fees rather than economic growth. These banks that led the economic plunge are now repositioned to be ongoing leaders. Which almost assures a continuing weak economy. Newly "saved" from failure, they will Defend & Extend their old Success Formula in the name of "conservative management" when in fact they will perpetuate the behavior that put money into the wrong places and kept money from where it would be most productive.
Free market economists have long discussed how markets have no "brakes". They move to excess before violently reacting. Like a swing that goes all one direction until violently turning the opposite direction. Leaving those at the top and bottom with very upset stomachs and dramatic vertigo. The only way to avert the excessive tops is market intervention – which is what the government bail-out was. It intervened in a process that would have wiped out most of the largest U.S. banks. But, in the wake of that intervention we're left with, well, those same U.S. banks. And mostly the same leaders.
What's needed now are Disruptions inside these banks which will force a change in their Success Formula. This includes leadership changes, like the ousting of Bank of America's Chairman/CEO. But it takes more than changing one man, and more than one bank. It takes Disruption across the industry which will force it to change. Force it to open White Space in which it redefines the Success Formula to meet the needs of a shifted market – which almost pushed them over the edge – before those same shifts do crush the banks and the economy.
And that is now going to be up to the regulators. The poor Secretary of Treasury is already eyeball deep in complaints about his policies and practices. I'm sure he'd love to stand back and avoid more controversy. But, unless the regulatory apparatus now pushes those leading these banks to behave differently, to Disrupt and implement White Space to redefine their value for a changed marketplace, we can expect a protracted period of bickering and very weak returns for these banks. We can expect them to walk a line of ups and downs, but with returns that overall are neutral to declining. And that they will stand in the way of newer competitors who have a better approach to global banking from taking the lead.
So, if you didn't like government intervention to save the banks – you're really going to hate the government intervention intended to change how they operate. If you are glad the government intervened, then you'll find yourself arguing about why the regulators are just doing what they must do in order to get the banks, and the economy, operating the way it needs to in a shifted, information age.
by Adam Hartung | Mar 26, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Innovation, Leadership, Quotes
Clayton Christensen is a Harvard Business School professor who first described in detail how "disruptive" innovations shift markets, allowing upstart competitors to overtake existing companies that appear invulnerable. I just found a 4 minute video clip "Clay Christensen's Advice for Jamie Dimon" at BigThink.com. In this clip the famous professor tells the story about how the big "banks" allowed themselves to be overtaken by "non-banks" – and then he offers advice on what the big banks should do (Jamie Dimon is the Chairman and CEO of J.P.MorganChase, and an HBS alumni.)
Dr. Christensen lays out succinctly how banks relied on loan officers to find good loan candidates, and make good loans. But increasingly, borrowers were classified by a computer program, not by loan officers. Once the qualification process was turned into a computer-based Q&A, anybody with money could get into the lending business – whether for credit cards, or car loans, or mortgages, or small business loans, or commercial loans. Losing control of each of these lower-end markets, the bankers had to bid up their willingness to take on more risk to remain in business while also chasing fewer and fewer high-quality borrowers. The result was greater risk being taken by banks to compete with non-banks (like GMAC, GE Credit, Discover Card, etc.) What should they do? Dr. Christensen says go buy an Indian or Chinese phone company!!!
Hand it to Dr. Christensen to make the quick and cogent case for how Lock-in by the banks got them into so much trouble. By trying to do more of the same in the face of a radically shifting market (people going to non-banks for loans and to make deposits), they found themselves taking on considerably more risk than they originally intended. Rather than finding businesses with good rates of return, they kept taking on slightly more risk in the business they knew. They favored "the devil you know" over the "the devil you don't know." In reality, they were taking on considerably more risk than if they had diversified into other businesses that were on far less shaky ground than unbacked mortgages.
This is Strategic Bias. We all like to remain "close to core" when investing resources. So we keep taking on more and more risk to remain in our "core" — and for little reason other than it's the market and business we know. Because we know the business, we convince ourselves it's not as risky as doing something else. In truth, markets determine risk – not us. Because we assess risk from our personal perspective, we keep convincing ourselves to do more of what we've done — even when the marketplace makes the risk of doing what we've done incredibly risky —- like happened to Citbank, Bank of America and a host of other banks.
And in great form, the professor offers a solution almost nobody would consider. His argument is that (1) these banks need to go where demand is great, go to new and growing markets, not old markets, and loan demand cannot be greater than in emerging markets. (2) To succeed in the future (not the past) banks have to learn to compete in emerging markets because of growth and because so many winning competitors are already there, and (3) you want to enter businesses that are growing, not what necessarily your traditional business or what you are used to doing. He points out that the traditional "banking" infrastructure is nascent in emerging markets, and well may not develop as it did in the western world. But everyone in these places has phones, so phones are becoming the tool for transactions and the handling of money. When people start doing everything on their phone (remember the rapidly escalating capabilities of phones – like the iPhone and Pre) it may well be that the "phone company" becomes more of a bank than a bank!!
