Profit from growth markets, not “core” markets – Virgin & Nike vs. Dell & Sears


Summary:

  • We are biased toward doing what we know how to do, rather than something new
  • We like to think we can forever grow by keeping close to what we know – that’s a myth
  • Growth only comes from entering growth markets – whether we know much about them or not
  • To grow you have to keep yourself in growth markets, and it is dangerous to limit your prospects to projects/markets that are “core” or “adjacent to core”

Recently a popular business book has been Profit from the Core.  This book proposes the theory that if you want to succeed in business you should do projects that are either in your “core,” or “adjacent to your core.”  Don’t go off trying to do something new.  The further you move from your “core” the less likely you will succeed.  Talk about an innovation killer!  CEOs that like this book are folks who don’t want much new from their employees. 

I was greatly heartened by a well written blog article at Growth Science International  (www.GrowthSci.com) “Profit from Your Core, or Not.. The Myth of Adjacencies.”  Author Thomas Thurston does a masterful job of pointing out that the book authors fall into the same deadly trap as Jim Collins and Tom Peters.  They use hindsight primarily as the tool to claim success.  Their analysis looks backward – trying to explain only past events.  In doing so they cleverly defined terms so their stories seemed to prove their points.  But they are wholly unable to be predictive.  And, if their theory isn’t predictive, then what good is it?  If you can’t use their approach to give a 98% or 99% likelihood of success, then why bother?  According to Mr. Thurston, when he tested the theory with some academic rigor he was unable to find a correlation between success and keeping all projects at, or adjacent to, core.

Same conclusion we came to when looking at the theories proposed by Jim Collins and Tom Peters.  It sounds good to be focused on your core, but when we look hard at many companies it’s easy to find large numbers that simply do not succeed even though they put a lot of effort into understanding their core, and pouring resources into protecting that core with new core projects and adjacency projects.  Markets don’t care about whatever you define as core or adjacent.

It feels good, feels right, to think that “core” or “adjacent to core” projects are the ones to do.  But that feeling is really a bias.  We perceive things we don’t know as more risky than thing we know.  Whether that’s true or not.  We perceive bottled water to be more pure than tap water, but all studies have shown that in most cities tap water is actually lower in free particles and bacteria than bottled – especially if the bottle has sat around a while. 

What we perceive as risk is based upon our background and experience, not what the real, actual risk may be.  Many people still think flying is riskier than driving, but every piece of transportation analysis has shown that commercial flying is about the safest of all transportation methods – certainly much safer than anything on the roadway.  We also now know that computer flown aircraft are much safer than pilot flown aircraft – yet few people like the idea of a commercial drone which has no pilot as their transportation.  Even though almost all commercial flight accidents turn out to be pilot error – and something a computer would most likely have overcome.  We just perceive autos as less risky, because they are under our control, and we perceive pilots as less risky because we understand a pilot much better than we understand a computer.

We are biased to do what we’ve always done – to perpetuate our past.  And our businesses are like that as well.  So we LOVE to read a book that says “stick close to your known technology, known customers, known distribution system – stick close to what you know.”  It reinforces our bias.  It justifies us not doing what we perceive as being risky.  Even though it is really, really, really lousy advice.  It just feels so good – like sugary cereal for breakfast – that we justify it in our minds – like saying “breakfast is the most important meal of the day” as we consume food that’s probably less healthy than the box it came in!

There is no correlation between investing in your core, or close to core, projects and high rates of return.  Mr. Thurston again points this out.  High rates of return come from investing in projects in growth markets.  Businesses in growth markets do better, even when poorly managed, than businesses in flat or declining markets.  Where there are lots of customers wanting to buy a solution you simply do better than when there are lots of competitors fighting over dwindling customer revenues.  Regardless of how well you don’t know the former or do know the latter.  Market growth is a much better predictor of success than understanding your “core” and whatever you consider “adjacent.”

Virgin didn’t know anything about airlines before opening one – but international travel from London was set to boom and Virgin did well (as it has done in many new markets.)  Apple didn’t know anything about retail music before launching the iPhone and iTunes, but digital music had started booming at Napster and Apple cleaned up.  Nike was a shoe company that didn’t know anything about golf merchandise, but it entered the market for all things golf (first with just one club – the driver – followed by other things) by hooking up with Tiger Woods just as he helped promote the sport into dramatic growth.  

Success comes from entering new markets where there is growth.  Growth can overcome a world of bad management choices.  When there are lots of customers with needs to fill, you can make a lot of mistakes and still succeed.  To restrict yourself to “core” and “adjacent” invites failure, because your “core” and the “adjacent” markets that you know well simply may not grow.  Leaving you in a tough spot seeking higher profits in the face of stiff competition — like Dell today in PCs.  Or GM in autos.  Sears in retailing.  They may know their “core” but that isn’t giving them the growth they want, and need, to succeed in 2010.

Stop Focusing on Your Core – Forbes, Apple, Google


Leadership

Stop Focusing On Your Core Business

It has become the fast track to oblivion.

“Where Have All the Flowers Gone” was a 1960s antiwar hit for Peter,
Paul and Mary. The “flowers” meant soldiers dying in Vietnam. These days we might be tempted to sing,
“Where Have All the Mighty Corporations Gone?”

