Irrelevancy leads to failure – Worry for Yahoo, Microsoft, HP, Sears, etc.

The web lit up yesterday when people started sharing a Fortune quote from Marissa Mayer, CEO of Yahoo, "We are literally moving the company from BlackBerrys to smartphones."  Why was this a big deal?  Because, in just a few words, Ms. Mayer pointed out that Research In Motion is no longer relevant.  The company may have created the smartphone market, but now its products are so irrelevant that it isn't even considered a market participant.

Ouch.  But, more importantly, this drove home that no matter how good RIM thinks Blackberry 10 may be, nobody cares.  And when nobody cares, nobody buys.  And if you weren't convinced RIM was headed for lousy returns and bankruptcy before, you certainly should be now.

But wait, this is certainly a good bit of the pot being derogatory toward the kettle.  Because, other than the highly personalized news about Yahoo's new CEO, very few people care about Yahoo these days as well.  After being thoroughly trounced in ad placement and search by Google, it is wholly unclear how Yahoo will create its own relevancy.  It may likely be soon when a major advertiser says "When placing our major internet ad program we are focused on the split between Google and Facebook," demonstrating that nobody really cares about Yahoo anymore, either. 

And how long will Yahoo survive?

The slip into irrelevancy is the inflection point into failure.  Very few companies ever return.  Once you are no longer relevant, customer quickly stop paying attention to practically anything you do.  Even if you were once great, it doesn't take long before the slide into no-growth, cost cutting and lousy financial performance happens. 

Consider:

  • Garmin once led the market for navigation devices.  Now practically everyone uses their mobile phone for navigation. The big story is Apple's blunder with maps, while Google dominates the marketplace.  You probably even forgot Garmin exists.
  • Radio Shack once was a consumer electronics powerhouse.  They ran superbowl ads, and had major actresses parlaying with professional sports celebrities in major network ads.  When was the last time you even thought about Radio Shack, much less visited a store?
  • Sears was once America's premier, #1 retailer.  The place where everyone shopped for brands like Craftsman, DieHard and Kenmore.  But when did you last go into a Sears?  Or even consider going into one?  Do you even know where one is located?
  • Kodak invented amateur photography.  But when that market went digital nobody cared about film any more.  Now Kodak is in bankruptcy.  Do you care?
  • Motorola Razr phones dominated the last wave of traditional cell phones.  As sales plummeted they flirted with bankruptcy, until Motorola split into 2 pieces and the money losing phone business became Google – and nobody even noticed.
  • When was the last time you thought about "building your body 12 ways" with Wonder bread?  Right.  Nobody else did either.  Now Hostess is liquidating.

Being relevant is incredibly important, because markets shift quickly today. As they shift, either you are part of the trend going forward – or you are part of the "who cares" past.  If you are the former, you are focused on new products that customers want to evaluate. If you are the latter, you can disappear a whole lot faster than anyone expected as customers simply ignore you.

So now take a look at a few other easy-to-spot companies losing relevancy:

  • HP headlines are dominated by write offs of its investments in services and software, causing people to doubt the viability of its CEO, Meg Whitman.  Who wants to buy products from a company that would spend billions on Palm, business services and Autonomy ERP software only to decide they overspent and can never make any money on those investments?  Once a great market leader, HP is rapidly becoming a company nobody cares about; except for what appears to be a bloody train wreck in the making.  In tech – lose customesr and you have a short half-life.
  • Similarly Dell.  A leader in supply chain management, what Dell product now excites you?  As you think about the money you will spend this holiday, or in 2013, on tech products you're thinking about mobile devices — and where is Dell?
  • Best Buy was the big winner when Circuit City went bankrupt.  But Best Guy didn't change, and now margins have cratered as people showroom Amazon while in their store to negotiate prices.  How long can Best Buy survive when all TVs are the same, and price is all that matters?  And you download all your music and movies?
  • Wal-Mart has built a huge on-line business.  Did you know that?  Do you care?  Regardless of Wal-mart's on-line efforts, the company is known for cheap looking stores with cheap merchandise and customers that can't maintain credit cards.  When you look at trends in retailing, is Wal-Mart ever the leader – in anything – anymore?  If not, Wal-mart becomes a "default" store location when all you care about is price, and you can't wait for an on-line delivery.  Unless you decide to go to the even cheaper Dollar General or Aldi.

And, the best for last, is Microsoft.  Steve Ballmer announced that Microsoft phone sales quadrupled!  Only, at 4 million units last quarter that is about 10% of Apple or Android.  Truth is, despite 3 years of development, a huge amount of pre-release PR and ad spending, nobody much cares about Win8, Surface or new Microsoft-based mobile phones.  People want an iPhone or Samsung product. 

After its "lost decade" when Microsoft simply missed every major technology shift, people now don't really care about Microsoft.  Yes, it has a few stores – but they dwarfed in number and customers by the Apple stores.  Yes, the shifting tiles and touch screen PCs are new – but nobody real talks about them; other than to say they take a lot of new training.  When it comes to "game changers" that are pushing trends, nobody is putting Microsoft in that category.

So the bad news about a  $6 billion write-down of aQuantive adds to the sense of "the gang that can't shoot straight" after the string of failures like Zune, Vista and early Microsoft phones and tablets.  Not to mention the lack of interest in Skype, while Internet Explorer falls to #2 in browser market share behind Chrome. 

Browser share IE Chrome 5-2012Chart Courtesy Jay Yarrow, BusinessInsider.com 5-21-12

When a company is seen as never able to take the lead amidst changing
trends, investors see accquisitions like $1.2B for Yammer as a likely future write down.  Customers lose interest and simply spend money elsewhere.

As investors we often hear about companies that were once great brands, but selling at low multiples, and therefore "value plays."  But the truth is these are death traps that wipe out returns.  Why?  These companies have lost relevancy, and that puts them one short step from failure. 

As company managers, where are you investing?  Are you struggling to be relevant as other competitors – maybe "fringe" companies that use "voodoo solutions" you don't consider "enterprise ready" or understand – are obtaining a lot more interest and media excitment?  You can work all you want to defend & extend your past glory, but as markets shift it is amazingly easy to lose relevancy.  And it's a very, very tough job to play catch- up. 

Just look at the money being spent trying at RIM, Microsoft, HP, Dell, Yahoo…………

Why the Top 20 R&D spenders waste their money – lessons from Microsoft & GM

Many people equate spending on R&D with investing in innovation.  The logic goes that R&D spending is lab spending, and out of labs come innovations.  Hence, those that spend a lot on R&D are innovative.

That is faulty logic.

This chart shows R&D spending from the top 20 companies in 2011:

Top 20 R and D spenders 2011
Chart reproduced with permission of Business Insider

Think of your own list of companies that are providing innovations which change your work, or life. Would you include Apple? Amazon? Facebook? Google? Genentech?  (Here's the link to Fast Company's 50 most innovative for 2012).  Note that none of these companies appear on the list of top R&D spenders. 

On the other hand, as you look at the big spender list some things might be apparent:

  • Microsoft is #5, spending $9B and nearly 13% of revenue.  Yet, for this money in 2012 the world received updates to their aging operating system and office automation software.  Both of which failed to register favorable reviews by industry gurus, and are considered far from innovative.  And Nokia, which is so floundering some consider it a likely bankruptcy candidate soon, is #7! Despite spending nearly $8B on R&D Nokia is now completely reliant on Microsoft if it is to even survive.
  • Autos make up a big part of the group.  Toyota, GM, Volkswagen, Honda and Daimler are all on the list, spending a whopping $36B.  Yet, even though they give us improvements nobody considers them (especially GM)  very innovative.  That award would go to little Tesla Motors.  Or maybe Tata Motors in India.
  • Pharmaceuticals make up the dominant industry.  Novartis, Roche, Pfizer, Merck, Johnson & Johnson, Sanofi, GlaxoSmithKline and AstraZeneca are all here – spending a cumulative $54B!  Yet, they have all failed to give the world any incredible new drugs, all have profit struggles, and the industry is rife with discussions about weak product pipelines. The future of modern medicine increasingly is shifting to genetic solutions, biologics and more specific alternatives to the historical drug regimes from these aging pharma R&D programs.

