by Adam Hartung | May 2, 2012 | Defend & Extend, Lock-in, Web/Tech
My latest bi-monthly column for CIO magazine came out in print this week. In it I challenge CIOs to think hard about what made the role successful in the 1970s – then in the 1990s – and how it is transitioning today. Far too many CIOs are locked in on old notions about what made them successful – usually controlling both hardware and software and forcing managers to behave in ways acceptable to IT. But today cloud computing, mobile devices and apps make it possible for many "users" to obviate the IT department entirely – skip the enterprise applications – and find an easy route for their information needs.
I encourage you to click through to the article on CIO.com, or ComputerWorld.com – if you're in IT it should give you something to think about regarding your role. If you are an investor it should give you some new thoughts about what IT companies are worth your money (time to rethink Oracle and SAP, for example.) And if you're a manager it just might embolden you to focus on your needs and fight back on IT solutions that don't work for you.
CIO Mag – http://www.cio.com/article/704934/CIOs_Will_You_Be_Relevant_in_2017_
ComputerWorld – http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9226722/CIOs_Will_You_Be_Relevant_in_2017_
by Adam Hartung | Apr 26, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
WalMart's been accused of bribing officials in Mexico to grow its business. But by and large, few in America seem to care. The stock fell only modestly from its highs of last week, and today the stock recovered from the drop off to the lows of February.
But WalMart is going to fail. WalMart is trying to defend and extend a horribly outdated industrial strategy.
Sam Walton opened his original five and dime stores in the rural countryside, and competed just like small retailers had done for decades. But quickly he recognized that industrialization offered the opportunity to shift the retail market. By applying industrial concepts like scale, automation and volume buying he could do for retailing what Ford and GM had done for auto manufacturing. And his strategy, designed for an industrial marketplace, worked extremely well. Like it or not, WalMart outperformed retailers still trying to compete like they had in the 1800s, and WalMart was spectacularly successful.
But today, the world has shifted again. Only WalMart is putting all its resources into trying to defend and extend its industrial era strategy, rather than modify to compete in the information age. Because its strategy doesn't work, the company keeps wandering into spectacular failures, and horrible leadership problems.
- In 2005 WalMart's Vice Chairman and a corporate Vice President tried to use the company's size to wring more out of gift card and merchandise suppliers. Both were caught and fired for fraud.
- In 2006 WalMart hired a new head of marketing to update the strategy, and improve the stores and merchandise. But upon realizing her recommendations violated the existing WalMart industrial strategy the company fired her after only a few months, and went public with character besmirching allegations that she and an ad agency executive were having an affair. Like that (even if true, which is hotly disputed) somehow mattered to the changes WalMart needed. Changes which were abruptly terminated upon firing her.
- In 2008 a WalMart employee became an invalid in a truck accident. When the employee won a lawsuit related to the accident, WalMart sued the invalid employee to return $470,000 in insurance payments made by WalMart. As if WalMart's future depended on the return of that money.
- In a cost saving move, WalMart moved its marketing group under merchandising, in order to reduce employees and the breadth of merchandise, as well as keep the company more tightly focused on its strategy.
All 3 of these incidents show a leadership team that is so entrenched in history it will do anything – anything – to keep from evolving forward. And sd that history developed it paved a pathway where it was only a very small step to paying bribes in order to open more stores in Mexico. Such bribes could easily be seen as just doing "whatever it takes" to keep defending the existing business model, extending it into new markets, even though it is at the end of its life.
It has come to light that after paying the bribes, the leadership team did about everything it could to cover them up. And that included spending millions on lobbying efforts to hopefully change the laws before anyone was caught, and possibly prosecuted. The goal was to keep the stores open, and open more. If that meant a little bribing went on, then it was best to not let people know. And instead of saying what WalMart did was wrong, change the rules so it doesn't look like it was wrong.
At WalMart right and wrong are no longer based on societal norms, they are based on whether or not it lets WalMart defend its existing business by doing more of what it wants to do.
WalMart's industrial strategy is similar to the Titanic strategy. Build a boat so big it can't sink. And if any retailer could be that big, then WalMart was it. But these scandals keep showing us that the water is increasingly full of icebergs. Each scandal points out that WalMart's strategy is harder to navigate, and is running into big problems. Even though the damage isn't visible to most of us, it is nonetheless clear to WalMart executives that doing more of the same is leading to less good results. WalMart is taking on water, and it has no solution. In their effort to prop up results executives keep doing things that are less and less ethical – sometimes even illegal – and guiding people down through all levels of management and employment to do the same.
WalMart's problems aren't unions, or city zoning councils, or women's rights and fair pay organizations. WalMart's problem is an out of date retail strategy. Consumers have a lot of options besides going to stores that look like airplane hangers, and frequently without paying a premium. There is wider selection, in attractive stores, with better quality and a better shopping experience. And beyond traditional retail, consumers can now buy almost anything 24×7 on-line, frequently at a better price than WalMart – despite its enormous and automated distribution centers and stores, with tight inventory and expense control.
But WalMart is completely unable to admit its strategy is outdated, and unwilling to make any changes. This week, amidst the scandal, WalMart rolled out its latest and greatest innovation for on-line shopping. WalMart will now allow an on-line customer to pay with cash. After placing an order on-line they can trot down to the store and pay the cash, then WalMart will recognize the order and ship the product.
Really. Now, if this is targeted at customers that are so out of the modern loop that they have no credit card, no debit card, no on-line checking capability and no Paypal account tied to checking – do you think they have a PC to place an online order? And if they did go to the local library to use a computer, why would they go pay at the store only to have the item shipped – rather than simply buy it in the store and take it home immediately?
Clearly, once again, WalMart isn't trying to change its strategy. This is an effort to extend the old WalMart, in a bizarre way, online. The company keeps trying to keep people coming into the store.
Amazingly, despite the fact that there's a 50/50 (or better) chance that the CEO and a number of WalMart execs will have to be removed from their position – and could well go to jail for Foreign Corrupt Practice Act violations – most people are unmoved. The stock has barely flinched, and option traders see the stock remaining at 55 or higher out into September. Nobody seems to believe that all these hits WalMart is taking really matters.
A famous Titanic line is "and the band played on." This refers to the band continuing to play song after song, oblivious to disaster, until the ship suddenly broke, heaved up and dove into the ocean leaving only those in life boats to survive. As the Titanic was taking on water not the captain, the officers, the crew, the passengers or those listening over the airwaves wanted to accept that the Titanic would sink.
But it did.
So how long will you hold onto WalMart shares? WalMarts growth has been declining for a decade, and even went negative in 2009. Same store sales have declined for 2 years. Scandals are now commonplace. Online retailers such as Amazon and Overstock.com are stripping out all the retail growth, leaving traditionalists in decline. WalMart may be doing better than Sears, or Best Buy, but for how long?
