by Adam Hartung | Nov 11, 2011 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lifecycle, Web/Tech
In the back half of the 1990s Apple was clearly on the route to bankruptcy. Sun Micrososystems seriously investigated buying Apple. After a review, leadership opted not to make the acquisition. Sun’s non-officer management, bouyed on rumors of the acquisition, was heartbroken upon hearing Sun would not proceed. When Chairman Scott McNeely was asked at a management retreat why the executive team passed on Apple, he responded with “Do you think you can fix that?”
Sun leadership clearly had answered “no.” Good for a lot of us that Steve Jobs said “yes.”
Sun has largely disappeared, losing 95% of its market cap after 2000 and being acquired by Oracle. Why did Mr. Jobs succeed where the leadership of Sun, which couldn’t save itself much less Apple, feared it would fail?
For insight, look no further than the recent failure of Filene’s Basement (“Filene’s Saga Ends” Boston.com) and its acquirer Sym’s (“Retailers’s Sym’s and Filene’s Go Out of Business” Chicago Tribune.) Most of the time, when a troubled business is acquirerd not only is the buyer unable to fix the poor performer, but investments incurred by the buyer jeapardizes its business to the point of failure as well. Given the track record of corporations at fixing bad businesses, Mr. McNeely was on statistically sound footing to reject buying Apple.
Why is the track record of corporate management so bad at fixing problem businesses? Largely because most of their time is spent tyring to extend the past, rather than create a business which can thrive in the future.
The leadership of Sun didn’t see a future filled with mobile devices for music, movies or telephony. They were fixated on the Unix-based computers Sun built and sold. It was unclear how Apple would help them sell more servers, so it was a management diversion – a “poor strategic fit” – for Sun to acquire a technology intensive, talent rich organization. They passed, stayed focused on Unix servers and high-end workstations, and failed as that market shifted to PC products.
Much is the same for Filene’s Basement. A great brand, Sym’s bought Filene’s in an effort to continue pushing the discount model both Filene’s and Sym’s had historically pursued. Unfortunately, the market for discount department store merchandise was rapidly shifting to higher end middle-market players like Kohl’s, and for deeply discounted goods the internet was making deal shopping a lot easier for everyone. Because management was fixated on the old business, they missed the opportunity to make Filene’s and Sym’s a leader in new retail markets – like Amazon has done.
Remember in 2006 when Western Auto’s leader (and former hedge fund manager) Ed Lampert bought up the bonds of KMart, then used that position to acquire Sears? The market went gaga over the acquisition, heralding Mr. Lampert as a genius. Jim Cramer urged on his television program Mad Money that everyone buy Sears. Now the merged KMart/Sears company has lost much of its value, and 24×7 Wall Street claimed it was the #1 worst performing retail chain (“America’s Eight Worst-Performing Retail Chains“.)
Chart courtesy Yahoo.com 11/11/11 (note vertical scale is logarithmic)
Both KMart and Sears were deeply troubled when Mr. Lampert acquired them. But he largely followed a program of cost cutting, hoping people would return to the stores once he lowered prices. What he missed was a retail market which had shifted to Wal-Mart for the low-end products, and had fragmented into multiple competitors in the mid-priced market leaving Sears Holdings with no compelling value proposition.
Mr. Lampert has turned over management, fired scores of employees, closed stores and largely led both brands to retail irrelevancy. By trying to do more of the past, only better, faster and cheaper he ran into the buzz saw of competitors already positioned in the shifted market and created nothing new for shoppers, or investors.
And that’s why investors need to worry about Home Depot. The company was a shopper and investor darling as it maintained double digit growth through the 1980s and 1990s. But as competition matched, or beat, Home Depot’s prices – and often the capability of in-store help – growth slowed.
The Board replaced the founding leader with a senior General Electric leader named Robert Nardelli. He rapidly moved to operate the historical Home Depot success formula cheaper, better and faster by cutting costs — from employees to store operations and inventory. And customers moved even more quickly to the competition.
