Things are bad at HP these days. CEO and Board changes have confused the management team and investors alike. Despite a heritage based on innovation, the company is now mired in low-growth PC markets with little differentiation. Investors have dumped the stock, dropping company value some 60% over two years, from $52/share to $22 – a loss of about $60billion.
Reacting to the lousy revenue growth prospects as customers shift from PCs to tablets and smartphones, CEO Meg Whitman announced plans to eliminate 27,000 jobs; about 8% of the workforce. This is supposedly the first step in a turnaround of the company that has flailed ever since buying Compaq and changing the company course into head-to-head PC competition a decade ago. But, will it work?
Not a chance.
Fixing HP requires understanding what went wrong at HP. Simply, Carly Fiorina took a company long on innovation and new product development and turned it into the most industrial-era sort of company. Rather than having HP pursue new technologies and products in the development of new markets, like the company had done since its founding creating the market for electronic testing equipment, she plunged HP into a generic manufacturing war.
Pursuing the PC business Ms. Fiorina gave up R&D in favor of adopting the R&D of Microsoft, Intel and others while spending management resources, and money, on cost management. PCs offered no differentiation, and HP was plunged into a gladiator war with Dell, Lenovo and others to make ever cheaper, undifferentiated machines. The strategy was entirely based upon obtaining volume to make money, at a time when anyone could buy manufacturing scale with a phone call to a plethora of Asian suppliers.
Quickly the Board realized this was a cutthroat business primarily requiring supply chain skills, so they dumped Ms. Fiorina in favor of Mr. Hurd. He was relentless in his ability to apply industrial-era tactics at HP, drastically cutting R&D, new product development, marketing and sales as well as fixating on matching the supply chain savings of companies like Dell in manufacturing, and WalMart in retail distribution.
Unfortunately, this strategy was out of date before Ms. Fiorina ever set it in motion. And all Mr. Hurd accomplished was short-term cuts that shored up immediate earnings while sacrificing any opportunities for creating long-term profitable new market development. By the time he was forced out HP had no growth direction. It's PC business fortunes are controlled by its suppliers, and the PC-based printer business is dying. Both primary markets are the victim of a major market shift away from PC use toward mobile devices, where HP has nothing.
HPs commitment to an outdated industrial era supply-side manufacturing strategy can be seen in its acquisitions. What was once the world's leading IT services company, EDS, was bought in 2008 after falling into financial disarray as that market shifted offshore. After HP spent nearly $14B on the purchase, HP used that business to try defending and extending PC product sales, but to little avail. The services group has been downsized regularly as growth evaporated in the face of global trends toward services offshoring and mobile use.
In 2009 HP spent almost $3B on networking gear manufacturer 3Com. But this was after the market had already started shifting to mobile devices and common carriers, leaving a very tough business that even market-leading Cisco has struggled to maintain. Growth again stagnated, and profits evaporated as HP was unable to bring any innovation to the solution set and unable to create any new markets.
In 2010 HP spent $1B on the company that created the hand-held PDA (personal digital assistant) market – the forerunner of our wirelessly connected smartphones – Palm. But that became an enormous fiasco as its WebOS products were late to market, didn't work well and were wholly uncompetitive with superior solutions from Apple and Android suppliers. Again, the industrial-era strategy left HP short on innovation, long on supply chain, and resulted in big write-offs.
Clearly what HP needs is a new strategy. One aligned with the information era in which we live. Think like Apple, which instead of chasing Macs a decade ago shifted into new markets. By creating new products that enhanced mobility Apple came back from the brink of complete failure to spectacular highs. HP needs to learn from this, and pursue an entirely new direction.
But, Meg Whitman is certainly no Steve Jobs. Her career at eBay was far from that of an innovator. eBay rode the growth of internet retailing, but was not Amazon. Rather, instead of focusing on buyers, and what they want, eBay focused on sellers – a classic industrial-era approach. eBay has not been a leader in launching any new technologies (such as Kindle or Fire at Amazon) and has not even been a leader in mobile applications or mobile retail.