WalMart has no ability to stop the economic shift from an industrial to an information age. It could choose to adapt, but instead its leaders have done the opposite. The retailers now succeeding are those eschewing almost all the WalMart practices in favor of using customer information to offer what people want (out of their much wider selection) when customers want it, often at surprisingly good prices. This is the current carrying emerging retailers to better profitability – and it is the current WalMart remains intent on fighting. Even as its executives face prison.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 20, 2012 | Current Affairs, In the Swamp, Lifecycle, Lock-in, Television, Web/Tech
Who can forget what a great company Sony was, and the enormous impact it had on our lives? With its heritage, it is hard to believe that Sony hasn't made a profit in 4 consecutive years, just recently announced it will double its expected loss for this year to $6.4 billion, has only 15% of its capital left as equity (debt/equity ration of 5.67x) and is only worth 1/4 of its value 10 years ago!
After World War II Sony was the company that took the transistor technology invented by Texas Instruments (TI) and made the popular, soon to become ubiquitous, transistor radio. Under co-founder Akio Morita Sony kept looking for advances in technology, and its leadership spent countless hours innovatively thinking about how to apply these advances to improve lives. With a passion for creating new markets, Sony was an early creator, and dominator, of what we now call "consumer electronics:"
- Sony improved solid state transistor radios until they surpassed the quality of tubes, making good quality sound available very reliably, and inexpensively
- Sony developed the solid state television, replacing tubes to make TVs more reliable, better working and use less energy
- Sony developed the Triniton television tube, which dramatically improved the quality of color (yes Virginia, once TV was all in black & white) and enticed an entire generation to switch. Sony also expanded the size of Trinitron to make larger sets that better fit larger homes.
- Sony was an early developer of videotape technology, pioneering the market with Betamax before losing a battle with JVC to be the standard (yes Virginia, we once watched movies on tape)
- Sony pioneered the development of camcorders, for the first time turning parents – and everyone – into home movie creators
- Sony pioneered the development of independent mobile entertainment by creating the Walkman, which allowed – for the first time – people to take their own recorded music with them, via cassette tapes
- Sony pioneered the development of compact discs for music, and developed the Walkman CD for portable use
- Sony gave us the Playstation, which went far beyond Nintendo in creating the products that excited users and made "home gaming" a market.
Very few companies could ever boast a string of such successful products. Stories about Sony management meetings revealed a company where executives spent 85% of their time on technology, products and new applications/markets, 10% on human resource issues and 5% on finance. To Mr. Morita financial results were just that – results – of doing a good job developing new products and markets. If Sony did the first part right, the results would be good. And they were.
By the middle 1980s, America was panicked over the absolute domination of companies like Sony in product manufacturing. Not only consumer electronics, but automobiles, motorcycles, kitchen electronics and a growing number of markets. Politicians referred to Japanese competitors, like the wildly successful Sony, as "Japan Inc." – and discussed how the powerful Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) effectively shuttled resources around to "beat" American manufacturers. Even as rising petroleum costs seemed to cripple U.S. companies, Japanese manufacturers were able to turn innovations (often American) into very successful low-cost products growing sales and profits.
So what went wrong for Sony?
Firstly was the national obsession with industrial economics. W. Edward Deming in 1950s Japan institutionalized manufacturing quality and optimization. Using a combination of process improvements and arithmetic, Deming convinced Japanese leaders to focus, focus, focus on making things better, faster and cheaper. Taking advantage of Japanese post war dependence on foreign capital, and foreign markets, this U.S. citizen directed Japanese industry into an obsession with industrialization as practiced in the 1940s — and was credited for creating the rapid massive military equipment build-up that allowed the U.S. to defeat Japan.
Unfortunately, this narrow obsession left Japanese business leaders, buy and large, with little skill set for developing and implementing R&D, or innovation, in any other area. As time passed, Sony fell victim to developing products for manufacturing, rather than pioneering new markets.
The Vaio, as good as it was, had little technology for which Sony could take credit. Sony ended up in a cost/price/manufacturing war with Dell, HP, Lenovo and others to make cheap PCs – rather than exciting products. Sony's evolved a distinctly Industrial strategy, focused on manufacturing and volume, rather than trying to develop uniquely new products that were head-and-shoulders better than competitors.
In mobile phones Sony hooked up with, and eventually acquired, Ericsson. Again, no new technology or effort to make a wildly superior mobile device (like Apple did.) Instead Sony sought to build volume in order to manufacture more phones and compete on price/features/functions against Nokia, Motorola and Samsung. Lacking any product or technology advantage, Samsung clobbered Sony's Industrial strategy with lower cost via non-Japanese manufacturing.
When Sony updated its competition in home movies by introducing Blue Ray, the strategy was again an Industrial one – about how to sell Blue Ray recorders and players. Sony didn't sell the Blue Ray software technology in hopes people would use it. Instead it kept it proprietary so only Sony could make and sell Blue Ray products (hardware). Just as it did in MP3, creating a proprietary version usable only on Sony devices. In an information economy, this approach didn't fly with consumers, and Blue Ray was a money loser largely irrelevant to the market – as is the now-gone Sony MP3 product line.
We see this across practically all the Sony businesses. In televisions, for example, Sony has lost the technological advantage it had with Trinitron cathode ray tubes. In flat screens Sony has applied a predictable, but money losing Industrial strategy trying to compete on volume and cost. Up against competitors sourcing from lower cost labor, and capital, countries Sony has now lost over $10B over the last 8 years in televisions. Yet, Sony won't give up and intends to stay with its Industrial strategy even as it loses more money.
Why did Sony's management go along with this? As mentioned, Akio Morita was an innovator and new market creator. But, Mr. Morita lived through WWII, and developed his business approach before Deming. Under Mr. Morita, Sony used the industrial knowledge Deming and his American peers offered to make Sony's products highly competitive against older technologies. The products led, with industrial-era tactics used to lower cost.
But after Mr. Morita other leaders were trained, like American-minted MBAs, to implement Industrial strategies. Their minds put products, and new markets, second. First was a commitment to volume and production – regardless of the products or the technology. The fundamental belief was that if you had enough volume, and you cut costs low enough, you would eventually succeed.
By 2005 Sony reached the pinnacle of this strategic approach by installing a non-Japanese to run the company. Sir Howard Stringer made his fame running Sony's American business, where he exemplified Industrial strategy by cutting 9,000 of 30,000 U.S. jobs (almost a full third.) To Mr. Stringer, strategy was not about innovation, technology, products or new markets.
Mr. Stringer's Industrial strategy was to be obsessive about costs. Where Mr. Morita's meetings were 85% about innovation and market application, Mr. Stringer brought a "modern" MBA approach to the Sony business, where numbers – especially financial projections – came first. The leadership, and management, at Sony became a model of MBA training post-1960. Focus on a narrow product set to increase volume, eschew costly development of new technologies in favor of seeking high-volume manufacturing of someone else's technology, reduce product introductions in order to extend product life, tooling amortization and run lengths, and constantly look for new ways to cut costs. Be zealous about cost cutting, and reward it in meetings and with bonuses.