Do you see the obvious pattern?  Most big R&D spenders are not really seeking innovations.  They are spending money on historical programs, following historical patterns and trying to defend and extend the historical business.  In other words, they are spending vast sums attempting to sustain (or recapture) historical success.  And, as the list shows, largely doing a pretty lousy job of it. 

If you were given $10,000 to invest would you select these top 20 R&D spenders – or would you look for other, more innovative companies.  From a profitability, rate of return and trend perspective, most of these companies look weak – or downright horrible.

Innovators don't focus on what they spend, but where they spend it.

The companies most known for innovation don't keep spending money year after year on their old business.  Instead of digging deeper into what they already know, they invest laterally.  They spend money putting the pieces together in new, unique ways.  They try to find new solutions to old problems, using new – even fringe – technologies.  They try to develop disruptive solutions that actually change the marketplace, rather than trying to make something that already exists better, faster or cheaper.

Lots of people like to think there is "scale" in research.  Bigger is better.  What's more important, for investors, is that there is "diminishing returns."  The more you research an area the more you have to spend to find anything new.  The costs keep escalating, as the gains shrink.  After investing for a while, continuing to research an area is not a good investment (although it may be very intellectually interesting.) 

Most of the companies on this list would be smarter to scrap their existing R&D programs, cut the budget in half (at least,) and then invest it somewhere very different.  Instead of looking deeper, they need to look wider – broader.  They need to investigate alternative solutions, rather than more of the same.  They need to be putting more money on fringe opportunities, and a lot less into the core.

Until they do, few on this list are very good investment bets.  You'll do better investing like, and in, the real innovators.

 

Are American’s Abusing Social Security Disability?

Does anyone remember the 1990s?  Economic growth was robust, the stock market was exploding and unemployment was low.  Even though outsourcing was just emerging as a new business practice, there were more jobs than employees in America, and the Federal Reserve Board Chairman worried about "irrational exuberance."  If you had a degree you had a job, and you had a car (or 2) and a house as you awaited ever rising income and asset values.

Oh my, how times have changed.  A third of U.S. homes are worth less than the mortgage, auto sales fell off a cliff as GM and Chrysler filed bankruptcy, trust in banks has disappeared, savers earn nearly 0% yet investors shun stocks and laugh at declining values of IPOs.  And unemployment remains stubbornly stuck just below double digits as job growth remains anemic, despite reduced outsourcing and rising oversees costs. 

So how do Americans react to limited economic growth?  Apparently, increasingly, by feigning disabilities in order to create their own form of social welfare net similar to Europe.  Regardless of what Americans say, it is important to look at what they do

This week I am pleased to offer you a guest blog from Jack Ablin, Chief Investment Officer of Harris Private Bank, a division of BMO Financial:

Working conditions in the United States are getting downright dangerous if the Social Security disability statistics are any indication.  The number of Americans collecting disability is rising at an unprecedented and alarming rate.  This belies Bureau of Labor Statistics data that tells the story of workplace safety that is constantly improving.  Everyone knows that injury incidence rates have been in secular decline since, well, always. 

When thinking about worker-related risks, "Lunch atop a Skyscraper," the famous Depression era photo by Charles C. Ebbets immediately comes to mind.  What we once accepted at the workplace is now wildly unacceptable:


Steelworker lunch

In 2010, there were 3.5 total recordable cases of non-fatal occupational injury and illness per 100 full-time workers, down from 5.0 less than a decade ago.  In 1973 the rate was 11 per 100.  The net decline amounts to a 3.7 percent reduction in these hazards every year for four decades

Of course, not all injuries and illness are work related.  Then again, is there any aspect of our lives that has not become safer in the last two generations?  For example, auto injuries are always a factor.  But those risks have collapsed with the advent of airbags, anti-lock brakes and other technological breakthroughs. 
 
The Social Security Administration’s website cites two criteria for disability eligibility:
•      You must be unable to do any substantial work because of your medical condition(s); and
•      Your medical condition(s) must have lasted, or be expected to last at least 1 year, or be expected to result in your death.

Quizzically, from 1980 to 2002 there was no change in the percentage of the workforce claiming disability, yet the “disability participation rate” has embarked on a 4.5 percent ascent each year for the last decade.  There is now 1 person collecting disability for every 12 in the workforce

This occurred despite the evolution toward more of a “desk job” workforce.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that today only 14% of working Americans are in goods producing jobs, down from more than 25% in 1973.  Yet, somehow, claims for disability benefits have headed in the opposite direction:

Disability Participation Rate
 
There are people out there that truly want to work but are too sick or injured to do so.  Sadly, many are unfortunately being branded with a stigma because of the legions that are out there gaming the system.  That is the only way we can explain how almost as many people collect disability (10.8 million) as there are working in the entirety of manufacturing (12 million). 

It is plain to see that permanently stagnant labor markets are making Social Security disability the new unemployment benefit.  
 
The impact of America's "no growth decade" from 2000-2010 is clearly impacting America.  I want to thank Jack for his analysis.  I urge your to sign up for Jack's newsletter, full of insight about the economy, interest rates, investing and jobs by contacting him at [email protected].  Jack is a graduate of Vassar and has his MBA from Boston University.  He is a CFA and frequent contributor to CNBC, Bloomberg, Barron's and The Wall Street Journal.

McDonald’s Growth Stall is Deadly

McDonald’s Growth Stall is Deadly

McDonald’s is in a Growth Stall.  Even though the stock is less than 10% off its recent 52 week high (which is about the same high it’s had since the start of 2012,) the odds of McDonald’s equity going down are nearly 10x the odds of it achieving new highs.

A Growth Stall occurs when a company has 2 consecutive quarters of declining sales or earnings, or 2 consecutive quarters of lower sales or earnings than the previous year.  And our research, in conjunction with The Conference Board, proved that when this happens the future becomes fairly easy to predict.

Growth Stalls are Deadly

Growth Stalls are Deadly

 

When companies hit a growth Stall, 93% of the time they are unable to maintain even a 2% growth rate. 55% fall into a consistent revenue decline of more than 2%. 1 in 5 drop into a negative 6%/year revenue slide. 69% of Growth Stalled companies will lose at least half their market capitalization in just a few years. 95% will lose more than 25% of their market value.

Back in February, McDonalds sales in USA stores open at least 13 months fell 1.4%.  By May these same stores reported reported their 7th consecutive month (now more than 2 quarters) of declining revenues. And in July McDonald’s reported the worst sales decline in over a decade – with stores globally selling 2.5% less (USA stores were down 3.2% for the month.)  McDonald’s leadership is now warning that annual sales will be weaker than forecast – and could well be a reported decline.

While McDonald’s has been saying that Asian store revenue growth had offset the USA declines, we now can see that the USA drop is the key signal of a stall.  There was no specific program in Asia to indicate that offshore revenues could create a renewed uptick in USA sales.  Now with offshore sales plummeting we can see that McDonald’s American performance is the lead indicator of a company with serious performance issues.

Growth Stalls are a great forecasting tool because they indicate when a company has become “out of step” with its marketplace.  While management, and in fact many analysts, will claim that this performance deficit is a short term aberration which will be repaired in coming months, historical evidence — and a plethora of case stories – tell us that in fact by the time a Growth Stall shows itself (especially in a company as large as McDonald’s) the situation is far more dire (and systemic) than management would like investors to believe.

Something fundamental has happened in the marketplace, and company leadership is busy trying to defend its historical business in the face of a major change that is pulling customers toward substitute solutions.  Frequently this defend & extend approach exacerbates the problems as retrenchment efforts further hurt revenues.

McDonald’s has reached this inflection point as the result of a long string of leadership decisions which have worked to submarine long-term value.

Back in 2006 McDonald’s sold its fast growing Chipotle chain in order to raise additional funds to close some McDonald’s stores, and undertake an overhaul of the supply chain as well as many remaining stores.  This one-time event was initially good for McDonald’s, but it hurt shareholders by letting go of an enormously successful revenue growth machine.

