by Adam Hartung | Jan 14, 2015 | Investing, Retail, Trends
Retail sales fell .9% in December. Even excluding autos and gasoline, retail sales fell .3%. Further, November retail sales estimates were revised downward from an initial .7% gain to a meager .4%, and October sales advances were revised downward from a .5% gain to a mere .3%. Sales were down at electronic stores, clothing stores and department stores – all places we anticipated gains due to an improving economy, more jobs and more cash in consumer pockets.
Whoa, what’s happening? Wasn’t lower gasoline pricing going to free up cash for people to go crazy buying holiday gifts? Weren’t we all supposed to feel optimistic about our jobs, higher future wages and more money to spend after that horrible Great Recession thus leading us to splurge this holiday?
There were early signals that conventional wisdom was going to be wrong. Back on Black Friday (so named because it is supposedly the day when retailers turn a profit for the year) we learned sales came in a disappointing 11% lower than 2013. Barron’s analyzed press releases from Wal-Mart, and discerned that 2014 was a weaker Black Friday than 2013 and probably 2012. Simply put, fewer people went shopping on Black Friday than before, despite longer store hours, and they bought less.
So was this really a horrible holiday?
Retail store sales are only part of the picture. Increasingly, people are shopping on-line – and we all know it. According to ComScore, on-line sales made to users of PCs (this excludes mobile devices) were up 17% on Cyber Monday, in stark contrast to traditional brick-and-mortar. Exceeding $2B, it was the largest on-line retail day in history. The Day after Cyber Monday sales were up 27%, and the Green Monday (one week after Cyber Monday) sales were up 15% (all compared to year ago.) Overall, the week after Thanksgiving on-line sales rose 14%, and on Thanksgiving Day itself sales were up a whopping 32%. The week before Christmas (16th-21st) on-line sales surged 18%. According to IBM Digital Analytics the on-line November-December sales were up 13.9% vs. 2013.
The trend has never been more pronounced. Regardless of how much people are going to spend, they are spending less of it in traditional brick-and-mortar retail, and more of it on-line.
So, what about Wal-Mart? The chain remains mired in its traditional way of doing business. Even though same-store sales have been flat-to-down most of the last 2 years, and the number of full-line stores has declined in the USA, the chain remains committed quarter after quarter to defending its outdated success formula. Even in China, where Alibaba has demonstrated it can grow on-line ecommerce revenues more than 50%/year, Wal-Mart continues to try growing with a physical presence – even though it has been a tough, unsuccessful slog.
Yet, despite its bribery scandal in Mexico undertaken to prop up revenues, lawsuits due to over-worked, stressed truck drivers having accidents on double shifts killing and injuring people, and an inability to grow, Wal-Mart’s stock trades at near all-time highs. The stock has nearly doubled since 2011, even though the company is at odds with the primary retail, and demographic, trends.
On the other end of the spectrum is Amazon.com. Amazon is still growing revenues at over 20%/year. And introducing successful new publishing and internet service businesses, expanding same day delivery (and even one hour delivery) in urban markets like New York City, as well as expansion of its Prime service to include more original programming with famed director Woody Allen after winning the Golden Globe award for its original series Transparent.
However, several analysts were trash talking Amazon in 2014. 20% growth has them worried, given that the company once grew at 40%. Even though Amazon’s growth is a serious reason companies like Wal-Mart cannot grow. And there is the perennial lack of profitability – including a larger than expected loss in the second quarter ; a loss which included a $170M write-off on FirePhones which never really found a customer base. The latter item led to a Fast Company brutal lambasting of CEO Jeff Bezos as a micro-manager out-of-touch with customers.
This lack of analyst support has seriously hurt Amazon.com share performance. From 2010 to early 2014 the stock quadrupled in value from $100 to $400. But over the past year the stock has fallen back 25%. After dropping to $300/share in April, the stock has rallied but then retrenched no less than 3 times, and is now trading very close to its 52 week low. And, it shows no momentum, trading below its moving average.