As the recessions worsened job growth remained scarce and eventually home values plummeted causing Home Depot’s growth to disappear. The company may be good at what it used to do, but that is simply a more competitive market that is a lot less interesting to shoppers today. Because Home Depot has not shifted into new markets, it is in a difficult situation (and considered the 5th worst performing retailer.) Who cares if you are a competitive home improvement store when your house is only worth 75% of the outstanding mortgage and you can’t refinance?
Chart source Yahoo Finance 11/11/11
And it is worth taking some time to look at Wal-Mart. The chain is famous for its rural and suburban stores selling at low prices, both as Wal-Mart and Sam’s Club. But looking forward, we see the company has failed at everything else it has tried. It’s offshore businesses have never met expectations and the company has left most markets. It’s efforts at more targeted merchandise, upscale stores and smaller stores have all been abandoned. And the company remains a serious lagger in understanding on-line sales as it has continued pouring money into defending its historical business, providing almost no return to investors for a decade.
The market is shifting, competitors have attacked its old “core,” but Wal-Mart remains stuck trying to do more, better, faster, cheaper with no clear sign it will make any difference as people change buying patterns. How can any brick-and-mortar retailer compete on cost with a web page?
Chart Source Yahoo Finance 11/11/11
All markets shift. All of them. Poor performance is most often an indication that the company has not shifted with the market. Competition in lower growth markets leads to weak revenue performance, and declining profits. Trying to “fix” the business by doing more of the same is almost always a money-losing proposition that hastens failure.
It is possble to fix a weak business. Moving with shifting markets into mobile has been very valuable for Apple investors. Two decades ago IBM shifted from hardware sales to a services focus, and the company not only escaped bankruptcy but now is worth more than Microsoft.
“Fixing” requires focusing on the future, and figuring out how to compete in the shifting market. Rather than applying cost-cutting and operational improvement, it is important to determine what future markets value, and deliver that. Zappos figured out that it could take a big lead in footwear and apparel if it offered people on-line convenience, and guaranteed taking back any products customers didn’t want (“What Other Businesses Can Learn from Zappos” CMSWire.com.) It’s sales exploded. Toms Shoes tapped into the market desire for helping others by donating a pair of shoes every time someone bought a pair, and sales are growing in double digits (CNBC video on Tom’s Shoes).
History has taught us to be pessimistic about fixing a troubled business. But that is largely because most management is fixated on trying to defend & extend the past. But turnarounds can be a lot more common if leaders instead focus on the future and meet emerging needs. It simply takes a different approach.
In the meantime, in retail it’s a lot smarter to invest in Amazon and retailers meeting emerging needs than those fixated on cost cutting and operational improvement. Be wary of Sears, Home Depot and Wal-Mart as long as management remains locked-in to its past.
by Adam Hartung | Jul 9, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Rapids, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in, Openness
Google is growing, and GM is trying to get out of bankruptcy. On the surface there are lots of obvious differences. Different markets, different customers, different products, different size of company, different age. But none of these get to the heart of what's different about the two companies. None of these really describe why one is doing well while the other is doing poorly.
GM followed, one could even say helped create, the "best practices" of the industrial era. GM focused on one industry, and sought to dominate that market. GM eschewed other businesses, selling off profitable businesses in IT services and aircraft electronics. Even selling off the parts business for its own automobiles. GM focused on what it knew how to do, and didn't do anything else.
GM also figured out its own magic formula to succeed, and then embedded that formula into its operating processes so the same decisions were replicated again and again. GM Locked-in on that Success Formula, doing everything possible to Defend & Extend it. GM built tight processes for everything from procurement to manufacturing operations to new product development to pricing and distribution. GM didn't focus on doing new things, it focused on trying to make its early money making processes better. As time went by GM remained committed to reinforcing its processes, believing every year that the tide would turn and instead of losing share to competitors it would again gain share. GM believed in doing what it had always done, only better, faster and cheaper. Even into bankruptcy, GM believed that if it followed its early Success Formula it would recapture earlier rates of return.
Google is an information era company, defining the new "best practices". It's early success was in search engine development, which the company turned into a massive on-line advertising placement business that superceded the first major player (Yahoo!). But after making huge progress in that area, Google did not remain focused alone on doing "search" better year after year. Since that success Google has also launched an operating system for mobile phones (Android), which got it into another high-growth market. It has entered the paid search marketplace. And now, "Google takes on Windows with Chrome OS" is the CNN headline.