Who knows if Clayton is right about the Indian phone company? But his point that you have to consider competitors you never thought about before is spot on. When markets shift they don't return to old ways. It's all about the future, and banking has changed, so don't expect it to return to old methods. Secondly, you have to be willing to Disrupt old Lock-ins about your business. If the "loaning" of money is now automated, banking becomes about transaction management – not making loans. You have to consider entirely different ways of competing, and that means Disrupting your Lock-ins so you can consider new ways of competing. Thirdly, you don't just sit and wait to see what happens. Get out there and participate! Open White Space projects in which you experiment and LEARN what works. You can't develop a new Success Formula by thinking about it, you have to DO IT in the marketplace.
Big American banks have tilted on the edge of failure. More will likely fail – although we don't yet know which the regulators will put under or keep afloat. What we can be sure of is that the market conditions that put them on the edge will not revert. To be successful in the future these organizations have to change. Probably radically so. So if they want to use the TARP money effectively, they had better take action quickly to begin experimenting in new markets with new solutions.
Gotta hand it to Professor Clayton Christensen, he's made a huge improvement in the way we think about innovation and strategy the last few years. His ideas on banking are well worth consideration by the CEOs trying to bring their shareholders, employees and customers back from brink.
by Adam Hartung | Mar 24, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Weblogs
"Senator proposes nonprofit status for newspapers" was the headline at Marketwatch.com today. Senator Benjami Cardin, a democrate from Maryland, has proposed allowing newspapers to convert to 501(c)(3) status so their subscription and advertising revenue woujld be tax exempt, while contributions to run the papers would be tax deductible. This would allow some newspapers to stay afloat.
Let me share with you a response I received from a fellow reader of this blog:
"I watched Chris Mathews and had the same feeling. As they spoke I had visions of chiefs of Bethlehem, U.S. Steel, etc. sitting around a table in the 60s going 'continuous casting, those Japanese, that's not going anywhere.'
How can they say investigative reporting is going to be dead – there are a million reporters out there working for passion and curiosity. As a matter of fact, if I was going to be paid for a year to chase a story, seems to me a strong incentive to create a story when there really wasn't one.
I loved the way they were holding the paper and saying how people will miss the periphery articles. People will be limited to their feeds and be exposed to the rest of what's going on. I look at it as if I read an article in a newspaper that is just one take of the situation. With the internet I can drill down to get additional information and opinions. Plus get immediate commentary from experts."
Lots of people are getting "subsidy happy" these days. Money to banks, money to car companies, money to newspapers. What we must realize is that these short-term subsidies should be targeted at stopping a worse calamity. Nothing more. Sort of trading off company subsidies against even higher costs for unemployment, uninsured health care, and the costs of letting companies fail short-term. The reality is that none of these subsidized companies are sustainable as they are. The market has shifted, and their Success Formulas no longer produce positive results. They will burn up the subsidy money, as we've already seen happen at GM, and soon ask for more.
When markets shift, new competitors emerge to thrive. Provided we don't get in their way by propping up bad competitors too long with subsidies. In banking, we saw the unregulated institutions on a global scale start doing all sorts of financial services. While some of these are reverting back to regulated banks in the U.S. today so they can receive subsidies, globally we have seen the emergence of immense banks that are outside U.S. regulation. These institutions can borrow and lend globally, and are creating a new approach to financial services. We can't prop up an uncompetitive Citigroup against giant global banks making profits offshore. Likewise, globalization of manufacturing now means that good, low cost cars can be produced in Korea, China and India – making rates of return on higher cost labor in the USA, Germany and Japan harder to obtain. Additionally, many of these offshore competitors (in particular Japanese and Korean) have demonstrated they can deliver proifts on far lower volumes, thus requiring faster launch cycles and more niche products to succeed. GM lacks the manufacturing cost structure (in short-term line costs as well as labor) and the new product introduction processes to survive against these competitors. In newspapers consolidating the reporting into a daily made sense when you needed vast and costly infrastructure to print and deliver the news – no longer requirements in a web-enabled news marketplace.