Which is why investors in Wal-Mart should sell, and reinvest in Amazon.com.
All the trends point to Wal-Mart being overvalued. Its revenues show no signs of achieving any substantial growth. And, despite its sheer size, all retail trends are working against the behemoth. It has been trying to find a growth engine for 10 years, but nothing has come to fruition – including big investments in offshore markets. The company keeps trying to defend & extend its old success formula, thus creating a bigger and bigger gap between itself and future market success.
Simultaneously, Amazon.com continues to invest in major developing trends. From publishing to television programming to cloud/web services and even general retail, everything into which Amazon invests is growing. And even though this is a company with $100B in revenues, it is still growing at a remarkable 20%. While some analysts may wish the investment rate would slow, and that Amazon would never make mistakes (like Firephone,) the truth is that Amazon is putting money into projects which have pretty good odds of making sizable money as it helps change the game in multiple markets.
Think of investing like paddling a canoe. When you are investing against trends, it’s like paddling up the river. You can make progress, but it is hard. And, one little mistake and you easily slip backward. Lose any momentum at all and you could completely turn around and disappear (like happened to Circuit City, and now both Sears and JCPenney.) When you invest with the trends it is like paddling down the river. The trend, like a current, keeps you moving in the right direction. You can still make mistakes, but the odds are quite a lot higher you will make your destination easily, and with resources to spare. That’s why the sales results for December are important. The show traditional retailers are paddling up river, while on-line retailers are paddling down-river.
I don’t know if Wal-Mart’s stock value has peaked, but it is hard to understand why anybody would expect it to go higher. It could continue to rise, but there are ample reasons to expect investors will figure out how tough future profits will be for Wal-Mart and dispose of their positions. On the other hand, even though Amazon.com could continue to slide down further there are even more reasons to expect it will have great future quarters with revenue gains and – eventually – those long-sought-after profits that some analysts seek. Meanwhile, Amazon is investing in projects with internal rates of return far higher than most other companies because they are following major trends. Odds are pretty good that in a few years the trends will make investors happy they own Amazon, and dropped out of Wal-Mart.
by Adam Hartung | Aug 23, 2013 | In the Swamp, Leadership, Software, Web/Tech
Steve Ballmer announced he would be retiring as CEO of Microsoft within the next 12 months. This extended timing, rather than immediately, shows clear the Board is ready for him to go but there is nobody ready to replace him.
The big question is, who would want Ballmer's job? It will be very tough to make Microsoft an industry leader again. What would his replacement propose to do? The fuse for a turnaround is short, and the options faint.
Microsoft has been on a downhill trajectory for at least 4 years. Although the company has introduced innovations in gaming (xBox and Kinect) as well as on-line (games and Bing), those divisions perpetually lose money. Stiff competitors Sony, Nintendo and Google have made these forays intellectually interesting, but of no value for investors or customers. The end-game for Microsoft has remained Windows – and as PC sales decline that's very bad news.
Microsoft viability has been firmly tied to Windows and Office sales. Historically these have been unassailable products, creating over 100% of the profits at Microsoft (covering losses in other divisions.) But, these products have lost growth, and relevancy. Windows 8 and Office 365 are product nobody really cares about, while they keep looking for updates from Apple, Google, Amazon and Samsung.
The market started going mobile 10 years ago. As Apple and Google promoted increased mobility, Microsoft tried to defend & extend its PC stronghold. It was a classic business inflection point in the making. Everyone knew at some point mobile devices would be more important than PCs. But most industry insiders (including Microsoft) kept thinking it would be later rather than sooner.
They were wrong. The shift came a lot faster than expected. Like in sailboat racing, suddenly the wind was taken out of Microsoft's sails as competitors shot to the lead in customer interest. While people were excited for new smartphones and tablets, Microsoft tried to re-engineer its historical product as an extension into the new market.