Since that sale Chipotle has outperformed McDonalds by 3x, and it was clear in 2011 that investors were better off with the faster growing Chipotle than the operationally focused McDonald’s.  Desperate for revenues as its products lagged changing customer tastes, by December, 2012 McDonald’s was urging franchisees to stay open on Christmas Day in order to add just a bit more to the top line.  However, such operational tactics cannot overcome a product line that is fat-and-carb-heavy and off current customer food trends, and by this July was ranked the worst burger in the marketplace.  Meanwhile McDonald’s customer service this June ranked dead last in the industry.  All telltale signs of the problems creating the emergent Growth Stall.

Meanwhile, McDonald’s is facing a significant attack on its business model as trends turn toward higher minimum wages.  By August, 2013 the first signs of the trend were clear – and the impact on McDonald’s long-term fortunes were put in question.  By February, 2014 the trend was accelerating, yet McDonald’s continued ignoring the situation.  And this month the issue has become a front-and-center problem for McDonald’s investors as the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has said it will not separate McDonald’s from its franchisees in pay and hours disputes – something which opens McDonald’s deep pockets to litigants looking to build on the living wage trend.

The McDonald’s CEO is somewhat “under seige” due to the poor revenue and earnings reports.  Yet, the company continues to ascribe its Growth Stall to short-term problems such as a meat processing scandal in China.  But this inverts the real situation. Such scandals are not the cause of current poor results.  Rather, they are the outcome of actions taken to meet goals set by leadership pushing too hard, trying to achieve too much, by defending and extending an outdated success formula desperately in need of change to meet new competitive market conditions.

Application of Growth Stall analysis has historically been very valuable.  In May, 2009 I reported on the Growth Stall at Motorola which threatened to dramatically lower company value.  Subsequently Motorola spun off its money losing phone business, sold other assets and businesses, and is now a very small remnant of the business prior to its Growth Stall; which was brought on by an overwhelming market shift to smartphones from 2-way radios and traditional cell phones.

In February, 2008 a Growth Stall at General Electric indicated the company would struggle to reach historical performance for long-term investors.  The stock peaked at $57.80 in 2000, then at $41.40 in July, 2007.  By January, 2009 (post Stall) the company had crashed to only $10, and even recent higher valuations ($28 in 10/2013) are still far from the all-time highs – or even highs in the last decade.

In May, 2008 the Growth Stall at AIG portended big problems for the Dow Jones Industrial (DJIA) giant as financial markets continued to shift radically and quickly.  By the end of 2008 AIG stock cratered and the company was forced to wipe out shareholders completely in a government-backed restructuring.

Perhaps the most compelling case has been Microsoft.  By February, 2010 a Growth Stall was impending (and confirmed by May, 2011) warning of big changes for the tech giant.  Mobile device sales exploded, sending Apple and Google stocks soaring, while Microsoft’s primary, core market for PCs (and software for PCs) has fallen into decline.  Windows 8 subsequently had a tepid market acceptance, and gained no traction in mobile devices, causing Microsoft to write-off its investment in the Surface tablet.  Recent announcements about enormous lay-offs, with vast cuts in the acquired Nokia handheld unit, do not bode well for long-term revenue growth at the decaying (yet cash rich) giant.

As the Dow has surged to record highs, it has lifted all boats.  Including those companies which are showing serious problems.  It is easy to look at the ubiquity of McDonald’s stores and expect the chain to remain forever dominant.  But, the company is facing serious strategic problems with its products, service and business model which leadership has shown no sign of addressing.  The recent Growth Stall serves as a key long-term indicator that McDonald’s is facing serious problems which will most likely seriously jeopardize investors’ (as well as employees’, suppliers’ and supporting communities’) potential returns.

Why Jamie Dimon Told Us To Not Own JPMorganChase (or any other “money center” bank)

Most investors shouldn't be.  Given demands of work and family, there is almost no time to study companies, markets and select investments.  So smaller investors rely on 3rd parties, who rarely perform better than the most common indeces, such as the S&P 500 or Dow Jones Industrial Average.  For that reason, few small investors make more than 5-10% per year on their money, and since 2000 many would beg for that much return! 

Most investors would make more money with their available time by studying prices on the web and simply buying bargains where they could save more than 10% on their purchase. The satisfaction of a well priced computer, piece of furniture, nice suit or pair of shoes is far more gratifying than earning 2-4% on your investment, while worrying about whether you might LOSE 10-20-30%, or more!

And that's why you don't want to own JPMorganChase (JPMC.)  Last week's earning's call was a remarkable example of boredom.  Yes, Chairman and CEO Jamie Dimon and his team spent considerable time explaining how the London investment office lost $6B, and why they felt it was an "accident" that would not happen again.  But the truth is that this $6B "mistake" wasn't really all that big a deal, compared to the  $100B in mortgage and credit card losses since the financial crisis started!

Perhaps Mr. Dimon was right, given JPMC's size, that the whole experience was mostly "a tempest in a teapot."  Throughout the call the CEO kept emphasizing that JPMC was "going to go about the business of deposits and lending that is the 'core' business for the bank." Although known for outspokenness, Mr. Dimon sounded like any other bank CEO saying "things happen, but trust us. We really are conservative." 

So if a $6B surprise loss isn't that big a deal, what is important to shareholders of JPMC? 

How about the unlikelihood of JPMC earning any sort of decent return for the next decade, or two? 

The world has changed.  But this call, and the mountain of powerpoint slides and documents put out with it, reiterated just how little JPMC (and most of its competition, honestly) has not.  In this global world of network relationships, digital transactions, struggling home values and upside down mortgages, and very slow economic growth in developed countries, JPMC has no idea what "the next big thing" will be that could make its investors a 20-30% rate of return. 

Yes, in many traditional product lines return-on-equity is in the upper teens or even over 20%.  But, then there are losses in others.  So lots of trade-offs.  Ho-hum.  To seek growth JPMC is opening more branches (ho-hum). And trying to sign up more credit card customers (ho-hum) and make more smalll-business loans (ho-hum) while running ads and hoping to accumulate more deposit acounts (ho-hum.)  And they have cut compensation and other non-interest costs 12% (ho-hum.)

You could have listened to this call in the 1980s, or 1990s, and it would have sounded the same.

Only the world isn't at all the same.

And Mr. Dimon, and his team, knew this.  That's why JPMC created the Chief Investment Office (CIO) in London, and the synthetic credit portfolio that has caused such a stir.  The old success formula, despite the bailout which created these highly concentrated, huge banks, simply doesn't have much growth – in revenues or profits.  So to jack up returns the bank created an extremely complex business unit that made bets – big bets – sometimes HUGE bets – on interest rates and securities it did not own. 

These bets allowed small sums (like, say, $1B) to potentially earn multiples on the investment.   Or, lose multiples.  And the bets were all based on forecasts about future events – using a computer model created by the CIO's office.  As Mr. Dimon's team eloquently pointed out, this model became very complicated, and as reality varied from forecast nobody at JPMC was all that clear why the losses started to happen.  As they kept using the model, losses mounted.  Oops.

But now, we are to be very assured that JPMC's leaders are paying a lot more attention to the model, and thus JPMC isn't going to have such variations between forecast and reality. So this event won't happen again.

Right. 

If JPMC didn't need to use the highly complicated world of derivatives to potentially jack up its returns it would have closed the CIO before these losses happened.  Now they claim to have closed the synthetic trading portfolio, but not the CIO.  Think about that, if you had a unit operated by one of your very top leaders that "made a mistake" and lost $6B wouldn't you closing it?  You would only keep it open if you felt like you had to.  

Anybody out there remember the failure of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM?)  Certainly Mr. Dimon does. In the 1990s LTCM was the most famous "hedge fund" of its day.  The "model" used at Long Term Capital supposedly had zero risk, but extremely high returns.  Until a $4B loss created by the default of Russion bonds wiped out all the bank's reserves and capital.

Let's see, what's the big news these days?  Oh yeah, possible bond defaults in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland……

The recent "crisis" at JPMC reflects a company locked-in to an antiquated business model which has no growth and declining returns.  In order to prop up returns the bank took on almost unquantifiable additional risk, through its hedging operation. Even though hedging long had a risky history, and some spectacular failures. 