Thus, during his brief tenure running Sony Mr. Stringer will not be known for new products. Rather, he will be remembered for initiating 2 waves of layoffs in what was historically a lifetime employment company (and country.) And now, in a nod to Chairman Stringer the new CEO at Sony has indicated he will react to ongoing losses by – you guessed it – another round of layoffs. This time it is estimated to be another 10,000 workers, or 6% of the employment. The new CEO, Mr. Hirai, trained at the hand of Mr. Stringer, demonstrates as he announces ever greater losses that Sony hopes to – somehow – save its way to prosperity with an Industrial strategy.
Japanese equity laws are very different that the USA. Companies often have much higher debt levels. And companies can even operate with negative equity values – which would be technical bankruptcy almost everywhere else. So it is not likely Sony will fill bankruptcy any time soon.
But should you invest in Sony? After 4 years of losses, and entrenched Industrial strategy with MBA-style leadership focused on "numbers" rather than markets, there is no reason to think the trajectory of sales or profits will change any time soon.
As an employee, facing ongoing layoffs why would you wish to work at Sony? A "me too" product strategy with little technical innovation that puts all attention on cost reduction would not be a fun place. And offers little promotional growth.
And for suppliers, it is assured that each and every meeting will be about how to lower price – over, and over, and over.
Every company today can learn from the Sony experience. Sony was once a company to watch. It was an innovative leader, that pioneered new markets. Not unlike Apple today. But with its Industrial strategy and MBA numbers- focused leadership it is now time to say, sayonara. Sell Sony, there are more interesting companies to watch and more profitable places to invest.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 14, 2012 | Current Affairs, Leadership, Transparency, Web/Tech
Apple's amazing increase in value is more than just a "rah-rah" story for a turnaround. Fundamentally, Apple is telling everyone – globally – that there has been a tectonic shift in markets. And if leaders don't understand this shift, and incorporate it into their strategy and tactics, their organizations are going to have a very difficult future.
Recently Apple's value peaked at $600B. Yes, that is an astounding number, for it reflects not only 50% greater value than the oil giant Exxon/Mobil (~$390B), but more than the entire value of the stock markets in Spain, Greece and Portugal combined!
Source: Business Insider.com
This astounding valuation causes many to be reticent about owning Apple shares, for it seems implausible that any one company – especially a tech company with so few employees – could be worth so much.
Unless we look at this information in the context of a major, global economic shift. That what the world values has changed dramatically. And that what investors are telling business (and government) leaders is that in a globalized, fast paced world value is based upon what you know, when you know it – in other words information. Not land, buildings or the ability to make things.
Three hundred years ago the wealthiest people in the world owned land. Wars were fought for centuries to control land. Kings owned land, and controlled everything on the land while capturing the value of everything produced on that land. As changes came along, reducing the role of kings, land barons became the wealthiest people in the world. In an agrarian economy, where most human resources (and all others for that matter) were deployed in food production owning land was the most valuable thing on the planet.
But then some 120 years ago, along came the industrial reveolution. Suddenly, productivity rose dramatically by applying new machines to jobs formerly performed by humans. With this shift, value changed. The great industrialists were able to capture the value of greater productivity – making people like Cyrus McCormick, Henry Ford and Andrew Carnegie the wealthiest of the wealthy. Worth more than most states, and many foreign countries.
The age of manufacturing was based upon the productivity of machines and the application of industrial processes to what formerly was hand labor. Creating tools – from entignes to automobiles to airplanes – created great wealth. Knowing how to make these machines, and making them, created enormous value. And companies like General Motors, General Dynamics and General Electric were worth much more than the land upon which food was produced. And the commodity suppliers, like Exxon/Mobil, feeding industrial companies captured huge value as well.
By the middle 1900s America's farmers were forced to create ever larger farms to remain in business, and were constantly begging for government subsidies to stay alive via price controls (parity programs) and land "set-asides" run by the Agriculture Department. By the 1980s family farms going broke by the thousands, agricultural land values plummeted and the ability to create value by growing or processing food was a struggle. Across the developed world, wealth shifted into the hands of industrial companies from landowners.
Sometime in the 1990s the world shifted again, and that's what the chart above shows us. Countries with little or no technology companies – no information economy – cannot create value. On the other hand, companies that can drive new levels of productivity via the creation, management, use and sale of information can create enormous value.
Think about the incredible shift that has happened in retail. America's largest and most successful retailer from the 1900 turn of the century well into the 1960s was Sears. In an industry that long equated success with "location, location, location" Sears has had, and continues to control, enormous amounts of land and buildings. But the value of Sears has declined like a stone pitched off a bridge, now worth only $6B (1% the Apple value) despite all that real estate!
Simultaneously, America's largest retailer Wal-Mart has seen its value go nowhere for over a decade, despite its thousands of locations that span every state. Even though Wal-Mart keeps adding stores, and enlarging stores, adding more and more land and buildings to its "asset" base the company's customer base, sales and value are mired, unable to rise.
Yet, Amazon – which has no land, and almost no buildings – has used the last 20 years to go from start up to an $86B valuation – doing much better for shareholders than its traditional, industrial thinking competitors. In the last 5 years, Amazon's value has roughly quadrupled!
Source: Yahoo Finance
Yes, Amazon is a retailer. But the company has learned that applying an industrial strategy is far less valuable than applying an information strategy. As an internet leader, first with most browser formats on PCs and smartphones, Amazon has reached far more new customers than any traditional real-estate focused company. By launching Kindle Amazon focused on the information in books, rather than the format (print) revolutionizing the market and capturing enormous value.
By launching Kindle Fire Amazon takes information one step further, making it possible for customers to access new products faster, order faster and build their own retail world without ever going to a building. By becoming a tech company, Amazon is clearly well on the way to dominating retail, as Sears falls into irrelevancy and almost surely bankruptcy, and Wal-Mart stalls under the overhead of all that land, buildings and vast number of minimum-wage, uninsured employees.
We now must realize that value is not created by what accountants have long called "hard assets" – land, buildings and equipment. In fact, the 2 great U.S. recessions since 2000 have demonstrated to everyone that there is no security in these – the value can decline, decline fast, and decline far. Just because these things are easy to see and count does not insure value. They can easily be worth less than they cost to make – or own.
Successful competition in 2012 (and going forward) requires businesses know about customers, products and have the ability to supply solutions fast with great reach. Winning is about what you know, knowing it early, acting upon the information and then being able to disseminate that solution fast to those who have emerging needs.
Which is why you have to be excited about the brilliant move Facebook made to acquire Instagram last week. In one fast, quick step Facebook bought the ability to easily and effectively provide mobile image solutions – across any application – to millions of existing users. Something that every single person, and business, on the planet is either doing now, or will be doing very soon.