Windows 8 tablets and Surface tablets were ill-fated from the beginning. They did not appeal to the huge installed base of Windows customers, because changes like touch screens and tiles simply were too expensive and too behaviorally different. And they offered no advantage for people to switch that had already started buying iOS and Android products. Not to mention an app availability about 10% of the market leaders. Simply put, investing in Windows 8 and its own tablet was like adding bricks to a downhill runaway truck (end-of-life for PCs) – it sped up the time to an inevitable crash.
And spending money on poorly thought out investments like the Barnes & Noble Nook merely demonstrated Microsoft had money to burn, rather than a strategy for competing. Skype cost some $8B, but how has that helped Microsoft become more competive? It's not just an overspending on internal projects that failed to achieve any market success, but a series of wasted investments in bad acquisitions that showed Microsoft had no idea how it was going to regain industry leadership in a changing marketplace going more mobile and into the cloud every month.
Now the situation is pretty dire, and now is the time for Microsoft to give up on its defend and extend strategy for Windows/Office. Customers are openly uninterested in new laptops running Windows 8. And Win 8.1 will not change this lackadaisical attitude. Nobody is interested in Windows 8 phones, or tablets. This has left companies in the Microsoft ecosystem like HP, Dell and Nokia gasping for air as sales tumble, profits evaporate and customers flock to new solutions from Apple and Samsung. Instead of seeking out an update to Office for a new PC, people are using much lighter (and cheaper) cloud services from Amazon and office solutions like Google docs. And most of those old add-on product sales, like printers and servers, are disappearing into the cloud and mobile displays.
So now, after being forced to write off Surface and report a horrible quarter, the Board has pushed Ballmer out the door. Pretty remarkable. But, incredibly late. Just like the leaders at RIM stayed too long, leaving the company with no future options as Blackberry sales plummeted, Ballmer is taking leave as sales, profits and cash flow are taking a turn for the worst. And only months after a reorganization that simply made the whole situation a lot more confusing for not only investors, but internal managers and employees.
Microsoft has a big cash hoard, but how long will that last? As its distribution system falters, and sales drop, the costs will rapidly catch up with cash flow. Big layoffs are a certainty; think half the workforce in 2 years. Equally certain are sales of divisions (who can buy xBox market share and turn it competitively profitable?) or shut-downs (how long will Bing stay alive when it is utterly unnecessary and expensive to maintain?)
But, there is a better option. Without the cash from
Windows/Office, you can't keep much of the rest of Microsoft walking. So
now is the time to cut investments in Windows/Office and put money into the
best things Microsoft has going – primarily Kinect and cloud services. A radical restructuring of its spending and investments.
Kinect is an incredible product. It has found multiple applications Microsoft fails to capitalize upon. Kinect has the possibility of becoming the centerpiece for managing how we connect to data, how we store data, how we find data. It can bring together our smartphone, tablet and historical laptop worlds – and possibly even connect this to traditional TV and radio. It can be the centerpiece for two-way communications (think telephone or skype via all your devices.) Coupled with the right hardware, it can leapfrog iTV (which we still are waiting to see) and Cisco simultaneously.
In cloud services it will take a lot to compete with leaders Amazon, IBM, Apple and Google. They have made big investments, and are far in front. But, this is the bread-and-butter market for Microsoft. Millions of small businesses that want easy to use BYOD (bring your own device) environment, and easy access to data, documents and functionality for IT, like guaranteed data back-up and uptime, and user functionality like all those apps. These customers have relied on Microsoft for these kind of services for years, and would enjoy a services provider with an off-the-shelf product they can implement easily and cheaply that supports all their needs. Expensive to develop, but a growing market where Microsoft has a chance to leapfrog competitors.
As for Bing, give it to Yahoo – if Marissa Mayer will take it. Stop the bloodletting and get out of a market where Microsoft has never succeeded. Bing is core to Yahoo's business. If you can trade for some Yahoo stock, go for it. Let Yahoo figure out how to sell content and ads, while Microsoft refocuses on the new platform for 2017; from the user to the infrastructure services.
