by Adam Hartung | Dec 7, 2010 | Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Leadership, Web/Tech
Today’s guest blog is provided by Mike Meikle, hope you enjoy:
Summary
- Oracle is at the top of the heap in the Traditional Software market.
- Traditional Software market is deflating with $7 billion less profit than 2009
- Software as a Service, a component of Cloud Computing, has a forecasted 26% annual growth rate over the next five years.
- Oracle Cloud Computing strategy is muddled with bi-polar corporate marketing and platform dependency.
- Customers feel trapped with Oracle and are looking for alternatives.
- Oracle is trapped in a classic Defend and Extend situation.
- Oracle seems to be following Microsoft in using 1990’s corporate strategy in 2011.
Throughout the 1990’s Microsoft held the dominant position in software. Firmly ensconced in Corporate and Consumer arenas, Microsoft generated enormous profits. With an overflowing war chest, MSFT aggressively quashed or bought out the competition – which eventually attracted the attention of the United States Justice Department.
After a little less than 10 years, Microsoft now fights to stay relevant as multiple challengers have exposed gaping holes in its armor. The tech giant’s senior leadership appears rudderless as product lines fail to get off the mark (Windows Phone 7) or flounder (Vista).
With this in mind let us turn toward Oracle. Long viewed as the top Database Management System (DBMS) for the corporate world, its database software underpins much of the global information economy. It has a large war chest stuffed with the profits created by costly traditional software licensing deals with locked-in customers. It has used that cash to acquire new lines of business (PeopleSoft, Sun) and competitors (ATG, MySQL).
However there are some dark clouds on the horizon. The advent of Cloud Computing is a threat to its current licensing model. How will Oracle adapt to corporations implementing virtual servers and databases in the Cloud? Traditional software licensing is down $7 billion industry-wide from 2009. Meanwhile “software as a service” (SaaS) is seeing explosive growth, with a forecasted 26% annual growth rate over the next five years as a natural component of Cloud Computing.
Oracle has made some efforts to delve into the Cloud Computing fray with the Oracle Exalogic Elastic Cloud, or “Cloud-In-a-Box”, leveraging their SUN and ATG acquisitions. However this arrives several years behind the Amazon, Google, and Microsoft triumvirate of Cloud Computing products. Oracle’s Cloud offering will also have to overcome Oracle’s own negative statements about Cloud Computing. CEO Larry Ellison called Cloud Computing “complete gibberish” in late 2008.
Oracle also has problems with its customers. Chafing under the steep licensing costs and sub-standard support, nearly half are looking to shift to lower cost alternatives as they become available. Many have felt trapped by lack of suitable replacements. MySQL was one such competitor, but with Oracle purchasing SUN and getting MySQL in the bargain, that option disappeared. So customers have continued to (reluctantly) fork over licensing and maintenance fees to Oracle, creating the bulk of the organization’s profit stream.
Sound familiar?
Also, the champions of Oracle software offerings, developers, are dissatisfied with the company. The founders of MySQL and the creator of Java, now key software offerings of Oracle, have jumped ship as a result of disagreements with Oracle’s corporate direction.
Now Oracle finds itself in is a classic Defend & Extend situation. Nearly all their profits rely on historical licensing and maintenance for traditional software, a market that is rapidly shrinking. Current customers are unhappy with cost and service; hungry for alternatives and ready to embrace new solutions. But Oracle has arrived late and timidly to the Cloud Computing maketplace, attempting to leverage recently acquired assets where key personnel have left (and taking who knows how much vital market and product knowledge.) Not only will Oracle have to struggle to differentiate itself from other Cloud offerings going forward, it will have to incorporate their newly acquired assets (including technologies) into a cohesive offering while trying to ramp up top notch service.
Oracle will have to break out of the “consistency trap” if it is to drive profits toward new growth. New services that provide value to the customer will have to be developed and aggressively marketed. To grow future revenue and profits Oracle cannot rely on shoehorning customers into poorly fitting licensing and support models based on the fading market of yesteryear.
Or Oracle could choose to not change its old Success Formula. For advice on that approach Oracle’s Mr. Ellison talk to Microsoft’s Mr. Ballmer to see how well his 1990’s corporate strategy is working as Microsoft stumbles into 2011.
Thanks Mike! Mike Meikle shares his insights at “Musings of a Corporate Consigliere” (http://mikemeikle.wordpress.com/). I hope you read more of his thoughts on innovation and corporate change at his blog site. I thank Mike for contributing this blog for readers of The Phoenix Principle today, and hope you’ve enjoyed his contribution to the discussion about innovation, strategy and market shifts.