While CEO at eBay Ms. Whitman purchased PayPal. But rather than build that platform into the next generation transaction system for web or mobile use, Paypal was used to defend and extend the eBay seller platform. Even though PayPal was the first leader in on-line payments, the market is now crowded with solutions like Google Wallets (Google,) Square (from a Twitter co-founder,) GoPayment (Intuit) and Isis (collection of mobile companies.)
Had Ms. Whitman applied an information-era strategy Paypal could have been a global platform changing the way payment processing is handled. Instead its use and growth has been limited to supporting an historical on-line retail platform. This does not bode well for the future of HP.
HP cannot save its way to prosperity. That never works. Try to think of one turnaround where it did – GM? Tribune Corp? Circuit City? Sears? Best Buy? Kodak? To successfully turn around HP must move – FAST – to innovate new solutions and enter new markets. It must change its strategy to behave a lot more like the company that created the oscilliscope and usher in the electronics age, and a lot less like the industrial-era company it has become – destroying shareholder value along the way.
Is HP so cheap that it's a safe bet. Not hardly. HP is on the same road as DEC, Wang, Lanier, Gateway Computers, Sun Microsystems and Silicon Graphics right now. And that's lousy for investors and employees alike.
It seems like the best way to find old success is to do more of what used to make you successful
But lack of success is from market shifts, meaning you need to do more things
Investing in what you know gets more expensive every year, with little (if any) improvement in returns
To regain success it’s actually better to get out into new markets where you can compete with lower investment rates, generating more profitable sales
Apple increased its sales of Macs not by focusing on Macs – but instead by becoming a winner in entirely different markets creating a feedback loop to the old, original “core”
MediaPost.com, in its article “Enterprise Sector Takes a Shine to Apple” has some remarkable statistics about Apple sales. At a time when most PC manufacturers, such as Dell and HP, are struggling to maintain even decent growth (even after the launch of upgraded Windows 7 and Office 2010) Apple is dramatically increasing its volume of Macs – and gaining market share. In last year’s second quarter:
Mac sales jumped almost 50% in the business sector
Mac sales jumped a whopping 200% in the government sector
Mac sales rose over 31% in the home sector
In Europe, Mac unit sales doubled their market share – and more than tripled their share in dollars
Yes, Macs are a small part of the market. Around 3.5% in the U.S. But, if you’re an Apple employee, supplier or investor that doesn’t matter, does it? In fact, it comes off sounding like a PC fan pooh-poohing a really astounding sales improvement. Nobody is saying the Mac will soon replace PCs (that’s more likely to happen via mobile devices where Apple has iPhone and iPad). But when you can dramatically increase your sales, especially as a $50B company, it’s a big deal.
The lesson for managers here is more unconventional. For years we’ve been told the way to grow your sales and profits is to “stick to your knitting.” To “protect your core.” The idea has been promoted that you should jettison anything that is a diversion to what you want to do best, and completely focus on what you select, and then try to out-compete all others with that product. If things don’t improve, then you need to get even more focused on your core, and invest more deeply. And hope the Mojo returns.
But that’s exactly the opposite of what Apple did. When almost bankrupt in 2001 Apple jettisoned multiple Mac products. It invested in music and entertainment products (iPod. iTouch and iTunes) to grab large sales with lower investment rates. It then rolled that success into developing the mobile computing/phone business with the iPhone and all those apps (some 250 thousand now and growing!). And it built on that success with a mobile tablet called the iPad. The Mac is now growing as a result of Apple’s success in all these other products creating a favorable feedback loop to the original “core”.
Apple spends less than 1/8th the money on R&D as Microsoft. And an even lesser amount on marketing, PR and sales. Yet, by entering new markets it gets far more “bang for its buck.” By entering new markets Apple is able to develop and launch new products, that sell in greater volumes and at higher profits, than had it stuck to being a “Mac company.” In fact, back when it only had 45 days of cash on hand, if it had stayed a “Mac company” Apple would have failed.