Source: Wired
On a cost-per-existing-customer basis, Facebook stole Instagram. And that's before Facebook spreads out the solution to the rest of its 780million users! Forget about how many employees Instagram has, or its historical revenues or its assets. In an innovation economy, if you have a product that 35million people hear about and start using in less than a year, you have something very valuable!
Kudos go to Mark Zuckerberg as CEO, and his team, for making this acquisition so quickly. Before Instagram had a chance to hire bankers, market itself and probably raise its value 10x. That's why Mr. Zuckerberg was Time Magazine's "Man of the Year" at the start of 2011 – and why he's been able to create so much more value for his shareholders than the CEOs of industrial companies – like say GE.
Going forward, no company can plan to survive with an industrial strategy. That approach, and those rules, simply don't create high returns. To be successful you MUST become a tech company. And while this may not feel comfortable, it is reality. Every business must shift, or die.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 4, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
Understand your core strength, and protect it. Sounds like the key to success, and a simple motto. It's the mantra of many a management guru. Only, far too often, it's the road to ruin.
The last week 3 big announcements showed just how damning the "strategy" of building on historical momentum can be.
Start with Research in Motion's revenue and earnings announcement. Both metrics fell short of expectations as Blackberry sales continue to slide. Not many investors were actually surprised about this, to be honest. iOS and Android products have been taking away share from RIM for several months, and the trend remains clear. And investors have paid a heavy price.
Source: BusinessInsider.com
There is no doubt the executives at RIM are very aware of this performance, and desperately would like the results to be different. RIM has known for months that iOS and Android handhelds have been taking share. The executives aren't unaware, nor stupid. But, they have not been able to change the internal momentum at RIM to the right issues.
The success formula at RIM has long been to "own" the enterprise marketplace with the Blackberry server products, offering easy to connect and secure network access for email, texting and enterprise applications. Handsets came along with the server and network sales. All the momentum at RIM has been to focus on the needs of IT departments; largely security and internal connectivity to legacy systems and email. And, honestly, even today there is probably nobody better at that than RIM.
But the market shifted. Individual user needs and productivity began to trump the legacy issues. People wanted to leave their laptops at home, and do everything with their smartphones. Apps took on a far more dominant role, as did ease of use. Because these were not part of the internal momentum at RIM the company ignored those issues, maintaining its focus on what it believed was the core strength, especially amongst its core customers.
Now RIM is toast. It's share will keep falling, until its handhelds become as popular as Palm devices. Perhaps there will be a market for its server products, but only via an acquisition at a very low price. Momentum to protect the core business killed RIM because its leaders failed to recognize a critical market shift.
Turn next to Yahoo's announcement that it is laying off 1 out of 7 employees, and that this is not likely to be the last round of cuts. Yahoo has become so irrelevant that analysts now depicct its "core" markets as "worthless."
Source: SiliconAlleyInsider.com
Yahoo was an internet pioneer. At one time in the 1990s it was estimated that over 90% of browser home pages were set to Yahoo! But the need for content aggregation largely disappeared as users learned to use search and social media to find what they wanted. Ad placement revenue for keywords transferred to the leading search provider (Google) and for display ads to the leading social media provider (Facebook.)
But Yahoo steadfastly worked to defend and extend its traditional business. It enhanced its homepage with a multitude of specialty pages, such as YahooFinance. But each of these has been outdone by specialist web sites, such as Marketwatch.com, that deliver everyhing Yahoo does only better, attracting more advertisers. Yahoo's momentum caused it to miss shifting with the internet market. Under CEO Bartz the company focused on operational improvements and efforts at enhancing its sales, while market shifts made its offerings less and less relevant.
Now, Yahoo is worth only the value of its outside stockholdings, and it appears the new CEO lacks any strategy for saving the enterprise. The company appears ready to split up, and become another internet artifact for Wikipedia. Largely because it kept doing more of what it knew how to do and was unable to overcome momentum to do anything new.
Last, but surely not least, was the Dell announced acquisition of Wyse.
Dell is synonymous with PC. But the growth has left PCs, and Dell missed the markets for mobile entertainment devices (like iPods or Zunes,) smartphones (like iPhone or Evo) and tablets (like iPads and Galaxy Tab.) Dell slavisly kept to its success formula of doing no product development, leaving that to vendors Microsoft and Intel, as it focused on hardware manufacturing and supply chain excellence. As the market shifted from the technologies it knew Dell kept trying to cut costs and product prices, hoping that somehow people would be dissuaded from changing technologies. Only it hasn't worked, and Dell's growth in sales and profits has evaporated.
Don't be confused. Buying Wyse has not changed Dell's "core." In Wyse Dell found another hardware manufacturer, only one that makes old-fashioned "dumb" terminals for large companies (interpret that as "enterprise,") mostly in health care. This is another acquisition, like Perot Systems, in an effort to copy the 1980s IBM brand extension into other products and services that are in like markets – a classic effort at extending the original Dell success formula with minimal changes.
Wyse is not a "cloud" company. Rackspace, Apple and Amazon provide cloud services, and Wyse is nothing like those two market leaders. Buying Wyse is Dell's effort to keep chasing HP for market share, and trying to pick up other pieces of revenue as it extends is hardware sales into more low-margin markets. The historical momentum has not changed, just been slightly redirected. By letting momentum guide its investments, Dell is buying another old technology company it hopes it can can extend its "supply chain" strenths into – and maybe find new revenues and higher margins. Not likely.
Over and again we see companies falter due to momentum. Why? Markets shift. Faster and more often than most business leaders want to admit. For years leaders have been told to understand core strengths, and protect them. But this approach fails when your core strength loses its value due to changes in technologies, user preferences, competition and markets. Then the only thing that can keep a company successful is to shift. Often very far from the core – and very fast.
Success actually requires overcoming internal momentum, built on the historical success formula, by putting resources into new solutions that fulfill emerging needs. Being agile, flexible and actually able to pivot into new markets creates success. Forget the past, and the momentum it generates. That can kill you.
by Adam Hartung | Mar 29, 2012 | Current Affairs, Disruptions, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Openness, Transparency
No businessperson thinks the way to solve a business problem is via the courts. And no issue is larger for American business than health care. Despite all the hoopla over the Supreme Court reviews this week, this is a lousy way for America to address an extremely critical area.
The growth of America's economy, and its global competitiveness, has a lot riding on health care costs. Looking at the table, below, it is clear that the U.S. is doing a lousy job at managing what is the fastest growing cost in business (data summarized from 24/7 Wall Street.)
While America is spending about $8,000 per person, the next 9 countries (in per person cost) all are grouped in roughly the $4,000-$5,000 cost — so America is 67-100% more costly than competitors. This affects everything America sells – from tractors to software services – forcing higher prices, or lower margins. And lower margins means less resources for investing in growth!