"Google to unveil operating system to rival Microsoft" is the Marketwatch headline. This is not dissimilar from GM buying into the airline business. For people outside the industry, it seems somewhat related. But to those inside the industry this seems like a dramatic move. For participants, these are entirely different technologies and entirely different markets. Not only that, but Microsoft's Windows has dominated (over 90% market share) the desktop and laptop computer markets for years. To an industrial era strategist the Windows entry barriers would be considered insurmountable, making it not worthwhile to pursue any products in this market.
Google is unlike GM in that
- it has looked into the future and recognizes that Windows has many obstacles to operating effictively in a widely connected world. Future scenarios show that alternative products can make a significant difference in the user experience, and even though a company currently dominates the opportunity exists to Disrupt the marketplace;
- Google remains focused on competitors, not just customers. Instead of talking to customers, who would ask for better search and ad placement improvements, Google has observed alternative, competitive operating system products, like Unix and Linux, making headway in both servers and the new netbooks. While still small share, these products are proving adept at helping people do what they want with small computers and these customers are not switching to Windows;
- Google is not afraid to Disrupt its operations to consider doing something new. It is not focused on doing one thing, and doing it right. Instead open to bringing to market new technologies rapidly when they can Disrupt a market; and
- Google uses extensive White Space to test new solutions and learn what is needed in the product, distribution, pricing and promotion. Google gives new teams the permission and resources to investigate how to succeed – rather than following a predetermined path toward an internally set goal (like GM did with its failed electric car project).
Nobody today wants to be like GM. Struggling to turn around after falling into bankruptcy. To be like Google you need to quit following old ideas about focusing on your core and entry barriers – instead develop scenarios about the future, study competitors for early market insights, Disrupt your practices so you can do new things and test lots of ideas in White Space to find out what the market really wants so you can continue growing.
Don't forget to download the new, free ebook "The Fall of GM: What Went Wrong and How To Avoid Its Mistakes"
by Adam Hartung | Apr 21, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
"With Oracle, Sun avoids becoming another Yahoo," headlines Marketwatch.com today. As talks broke down because IBM was unwilling to up its price for Sun Microsystems, Oracle Systems swept in and made a counter-offer that looks sure to acquire the company. Unlike Yahoo – Sun will now disappear. The shareholders will get about 5% of the value Sun was worth a decade ago at its peak. That's a pretty serious value destruction, in any book. And if you don't think this is bad news for the employees and vendors just wait a year and see how many remain part of Oracle. A sale to IBM would have fared no better for investors, employees or vendors.
It was clear Sun wasn't able to survive several years ago. That's why I wrote about the company in my book Create Marketplace Disruption. Because the company was unwilling to allow any internal Disruptions to its Success Formula and any White Space to exist which might transform the company. In the fast paced world of information products, no company can survive if it isn't willing to build an organization that can identify market shifts and change with them.
I was at a Sun analyst conference in 1995 where Chairman McNealy told the analysts "have you seen the explosive growth over at Cisco System? I ask myself, how did we miss that?" And that's when it was clear Sun was in for big, big trouble. He was admitting then that Sun was so focused on its business, so focused on its core, that there was very little effort being expended on evaluating market shifts – which meant opportunities were being missed and Sun would be in big trouble when its "core" business slowed – as happens to all IT product companies. Sun had built its Success Formula selling hardware. Even though the real value Sun created shifted more and more to the software that drove its hardware, which became more and more generic (and less competitive) every year, Sun wouldn't change its strategy or tactics – which supported its identity as a hardware company – its Success Formula. Even though Sun became a leader in Unix operating systems, extensions for networking and accessing lots of data, as well as the creator and developer of Java for network applications because software was incompatible with the Success Formula, the company could not maintain independent software sales and the company failed.
Sort of like Xerox inventing the GUI (graphical user interface), mouse, local area network to connect a PC to a printer, and the laser printer but never capturing any of the PC, printer or desktop publishing market. Just because Xerox (and Sun) invented a lot of what became future growth markets did not insure success, because the slavish dedication to the old Success Formula (in Xerox's case big copiers) kept the company from moving forward with the marketplace.