What we now see is that constantly re-investing in what you know drives down marginal rates of return. It keeps getting harder and harder, at ever greater cost, to drive new development and new sales with upgrades to old products. Look at the sales and profit problems at Sun Microsystems (world leader in Unix servers) and Silicon Graphics (world leader in graphics computers) and now Dell. What we’d like to think works at driving revenue and profits really raises new product costs and creates an easy target for new competitors who attack you as you sit there, all Locked-in to doing more of the same.
Contrarily, when you develop new products for new markets you grow revenues at lower cost, and thus higher profits. And you create a feedback loop that helps you get more sales without massive investments in your historical “core.” Think about Nike. It hasn’t been a “shoe company” for a very long time – but its shoes are greatly benefited by all the success Nike has in golf clubs and all those other products with a swoosh on them.
When confronted with a decision between “investing in the core” – or “protecting the mother ship” – or investing in new markets and solutions —- be very careful. Your “gut” may lead you to “in a blink” decide the obvious answer is to invest in what you know. But we are learning every quarter that this is a road to problems. You get more and more focused, and less and less prepared for the market shift that sent you into that “core focus” in the first place. Pretty soon you’re so far removed from the market you can’t survive – like Sun and SGI. It’s really a whole lot smarter to get out into new markets with White Space teams that can generate revenues with a lot less cost by being a smart, early competitor.
Eight months ago I wrote (10/20/09 – Keep an Eye on Dell – Good Things Happening) that Dell's efforts to bring a smart phone to market showed real promise for the company. Michael Dell seemed committed to shaking things up in order to launch new products. And in February I wrote (2/22/10 Looking for Winners – Dell) not to be too worried about Dell's small desktop market share losses because Dell needed to be heading into new markets – like Smart phones – seeking growth rather than over-investing in its old desktop business.
But I've since turned much more negative. The Reuter's article points out that Dell still hasn't gotten the smart phone to market in the USA. A phone was released in China last year, but sales have been minimal. There is a vague promise (no date) to release a new product in China – but none in the USA. And a potential tablet (competitor to iPad) is consideredby end of 2010, but the company stresses no firm date.
Dell is moving far too slowly, and is far too uncommitted, to new businesses. The company is listening to the analysts who have traditionally followed them – the large customers who have bought Microsoft products and are still doing so – and large vendors who want to maintain the status quo. All of these folks are as locked-in as Dell.
Meanwhile Apple and Google keep selling thousands of units into these rapidly expanding new markets, growing share as well as sales at substantial profit.
This effort by Google is certainly good for its Chrome O/S. Even if Dell moves slowly, having Chrome adopted into any part of the historically monopolistic Microsoft community is a good thing. And the announcement itself shows the fragility of Microsoft in its historical market as growth slows and large distributors look to new solutions for "cloud computing" from new vendors. So this is good for Google, and another dart into the wounds of Microsoft.
The market keeps shifting toward new technology and the vendors supporting it – making the re-invention gap bigger and bigger at Dell. I don’t think Dell’s management is up to the market challenges. They had a shot at real change, but by not giving the growth projects (then or now) real permission to do what it takes to succeed, including moving much faster to market, nor sufficient resources to meet market needs, Dell is hastening its own demise. With its outdated, and now low-return, success formula firmly locked in, Dell looks likely to follow Wang, Lanier, Burroughs, DEC, Silicon Graphics and Sun Microsystems into the history books.
Recently SeekingAlpha.com ran the article "Time for Tivo to say Ta Ta." The author (a professor) took the point of view that Tivo had filled a need, but now there were ample new options – such as on-line downloads – making Tivo obsolete. As a result, the company should fold up its tent and let the employees move on.
I was struck, because the good professor did not seem to think it might be possible for Tivo to change its business model and move into the other growing opportunities while simultaneously maintaining the traditional Tivo set-top business until the market figures out what customers really want. That sort of predicting future markets is dangerous for 2 reasons:
the inherent assumption that Tivo can be in only one market is flawed. There is nothing stopping Tivo from participating in the marketplace robustly with mutliple solution offerings. It can even cannibalize its own "base" revenues if the market shifts into other solutions. Tivo could remain top of the market – regardless of what solution dominates
predicting future markets is a fools game. The good professor may guess some of these futurist positions right, but he's sure to get many wrong. Any business that bets its product development or investments on future predictions is destined to eventually get it wrong – and possibly destroy itself. Good leaders use scenarios to realize there are multiple possibilities, and then participate in several of them in order to be assured of growth.