American health care is limiting the countries overall economic growth capability by consuming dramatically more resources than our competitors. Where American spends 17.4% of GDP (gross domestic product) on health care, our competitors are generally spending only 11-12% of their resources. This means America is "taxing" itself an extra 50% for the same services as our competitive countries. And without demonstrably superior results. That is money which Americans would gain more benefit if spent on infrastructure, R&D, new product development or even global selling!
Americans seem to be fixated on the past. How they used to obtain health care services 50 years ago, and the role of insurance 50 years ago. Looking forward, health care is nothing like it was in 1960. The days of "Dr. Welby, MD" serving a patient's needs are long gone. Now it takes teams of physicians, technicians, nurses, diagnosticians, laboratory analysts and buildings full of equipment to care for patients. And that means America needs a medical delivery system that allows the best use of these resources efficiently and effectively if its citizens are going to be healthier, and move into the life expectancies of competitive countries.
Unfortunately, America seems unwilling to look at its competitors to learn from what they do in order to be more effective. It would seem obvious that policy makers and those delivering health care could all look at the processes in these other 9 countries and ask "what are they doing, how do they do it, and across all 9 what can we see are the best practices?"
By studying the competition we could easily learn not only what is being done better, but how we could improve on those practices to be a world leader (which, clearly, we now are not.) Yet, for the most part those involved in the debate seem adamant to ignore the competition – as if they don't matter. Even though the cost of such blindness is enormous.
Instead, way too much time is spent asking customers what they want. But customers have no idea what health care costs. Either they have insurance, and don't care what specific delivery costs, or they faint dead away when they see the bill for almost any procedure. People just know that health care can be really good, and they want it. To them, the cost is somebody else's problem. That offers no insight for creating an effective yet simultaneously efficient system.
America needs to quit thinking it can gradually evolve toward something better. As Clayton Christensen points out in his book "The Innovator's Prescription: A Disruptive Solution for Health Care" America could implement health care very differently. And, as each year passes America's competitiveness falls further behind – pushing the country closer and closer to no choice but being disruptive in health care implementation. That, or losing its vaunted position as market leader!
Is the "individual mandate" legal? That seems to be arguable. But, it is disruptive. It seems the debate centers more on whether Americans are willing to be disruptive, to do something different, than whether they want to solve the problem. Across a range of possibilities, anything that disrupts the ways of the past seems to be argued to death. That isn't going to solve this big, and growing, problem. Americans must become willing to accept some radical change.
The simple approach would be to look at programs in Oregon, Massachusetts and all the states to see what has worked, and what hasn't worked as well. Instead of judging them in advance, they could be studied to learn. Then America could take on a series of experiments. In isolated locations. Early adopter types could "opt in" on new alternative approaches to payment, and delivery, and see if it makes them happy. And more stories could be promulgated about how alternatives have worked, and why, helping everyone in the country remove their fear of change by seeing the benefits achieved by early leaders.
Health care delivery, and its cost, in America is a big deal. Just like the oil price shocks in the 1970s roiled cost structures and threatened the economy, unmanagable health care delivery and cost threatens the country's economic future. American's surely don't expect a handful of lawyers in black robes to solve the problem.
America needs to learn from its competition, be willing to disrupt past processes and try new approaches that forge a solution which not only delivers better than anyone else (a place where America does seem to still lead) but costs less. If America could be the first on the moon, first to create the PC and first to connect everyone on smartphones this is a problem which can be solved – but not by attorneys or courts!
by Adam Hartung | Mar 20, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Rapids, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
The Good – Apple
Apple's latest news to start paying a big dividend, and buying back shares, is a boon for investors. And it signals the company's future strength. Often dividends and share buybacks indicate a company has run out of growth projects, so it desires to manipulate the stock price as it slowly pays out the company's assets. But, in Apple's (rare) case the company is making so much profit from existing businesses that they are running out of places to invest it – thus returning to shareholders!
With a $100B cash hoard, Apple anticipates generating at least another $150B of free cash flow, over and above needs for ongoing operations and future growth projects, the next 3 years. With so much cash flowing the company is going to return money to investors so they can invest in other growth projects beyond those Apple is developing. Exactly what investors want!
I've called Apple the lowest risk, highest return stock for investors (the stock to own if you can only own one stock) for several years. And Apple has not disappointed. At $600/share the stock is up some 75% over the last year (from about $350,) and up 600% over the last 5 years (from about $100.) And now the company is going to return investors $10.60/year, currently 1.8% – or about 4 times your money market yield, or about 75% of what you'd get for a 10 year Treasury bond. Yet investors still have a tremendous growth in capital opportunity, because Apple is still priced at only 14x this year's projected earnings, and 12 times next year's projected earnings!
Apple keeps winning. It's leadership in smart phones continues, as the market converts from traditional cell phones to smart phones. And its lead in tablets remains secure as it sells 3 million units of the iPad 3 over the weekend. In every area, for several years, Apple has outperformed expectations as it leads the market shift away from traditional PCs and servers to mobile devices and using the "cloud."
The Bad – Google
Google was once THE company to emulate. At the end of 2008 its stock peaked at nearly $750/share, as everyone thought Google would accomplish nothing short of world domination (OK, a bit extreme) via its clear leadership in search and the way it dominated internet usage. But that is no longer the case, as Google is being eclipsed by upstarts such as Facebook and Groupon.
What happened? Even though it had a vaunted policy of allowing employees to spend 20% of their time on anything they desired, Google never capitalized on the great innovations created. Products like Google Wave and Google Powermeter were created, launched – and then subsequently left without sponsors, management attention, resources or even much interest. Just as recently happened with GoogleTV.
They floundered, despite identifying very good solutions for pretty impressive market needs, largely because management chose to spend almost all its attention, and resources, defending and extending its on-line ad sales created around search.
- YouTube is a big user environment, and one of the most popular sites on the web. But Google still hasn't really figured out how to generate revenue, or profit, from the site. Despite all the user activity it produces a meager $1.6B annual revenue – and nearly no profit.
- Android may have share rivaling Apple in smartphones, but it is nowhere in tablets and thus lags significantly in the ovarall market with share only about half iOS. Worse, Android smartphones are not nearly as profitable as iPhones, and now Google has made an enormous, multi-billion investment in Motorola to enter this business – and compete with its existing smartphone manufacturers (customers.) To date Android has been a product designed to defend Google's historical search business as people go mobile – and it has produced practically no revenue, or profit.
- Chrome browsers came on the scene and quickly grew share beyond Firefox. But, again, Google has not really developed the product to reach a dominant position. While it has good reviews, there has been no major effort to make it a profitable product. Possibly Google fears fighting IE will create a "money pit" like Bing has become for Microsoft in search?
- Chromebooks were a flop as Google failed to invest in robust solutions allowing users to link printers, MP3 players, etc. – or utilize a wide suite of thin cloud-based apps. Great idea, that works well, they are a potential alternative to PCs, and some tablet applications, but Google has not invested to make the product commercially viable.