Strong leaders have their benefits. But, when they don't understand market shifts, and spend far too long trying to defend & extend past markets, they can put their organizations in terrible jeopardy of total failure. Ballmer leaves no with clear replacement, nor with any vision in place for leapfrogging competitors and revitalizing Microsoft.
So it is imperative the new leader provide this kind of new thinking. There are trends developing that create future scenarios where Microsoft can once again be a market leader. And it will be the role of the new CEO to identify that vision and point Microsoft's investments in the right direction to regain viability by changing the game on the current winners.
by Adam Hartung | Jul 18, 2013 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
Sears has performed horribly since acquired by Fast Eddie Lampert's KMart in 2005. Revenues are down 25%, same store sales have declined persistently, store margins have eroded and the company has recently taken to reporting losses. There really hasn't been any good news for Sears since the acquisition.
Bloomberg Businessweek made a frontal assault on CEO Edward Lampert's leadership at Sears this week. Over several pages the article details how a "free market" organization installed by Mr. Lampert led to rampant internal warfare and an inability for the company to move forward effectively with programs to improve sales or profits. Meanwhile customer satisfaction has declined, and formerly valuable brands such as Kenmore and Craftsman have become industry also-rans.
Because the Lampert controlled hedge fund ESL Investments is the largest investor in Sears, Mr. Lampert has no risk of being fired. Even if Nobel winner Paul Krugman blasts away at him. But, if performance has been so bad – for so long – why does the embattled Mr. Lampert continue to lead in the same way? Why doesn't he "fire" himself?
By all accounts Mr. Lampert is a very smart man. Yale summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa, he was a protege of former Treasury Secretay Robert Rubin at Goldman Sach before convincing billionaire Richard Rainwater to fund his start-up hedge fund – and quickly make himself the wealthiest citizen in Connecticut.
If the problems at Sears are so obvious to investors, industry analysts, economics professors, management gurus and journalists why doesn't he simply change?
Mr. Lampert, largely because of his success, is a victim of BIAS. Deep within his decision making are his closely held Beliefs, Interpretations, Assumptions and Strategies. These were created during his formative years in college and business. This BIAS was part of what drove his early success in Goldman, and ESL. This BIAS is now part of his success formula – an entire set of deeply held convictions about what works, and what doesn't, that are not addressed, discussed or even considered when Mr. Lampert and his team grind away daily trying to "fix" declining Sears Holdings.
This BIAS is so strong that not even failure challenges them. Mr. Lampert believes there is deep value in conventional retail, and real estate. He believes strongly in using "free market competition" to allocate resources. He believes in himself, and he believes he is adding value, even if nobody else can see it.
Mr. Lampert assumes that if he allows his managers to fight for resources, the best programs will reach the top (him) for resourcing. He assumes that the historical value in Sears and its house brands will remain, and he merely needs to unleash that value to a free market system for it to be captured. He assumes that because revenues remain around $35B Sears is not irrelevant to the retail landscape, and the company will be revitalized if just the right ideas bubble up from management.
Mr. Lampert inteprets the results very different from analysts. Where outsiders complain about revenue reductions overall and same store, he interprets this as an acceptable part of streamlining. When outsiders say that store closings and reduced labor hurt the brand, he interprets this as value-added cost savings. When losses appear as a result of downsizing he interprets this as short-term accounting that will not matter long-term. While most investors and analysts fret about the overall decline in sales and brands Mr. Lampert interprets growing sales of a small integrated retail program as a success that can turn around the sinking behemoth.
Mr. Lampert's strategy is to identify "deep value" and then tenaciously cut costs, including micro-managing senior staff with daily calls. He believes this worked for Warren Buffett, so he believes it will continue to be a successful strategy. Whether such deep value continues to exist – especially in conventional retail – can be challenged by outsiders (don't forget Buffett lost money on Pier 1,) but it is part of his core strategy and will not be challenged. Whether cost cutting does more harm than good is an unchallenged strategy. Whether micro-managing staff eats up precious resources and leads to unproductive behavior is a leadership strategy that will not change. Hiring younger employees, who resemble Mr. Lampert in quick thinking and intellect (if not industry knowledge or proven leadership skills) is a strategy that will be applied even as the revolving door at headquarters spins.