Economists can make strong arguments for subsidies to help short-term dislocations. Such as helping companies in New Orleans to get back up and running due to a hurricane. That is a short-term problem not related to a market shift. But arguments for subsidies offered during market shifts are strictly "public policy" efforts trading off one policy cost for another. They cannot "save" a business. The company and its employees must use the subsidy to change their Success Formula as fast as possible, so they can compete with some product in some market where they can grow — without need for a subsidy
TARP and its other stimulus products are intended to keep some air in some parts of the boat so it doesn't sink entirely. But they aren't fixing the ship. That requires new competitors emerge that are attuned to current market needs, and have Success Formulas that produce profits based upon future markets. As the economist Schumpeter said 70 years ago, we rely upon these new entrepreneurs to give us the creative new solutions that create growth in the wake of the destruction of old businesses unable to keep up with shifting markets. Let's hope we don't spend all our money trying to keep the old battleship afloat, because we'll need some to help the newer, faster, more agile competitors grow with solutions that meet current and future needs.
by Adam Hartung | Mar 20, 2009 | Current Affairs, General, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Travel, Web/Tech
"Xerox chops earnings outlook as sales slide" is the headline on Marketwatch.com. Do you remember when Xerox was considered the most powerful sales company on earth? In the 1970s and into the 1980s corporations marveled at the sales processes at Xerox – because those processes brought in quarter after quarter of increasing profitable revenue. Xerox practically wiped out competitors – the small printing press manufacturers – during this period, and "carbon paper" was quickly becoming a museum relic (if you are under 30 you'll have to ask someone older what carbon paper is – because it requires an explanation of something called a typewriter as well [lol]).
But today, do you care about Xerox? If you have a copier, you don't care who made it. It could be from Sharp, or Canon, or anybody. You don't care if it's Xerox unless you work in a "copy store" like Kinko's or run the copy center for the corporation – and possibly not even in those jobs. And because desktop printers have practically made copiers obsolete, you may not care about copiers at all. In short, even though Xerox invented the marketplace for widespread duplicating, because the company stayed in its old market of big copiers it has seen revenue declines and has largely become irrelevant.
"U.S. airline revenue plunges for another month" is another Marketwatch.com headline. And I ask again, do you care? The airlines were deregulated 30 years ago, and since then as a group they've never consistently made money (only 1 airline – Southwest – is the exception to this discussion.) The big players in the early days included TWA, Eastern, Braniff, PanAm – names long gone from the skies. They've been replaced by Delta, American and United – as we've watched the near collapse of US Airways, Northwest and Continental. But we've grown so used to the big airlines losing money, and going bankrupt, and screaming about unions and fuel costs, that we've pretty much quit caring. The only thing frequent travelers care about now is their "frequent flier miles" and how they can use them. The airline itself is irrelevant – just so long as I get those miles and get my status and they let me board early.
When you don't grow, you lose relevance. In the mid-1980s the battle raged between Apple's Macintosh and the PC (generically, from all manufacturers) as to which was going to be the dominant desktop computer. By the 1990s that question had been answered, and as Macintosh sales lagged Apple lost relevance. But then when the iPod, iTunes, iTouch and iPhone came along suddenly Apple gained a LOT of relevance. When companies grow, they demonstrate the ability to serve markets. They are relevant. When they don't grow, like GM and Citibank, they lose relevance. It's not about cash flow or even profitability. When you grow, like Amazon with its Kindle launch, you get attention because you demonstrate you are connected to where markets are headed.
Is your business obsessing about costs to the point it is hurting revenue? If so, you are at risk of losing relevance. Like Sara Lee in consumer goods, or Sears in retailing, even if the companies are able to make a profit – possibly even grow profits after some bad years – if you can't grow the top line you just aren't relevant. And if you aren't relevant, you can't get more customers interested in your products/services, and you can't encourage investors. People want to be part of Google, not Kodak.
To maintain (or regain) relevance today, you have to focus on growth. Cutting costs is not enough. If you lose relevance, you lose your customer base and financing, and you make it a whole lot easier for competitors to grow. While you're looking internally, or managing the bottom line, competitors are figuring out the market direction, and proving it by demonstrating growth. And that's why today, even more than before, it is so critical you focus planning on future markets for growth, obsess about competitors, use Disruptions to change behavior and implement White Space to experiment with new business opportunities. Because if you don't do those things you are far, far too likely to simply become irrelevant.
[note: Thanks for feedback that my spelling and grammar have gotten pretty sloppy lately. I'm going to allocate more time to review, as well as writing. And hopefully pick up some proofreading to see if this can improve. Sorry for the recent problems, and I appreciate your feedback on errors.]
by Adam Hartung | Mar 12, 2009 | Current Affairs, General, Leadership, Lock-in
What do you think of when someone says "The Dow"? Most people think of the Dow Jones Industrial Average – a mix of some roughly 30 companies (the number isn't fixed and does change). But very few people know the names on the list, or why those companies are selected. As time has passed, most people think of "The Dow" as "blue chip" companies that are supposed to be the largest, strongest and safest companies on the New York Stock Exchange. For this last reason, it's probably time to think about killing "The Dow." It's certainly clear that what the selection committee thought were "blue chip" a year ago was off by about 50% – with many names gone or nearly gone (like AIG, GM, Citibank) and many struggling to convince people about their longevity (like Pfizer).