But this was the only way JPMC knew how to boost returns, so it did it anyway. In an almost off-hand comment Mr. Dimon remarked a capable executive fired CIO Ina Drew was.  And that she was credited with "saving the bank" by some of Mr. Dimon's fellow executives. Most likely her money-losing, high risk efforts were another attempt by Ms. Drew to "save the bank's returns" and thus why she was lauded even after losing $6B.

But no more.  Now the bank is just going to slog it out being the boring bank it used to be.  Amidst all the slides and documents there was NO explanation of what JPMC was going to do next to create growth.  So JPMC is still susceptible to crisis – from debt defaults, Euro crisis, no growth economies, etc. – but shows little, if any, upside growth.

And that's why you don't want to invest in JPMC.  For the last 3 years the stock has swung wildly.  Big swings are loved by betting stock traders.  But quarter to quarter vicissitudes are not helpful for investors who need growth so they can generate a 50% gain in 5 years when they need the money for junior's college tuition. 

For that matter, I can't think of any "money center" bank worth investing. All of them have the same problem. After being "saved" they are less likely to behave differently than ever before.   At JPMC leadership took bets in derivatives trying to jack up returns.  At Barclay's Bank it appears leadership manipulated a key lending rate (LIBOR.)  All actions typical of executives that are stuck in a lousy market, that is shifting away from them, and feeling it necessary to push the envelope in an effort to squeek out higher returns.

If you feel compelled to invest in financial services, look outside the traditional institutions.  Consider Virgin, where Virgin Money is behaving uniquely – and could create incredible growth with very high returns.  In a business no "traditional" bank is pursuing.  Or Discover Financial Services which is using a unique on-line approach to deposits and lending.  Although these are nothing like JPMC, they offer opportunity for growth with probably less risk of another future crisis.

 

 

 

OOPS! 5 CEOs that Should Have Already Been Fired (Cisco, GE, WalMart, Sears, Microsoft)

This has been quite the week for CEO mistakes.  First was all the hubbub about Scott Thompson, CEO of Yahoo, inflating his resume to include a computer science degree he did not actually receive.  According to Mr. Thompson someone at a recruiting firm added that degree claim in 2005, he didn't know it and he's never read his bio since.  A simple oversight, if you can believe he hasn't once read his bio in 7 years, and he didn't think it was ever important to correct someone who introduced him or mentioned it.  OOPS – the easy answer for someone making several million dollars per year, and trying to guide a very troubled company from the brink of failure. Hopefully he is more persistent about checking company facts.

But luckily for him, his errors were trumped on Thursday when Jamie Dimon, CEO of J.P.MorganChase notified the world that the bank's hedging operation messed up and lost $2B!!  OOPS!  According to Mr. Dimon this is really no big deal. Which reminded me of the apocryphal Senator Everett Dirksen statement "a billion here, a billion there and pretty soon it all adds up to real money!" 

Interesting "little" mistake from a guy who paid himself some $50M a few years ago, and benefitted greatly from the government TARP program.  He said this would be "fodder for pundits," as if we all should simply overlook losing $2B?  He also said this was "unfortunate timing."  As if there's a good time to lose $2B? 

But neither of these problems will likely result in the CEOs losing their jobs.  As obviously damaging as both mistakes are, which would naturally have caused us mere employees to instantly lose our jobs – and potentially be prosecuted – CEOs are a rare breed who are allowed wide lattitude  in their behavior.  These are "one off" events that gain a lot of attention, but the media will have forgotten within a few days, and everyone else within a few months.

By comparison, there are at least 5 CEOs that make these 2 mistakes appear pretty small.  For these 5, frequently honored for their position, control of resources and personal wealth, they are doing horrific damage to their companies, hurting investors, employees, suppliers and the communities that rely on their organizations.  They should have been fired long before this week.

#5 – John Chambers, Cisco Systems.  Mr. Chambers is the longest serving CEO on this list, having led Cisco since 1995 and championed much of its rapid growth as corporations around the world began installing networks.  Cisco's stock reached $70/share in 2001.  But since then a combination of recessions that cut corporate IT budgets and a market shift to cloud computing has left Cisco scrambling for a strategy, and growth.

Mr. Chambers appears to have been great at operating Cisco as long as he was in a growth market.  But since customers turned to cloud computing and greater use of mobile telephony networks Cisco has been unable to innovate, launch and grow new markets for cloud storage, services or applications.  Mr. Chambers has reorganized the company 3 times – but it has been much like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.  Lots of confusion, but no improvement in results.

Between 2001 and 2007 the stock lost half its value, falling to $35.  Continuing its slide, since 2007 the stock has halved again, now trading around $17.  And there is no sign of new life for Cisco – as each earnings call reinforces a company lacking a strategy in a shifting market.  If ever there was a need for replacing a stayed-in-the-job too long CEO it would be Cisco.

#4 – Jeffrey Immelt, General Electric (GE).  GE has only had 9 CEOs in its 100+ year life.  But this last one has been a doozy.  After more than a decade of rapid growth in revenue, profits and valuation under the disruptive "neutron" Jack Welch, GE stock reached $60 in 2000.  Which turns out to have been the peak, as GE's value has gone nowhere but down since Mr. Immelt took the top job.

GE was once known for entering and changing markets, unafraid to disrupt how the market performed with innovation in products, supply chain and operations.  There was no market too distant, or too locked-in for GE to not find a way to change to its advantage – and profit.  But what was the last market we saw GE develop?  What has Mr. Immelt, in his decade at the top of GE, done to keep GE as one of the world's most innovative, high growth companies?  He has steered the ship away from trouble, but it's only gone in circles as it's used up fuel. 

From that high in 2001, GE fell to a low of $8 in 2009 as the financial crisis revealed that under Mr. Immelt GE had largely transitioned from a manufacturing and products company into a financial house.  He had taken what was then the easy road to managing money, rather than managing a products and services company.  Saved from bankruptcy by a lucrative Berkshire Hathaway, GE lived on.  But it's stock is still only $19, down 2/3 from when Mr. Immelt took the CEO position. 

"Stewardship" is insufficient leadership in 2012.  Today markets shift rapidly, incur intensive global competition and require constant innovation.  Mr. Immelt has no vision to propel GE's growth, and should have been gone by 2010, rather than allowed to muddle along with middling performance.

#3 – Mike Duke, WalMart.  Mr. Duke has been CEO since 2009, but prior to that he was head of WalMart International.  We now know Mr. Duke's business unit saw no problems with bribing foreign officials to grow its business.  Just on the basis of knowing about illegal activity, not doing anything about it (and probably condoning and recommending more,) and then trying to change U.S. law to diminish the legal repurcussions, Mr. Duke should have long ago been fired. 

It's clear that internally the company and its Board new Mr. Duke was willing to do anything to try and grow WalMart, even if unethical and potentially illegal.  Recollections of Enron's Jeff Skilling, Worldcom's Bernie Ebbers and Hollinger's Conrdad Black should be in our heads.  How far do we allow leaders to go before holding them accountable?

But worse, not even bribes will save WalMart as Mr. Duke follows a worn-out strategy unfit for competition in 2012.  The entire retail market is shifting, with much lower cost on-line companies offering more selection at lower prices.  And increasingly these companies are pioneering new technologies to accelerate on-line shopping with easy to use mobile devices, and new apps that make shopping, paying and tracking deliveries easier all the time.  But WalMart has largely eschewed the on-line world as its CEO has doggedly sticks with WalMart doing more of the same.  That pursuit has limited WalMart's growth, and margins, while the company files further behind competitively. 

Unfortunately, WalMart peaked at about $70 in 2000, and has been flat ever since.  Investors have gained nothing from this strategy, while employees often work for wages that leave them on the poverty line and without benefits.  Scandals across all management layers are embarrassing. Communities find Walmart a mixed bag, initially lowering prices on some goods, but inevitably gutting the local retailers and leaving the community with no local market suppliers.  WalMart needs an entirely new strategy to remain viable – and that will not come from Mr. Duke.  He should have been gone long before the recent scandal, and surely now.

