Yesterday I discussed how Sun Microsystems nailed its coffin shut in the mid-1990s when it committed itself to hardware instead of following the market into software. Even though Sun was the then leader in Unix operating systems (Solaris) and internet application development (Java), the company chose to only offer its software on its own hardware (Solaris) – or give it away (Java). Had Sun recognized the market shift to valuing software rather than "systems" the company could have transitioned itself and avoided being gobbled up by Oracle – which is sure to close Sun's R&D facility and discontinue hardware sales.
Now we hear that the New York Times company behaved very similarly at almost the same time, putting itself at unnecessary risk that has destroyed huge value for shareholders and cost thousands of jobs. In 1995 NYT was worth between $1.5B and $2B. The Boston Globe recently reported in "What Went Wrong?" that same year the founder of Monster offered to sell a chunk of his new company to the Globe (which is owned by NYT) for $1million. And Monster would start cooperating with the Globe to offer help-wanted ads on-line as well as in the newspaper. At the time, help wanted ads alone was a $100million business at the Globe. For 1% of just one segment of the Globe's revenue – and a far lesser fraction of NYT sales and equity value – the company could have been part of the great migration to the web.
Globe and NYT management said no. And for the rest of the decade advertising growth remained on a tear, driving the value of NYT up to about $6.5 to $7billion by 2000. And even though the recession came in 2001, NYT's value remained in that range until 2004. But then, in 2004, early market shifts started to become pronounced. Like the proverbial snowball rolling downhill, internet usage had become a big market and advertisers were looking for lower cost and more capable options. Advertisers from auto companies to movie studies started moving ad dollars to the web – as did companies advertising for help. The value of NYT started to drop, and hasn't stopped yet. In 5 years more than $6billion of that value has evaporated – leaving the whole of NYT – including not only the Globe but the venerable New York Times worth a mere $700million (see 5year chart here). Value is dropping precipitously as losses mount ("New York Times loss widens; shares fall 16%" was headline on Marketwatch yesterday), and the company leverages its Manhattan real estate to try preserving its now unprofitable Success Formula.
When business was good NYT had the opportunity to Disrupt itself and invest in some White Space to help understand the direction of future markets. Instead, management clung to the old Success Formula and ignored impending market shifts. While the company racked up profits it eschewed investing in new projects, because there were no Disruptions causing it to consider White Space. And now that the market has shifted it very likely is too late to save the company (investor Rupert Murdoch with investments across all media, including the web, is licking his chops for the opportunity to take over these influential journals with which he has long tangled politically. Even if only to watch them decline and remove a thorn in his side.) Because of decisions made in 1995, when business was good, the nails were being driven into the coffin. Management failed to recognize how deadly those decisions were, because they were focused on Defending & Extending the past rather than exploring how markets might change.
The Sun and NYT story emphasize how easy it is to remain Locked-in. Profits during good times – often right at the peak of the business – become an excuse to do more of the same. But what we see over and over is that long-term success requires Disruptions during these best times. Companies that make the transitions don't wait for the crisis. When times are good they invest in new market opportunities, so they can learn what works and how to compete. They Disrupt their old model so they pay attention to market shifts, and invest in White Space where they learn and inform the entire organization about what's coming. Lock-in is very dangerous because it is so easy to ignore. But if you want to survive market shifts you must create an organization that can evolve with new markets. That requires you manage Lock-in by constantly Disrupting and keeping White Space alive.
PS – a note of thanks to reader Tejune Kang for pointing me to the Globe article about Monster. I encourage all readers to forward me your insights to companies Locked-in and at risk, as well as those practicing The Phoenix Principle.