Quick history: "The Dow" is named afrer the first editor of the Wall Street Journal Charles Dow (co-founder of Dow Jones, owner of the Journal) who wrote in the late 1800s. Building on his early thoughts about markets, something called "Dow Theory" was developed in the early part of the 1900s. Simply put, this said to get a selection of manufacturing companies, and average their prices (the Dow Jones Industrials). Then, get a selection of transportation companies and average their prices (the Dow Jones Transportations [see, you forgot their were 2 "Dows" didn't you]). Then, watch these averages. If only one moves, you can't be predictive, but if both moves it means that businesses are both making and shipping more (or less) so you can bet the overall market will go the direction of the two averages. So it was a theory trying to predict business trends in an industrial economy by following two rough gages – production and transportation – using stock prices. [note: the first study of Dow Theory in 1934 said it didn't work – and it's never been shown to work predicatably.]
Don't forget, in this most quoted of all market averages the third word is "Industrial." The reason for creating the average was to measure the performance of industrial companies. And across the years, the names on the list were all kinds of industrials. Only in the most recent years was the definition expanded to include banks. But that was considered OK, because above all else "the Dow" was a measure of leading companies in an "industrial" economy and the banks had become key components in extending the industrial economy by providing leverage for "hard assets".
Marketwatch.com today asked the headline question "Is the Dow doing its job?" The article's concern was whether "the Dow" effectively tracked the economy because so many of its components have recently traded at remarkably low prices per share - 5 below $10 – and even 1 below $1! Historically these would have been swapped out for better performing companies in the economy. Faltering companies were dropped (like how AIG was dropped in the last year) – which meant that "the Dow" would always go up; because the owners could manipulate the components! [the owners are still the editors at The Wall Street Journal now owned by News Corp.] But even the editor of the Dow Jones Indexes said "While we wouldn't pick stocks that trade under $10 to be in the Dow [Citi and GM] are still representative of the industries they're in, and their decline in the recent past is part of the story of the market recently."
Recently, "the Dow" has taken a shellacking. And the reasons given are varied. But one thing we HAVE to keep in mind is that any measure of "industrial" companies deserves to get whacked, and we should not expect those industrial companies to dramatically improve. In the 1950s when the thinking was "what's good for GM is good for America" we were in the heyday of an industrial economy. And that phrase, even if never really used by anyone famous, made so much sense it became part of our lexicon. But we aren't in an industrial economy any more. And the failure of GM (as well as the struggles at Ford, Chrysler and Toyota) shows us that fact. If "the Dow" is a measure of industrial companies - or even more broadly, companies that operate an industrial business model – it is doing exactly what one should expect. And to expect it to ever recover to old highs is simply impossible.
The industrial era has been displaced, and in the future high returns will be captured by businesses that operate with information-intensive business models. Google should not be placed on the DJIA. We need a new basket – a new index. We need to put together a collection of companies that represent the strength of the economy – where new jobs will be created. Companies that use information to create competitive advantage and high rates of return — like how in an industrial economy businesses used "scale" and "manufacturing intensity" and "supply chain efficiency" to create superior returns. If we want to talk about "blue chip" companies that are more likely to show economic leadership, gauge the capability to succeed and the ability to drive improved economic output, we need a list of companies that are the big winners and demonstrate the ability to remain so by their superior understanding of the value in information and how to capture that value for investors, employees and vendors.
This index is not the NASDAQ. It would include Google, currently leading this new era as Ford did the last one 100 years ago. But other likley participants would be Amazon for demonstrating that the value of books is in the content, not the paper and that the value of retailing is not the building and store. Apple has shown how music can eclipse physical devices, and is leading the merger of computer/phone/PDA/wireless connectivity. Infosys is a leader in delivering information systems in 24×7 global delivery models. Comcast is leading us to see that computers, televisions, gaming systems, telephones and all sorts of communications/media will be delivered (and used) entirely differently. News Corp. is blurring the lines of media spanning all forms of content development as well as delivery in a rapidly shifting customer marketplace. Nike, or maybe Virgin, is showing us that branding is not about making the product – but instead about connecting products with customers. Roche for its ownership of Genentech and its deep pool of information on human genetics? What's common about these companies is that they are not about making STUFF. They are about using information to make a business, and capturing the value from that information.
RIP to the Dow Jones Industrial Average. It's future value looks, at best, unclear. What we need to do now is redefine what is a "blue chip" in this new economy. What are your ideas? Who should represent the soon to be exploding marketplace for biotech solutions based on genetics? Who will lead the nanotech wave? Who would you put on this new "blue chip information index"? Send me your ideas. And in the meantime, we can recognize that even those who created and manage the venerable "Dow" aren't really sure what to do with it.