#2 Edward Lampert, Sears Holdings.  OK, Mr. Lampert is the Chairman and not the CEO – but there is no doubt who calls the shots at Sears.  And as Mr. Lampert has called the shots, nobody has gained.

Once the most critical force in retailing, since Mr. Lampert took over Sears has become wholly irrelevant.  Hoping that Mr. Lampert could make hay out of the vast real estate holdings, and once glorious brands Craftsman, Kenmore and Diehard to turn around the struggling giant, the stock initially took off rising from $30 in 2004 to $170 in 2007 as Jim Cramer of "Mad Money" fame flogged the stock over and over on his rant-a-thon show.  But when it was clear results were constantly worsening, as revenues and same-store-sales kept declining, the stock fell out of bed dropping into the $30s in 2009 and again in 2012. 

Hope springs eternal in the micro-managing Mr. Lampert.  Everyone knows of his personal fortune (#367 on Forbes list of billionaires.)  But Mr. Lampert has destroyed Sears.  The company may already be so far gone as to be unsavable.  The stock price is based upon speculation of asset sales.  Mr. Lampert had no idea, from the beginning, how to create value from Sears and he surely should have been gone many months ago as the hyped expectations demonstrably never happened.

#1 – Steve Ballmer, Microsoft.  Without a doubt, Mr. Ballmer is the worst CEO of a large publicly traded American company.  Not only has he singlehandedly steered Microsoft out of some of the fastest growing and most lucrative tech markets (mobile music, handsets and tablets) but in the process he has sacrificed the growth and profits of not only his company but "ecosystem" companies such as Dell, Hewlett Packard and even Nokia.  The reach of his bad leadership has extended far beyond Microsoft when it comes to destroying shareholder value – and jobs.

Microsoft peaked at $60/share in 2000, just as Mr. Ballmer took the reigns.  By 2002 it had fallen into the $20s, and has only rarely made it back to its current low $30s value.  And no wonder, since execution of new rollouts were constantly delayed, and ended up with products so lacking in any enhanced value that they left customers scrambling to find ways to avoid upgrades.  By Mr. Ballmer's own admission Vista had over 200 man-years too much cost, and its launch still, years late, has users avoiding upgrades.  Microsoft 7 and Office 2012 did nothing to excite tech users, in corporations or at home, as Apple took the leadership position in personal technology.

So today Microsoft, after dumping Zune, dumping its tablet, dumping Windows CE and other mobile products, is still the same company Mr. Ballmer took control over a decade ago.  Microsoft is  PC company, nothing more, as demand for PCs shifts to mobile.  Years late to market, he has bet the company on Windows 8 – as well as the future of Dell, HP, Nokia and others.  An insane bet for any CEO – and one that would have been avoided entirely had the Microsoft Board replaced Mr. Ballmer years ago with a CEO that understands the fast pace of technology shifts and would have kept Microsoft current with market trends. 

Although he's #19 on Forbes list of billionaires, Mr. Ballmer should not be allowed to take such incredible risks with investor money and employee jobs.  Best he be retired to enjoy his fortune rather than deprive investors and employees of building theirs.

There were a lot of notable CEO changes already in 2012.  Research in Motion, Best Buy and American Airlines are just three examples.  But the 5 CEOs in this column are well on the way to leading their companies into the kind of problems those 3 have already discovered.  Hopefully the Boards will start to pay closer attention, and take action before things worsen.

 

Sell Google – Lot of Heat, Not Much Light

With revenues up 39% last quarter, it's far too soon to declare the death of Google.  Even in techville, where things happen quickly, the multi-year string of double-digit higher revenues insures survival – at least for a while. 

However, there are a lot of problems at Google which indicate it is not a good long-term hold for investors.  For traders there is probably money to be made, as this long-term chart indicates:

Google long term chart 5-3.12
Source: Yahoo Finance May 3, 2012

While there has been enormous volatility, Google has yet to return to its 2007 highs and struggles to climb out of the low $600/share price range.  And there's good reason, because Google management has done more to circle the wagons in self-defense than it has done to create new product markets.

What was the last exciting product you can think of from Google?  Something that was truly new, innovative and being developed into a market changer?  Most likely, whatever you named is something that has recently been killed, or receiving precious little management attention.  For a company that prided itself on innovation – even reportedly giving all employees 20% of their time to do whatever they wanted – we see management actions that are decidedly not about promoting innovation into the market, or making sustainable efforts to create new markets:

  • killed Google Powermeter, a project that could have redefined how we buy and use electricity
  • killed Google Wave, a product that offered considerable group productivity improvement
  • killed Google Flu Vaccine Finder offering new insights for health care from data analysis
  • killed Google Related which could have helped all of us search beyond keywords
  • killed Google synch for Blackberry as it focuses on selling Android
  • killed Google Talk mobile app
  • killed the OnePass Google payment platform for publishers
  • killed Google Labs – once its innovation engine
  • and there are rumors it is going to kill Google Finance

All of these had opportunities to redefine markets.  So what did Google do with these redeployed resources:

  • Bought Motorola for $12.5billion, which it hopes to take toe-to-toe with Apple's market leading iPhone, and possibly the iPad.  And in the process has aggravated all the companies who licensed Android and developed products which will now compete with Google's own products.  Like the #1 global handset manufacturer Samsung.  And which offers no clear advantage to the Apple products, but is being offered at a lower price.
  • Google+, which has become an internal obsession – and according to employees consumes far more resources than anyone outside Google knows.  Google+ is a product going toe-to-toe with Facebook, only with no clear advantages. Despite all the investment, Google continues refusing to publish any statistics indicating that Google+ is growing substantially, or producing any profits, in its catch-up competition with Facebook.

In both markets, mobile phones and social media, Google has acted very unlike the Google of 2000 that innovated its way to the top of web revenues, and profits. Instead of developing new markets, Google has chosen to undertaking 2 Goliath battles with enormously successful market leaders, but without any real advantage.

Google has actually proven, since peaking in 2007, that its leadership is remarkably old-fashioned, in the worst kind of way.  Instead of focusing on developing new markets and opportunities, management keeps focusing on defending and extending its traditional search business – and has proven completely inept at developing any new revenue streams.  Google bought both YouTube and Blogger, which have enormous user bases and attract incredible volumes of page views – but has yet to figure out how to monetize either, after several years.

For its new market innovations, rather than setting up teams dedicated to turning its innovations into profitable revenue growth engines Google leadership keeps making binary decisions.  Messrs. Page and Brin either decide the product and market aren't self-developing, and kill the products, or simply ignore the business opportunity and lets it drift.  Much like Microsoft – which has remained focused on Windows and Office while letting its Zune, mobile and other products drift into oblivion – or lose huge amounts of money like Bing and for years XBox.

I personalized that last comment onto the Google founders intentionally.  The biggest news out of Google lately has been a pure financial machination done for purely political reasons.  Announcing a stock dividend that effectively creates a 2-for-1 split, only creating a new class of non-voting "C" stock to make sure the founders never lose voting control.  This was adding belt to suspenders, because the founders already own the Class B stock giving them 66% voting control.  The purpose was purely to make sure nobody every tries to buy, or otherwise take over Google, because the founders will always have enough votes to make such an action impossible.

The founders explained this as necessary so they could retain control and make "big bets."  If "big bets" means dumping billions into also-ran products as late entrants, then they have good reason to fear losing company control.  Making big bets isn't how you win in the information technology industry.  You win by creating new markets, with new solutions, before the competition does it. 

Apple's huge wins in iPod, iTouch, iTunes, iPhone and iPad weren't "big bets."  The Apple R&D budget is 1/8 Microsoft's.  It's not big bets that win, its developing innovation, putting it into the market, shepharding it through a series of learning cycles to make it better and better and meeting previously unmet – often unidentified – needs.  And that's not what the enormous investments in mobile handsets and Google+ are about.

Although this stock split has no real impact on Google today, it is a signal.  A signal of a leadership team more obsessed with their own control than doing good for investors.  It is clearly a diversion from creating new products, and opening new markets.  But it was the centerpiece of communication at the last earnings call.  And that is a avery bad signal for investors.  A signal that the leaders see things likely to become much worse, with cash going out and revenue struggling, before too long.  So they are acting now to protect themselves.

