Toys R Us – How Bad Assumptions Fed Bad Financial Planning Creating Failure

Toys R Us – How Bad Assumptions Fed Bad Financial Planning Creating Failure

Toys R Us filed for bankruptcy this week.  And the obvious response was “another retailer slaughtered by Amazon and on-line retailing.”  But this conclusion comes short of describing why Toys R Us leadership did not do the obvious things to keep Toys R Us relevant.

toy retailing sales in us from statista

Amazon and WalMart both eclipsed Toys R Us in toy retail sales.
Chart courtesy of Felix Richter, Statista

Everyone, and I mean everyone, knew over the last decade that customers were buying more stuff on-line, including toys. And everyone also knew that WalMart was pushing extremely hard to keep customers going to their stores by offering products like toys at low prices.  And, it was clear that customers were shifting to buying more toys from both these retailers.  If this was so obvious to everyone, why didn’t Toys R Us leadership do something?  After all, Toys R Us is a multi-billion dollar revenue company.

The LBO

It was over 30 years ago when financiers discovered they could buy a company, sell off some assets and otherwise increase the company’s cash, then convince banks and bondholders to load the company with debt.  These financiers would then pull out the cash for themselves, and leave the company with a ton of debt.  The LBO (leveraged buy out) was born, invented by investment bankers like KKR (named for founders Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts.) They would use a small bit of private equity, and then use the company’s own assets to raise debt money (leverage) to buy the company.  By “restructuring” the company to a lower cost of operations, usually with draconian reductions, they would increase cash flow to make higher debt repayments.  Then they would either take the money out directly, or take the company public where they could sell their shares, and make themselves rich.  This form of deal making birthed what we now call the Private Equity business.

In 2005, KKR and Bain Capital (which included former Presidential candidate Mitt Romney) bought Toys R Us for about $6.6billion, plus assuming just under $1B of debt, for a total valuation of $7.5billion.  But the private equity  guys didn’t buy the company with equity.  They only put in $1.3billion, and used the company’s assets to raise $5.3billion in additional debt, making total debt a whopping $6.2B.  Total debt was now a remarkable 82.7% of total capital!  At the time of the deal interest rates on that debt were around 7.25%, creating a cash outflow of $450million/year just to pay interest on the loans.  At the time Toys R Us was barely making a profit of 2% – so the debt was double company net profits.

KKR and Bain buy Toys R Us logos

Debt led to bad management decisions and ultimately bankruptcy of the U.S. company

The biggest assumption behind a debt-financed takeover is that the company can cut costs to improve cash flow and thus pay the interest.  But behind that assumption is an even bigger assumption.  That the marketplace won’t change dramatically.  The KKR and Bain Capital leaders assumed they could shrink Toys R Us in a way that would lower operating costs.  They also assumed they could sell some under-utilized assets to raise cash.  They did not assume they would need contingency money if competition, and the marketplace, changed in some unplanned way.

eCommerce was pretty new in 2005.  Amazon was an $8.5 billion company, but it didn’t make any profits and very few predicted then it would become today’s $100 billion behemoth.  Because the financiers didn’t anticipate a big market shift to ecommerce, they focused on the war with Walmart and Target.  Their plans were to lower operating costs, close some stores that were underperforming, license some offshore stores, and sell some assets (like real estate owned or leases) to raise cash and repay the debt.

amazon.com toy car screen shot

But they weren’t prepared to take on another, entirely different competitor on-line.  As Amazon’s growth affected all retailers, Toys R Us simply did not have the resources to fight the traditional discount and dollar brick-and-mortar retailers, and build a major on-line presence, and keep paying that debt. While it is easy to sit on the sidelines and say that Toys R Us should have spent more money building its on-line presence in order to remain relevant, the fact is that the deal in 2005 left the company with insufficient cash flow to do so.  Regardless of what leadership might have wanted to do, simply keeping the lights on was a tough challenge when having to pay out so much cash to bondholders.