- Google tried to buy GroupOn to enter the "local" ad marketplace, but backed out as the price accelerated. While investors may be happy Google didn't overpay, the company missed a significant opportunity as it then faltered on creating a desirable competitive product. Now Google is losing the race to capture local market ads that once went to newspapers.
While Google chose to innovate, but not invest in market development, it missed several market opportunities. And in the meantime Google allowed Facebook to sneak up and overtake its "domination" position.
Facebook has led people to switch from using the internet as a giant library, navigated by search, to a social medium where referrals, discussions and links are driving more behavior. The result has advertisers shifting their money toward where "eyeballs" are spending most of their time, and placing a big threat on Google's ability to maintain its historical growth.
Thus Google is now dumping billions into Google+, which is a very risky proposition. Late to market, and with no clear advantage, it is extremely unclear if Google+ has any hope of catching Facebook. Or even creating a platform with enough use to bring in a solid, and growing, advertiser base.
The result is that today, despite the innovation, the well-known (and often good) products, and even all the users to its sites Google has the most concentrated revenue base among large technology companies. 95% of its revenues still come from ad dollars – mostly search. And with that base under attack on all fronts, it's little wonder analysts and investors have become skeptical. Google WAS a great company – but it's decisions since 2008 to lock-in on defending and extending its "core" search business has made the company extremely vulnerable to market shifts. A bad thing in fast moving tech markets.
Google investors haven't fared well either. The company has never paid a dividend, and with its big investments (past and future planned) in search and handsets it won't for many years (if ever.) At $635/share the stock is still down over 15% from its 2008 high. Albeit the stock is up about 8.5% the last 12 months, it has been extremely volatile, and long term investors that bought 5 years ago, before the high, have made only about 7%/year (compounded.)
Google looks very much like a company that has fallen victim to its old success formula, and is far too late adjusting to market shifts. Worse, its investments appear to be a company spending huge sums to defend its historical business, taking on massive gladiator battles against Apple and Facebook – two companies far ahead in their markets and with enormous leads and war chests.
The Ugly – Dell
Go back to the 1990s and Dell looked like the company that could do no wrong. It went head-to-head with competitors to be the leader in selling, assembling and delivering WinTel (Windows + Intel) PCs. Michael Dell was a modern day hero to other leaders hoping to match the company's ability to focus on core markets, minimize investments in anything else, and be a world-class supply chain manager. Dell had no technology or market innovation, but it was the best at beating down cost – and lowering prices for customers. Dell clearly won the race to the bottom.
But the market for PCs matured. And Dell has found itself one of the last bachelors at the dance, with few prospects. Dell has no products in leading growth markets, like smartphones or tablets. Nor even other mobile products like music or video. And it has no software products, or technology innovation. Today, Dell is locked in gladiator battles with companies that can match its cost, and price, and make similarly slim (to nonexistent) margins in the generic business called PCs (like HP and Lenovo.)
Dell has announced it intends to challenge Apple with a tablet launch later in 2012. This is dependent upon Microsoft having Windows 8 ready to go by October, in time for the holidays. And dependent upon the hope that a swarm of developers will emerge to build the app base for things that already exist on the iPad and Android tablets. The advantage of this product is as yet undefined, so the market is yet undefined. The HOPE is that somehow, for some reason, there is a waiting world of people that have delayed purchase waiting on a Windows device – and will find the new Dell product superior to a $299 Apple 2 already available and with that 500,000 app store.
Clearly, Dell has waited way, way too long to deal with changing its business. As its PC business flattens (and soon shrinks) Dell still has no smartphone products, and is remarkably late to the tablet business. And it offers no clear advantage over whatever other products come from Windows 8 licensees. Dell is in a brutal world of ever lower prices, shrinking markets and devastating competition from far better innovators creating much higher, and growing, profits (Apple and Amazon.)
For investors, the ride from a fast moving boat in the rapids into the swamp of no growth – and soon the whirlpool of decline – has been dismal. Dell has never paid a dividend, has no free cash flow to start paying one now, and clearly no market growth from which to pay one in the future. Dell's shares, at $17, are about the same as a year ago, and down about 20% over the last 5 years.
Leaders in all businesses have a lot to learn from looking at the Good, Bad and Ugly. The company that has invested in innovation, and then invested in taking that innovation to market in order to meet emerging needs has done extremely well. By focusing on needs, rather than business optimization, Apple has been able to shift with markets – and even enhance the market shift to position itself for rapid, profitable growth.
Meanwhile, companies that have focused on their core markets and products are doing nowhere near as well. They have missed market shifts, and watched their fortunes decline precipitously. They were once very profitable, but despite intense focus on defending their historical strengths profits have struggled to grow as customers moved to alternative solutions. By spending insufficient time looking outward, at markets and shifts, and too much time inward, on defending and extending past successes, they now face future jeopardy.
by Adam Hartung | Feb 29, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership, Web/Tech
This week people are having their first look at Windows 8 via the Barcelona, Spain Mobile World Congress. This better be the most exciting Microsoft product since Windows was created, or Microsoft is going to fail.
Why? Because Microsoft made the fatal mistake of "focusing on its core" and "investing in what it knew" – time worn "best practices" that are proving disastrous!
Everyone knows that Microsoft has returned almost nothing to shareholders the last decade. Simultaneously, all the "partner" companies that were in the "PC" (the Windows + Intel, or Wintel, platform) "ecosystem" have done poorly. Look beyond Microsoft at returns to shareholders for Intel, Dell (which recently blew its earings) and Hewlett Packard (HP – which says it will need 5 years to turn around the company.) All have been forced to trim headcount and undertake deep cost cutting as revenues have stagnated since 2000, at times falling, and margins have been decimated.
This happened despite deep investments in their "core" PC business. In 2009 Microsoft spent almost $9B on PC R&D; over 14% of revenues. In the last few years Microsoft has launched Vista, Windows 7, Office 2009 and Office 2010 all in its effort to defend and extend PC sales. Likewise all the PC manufacturers have spent considerably on new, smaller, more powerful and even cheaper PC laptop and desktop models.
Unfortunately, these investments in their core expertise and markets have not excited users, nor created much growth.
On the other hand, Apple spent all of the last decade investing in what it didn't know much about in 2000. Rather than investing in its "core" Macintosh business, Apple invested in the trend toward mobility, being an early leader with 3 platforms – the iPod, iPhone and iPad. All product categories far removed from its "core" and what it new well. But, all targeted at the trend toward enhanced mobility.
Don't forget, Microsoft launched the Zune and the Windows CE phones in the last decade. But, because these were not "core" products in "core" markets Microsoft, and its partners, did not invest much in these markets. Microsoft even brought to market tablets, but leadership felt they were inferior to the PC, so investments were maintained in traditional PC products. The Zune, Windows phone and early Windows tablets all died because Microsoft and its partner companies stuck to investing their most important, and best known, PC business.