Meanwhile, even as revenues grew 39% last quarter, there are signs of problems in Google's "core" market leadership is so fixated on defending.  As this chart shows, while volume of paid ads is going up, the price is now going down. Google price per click 4-2012

Source: Silicon Alley Insider

Prices go down when your product loses value.  You have to chase revenue.  Remember Proctor & Gamble's "Basics" product line launch?  Chasing revenue by cutting price.  In the short-term it can be helpful, but long-term it is not in your best interest.  Google isn't just cutting price on its incremental sales, but on all sales.  Increasingly advertisers are becoming savvy about what they can expect from search ads, and what they can expect from other venues – like Facebook – and the prices are reflecting expectations.  In a recent Strata survey the top 2 focus for ad executives were "social" (69%) and "display" (71%) – categories where Facebook leads – and both are ahead of "search."

At Facebook, we know the user base is around 800million.  We also know it's now the #1 site on the internet – more hits than Google.  And Facebook has much longer average user times on site.  All things attractive to advertisers.  Facebook is acquiring Instagram, which positions it much stronger on mobile devices, thus growing its market.  And while Google was talking about share splits, Facebook recently announced it was making Facebook email integrated into the Facebook platform much easier to use (which is a threat to Gmail) and it was adding a new analytics suite to help advertisers understand ad performance – like they are accustomed to at Google.  All of which increases Facebook's competitiveness with Google, as customers shift increasingly to social platforms.

As said at the top of this article, Google won't be gone soon.  But all signs point to a rough road for investors.  The company is ditching its game changing products and dumping enormous sums into me-too efforts trying to catch well healed and well managed market leaders.  The company has not created an ability to take new innovations to market, and remains stuck defending and extending its existing business lines.  And the top leaders just signaled that they weren't comfortable they could lead the company successfully, so they implemented new programs to make sure nobody could challenge their leadership. 

There are big fires burning at Google.  Unfortunately, burning those resources is producing a lot of heat – but not much light on a successful future.  It's time to sell Google.

Sayonara Sony – How Industrial, MBA Management Killed a Great Company

Who can forget what a great company Sony was, and the enormous impact it had on our lives?  With its heritage, it is hard to believe that Sony hasn't made a profit in 4 consecutive years, just recently announced it will double its expected loss for this year to $6.4 billion, has only 15% of its capital left as equity (debt/equity ration of 5.67x) and is only worth 1/4 of its value 10 years ago!

After World War II Sony was the company that took the transistor technology invented by Texas Instruments (TI) and made the popular, soon to become ubiquitous, transistor radio.  Under co-founder Akio Morita Sony kept looking for advances in technology, and its leadership spent countless hours innovatively thinking about how to apply these advances to improve lives.  With a passion for creating new markets, Sony was an early creator, and dominator, of what we now call "consumer electronics:"

  • Sony improved solid state transistor radios until they surpassed the quality of tubes, making good quality sound available very reliably, and inexpensively
  • Sony developed the solid state television, replacing tubes to make TVs more reliable, better working and use less energy
  • Sony developed the Triniton television tube, which dramatically improved the quality of color (yes Virginia, once TV was all in black & white) and enticed an entire generation to switch.  Sony also expanded the size of Trinitron to make larger sets that better fit larger homes.
  • Sony was an early developer of videotape technology, pioneering the market with Betamax before losing a battle with JVC to be the standard (yes Virginia, we once watched movies on tape)
  • Sony pioneered the development of camcorders, for the first time turning parents – and everyone – into home movie creators
  • Sony pioneered the development of independent mobile entertainment by creating the Walkman, which allowed – for the first time – people to take their own recorded music with them, via cassette tapes
  • Sony pioneered the development of compact discs for music, and developed the Walkman CD for portable use
  • Sony gave us the Playstation, which went far beyond Nintendo in creating the products that excited users and made "home gaming" a market.

Very few companies could ever boast a string of such successful products.  Stories about Sony management meetings revealed a company where executives spent 85% of their time on technology, products and new applications/markets, 10% on human resource issues and 5% on finance.  To Mr. Morita financial results were just that – results – of doing a good job developing new products and markets.  If Sony did the first part right, the results would be good.  And they were.

By the middle 1980s, America was panicked over the absolute domination of companies like Sony in product manufacturing.  Not only consumer electronics, but automobiles, motorcycles, kitchen electronics and a growing number of markets.  Politicians referred to Japanese competitors, like the wildly successful Sony, as "Japan Inc." – and discussed how the powerful Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) effectively shuttled resources around to "beat" American manufacturers.  Even as rising petroleum costs seemed to cripple U.S. companies, Japanese manufacturers were able to turn innovations (often American) into very successful low-cost products growing sales and profits.

So what went wrong for Sony?

Firstly was the national obsession with industrial economics.  W. Edward Deming in 1950s Japan institutionalized manufacturing quality and optimization.  Using a combination of process improvements and arithmetic, Deming convinced Japanese leaders to focus, focus, focus on making things better, faster and cheaper.  Taking advantage of Japanese post war dependence on foreign capital, and foreign markets, this U.S. citizen directed Japanese industry into an obsession with industrialization as practiced in the 1940s — and was credited for creating the rapid massive military equipment build-up that allowed the U.S. to defeat Japan.

Unfortunately, this narrow obsession left Japanese business leaders, buy and large, with little skill set for developing and implementing R&D, or innovation, in any other area.  As time passed, Sony fell victim to developing products for manufacturing, rather than pioneering new markets

The Vaio, as good as it was, had little technology for which Sony could take credit.  Sony ended up in a cost/price/manufacturing war with Dell, HP, Lenovo and others to make cheap PCs – rather than exciting products.  Sony's evolved a distinctly Industrial strategy, focused on manufacturing and volume, rather than trying to develop uniquely new products that were head-and-shoulders better than competitors.

In mobile phones Sony hooked up with, and eventually acquired, Ericsson.  Again, no new technology or effort to make a wildly superior mobile device (like Apple did.)  Instead Sony sought to build volume in order to manufacture more phones and compete on price/features/functions against Nokia, Motorola and Samsung.  Lacking any product or technology advantage, Samsung clobbered Sony's Industrial strategy with lower cost via non-Japanese manufacturing.

When Sony updated its competition in home movies by introducing Blue Ray, the strategy was again an Industrial one – about how to sell Blue Ray recorders and players.  Sony didn't sell the Blue Ray software technology in hopes people would use it.  Instead it kept it proprietary so only Sony could make and sell Blue Ray products (hardware).  Just as it did in MP3, creating a proprietary version usable only on Sony devices.  In an information economy, this approach didn't fly with consumers, and Blue Ray was a money loser largely irrelevant to the market – as is the now-gone Sony MP3 product line.

We see this across practically all the Sony businesses.  In televisions, for example, Sony has lost the technological advantage it had with Trinitron cathode ray tubes.  In flat screens Sony has applied a predictable, but money losing Industrial strategy trying to compete on volume and cost.  Up against competitors sourcing from lower cost labor, and capital, countries Sony has now lost over $10B over the last 8 years in televisions.  Yet, Sony won't give up and intends to stay with its Industrial strategy even as it loses more money.

Why did Sony's management go along with this?  As mentioned, Akio Morita was an innovator and new market creator.  But, Mr. Morita lived through WWII, and developed his business approach before Deming.  Under Mr. Morita, Sony used the industrial knowledge Deming and his American peers offered to make Sony's products highly competitive against older technologies.  The products led, with industrial-era tactics used to lower cost. 

But after Mr. Morita other leaders were trained, like American-minted MBAs, to implement Industrial strategies.  Their minds put products, and new markets, second.  First was a commitment to volume and production – regardless of the products or the technology.  The fundamental belief was that if you had enough volume, and you cut costs low enough, you would eventually succeed.

By 2005 Sony reached the pinnacle of this strategic approach by installing a non-Japanese to run the company.  Sir Howard Stringer made his fame running Sony's American business, where he exemplified Industrial strategy by cutting 9,000 of 30,000 U.S. jobs (almost a full third.) To Mr. Stringer, strategy was not about innovation, technology, products or new markets.  