Fast Company points out in "Avoiding Corporate Death Spirals in a Sea of Change" that all companies hoping to remain long-lived MUST learn to transition with shifting markets. The article parallels this blog in discussing failures at Blockbuster Video, Silicon Graphics, Digital Equipment – and more recently dramatic share declines in Palm. All are attributed to management Lock-in on early wins, then trying to Defend & Extend the early Success Formula too long. Market transitions killed them. The article goes on to point out that Cisco Systems, a company held up as an example of Phoenix Principle Management here, has succeeded and grown principally because it has learned how to adjust to market shifts.
No company needs to give up. But all companies that want to survive HAVE to learn to manage market transitions. There is no other choice. Shift happens.
Every day it seems someone tells me they "are looking forward to an improved economy." When I ask "Why?" they give me a horrified look like I must be stupid. "Because I want my business to improve" is the most frequent answer. To which I ask "What makes you think an improved economy will help you?"
This recession/depression is the result of several market shifts.What people/businesses want, and how they want it, has changed. They no longer are willing to part for hard earned (and often saved) dollars for the same solutions they once purchased. They want advances in technology, manufacturing processes, communications and all aspects of business to give them different solutions. Until that comes along, they are willing to put money in the bank and simply wait.
Take for example restaurants. Many owners and operators are complaining business was horrid in 2009, and still far from the way it was years ago. And regularly we hear it is due to "the recession. People fear they'll lose their jobs, so they don't eat out as often." Nicely said. Sounds logical. Makes for a convenient excuse for lousy results.
Only it's wrong.
In "Dinner out Declines: Economy Not Sole Factor" MediaPost.com does a great overview of the fact that dining out started declining in 2001, and has steadily been on a downward trend. Across all age groups, eating out is simply less interesting – at least at current prices. When the recession came along, it simply accelerated an existing trend. Increasingly, people were less satisfied with cookie-cutter, similar establishments that had similar food (almost all of which was prepared somewhere else and merely heated and combined in the restaurant) and exorbitant drink prices. For years restaurant prices had outpaced inflation, and simultaneously family changes – along with the growth of better prepared foods at grocers and specialty markets – was enticing people to eat at home.
This is true across almost all industries. A revived economy will not increase demand for land-line phone service. Nor for large V-8 American autos costing $60,000. Nor for newspapers, or magazines – or even books most likely. Or for oversized homes that cost too much to heat and cool. In fact, it was the trend away from these products which caused the recession. People simply had all of these things they wanted, so they stopped buying. Fearful of economic change, they simply accelerated a trend brought on by shifts in technology and underlying ways of doing things. When we once again talk about better economic growth in America it will not drive people to these purchases. Rather, people will be buying different things.
For the recession to go away requires a change in inputs. Providers have to start giving buyers what they want. They have to understand market needs, and give solutions which entice people to part with their money. Waiting for "the economy" will make no difference. Government stimulus can go on forever, but it won't create growth. It can't. Only new products and services that fulfill needs create growth. That will cause spending (demand), which generates the requirement for supply.
There are companies that had a great 2009. Google, Apple and Amazon are popular names. Why? Not just because they are somehow "tech" or "internet" companies. 2009 saw the demise of Sun Microsystems and Silicon Graphics, for example. The difference is these companies are studying the market, looking to the future and introducing new products and services which meet market needs. Because of this, they are growing. They are doing their part to revitalize the economy. Not with stimulus, but with products that excite people to part with their cash.
Those who are waiting on the economy to improve are destined to find a rough road. An improving economy will be full of new competitors with new solutions who did not wait. To be a winner businesses today must be bringing forward new products and services that meet today's needs – not yesterday's. And if we start getting winners then we will climb out of this economic foxhole.