Where are we now? Sales of PC's are stagnating, and going to decline. While sales of mobile devices are skyrocketing.
Source: Business Insider 2/14/12
Today tablet sales are about 50% of the ~300M unit PC sales. But they are growing so fast they will catch up by 2014, and be larger by 2015. And, that depends on PC sales maintaining. Look around your next meeting, commuter flight or coffee shop experience and see how many tablets are being used compared to laptops. Think about that ratio a year ago, and then make your own assessment as to how many new PCs people will buy, versus tablets. Can you imagine the PC market actually shrinking? Like, say, the traditional cell phone business is doing?
By focusing on Windows, and specifically each generation leading to Windows 8, Microsoft took a crazy bet. It bet it could improve windows to keep the PC relevant, in the face of the evident trend toward mobility and ease of use. Instead of investing in new technologies, new products and new markets – things it didn't know much about – Microsoft chose to invest in what it new, and hoped it could control the trend.
People didn't want a PC to be mobile, they wanted mobility. Apple invested in the trend, making the MP3 player a winner with its iPod ease of use and iTunes market. Then it made smartphones, which were largely an email device, incredibly popular by innovating the app marketplace which gave people the mobility they really desired. Recognizing that people didn't really want a PC, they wanted mobility, Apple pioneered the tablet marketplace with its iPad and large app market. The result was an explosion in revenue by investing outside its core, in technologies and markets about which it initially knew nothing.
Apple would not have grown had it focused its investment on its "core" Mac business. In the last year alone Apple sold more iOS devices than it sold Macs in its entire 28 year history!
Source: Business Insider 2/17/2012
Today, the iPhone business itself is bigger than all of Microsoft. The iPad business is bigger than the desktop PC business, and if included in the larger market for personal computing represents 17% of the PC market. And, of course, Apple is now worth almost twice the value of Microsoft.
We hear, all the time, to invest in what we know. But it turns out that is NOT the best strategy. Trends develop, and markets shift. By constantly investing in what we know we become farther and farther removed from trends. In the end, like Microsoft, we make massive investments trying to defend and extend our past products when we would be much, much smarter to invest in new technologies and markets that are on the trend, even if we don't know much, if anything, about them.
The odds are now stacked against Microsoft. Apple has a huge lead in product sales, market position and apps. It's closest challenger is Google's Android, which is attracting many of the former Microsoft partners (such as LG's recent defection) as they strive to catch up. Company's such as Nokia are struggling as the technology leadership, and market position, has shifted away from Microsoft as mobility changed the market.
Microsoft's technology sales used to be based upon convincing IT departments to use its platform. But today users largely buy mobile devices with their own money, and eschew the recommendations of the IT department. Just look at how users drove the demise of Research In Motion's Blackberry. IT needs to provide users with tools they like, and use platforms which are easy and low-cost to leverage with big app bases. That favors Apple and Android, not Microsoft with its far, far too late entry.
You can be smarter than Microsoft. Don't take the crazy bet of always doubling down on what you know. Put your focus on the marketplace, and identify shifts. It's cheaper, and smarter, to bet early on trends than constantly trying to fight the trend by investing – usually at an ever higher amount – in what you know.
by Adam Hartung | Feb 16, 2012 | Current Affairs, In the Rapids, Innovation, Leadership
Everyone hears about the growth at Apple. But far too few of us hear about great growth stories of start-up companies in non-tech industries that use today's sales tools to change the game and steal sales leadership from traditional competitors.
Jefferson Financial, which moved its headquarters from New York to Louisville, created dramatic, rapid growth using Twitter and Linked-in to take on industry giants like Schwab and B of A's Merrill Lynch. Readers should take this story to heart, because it shows the kind of success small and medium-sized businesses can have when they break out of traditional thinking and invest in new sales tools while stalwarts remain stuck doing the same old thing with diminishing results.
The Jefferson Financial Story – from Ron Volper, Ph.D
Companies that reduce their sales and marketing budgets in this tough economy—as most have– are doing exactly the wrong thing. While many are trying to cut their way out of the recession, the companies that are thriving in this economy are growing their way out by investing more in sales and marketing. And by capitalizing on new trends, such as social media and technology, to reach out to their customers.
That's what enabled Jefferson National Financial to grow its 2010 $180 million revenues to $280 million in 2011 (a 55% annual increase!) — and capture the dominant market share from much larger companies like Charles Schwab — selling financial products such as variable rate annuities to registered investment advisors and their clients throughout the US.
While most industry competitors cut their sales and customer service teams in the recessionary economy, Jefferson National tripled its sales team from 2010 to 2011. While competitors slashed advertising and marketing, Jefferson National substantially increased its advertising and marketing budget. Sound risky? Read on for the results.
Jefferson National combined hi-tech and hi-touch. For example, it used LinkedIn, Twitter, and YouTube to reach financial advisors (the intermediaries that recommend its products) and their clients (the investors). The company capitalized on a slew of tweets and re-tweets highlighting its relocation to Louisville and the creation of 95 new high paying management jobs. Social excitement induced both the mayor and the governor to attend a celebratory event, and encouraged the governor to designate a day as Jefferson National Day – creating a low cost media following of the company, its products and its success.
Successful viral marketing combined hi-tech social involvement with classic event marketing.
Lacking anything exciting to say, many of Jefferson's competitors reduced their fees (prices) for products and services to maintain revenues. Jefferson National was able to maintain its fees by successfully pitching its story directly to customers on-line, then following up with personal assistance, adding value and promoting a successful investor story. As a result, after only 5 years the company increased its fund offerings from 75 to 350.
Jefferson National leveraged its technology to help financial advisors grow their practices. By hosting financial advisor webinars on how to use Linked-in and other social media to gain referrals from existing clients it created a loyal, growing set of distributors and happy clients.
Additionally, Jefferson National used technology to give financial advisors “an end to end solution” demonstrating to investors on-line, regardless location, the power of tax deferred investment growth, regardless of whether the investor was conservative or aggressive.
The result – the company generated $1 billion in sales since inception and became the market share leader.
According to the Ron Volper Group’s recent analysis of 125 companies (including Jefferson National), 80% of companies that were successful in the 2008-2010 down market (as measured by meeting and exceeding their revenue and earnings goals and capturing market share) recognized that customer buying behavior changed, and altered their sales and marketing approach while their less successful peers kept doing "more of the same."
Unfortunately, too many companies exacerbated failure by cutting advertising and marketing budgets. Today customers demand 8 touches (or contacts) to make a buying decision; whereas prior to 2008 they required only 5 touches. While competition has toughened, customers have simultaneously become MORE demanding! The winners, like Jefferson National, recognized that social media, such as Twitter, Facebook and LinkedIn are immediate and inexpensive ways to attract attention and have followers share their success messages with their networks. Simultaneously they continued to advertise and promote their products in traditional ways, appealing to the widest swath of prospects.