Mr. Stringer's Industrial strategy was to be obsessive about costs. Where Mr. Morita's meetings were 85% about innovation and market application, Mr. Stringer brought a "modern" MBA approach to the Sony business, where numbers – especially financial projections – came first.  The leadership, and management, at Sony became a model of MBA training post-1960.  Focus on a narrow product set to increase volume, eschew costly development of new technologies in favor of seeking high-volume manufacturing of someone else's technology, reduce product introductions in order to extend product life, tooling amortization and run lengths, and constantly look for new ways to cut costs.  Be zealous about cost cutting, and reward it in meetings and with bonuses.

Thus, during his brief tenure running Sony Mr. Stringer will not be known for new products.  Rather, he will be remembered for initiating 2 waves of layoffs in what was historically a lifetime employment company (and country.)  And now, in a nod to Chairman Stringer the new CEO at Sony has indicated he will  react to ongoing losses by – you guessed it – another round of layoffs.  This time it is estimated to be another 10,000 workers, or 6% of the employment.  The new CEO, Mr. Hirai, trained at the hand of Mr. Stringer, demonstrates as he announces ever greater losses that Sony hopes to – somehow – save its way to prosperity with an Industrial strategy.

Japanese equity laws are very different that the USA.  Companies often have much higher debt levels.  And companies can even operate with negative equity values – which would be technical bankruptcy almost everywhere else.  So it is not likely Sony will fill bankruptcy any time soon. 

But should you invest in Sony?  After 4 years of losses, and entrenched Industrial strategy with MBA-style leadership focused on "numbers" rather than markets, there is no reason to think the trajectory of sales or profits will change any time soon. 

As an employee, facing ongoing layoffs why would you wish to work at Sony?  A "me too" product strategy with little technical innovation that puts all attention on cost reduction would not be a fun place.  And offers little promotional growth. 

And for suppliers, it is assured that each and every meeting will be about how to lower price – over, and over, and over.

Every company today can learn from the Sony experience.  Sony was once a company to watch. It was an innovative leader, that pioneered new markets.  Not unlike Apple today.  But with its Industrial strategy and MBA numbers- focused leadership it is now time to say, sayonara.  Sell Sony, there are more interesting companies to watch and more profitable places to invest.

The Good, Bad and Ugly – Apple, Google and Dell

The Good – Apple

Apple's latest news to start paying a big dividend, and buying back shares, is a boon for investors.  And it signals the company's future strength.  Often dividends and share buybacks indicate a company has run out of growth projects, so it desires to manipulate the stock price as it slowly pays out the company's assets.  But, in Apple's (rare) case the company is making so much profit from existing businesses that they are running out of places to invest it – thus returning to shareholders!

With a $100B cash hoard, Apple anticipates generating at least another $150B of free cash flow, over and above needs for ongoing operations and future growth projects, the next 3 years.  With so much cash flowing the company is going to return money to investors so they can invest in other growth projects beyond those Apple is developing.  Exactly what investors want! 

I've called Apple the lowest risk, highest return stock for investors (the stock to own if you can only own one stock) for several years.  And Apple has not disappointed.  At $600/share the stock is up some 75% over the last year (from about $350,) and up 600% over the last 5 years (from about $100.)  And now the company is going to return investors $10.60/year, currently 1.8% – or about 4 times your money market yield, or about 75% of what you'd get for a 10 year Treasury bond. Yet investors still have a tremendous growth in capital opportunity, because Apple is still priced at only 14x this year's projected earnings, and 12 times next year's projected earnings!

Apple keeps winning.  It's leadership in smart phones continues, as the market converts from traditional cell phones to smart phones.  And its lead in tablets remains secure as it sells 3 million units of the iPad 3 over the weekend.  In every area, for several years, Apple has outperformed expectations as it leads the market shift away from traditional PCs and servers to mobile devices and using the "cloud." 

The Bad – Google

Google was once THE company to emulate.  At the end of 2008 its stock peaked at nearly $750/share, as everyone thought Google would accomplish nothing short of world domination (OK, a bit extreme) via its clear leadership in search and the way it dominated internet usage.  But that is no longer the case, as Google is being eclipsed by upstarts such as Facebook and Groupon.

What happened?  Even though it had a vaunted policy of allowing employees to spend 20% of their time on anything they desired, Google never capitalized on the great innovations created.  Products like Google Wave and Google Powermeter were created, launched – and then subsequently left without sponsors, management attention, resources or even much interest.  Just as recently happened with GoogleTV.

They floundered, despite identifying very good solutions for pretty impressive market needs, largely because management chose to spend almost all its attention, and resources, defending and extending its on-line ad sales created around search. 

  • YouTube is a big user environment, and one of the most popular sites on the web.  But Google still hasn't really figured out how to generate revenue, or profit, from the site.  Despite all the user activity it produces a meager $1.6B annual revenue – and nearly no profit.
  • Android may have share rivaling Apple in smartphones, but it is nowhere in tablets and thus lags significantly in the ovarall market with share only about half iOS.  Worse, Android smartphones are not nearly as profitable as iPhones, and now Google has made an enormous, multi-billion investment in Motorola to enter this business – and compete with its existing smartphone manufacturers (customers.)  To date Android has been a product designed to defend Google's historical search business as people go mobile – and it has produced practically no revenue, or profit.
  • Chrome browsers came on the scene and quickly grew share beyond Firefox.  But, again, Google has not really developed the product to reach a dominant position.  While it has good reviews, there has been no major effort to make it a profitable product.  Possibly Google fears fighting IE will create a "money pit" like Bing has become for Microsoft in search?
  • Chromebooks were a flop as Google failed to invest in robust solutions allowing users to link printers, MP3 players, etc. – or utilize a wide suite of thin cloud-based apps.  Great idea, that works well, they are a potential alternative to PCs, and some tablet applications, but Google has not invested to make the product commercially viable.
  • Google tried to buy GroupOn to enter the "local" ad marketplace, but backed out as the price accelerated.  While investors may be happy Google didn't overpay, the company missed a significant opportunity as it then faltered on creating a desirable competitive product.  Now Google is losing the race to capture local market ads that once went to newspapers.

While Google chose to innovate, but not invest in market development, it missed several market opportunities.  And in the meantime Google allowed Facebook to sneak up and overtake its "domination" position. 

Facebook has led people to switch from using the internet as a giant library, navigated by search, to a social medium where referrals, discussions and links are driving more behavior.  The result has advertisers shifting their money toward where "eyeballs" are spending most of their time, and placing a big threat on Google's ability to maintain its historical growth.

Thus Google is now dumping billions into Google+, which is a very risky proposition.  Late to market, and with no clear advantage, it is extremely unclear if Google+ has any hope of catching Facebook.  Or even creating a platform with enough use to bring in a solid, and growing, advertiser base. 

The result is that today, despite the innovation, the well-known (and often good) products, and even all the users to its sites Google has the most concentrated revenue base among large technology companies.  95% of its revenues still come from ad dollars – mostly search.  And with that base under attack on all fronts, it's little wonder analysts and investors have become skeptical.  Google WAS a great company – but it's decisions since 2008 to lock-in on defending and extending its "core" search business has made the company extremely vulnerable to market shifts. A bad thing in fast moving tech markets.

Google investors haven't fared well either.  The company has never paid a dividend, and with its big investments (past and future planned) in search and handsets it won't for many years (if ever.)  At $635/share the stock is still down over 15% from its 2008 high.  Albeit the stock is up about 8.5% the last 12 months, it has been extremely volatile, and long term investors that bought 5 years ago, before the high, have made only about 7%/year (compounded.)

Google looks very much like a company that has fallen victim to its old success formula, and is far too late adjusting to market shifts.  Worse, its investments appear to be a company spending huge sums to defend its historical business, taking on massive gladiator battles against Apple and Facebook – two companies far ahead in their markets and with enormous leads and war chests. 