That is the first paragraph to my latest column for Forbes magazineA laundry list of notable failures the last few years is driving home the point that “focus on your core” is insufficient to even survive – much less thrive!  And don’t blame “the government” for these failures – as all were related to management decisions intended to keep the company “on track.”  Instead, these leadership teams “doubled down” on the old Success Formula until there just wasn’t any more juice left in that orange!

On the other hand, Apple demonstrates the value of seeking out new markets.  “The iPad is Already Bigger than the iPod — and Half as Big as the Mac” is the Business Insider article. 

Apple-rev-by-segment-6-10
Silicon Alley Insider 7-21-10

By distinctly not focusing on its core, and instead entering new markets, Apple — and Google as well — keep right on growing.  Ignoring the “Great Recession.”

So is your business strategy intended to have you keep doing more of the same?  Hoping if you do more, better, faster, cheaper things will return to the sales and profit growth of an earlier time?  Or are you entering new markets, putting out new solutions that meet emerging market needs?  Are you planning for a past era to return, or for the emerging future?  Do you use scenarios, or historical trend lines?  If you are hoping to be glorious by focusing on your core, give this Forbes article a read.  You just may decide to change course.

Innovation killers – Collins in the lead

Jim Collins has decided to start telling people how to manage innovation.  In "How Might We Emphasize Cost Effective Evaluation Tools" at the Good.is Blog Collins lays out his prescription for managing innovation.  And it's pure Collins, because he's a lot more interested in focus than results.  In fact, he is more concerned that before attempting innovation companies put in place a review process to rapidly cut off funds for innovations that go awry than figuring out how to behave differently.

Jim Collins has decided to tell people how to innovate.  Only his first recommendations don't sound anything like the road to innovation.  His five rules are timely, efficient, focused, sharable and actionable.  There's no mention of getting market input, or figuring out how to behave differently.  In Collins' world if you are efficient, mindful of the clock, focused and committed to extending your past Success Formula he's sure profits will evolve.

His passion for evaluation is paramount.  He loves to talk about being efficient in innovation, prototyping toward some goal that is pre-set.  Being "efficient" about the exercise drives his discussion – as if markets are efficient, or understanding how to make money in a shifted future marketplace is an efficient process.  And he is obsessed with being vigilant.  Collins is fearful that people will waste money on their innovation exercises.  Efficiency, ala Taylor and scientific management, is a dogma Collins cannot escape.  He wants his followers to be efficient, pre-planned, and obsessed about making sure money is not wasted from this escapade into innovation.

Jim Collins' prescription for success is one of the biggest snake oil
sales in business history.
  His book sales, and speaker fees,
demonstrate what a big PR budget from an aggressive publisher can
accomplish with content that sounds like "common sense."  Jim Collins'
"great" companies are anything but.
  Just run the list and you'll find
he loved companies like Circuit City, Fannie Mae, Wells Fargo and
Phillip Morris.  Companies that failed at innovation and ended up
smaller and less profitable (or gone completely.)

Today's economy has shifted. While Collins and Hamel spent years looking backward to see what worked in the 1970s, 80s and 90s those analyses are of no value today.  We aren't in an industrial economy any longer where building economies of scale or entry barriers works.  Being good at something is the mantra Collins lives upon, but when the market can shift in months, weeks or days to something entirely different being good at something that's obsolete does not create high rates of return. 

Collins is so afraid that companies will over-invest in something new he would rather kill an innovation than possibly spend too much.  His obsession with efficiency indicates an approach that is bankrupt intellectually, and has demonstrated it cannot produce better returns.  It sounds so good to be very focused, to be fearful of pouring good money after bad.  But reality is that businesses regularly accomplish just that – making bad investmentsby trying to defend & extend a business that is no longer competitive.

Only participating in changing markets creates high returns.  No business, not even huge companies like GM, Chrysler or Sun Microsystems, can "direct" a market.  There are no entry barriers in a globally connected digital economy.  If companies aren't willing to abandon their BHAGs (Big Hairy Audacious Goals) in favor of creating new solutions they simply are made obsolete.  Nobody's "hedgehog concept" will save them when the market shifts and previous sources of value are simply no longer valuable (just ask newspaper publishers, who never imagined that customers would move so fast to the web instead of waiting for their daily paper.) 

Almost 100 years ago a little known economist named Schumpeter said that value was created by introducing new solutions.  His work demonstrated that pursuing optimization led to lower rates of return, not higher.  As a result, he concluded that those who are flexible to market shifts – bringing new solutions to market rapidly – end up the big winners.  As we look at companies today, comparing Google, Apple, Cisco and Nike to GM, Kraft, Sara Lee and AT&T we can see that Schumpeter had it right. 

The gurus of business management helped us all realize how you could make improvements via optimization.  Peters told us to seek out excellence,  Hamel and Prahalad encouraged us to understand our core capabilities and leverage them.  Collins drummed into us that we should focus.  And most recently, a New Yorker editor with no business training or experience at all, Malcolm Gladwell, has admonished us to practice, practice, practice.  Yet, when we really look at performance we see that these practices make organizations more brittle, and subject to competitive attacks from those who would change the markets.

We know today that innovation leads to higher rates of return than optimization of old strategies.  But few recognize that innovation must be tied to market inputs.  We build organizations that are designed to execute what we did last year – not move toward what is needed next year.  This can be changed.  But first, we have to eliminate the innovation killers — and that includes Jim Collins.