Instead, Sun Microsystems kept trying to Defend & Extend its old, original Success Formula to the end. Even after several years struggling to sell hardware, Sun refused to change into the software company it needed to become. To unleash this value, Sun had to be acquired by another software company, Oracle, willing to let the hardware go and keep the software – according to the MercuryNews.com "With Oracle's acquisition of Sun, Larry Ellison's empire grows." Scott McNealy wouldn't Disrupt Sun and use White Space to change Sun, so its value deteriorated until it was a cheap buy for someone who could use the software pieces to greater value in another company.
Compare this with Steve Jobs. When Jobs left Apple in disrepute he founded NeXt to be another hardware company – something like a cross between Apple and Sun. But he found the Unix box business tough sledding. So he changed focus to a top application for high powered workstations – graphics – intending to compete with Silicon Graphics (SGI). But as he learned about the market, he realized he was better off developing application software, and he took over leadership of Pixar. He let NeXt die as he focused on high end graphics software at Pixar, only to learn that people weren't as interesed in buying his software as he thought they would be. So he transitioned Pixar into a movie production company making animated full-length features as well as commercials and short subjects. Mr. Jobs went through 3 Success Formulas getting the business right – using Disruptions and White Space to move from a box company to a software company to a movie studio (that also supplied software to box companies). By focusing on future scenarios, obsessing about competitors and Disrupting his approach he kept pushing into White Space. Instead of letting Lock-in keep him pushing a bad idea until it failed, he let White Space evolve the business into something of high value for the marketplace. As a result, Pixar is a viable competitor today – while SGI and Sun Microsystems have failed within a few months of each other.
It's incredibly easy to Defend & Extend your Success Formula, even after the business starts failing. It's easy to remain Locked-in to the original Success Formula and keep working harder and faster to make it a little better or cheaper. But when markets shift, you will fail if you don't realize that longevity requires you change the Success Formula. Where Unix boxes were once what the market wanted (in high volume), shifts in competitive hardware (PC) and software (Linux) products kept sucking the value out of that original Success Formula.
Sun needed to Disrupt its Lock-ins – attack them – in order to open White Space where it could build value for its software products. Where it could learn to sell them instead of force-bundling them with hardware, or giving them away (like Java.) And this is a lesson all companies need to take to heart. If Sun had made these moves it could have preserved much more of its value – even if acquired by someone else. Or it might have been able to survive as a different kind of company. Instead, Sun has failed costing its investors, employees and vendors billions.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 9, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lifecycle, Lock-in, Web/Tech
$193billion dollars. An amount that seems only viable for governments to discuss. But that is how much the value of Sun Microsystems declined in less than one decade (see chart here). At the height of its dominance as a supplier to telecom companies in the 1990s Sun was worth over $200billion. Recently IBM made an offer at just under $8billion. But Sun has rejected the IBM bid, which was more than double its recent market value, and Sun is now worth only about 60% of the bid. An amazing loss of value for a company that never paid a dividend. And the failure can be tied to a single problem.
Forbes magazine is having a field day with the leadership at Sun these days. "Sun May Be Pulling a Yahoo!" the magazine exclamed on Monday when Sun said it was turning down the IBM offer. The similarity is that both companies turned down values at above market price, but both probably won't receive offers from anyone else. The difference, however, is that Yahoo! has a chance to compete with Google, and Microsoft would have suffocated those chances. Sun, on the other hand, won't survive and the only way investors will get any value is if Sun agrees to the buyout.
Reinforcing the thinking that Sun won't make it on its own, Forbes today led with "Sun's Six Biggest Mistakes" which decries recent (last 4 years) tactical failings of the company. But in truth, Sun was destined to fail 8 years ago – as I argued clearly in my book Create Marketplace Disruption (buy a copy from my blog or at Amazon.com.) The company never overcame Lock-in to its initial Success Formula, and when its market shifted in 2000 the company went into a nosedive from which no tactical changes could save it.