The Ugly – Dell

Go back to the 1990s and Dell looked like the company that could do no wrong.  It went head-to-head with competitors to be the leader in selling, assembling and delivering WinTel (Windows + Intel) PCs.  Michael Dell was a modern day hero to other leaders hoping to match the company's ability to focus on core markets, minimize investments in anything else, and be a world-class supply chain manager.  Dell had no technology or market innovation, but it was the best at beating down cost – and lowering prices for customers.  Dell clearly won the race to the bottom.

But the market for PCs matured.  And Dell has found itself one of the last bachelors at the dance, with few prospects.  Dell has no products in leading growth markets, like smartphones or tablets.  Nor even other mobile products like music or video.  And it has no software products, or technology innovation. Today, Dell is locked in gladiator battles with companies that can match its cost, and price, and make similarly slim (to nonexistent) margins in the generic business called PCs (like HP and Lenovo.)

Dell has announced it intends to challenge Apple with a tablet launch later in 2012.  This is dependent upon Microsoft having Windows 8 ready to go by October, in time for the holidays.  And dependent upon the hope that a swarm of developers will emerge to build the app base for things that already exist on the iPad and Android tablets.  The advantage of this product is as yet undefined, so the market is yet undefined.  The HOPE is that somehow, for some reason, there is a waiting world of people that have delayed purchase waiting on a Windows device – and will find the new Dell product superior to a $299 Apple 2 already available and with that 500,000 app store.

Clearly, Dell has waited way, way too long to deal with changing its business.  As its PC business flattens (and soon shrinks) Dell still has no smartphone products, and is remarkably late to the tablet business.  And it offers no clear advantage over whatever other products come from Windows 8 licensees.  Dell is in a brutal world of ever lower prices, shrinking markets and devastating competition from far better innovators creating much higher, and growing, profits (Apple and Amazon.)

For investors, the ride from a fast moving boat in the rapids into the swamp of no growth – and soon the whirlpool of decline – has been dismal.  Dell has never paid a dividend, has no free cash flow to start paying one now, and clearly no market growth from which to pay one in the future.  Dell's shares, at $17, are about the same as a year ago, and down about 20% over the last 5 years. 

Leaders in all businesses have a lot to learn from looking at the Good, Bad and Ugly.  The company that has invested in innovation, and then invested in taking that innovation to market in order to meet emerging needs has done extremely well.  By focusing on needs, rather than business optimization, Apple has been able to shift with markets – and even enhance the market shift to position itself for rapid, profitable growth.

Meanwhile, companies that have focused on their core markets and products are doing nowhere near as well.  They have missed market shifts, and watched their fortunes decline precipitously.  They were once very profitable, but despite intense focus on defending their historical strengths profits have struggled to grow as customers moved to alternative solutions.  By spending insufficient time looking outward, at markets and shifts, and too much time inward, on defending and extending past successes, they now face future jeopardy.

Microsoft’s Crazy Windows 8 Bet – How you can invest smarter

This week people are having their first look at Windows 8 via the Barcelona, Spain Mobile World Congress.  This better be the most exciting Microsoft product since Windows was created, or Microsoft is going to fail. 

Why? Because Microsoft made the fatal mistake of "focusing on its core" and "investing in what it knew" – time worn "best practices" that are proving disastrous! 

Everyone knows that Microsoft has returned almost nothing to shareholders the last decade.  Simultaneously, all the "partner" companies that were in the "PC" (the Windows + Intel, or Wintel, platform) "ecosystem" have done poorly.  Look beyond Microsoft at returns to shareholders for Intel, Dell (which recently blew its earings) and Hewlett Packard (HP – which says it will need 5 years to turn around the company.)  All have been forced to trim headcount and undertake deep cost cutting as revenues have stagnated since 2000, at times falling, and margins have been decimated. 

This happened despite deep investments in their "core" PC business.  In 2009 Microsoft spent almost $9B on PC R&D; over 14% of revenues.  In the last few years Microsoft has launched Vista, Windows 7, Office 2009 and Office 2010 all in its effort to defend and extend PC sales.  Likewise all the PC manufacturers have spent considerably on new, smaller, more powerful and even cheaper PC laptop and desktop models.

Unfortunately, these investments in their core expertise and markets have not excited users, nor created much growth.

On the other hand, Apple spent all of the last decade investing in what it didn't know much about in 2000.  Rather than investing in its "core" Macintosh business, Apple invested in the trend toward mobility, being an early leader with 3 platforms – the iPod, iPhone and iPad.  All product categories far removed from its "core" and what it new well.  But, all targeted at the trend toward enhanced mobility.

Don't forget, Microsoft launched the Zune and the Windows CE phones in the last decade.  But, because these were not "core" products in "core" markets Microsoft, and its partners, did not invest much in these markets.  Microsoft even brought to market tablets, but leadership felt they were inferior to the PC, so investments were maintained in traditional PC products.  The Zune, Windows phone and early Windows tablets all died because Microsoft and its partner companies stuck to investing their most important, and best known, PC business.

Where are we now?  Sales of PC's are stagnating, and going to decline.  While sales of mobile devices are skyrocketing.

Tablet sales projections 2012-2015
Source: Business Insider 2/14/12

Today tablet sales are about 50% of the ~300M unit PC sales.  But they are growing so fast they will catch up by 2014, and be larger by 2015.  And, that depends on PC sales maintaining.  Look around your next meeting, commuter flight or coffee shop experience and see how many tablets are being used compared to laptops.  Think about that ratio a year ago, and then make your own assessment as to how many new PCs people will buy, versus tablets.  Can you imagine the PC market actually shrinking?  Like, say, the traditional cell phone business is doing?

By focusing on Windows, and specifically each generation leading to Windows 8, Microsoft took a crazy bet.  It bet it could improve windows to keep the PC relevant, in the face of the evident trend toward mobility and ease of use. Instead of investing in new technologies, new products and new markets – things it didn't know much about – Microsoft chose to invest in what it new, and hoped it could control the trend. 

People didn't want a PC to be mobile, they wanted mobility.  Apple invested in the trend, making the MP3 player a winner with its iPod ease of use and iTunes market.  Then it made smartphones, which were largely an email device, incredibly popular by innovating the app marketplace which gave people the mobility they really desired.  Recognizing that people didn't really want a PC, they wanted mobility, Apple pioneered the tablet marketplace with its iPad and large app market. The result was an explosion in revenue by investing outside its core, in technologies and markets about which it initially knew nothing.

Apple revenue by segment july 2011

Apple would not have grown had it focused its investment on its "core" Mac business.  In the last year alone Apple sold more iOS devices than it sold Macs in its entire 28 year history!

IOS devices vs Mac sales 2.12
Source: Business Insider 2/17/2012

Today, the iPhone business itself is bigger than all of Microsoft. The iPad business is bigger than the desktop PC business, and if included in the larger market for personal computing represents 17% of the PC market.  And, of course, Apple is now worth almost twice the value of Microsoft.

We hear, all the time, to invest in what we know.  But it turns out that is NOT the best strategy.  Trends develop, and markets shift.  By constantly investing in what we know we become farther and farther removed from trends.  In the end, like Microsoft, we make massive investments trying to defend and extend our past products when we would be much, much smarter to invest in new technologies and markets that are on the trend, even if we don't know much, if anything, about them.

The odds are now stacked against Microsoft.  Apple has a huge lead in product sales, market position and apps.  It's closest challenger is Google's Android, which is attracting many of the former Microsoft partners (such as LG's recent defection) as they strive to catch up. Company's such as Nokia are struggling as the technology leadership, and market position, has shifted away from Microsoft as mobility changed the market.

Microsoft's technology sales used to be based upon convincing IT departments to use its platform.  But today users largely buy mobile devices with their own money, and eschew the recommendations of the IT department. Just look at how users drove the demise of Research In Motion's Blackberry.  IT needs to provide users with tools they like, and use platforms which are easy and low-cost to leverage with big app bases.  That favors Apple and Android, not Microsoft with its far, far too late entry.

You can be smarter than Microsoft.  Don't take the crazy bet of always doubling down on what you know.  Put your focus on the marketplace, and identify shifts.  It's cheaper, and smarter, to bet early on trends than constantly trying to fight the trend by investing – usually at an ever higher amount – in what you know.