If you would like to contribute a guest blog please send me an email. I’d be pleased to pass along additional viewpoints on wide ranging topics.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 21, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
"With Oracle, Sun avoids becoming another Yahoo," headlines Marketwatch.com today. As talks broke down because IBM was unwilling to up its price for Sun Microsystems, Oracle Systems swept in and made a counter-offer that looks sure to acquire the company. Unlike Yahoo – Sun will now disappear. The shareholders will get about 5% of the value Sun was worth a decade ago at its peak. That's a pretty serious value destruction, in any book. And if you don't think this is bad news for the employees and vendors just wait a year and see how many remain part of Oracle. A sale to IBM would have fared no better for investors, employees or vendors.
It was clear Sun wasn't able to survive several years ago. That's why I wrote about the company in my book Create Marketplace Disruption. Because the company was unwilling to allow any internal Disruptions to its Success Formula and any White Space to exist which might transform the company. In the fast paced world of information products, no company can survive if it isn't willing to build an organization that can identify market shifts and change with them.
I was at a Sun analyst conference in 1995 where Chairman McNealy told the analysts "have you seen the explosive growth over at Cisco System? I ask myself, how did we miss that?" And that's when it was clear Sun was in for big, big trouble. He was admitting then that Sun was so focused on its business, so focused on its core, that there was very little effort being expended on evaluating market shifts – which meant opportunities were being missed and Sun would be in big trouble when its "core" business slowed – as happens to all IT product companies. Sun had built its Success Formula selling hardware. Even though the real value Sun created shifted more and more to the software that drove its hardware, which became more and more generic (and less competitive) every year, Sun wouldn't change its strategy or tactics – which supported its identity as a hardware company – its Success Formula. Even though Sun became a leader in Unix operating systems, extensions for networking and accessing lots of data, as well as the creator and developer of Java for network applications because software was incompatible with the Success Formula, the company could not maintain independent software sales and the company failed.
Sort of like Xerox inventing the GUI (graphical user interface), mouse, local area network to connect a PC to a printer, and the laser printer but never capturing any of the PC, printer or desktop publishing market. Just because Xerox (and Sun) invented a lot of what became future growth markets did not insure success, because the slavish dedication to the old Success Formula (in Xerox's case big copiers) kept the company from moving forward with the marketplace.
Instead, Sun Microsystems kept trying to Defend & Extend its old, original Success Formula to the end. Even after several years struggling to sell hardware, Sun refused to change into the software company it needed to become. To unleash this value, Sun had to be acquired by another software company, Oracle, willing to let the hardware go and keep the software – according to the MercuryNews.com "With Oracle's acquisition of Sun, Larry Ellison's empire grows." Scott McNealy wouldn't Disrupt Sun and use White Space to change Sun, so its value deteriorated until it was a cheap buy for someone who could use the software pieces to greater value in another company.
Compare this with Steve Jobs. When Jobs left Apple in disrepute he founded NeXt to be another hardware company – something like a cross between Apple and Sun. But he found the Unix box business tough sledding. So he changed focus to a top application for high powered workstations – graphics – intending to compete with Silicon Graphics (SGI). But as he learned about the market, he realized he was better off developing application software, and he took over leadership of Pixar. He let NeXt die as he focused on high end graphics software at Pixar, only to learn that people weren't as interesed in buying his software as he thought they would be. So he transitioned Pixar into a movie production company making animated full-length features as well as commercials and short subjects. Mr. Jobs went through 3 Success Formulas getting the business right – using Disruptions and White Space to move from a box company to a software company to a movie studio (that also supplied software to box companies). By focusing on future scenarios, obsessing about competitors and Disrupting his approach he kept pushing into White Space. Instead of letting Lock-in keep him pushing a bad idea until it failed, he let White Space evolve the business into something of high value for the marketplace. As a result, Pixar is a viable competitor today – while SGI and Sun Microsystems have failed within a few months of each other.
It's incredibly easy to Defend & Extend your Success Formula, even after the business starts failing. It's easy to remain Locked-in to the original Success Formula and keep working harder and faster to make it a little better or cheaper. But when markets shift, you will fail if you don't realize that longevity requires you change the Success Formula. Where Unix boxes were once what the market wanted (in high volume), shifts in competitive hardware (PC) and software (Linux) products kept sucking the value out of that original Success Formula.
Sun needed to Disrupt its Lock-ins – attack them – in order to open White Space where it could build value for its software products. Where it could learn to sell them instead of force-bundling them with hardware, or giving them away (like Java.) And this is a lesson all companies need to take to heart. If Sun had made these moves it could have preserved much more of its value – even if acquired by someone else. Or it might have been able to survive as a different kind of company. Instead, Sun has failed costing its investors, employees and vendors billions.