And the investors simply did not expect that the growth of on-line retailing would stall traditional retail stores, thus creating a major loss of value for retail real estate.  U.S. retail real estate value had increased in value for decades.  The assumption was that the real estate, whether owned or leased, would continue to go up in value.  Real estate was a “hard” asset that KKR and Bain Capital could bank on for raising cash to repay the debt.  But as on-line retail grew, and traditional retail declined, America became “over stored” with far too much retail space.  Prices were shattered in many markets, and it was not possible for Toys R Us to sell those assets for a gain that would meet the debt obligations.

With $400 million of debt coming due next year, Toys R Us simply doesn’t have the cash flow, or assets, to repay those bondholders

Old assumptions about finance are a big problem for companies today.  Assumptions about “leveraging” hard assets, and intangibles like brand value, are no longer true.  Competitors emerge, markets change, and old assets can lose value very fast.  Assumptions about business model stability are no longer true, as new competitors using newer technology create new ways to sell, and often at lower cost than was ever expected.  Assumptions about customer loyalty, and market share stability, are no longer true as new competitors appeal to customers differently and cause big shifts in buying behavior very fast.  The speed with which technology, competitors, markets and customers shift now requires companies have the funds available to invest in change.

This story isn’t just about debt.  The very popular activity of “returning money to shareholders by repurchasing stock” is a terrible idea.  Stock repurchases do not make a company more valuable, nor a stronger competitor.  Instead they burn through cash to reduce the company’s capitalization, and manipulate ratios like EPS (earnings per share) and P/E (price/earnings) multiple.  Stock repurchases hurt companies, and make them less competitive.  Good companies return money to shareholders by investing in growth, which raises sales, profits and increases the stock price making the company truly more valuable.

Toys R Us isn’t a story about Amazon, or eCommerce, taking out another retailer

A&P Family store 1950's painting

Toys R Us isn’t a story about Amazon, or eCommerce, taking out another retailer

A&P Family store 1950's painting

The important part of the Toys R Us story is realizing that the wrong financial decisions can doom your organization.  You can have a great vision, and even great ideas about new ways to compete.  But if you don’t have the money to invest in growth, it won’t happen.  If leaders don’t have the money to spend on new projects and new markets, because they’re sending it all to bondholders or using it to  repurchase shares in hopes of propping up a stock price, eventually there will be a market shift that will doom the old business model and leave it unable to compete.

To succeed today leaders need the money to invest in change, and they have to constantly invest it in change, or their companies will lose relevancy and end up like Toys R Us, Radio Shack, Circuit City, Aeropostale, The Limited, Payless Shoes, Gander Mountain, Golfsmith, Sports Authority, Borders Books and the great, original American retailer A&P.

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Creative Destruction is not inevitable – Kodak, Hostess, Microsoft

A lot of excitement was generated this week when Mitt Romney said the words "I like to fire people."  I'm sure he wishes he could rephrase his comment, as he easily could have made his point about changing service providers without those words.  Nonetheless, the aftermath turned to a discussion of job losses, and why Bain Capital has eliminated jobs while simultaneously creating some. 

Surprisingly, a number of economists suddenly started saying that firms like Bain Capital are justified in their job eliminations because they are merely implementing "creative destruction."  Although the leap is not obvious, the argument goes that some businesses are made inefficient and unprofitable by new technologies or business processes – so buyers (like Bain Capital) of hurting businesses often cannot "fix" the situation and have no choice but to close them.  Bain Capital inevitably will be stuck with losers it has no choice but to shutter – eliminating the jobs with the company.

Unfortunately, that argument is simply not true. The only thing that allows "creative destruction" to kill a company is a lack of good leadership.  Any company can find a growth path if its leaders are willing to learn from trends and steer in the growing direction.

Start by looking at recent events surrounding Kodak and Hostess, both quickly heading for Chapter 11.  Neither needed to fail. Management made the decisions which steered them into the whirlpool of failure. 