Most companies have not accepted the increased customer demand for increased touch, without higher prices. Most have not modified their marketing and sales approach to take account of changes in customer buying behavior. That’s why this is a perfect time for many small and mid-sized companies to adopt new technologies. These are the "slings" which can allow modern-day business Davids to attack lethargic Goliaths.
Thanks to my colleague Ron Volper for sending along this story. He is a believer that anyone can grow, even in this economy. RON VOLPER, Ph.D., is a leading authority on business development and author of Up Your Sales in a Down Market. As Managing Partner of the Ron Volper Group—Building Better Sales Teams, he has advised 90 Fortune 500 Companies and many mid-sized companies on how to increase sales in tough times and good times; and he has trained over 30,000 salespeople and executives over the past 25 years.
I hope your company can take this story to heart and find ways to incorporate new tools f0r creating growth as market shifts make old strategies less valuable, while creating new opportunities.
by Adam Hartung | Feb 11, 2012 | Current Affairs, In the Rapids, Innovation, Leadership, Television, Web/Tech
Buy Facebook. I don't care what the IPO price is.
Since Facebook informed us it was going public, and it's estimated IPO valuation was reported, debate has raged over whether the company could possibly be worth $75-$100B. Almost nobody writes that Facebook is undervalued, but many question whether it is overvalued.
If you are a trader, moving in and out of positions monthly and using options to leverage short-term price swings then this article is not for you. But, if you are an investor, someone who holds most stock purchases for a year or longer, then Facebook's IPO may be undervalued. The longer you can hold it, the more you'll likely make. Buy it in your IRA if possible, then let it build you a nice nest egg.
About 85% of Facebook's nearly $4B revenues, which almost doubled in 2011, are from advertising. So understanding advertising is critical to knowing why you want to buy, and hold, Facebook.
Facebook has 28% of the on-line display ad market, but only 5% of all on-line advertising. On-line advertising itself is generally predicted to grow at 16%/year. But there is a tremendous case to be made that the market will grow a whole lot faster, and Facebook's share will become a whole lot larger.
At the end of January Proctor & Gamble's stock took a hit as earnings missed expectations, and the CEO projected a tough year going forward. He announced 1,600 layoffs, many in marketing, as he admitted the ad budget was going to be "moderated" – code for cut. While advertising had grown at 24%/year sales were only growing at 6%. He then admitted that the "efficiency" of on-line advertising was demonstrating the ability to be much higher than traditional advertising. In other words, he is planning to cut traditional marketing and advertising, such as coupon printing and ads in newspapers and television, and spend more on-line.
P&G spends about $10B/year on advertising. 2.5x the Facebook revenue. Now, imagine if P&G moves 10% – or 25% – of its advertising from television (which is now a $250B market) on-line. That is $1-$2.5B per year, from just one company! Such a "marginal" move, by just one company, adds 1-3% to the total on-line market. Now, magnify that across Unilever, Danon, Kimberly-Clark, Colgate, Avon, Coke, Pepsi …… the 200 or 300 largest advertisers and it becomes a REALLY BIG number.
The trend is clear. People spend less time watching TV and reading newspapers. We all interact with information and entertainment more and more on computers and mobile devices. Ad declines have already killed newspapers, and television is on the precipice of following its print brethren. The market shift toward advertising on-line will continue, and the trend is bound to accelerate.
Last year P&G launched an on-line marketing program for Old Spice. The CEO singled out the 1.8 billion free impressions that received on-line. When the CEO of one of the world's largest advertisers takes note, and says he's going to move that way, you can bet everyone is going to head that direction. Especially as they recognize the poor "efficiency" of traditional media spending.
And don't forget the thousands of small businesses that have much smaller budgets. Most of them rarely, or never, could afford traditional media. On-line is not only more effective, but far cheaper. Especially as mobile devices makes local marketing even more targeted and effective. So as big companies shift to on-line we can expect small to medium sized businesses to shift as well, and new advertisers are being created which will expand the market even further. This trend could lead to a much faster organic market growth rate beyond 16% – perhaps 25% or even more!
Which brings us back to Facebook, which will be the primary beneficiary of this market shift.
Facebook is rapidly catching up with Google in the referral business. 850 million users is important, because it shows the ability Facebook has to bring people on-line, keep them on-line and then refer them somewhere. The kind of thing that made Google famous, big and valuable with search a decade ago. In fact, people spend much more time on Facebook than they do Google. When advertisers want to reach their audience they go where the people are (and are being referred) and that is Facebook. Nobody else is even close.
The good thing about having a big user base, and one that shares information, is the ability to gather data. Just like Google kept all those billions of searches to analyze and share data, increasingly Facebook is able to do the same. Facebook will be able to tell advertisers how people interact, how they move between pages, what keeps them on a page and what leads to buying behavior. Facebook uses this data to help users be more effective, just like Google does to help us do great searches. But in the future Facebook can package and sell this data to advertisers, helping them be more effective, and they can use it for selling, and placing, ads.
Facebook usage is dominant in social media, but becoming more dominant in all internet use. Like how Windows became the dominant platform for PC users, Facebook is well on its way to being the platform for how we use the web. Email will be less necessary as we communicate across Facebook with those we really want to know. Information on topics of interest will stream to us through Facebook because we select them, or our friends refer them. Solving problems will use referrals more, and searching less. The platform will help us be much more efficient at using the internet, and that reinforces more usage and more users. All the while attracting more advertisers.
The big losers will be traditional media. We may watch sports live, but increasingly we'll be unwilling to watch streaming TV as the networks trained boomers. Companies like NBC will suffer just as newspaper giants such as Tribune Corp., New York Times and Dow Jones. Ad agencies will have a very tough time, as ad budgets drop their placement fees will decline concomittantly. Lavish spending on big budget ads will also decline.
Anyone in on-line advertising is likely to be a winner initially. Linked-in, Twitter, Pinterest and Google will all benefit from the market shift. But the biggest winner of all will be Facebook.
What if the on-line ad market grows 25%/year (think not possible? look at how fast the smartphone and tablet markets have grown while PC sales have stagnated last 2 years as that market shifted. And don't forget that incremental amount could easily happen just by the top 50 CPG companies moving 10% of their budget!)? That adds $20-$25B incrementally. If Facebook's share shifts from 5% to 10% that would add $2-2.5B to Facebook first year; more than 50%!
Blow those numbers up just a bit more. Say double on-line advertising and give Facebook 20% share as people drop email and traditional search for Facebook – plus mobile device use continues escalating. Facebook revenues could double up, or more, for several years as trends obsolete newspapers, magazines, televisions, radios, PCs and traditional thoughts about advertising.
If you missed out on AT&T in the 1950s, IBM in the 1960s, Microsoft in 1980, or Apple in 2000, don't miss this one. Forget about all those spreadsheets and short-term analyst forecasts and buy the trend. Buy Facebook.