Scott McNealy was the patriarch of Sun Microsystems. Son of an auto executive, he had a love for "big iron" as he called the large, robust American cars of the 50s, 60s and 70s. And when he started Sun Microsystems he imbued it with an identity for "big iron." Mr. McNealy wasn't interested in creating a software company, he wanted to sell hardware – like the days when computing was all about big mainframe machines. His might be smaller and cheaper than mainframes, but the identity of Sun was clearly tied to selling boxes that were powerful, and expensive.
Everything about the company's development linked to this identity (see the book for details). The company strategy was tied to being a leader in selling hardware systems. First powerful desktop systems but increasingly powerful network servers. Iron that would replace mainframes and extend computing power to challenge supercomputers. All tactics, from R&D to manufacturing and sales tied to this Identity. And because the products were good, and met a market need in the 80s and 90s, this Success Formula flourished and reinforced the Identity.
A lot of new products came out of Sun Microsystems. They were an early leader in RISC chips to drive faster processing. And faster memory schemes and disk array technology. These reinforced the sale of hardware systems. The company also extended the capabilities of Unix software, but of course you could only buy this enhanced system if you bought one of their computers. Sun even invented Java, a major advancement for internet applications. But then they gave away this software because it didn't reinforce the sale of their hardware. Sun felt that if everyone used Java it would generally grow internet ue, which would grow server demand, which would help them sell more server hardware – so don't even bother trying to build a software sales capability. That did not reinforce the Identity, so it wasn't part of the Success Formula. Everything leadership and the company did was focused on its core – Defending and Extending the sales of Unix Workstations and Servers. It's hedgehog concept was to be the world's best at this, and it was. Sun intended to Defend & Extend that Identity and its Success Formula at all costs.
But then the market shifted. The telecom companies over-invested in infrastructure, and their demand for Sun hardware fell dramatically. Workstations based on PC technology caught up with Sun hardware for many applications, rendering the Sun workstations overpriced. Makers of PC servers developed advancements making their servers faster, and considerably cheaper, meaning Sun servers weren't required or were overpriced for company applications. Within 2 years, the market had shifted away from needing all those Sun boxes, causing Sun sales and market value to collapse.
Sun made one mistake. It never addressed the potential for a market shift that could obsolete its Success Formula. Sun never challenged its Identity. Sun leaders never developed scenarios that envisioned solutions other than an extended Sun leadership position. They only looked at competitors they met originally (such as DEC and SGI) and when they beat those competitors leadership quit obsessing about new comers, causing them to miss the shift to lower price platforms. Although Scott McNealy was an outrageous sort of character, he created lots of disturbance in Sun without creating any Disruption. People felt the heat of his presence, but there was no tolerance for anyone who would shed light on market changes (especially after Ed Zander was installed as COO). Nobody challenged the Success Formula. Nobody in leadership was allowed to consider Sun doing something different – like selling software profitably. And thus, there was no White Space in Sun. No place to with permission to do new things, and no resources to do anything but promote "big iron."
When any company remains tied to its Identity and its Lock-in failure will eventually happen. Markets shift. Then, all the tactical efforts in the world are insufficient. It takes a new Success Formula – maybe even an entirely new identity. Like Virgin becoming an airline rather than a record company. Or Singer a defense contractor rather than a sewing machine company. Or maybe something as simple as GE becoming something besides a light bulb and electric generation company – getting into locomotives and jet engines. The one big mistake made by Sun can be made by anyone. To remain Locked-in too long and let market shifts destroy your value.
by Adam Hartung | Mar 18, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Rapids, In the Swamp, Innovation, Leadership, Web/Tech
We hear people say that eventually there will be no PC. Did you ever wonder what "the next thing" will look like that makes the PC obsolete? For most of us, working away day-to-day on our PC, and talking on our mobile phone, we hear the chatter, but it doesn't ring for us. As customers, all we can imagine is the PC a little cheaper, or a little smaller, or doing a few new things. And same for our phone. But, for those who are making the technology real, imagining that next way of getting things done – of improving our personal productivity the way the PC did back in the early '80s – it is an obsession.