Kodak watched the market for amateur photography shrink for 30 years – drying up profits for film and paper.  Yet, management consistently – quarter after quarter and year after year – made the decision to try defending and extending the historical market rather than move the company into faster growing, more profitable opportunities.  Kodak even invented much of the technology for digital photography, but chose to license it to others rather than develop the market because Kodak feared cannibalizing existing sales – as they became increasingly at risk! 

Hostess is making a return trip to Chapter 11 this decade.  But it's not like the trend away from highly processed, shelf stable white bread and sugary pastry snacks is anything new.  While 1960s parents and youth might have enjoyed the vitamin enriched Wonder Bread "helping grow bodies 12 ways" the trend toward fresher, and healthier, staples has been happening for 40 years.  In the 1980s when the company was known as Continental Baking profits were problematic, and it was clear that to keep what was then the nation's largest truck fleet profitable required new products as consumers were shifting to fresher "bake off" goods in the grocery store as well as brands promising more fiber and taste.  But despite these obvious trends, leadership continued trying to defend and extend the business rather than shift it.

These stories weren't "creative destruction."  They were simply bad leadership.  Decisions were made to do more of the same, when clearly something desperately different was needed! At the Harvard Business School Working Knowledge web site famed strategiest Michael Porter states "the granddaddy of all mistakes is competing to be the best, going down the same path as everybody else and thinking that somehow you can achieve better results."  Failure happened because the leaders were so internally focused they chose to ignore external inputs, trends, which would have driven better decisions!

In the 1980s Singer realized that the sewing machine market was destined to decline as women left homemaking for paying jobs, and as textile industry advances made purchased clothing cheaper than self-made.  Over a few years the company transitioned out of the traditional, but dying, business and became a very successful defense industry contractor!  Rather than letting itself be "creatively destroyed" Singer identified the market trends and moved from decline to growth!

Similarly, IBM almost failed as the computer market shifted from mainframes to PCs, but before all was lost (including jobs as well as investor value) leaders changed company focus from hardware to services and vertical market solutions allowing IBM to grow and thrive. 

The failure of Digital Equipment (DEC) at the same time was not "creative destruction" but company leadership unwillingness to shift from declining mini-computer and high priced workstation sales into new businesses.

More recently, over the last decade a nearly dead Apple resurrected itself by tying into the large trend for mobility, rather than focusing on its niche Mac product sales.  Company leaders took the company into consumer electronics (ipod, ipod touch,) tablet computing and cloud-based solutions (iPad) and mobile telephony with digital apps (iPhone.)  Apple had no legacy in any of these markets, but by linking to trends rather than fixating on past businesses "creative destruction" was avoided.

There are many businesses today that are in trouble because leaders simply won't pay attention to trends.  Avon, Sears and Barnes & Noble are three companies with limited futures simply because leaders seem unable to pull their heads out of the internal strategic planning sand and look at environmental trends in order to shift.

My favorite target is, of course, Microsoft.  Nobody thinks we will be carrying laptop PCs around in 5 years.  Yet, Microsoft has been unable to recognize the trend away from PCs and do anything effective.  Its efforts in music (Zune) and mobile handsets have been indifferent, insufficiently supported and mostly dropped.  Mr. Ballmer continues to speak about a long future for PC sales even as Q4 volume dropped 1.4% according to IDC and Gartner.  Even though everyone knows this trend is due to limited PC innovation and rapidly accelerating mobile-based solutions, Microsoft blamed the problem on, of all things, floods in Thailand that restricted manufacturing output.  Really.

We'll learn soon enough just how many jobs Bain Capital created, and killed.  But those lost were not due to "creative destruction."  They were due to leadership decisions to discontinue the business rather than invest in trends and transitioning to new markets.  Creative destruction is an easy excuse to avoid blaming leaders for failures caused by their unwillingness to recognize trends and take actions to invest in them which will create winning businesses.