With the economy soft, and sales harder to come by, more companies are thinking about what changes they can make to be more competitive. But what we’re seeing now is the emergence of competitors that Disrupted when times were good, and the decline of those who chose to Defend & Extend old Success Formulas in order to maximize profits back then.
Let’s take a look at Sun Microsystems (see chart here.) Trading today at $5.25/share, Sun was a darling of the internet boom – peaking at about $250/share in 2000. But $5.25/share (adjusted for splits) is about what Sun was worth in the mid-1990s. At that time Sun was a big winner as internet usage exploded and the telecom companies – as well as industry participants from tech to manufacturers – could not get enough Unix servers. Everyone was predicting that the need for servers was never going to decline, and Sun was "#1 with a rocket", to use an old radio term for a big hit song.
In 1995 Sun held a management retreat for all its managers and higher in Monterey, CA. Scott McNealy, the chairman and CEO, asked the audience "if you could buy Apple, would you do it?" The audience reacted with a positive roar! These managers all saw the benefit of having a low-price workstation line to augment their expensive servers. Further, Unix was notoriously difficult to use and the hope of bringing a better GUI interface was very appealing. They saw that if they could help the sales of Macs it would be a great way to slow the Wintel (Microsoft Windows plus Intel microprocessor) PC platform – which was the biggest competitor to Unix. And Apple had lots of applications in media and the office that eluded the very techie Sun products. These managers, directors and V.P.s had all thought about an Apple + Sun merger, and they saw the opportunities.
Mr. McNealy looked at the raucous, hopeful crowd and said, "you think you could fix that mess? With all we have to do to keep up with market growth, you don’t see buying Apple as a major diversion?" The air was sucked out of the room. Obviously, Apple was troubled. But there was real hope for growth in new and unpredictable ways from combining the two companies, their positive brands, their great technologies and their creative roots. But Mr. McNealy went on to tell the audience that the executive team had thought about the acquisition, and just couldn’t see doing it. It would be too disruptive.
That management retreat had as its keynote speaker Gary Hamel, author of Competing for the Future. Mr. Hamel gave a great presentation about how his research showed great companies figured out their core – their core strength – and then reinforced that strength. The rest of the retreat was spent with the management personnel in various break-out sessions defining the "core" at Sun Microsystems and then identifying how Sun could reinforce that core.
Of course, it only took 5 years for the internet bubble to burst. The telecoms were some of the first victims, with their value plummeting. Demand for servers fell off a proverbial cliff. Meanwhile, Unix servers from IBM and others had increased in performance and capability – giving the once high-flying Sun a competitive kick in the pants. Worse, the power of Wintel servers had continued to increase, making the price difference between a Unix server and a Wintel server much less acceptable. IT Department customers were beginning to shift to PC servers in order to lower cost. And Sun, with its focus on servers, had no desktop product to sell – no competitor to the PC – nor any software products to sell. The internet market was rapidly shifting toward Cisco and those who sold robust network gear. Sun was watching its market disappear right out from under it – and happening in weeks.
Now it’s unclear what the future holds for Sun Microsystems (read article here). Sales have not recovered. Losses have been mounting. Sun’s dealing with hundreds of millions of dollars in restructuring costs (again), and some of its businesses are now worth so little that the company is probably going to be forced to write off millions (maybe billions) in goodwill on the books. If it has to write off too much good will, Sun could end up declaring bankruptcy.
The time for Disruption at Sun was when business was good – in 1995 and 1996. Had they bought Apple, who knows what combination might have happened. At the time, Cisco (see chart here) was growing quite handily. But Cisco built into its ethos the notion that the company would obsolete its own products. This desire, to never ride too far out the product curve and instead cannibalize their own sales before competitors did, has allowed Cisco to keep growing revenues and profits. Instead of "focusing on its core" Cisco keeps looking for the competitors (companies and products) that could make Cisco obsolete – and using those competitors to help Cisco drive growth.
Even with Disruptions, many competitors will not survive this recession. Not because the managers are lazy or sloppy. But because they will become victims of better competitors who built Success Formulas more aligned with future market needs. Those who Disrupted in 2005 and 2006, who positioned themselves for globalization and rapid market shifts, will do relatively better in 2009 than those who chose to Defend & Extend what they used to do. The best time to Disrupt and create White Space is when things are good – because that prepares you to win big when markets shift and times get tough.