I think we're getting really close, however. In what Forbes magazine headlined "Apple's Explosive iPhone Update" we learn that Apple is dramatically enhancing what it's little hand held device can do. USAToday hit upon all the new capabilities of the iPhone in its article "Apple iPhone software prices may rise," but these are just the capabilities us mere users can see. On top of these, Apple has provided 1,000 new Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). These allow programmers all kinds of opportunities to do new things with the iPhone (or iTouch). We all know that the netbook direction has small devices doing spreadsheets, presentations and documents – and that is, well, child's play and not the next move to personal productivity. You have to go beyond what's already been done on these machines if you want to get new users – those that will make your product supercede and obsolete the old product. And these APIs open that world for programmers to do new things on the iPhone and iTouch.
So go beyond your PC and phone with your thinking. With just one of the new offerings, Push, your iPhone could recognize your location (via GPS), know you are walking in front of a Pizza Hut (example) and ring you that this store will give you $2.00 off on a lunch pizza. Right now. And it'll create that magical bar code so the minimum wage employee at the register can scan your phone to get the price right when you check out. Or link your phone via bluetooth to your heart rate monitor in your running watch and automatically email the result to your cardiologist for the hourly profile she's building to determine your next round of pills – with a quick ring and reminder to you that you best slow that walk down a little if you want to get positive, rather than negative, impact. Or you get an alert that UBS just posted on the web a new review of GE (in your stock portfolio) and your phone automatically forwarded it to your broker at Merrill asking him for a comment and executed a stop-sell order at $.30 below the current market price via the on-line ML order application. By the way, you were supposed to turn at the last corner, but you were so busy listening to your alert that you missed the intersection so the GPS is re-orienting you to the destination – especially since there is construction on the next street and the sidewalk is closed – as per the notice posted by Chicago Streets and Sanitation this morning.
What makes this interesting is that it's the device, plus the open APIs, that make this stuff real and not just fairy dreams. That makes you wonder if you really want to lug around that 7 pound laptop, now that you get the newspaper, magazines and your books from Amazon all on the iPhone as well. And when you're delayed at O'Hare you can download last night's episode of Two-and-a-half Men and watch it on the screen while you wait to board. The laptop can't do everything this new device can do – and the new thing is smaller, and cheaper, and easier. This is all getting very real now. And with Google and Palm close on Apple's heals, it's now a big race to see who delivers these applications.
Does your scenario of the future have all this in mind? Are you planning for this level of productivity? Of information access? Of real-time knowledge? Are you thinking about how to use this capability to improve returns so you can explode out of this recession in 2010? Do you think you better take some time now to check?
In the meantime, IBM wants to buy Sun Microsystems according to the Marketwatch.com article "IBM May get Burnt." Talk about "other side of the coin." Why would anybody want to buy a company with declining sales? In IBM's case, probably to eliminate a competitor. Now that is typical 1980s industrial thinking. "So last century" as the young people say. The financial services and telecom industries are "soft" – to say the least. IT purchases are lowered. IBM and Sun are big suppliers. So IBM can buy Sun and hope that it will get rid of a competitor, and then raise prices. And that is typical industrial era – circa Michael Porter and his book Competitive Strategy – thinking. Lots of people are probably saying "why not, sounds like a good way to make money."
At least one problem is that this is no cheap acquisition. Ignoring integration problems, even though Sun is down – a huge amount down – the acquisitions is still over $6billion. Sure, IBM has that in cash. But what happens in information businesses is that competition never goes away. With budgets low, what sorts of PC servers (maybe from HP) running Linux are coming out that the customers will compare with Unix servers – and push down prices even if IBM has no Unix server competition? What opportunities for outsourcing applications to offshore server farms, running Chinese or Korean-made boxes with Linux, taking the business away from IBM exist? Or what applications will be eliminated by banks and telcos that need to axe costs for survival now that markets have shifted? You don't get to "own" an information-based business, and you don't get to control the pricing or behavior of customers. IBM needs to wake up and realize that it's investment in Sun within 2 years will be washed away.
We should be heading forward, not backward. Especially during this recession. Those companies that deliver new products that exceed old capabilities will be winners. Those that seize this opportunity to Disrupt markets – like Apple is doing – will create platforms for growth. Those that try applying industrial practices will find themselves looking in the rear view mirror, but never find that lost "glory land" that disappeared in the big recession of 2008/09. As investors, we need to keep our eyes on the growing companies building new applications, rather than the ones trying to regain yesterday.