The retail market has changed dramatically, and incredibly quickly. Advances in internet shopping, technology for on-line shopping (from mobile devices to mobile payments) and rapid delivery have forever altered the economics of retailing. Customer ease of showrooming, and desire to shop remotely means conventional retail has shrunk, and will continue to shrink for several years. This means the real challenge for Sears is not to be a better Sears as it was in 2000 — but to become something very different that can compete with both WalMart and Amazon – and consumer goods manufacturers like GE (appliances) and Exide (car batteries.)
There is no doubt Mr. Lampert is a very smart person. He has made a fortune. But, he and Sears are a victim of his BIAS. Poor results, bad magazine articles and even customer complaints are no match for the BIAS so firmly underlying early success. Even though the market has changed, Mr. Lampert's BIAS has him (and his company) in internal turmoil, year after year, even though long ago outsiders gave up on expecting a better result.
Even if Sears Holdings someday finds itself in bankruptcy court, expect Mr. Lampert to interpret this as something other than a failure – as he defends his BIAS better than he defends its shareholders, employees, suppliers and customers.
What is your BIAS? Are you managing for the needs of changing markets, or working hard to defend doing more of what worked in a bygone era? As a leader, are you targeting the future, or trying to recapture the past? Have market shifts made your beliefs outdated, your interpretations of what happens around you faulty, your assumptions inaccurate and your strategies hurting results? If any of this is true, it may be time you address (and change) your BIAS, rather than continuing to invest in more of the same. Or you may well end up like Sears.
by Adam Hartung | Jul 10, 2013 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Television
Tribune Corporation finally emerged from a 4 year bankruptcy on the last day of 2012. Before the ink hardly dried on the documents, leadership has decided to triple company debt to double up the number of TV stations. Oh my, some people just never learn.
The media industry is now over a decade into a significant shift. Since the 1990s internet access has changed expectations for how fast, easily and flexibly we acquire entertainment and news. The result has been a dramatic decline in printed magazine and newspaper reading, while on-line reading has skyrocketed. Simultaneously, we're now seeing that on-line streaming is making a change in how people acquire what they listen to (formerly radio based) and watch (formerly television-based.)
Unfortunately, Tribune – like most media industry companies – consistently missed these shifts and underestimated both the speed of the shift and its impact. And leadership still seems unable to understand future scenarios that will be far different from today.
In 2000 newspaper people thought they had "moats" around their markets. The big newspaper in most towns controlled the market for classified ads for things like job postings and used car sales. Classified ads represented about a third of newspaper revenues, and 40% of profits. Simultaneously display advertising for newspapers was considered a cash cow. Every theatre would advertise their movies, every car dealer their cars and every realtor their home listings. Tribune leadership felt like this was "untouchable" profitability for the LA Times and Chicago Tribune that had no competition and unending revenue growth.
So in 2000 Tribune spent $8B to buy Times-Mirror, owner of the Los
Angeles Times. Unfortunately, this huge investment (75% over market
price at the time, by the way) was made just as people were preparing to
shift away from newspapers. Craigslist, eBay and other user sites killed the market for classified ads. Simultaneously movie companies, auto companies and realtors all realized they could reach more people, with more information, cheaper on-line than by paying for newspaper ads.
These web sites all existed before the acquisition, but Tribune leadership ignored the trend. As one company executive said to me "CraigsList!! You think that's competition for a newspaper? Craigslist is for hookers! Nobody would ever put a job listing on Craigslist." Like his compadres running newspapers nationwide, the new competitors and trends toward on-line were dismissed with simplistic statements and broad generalizations that things would never change.
The floor fell out from under advertising revenues in newspapers in the 2000s. There was no way Times-Mirror would ever be worth a fraction of what Tribune paid. Debt used to help pay for the acquisition limited the options for Tribune as cost cutting gutted the organization.
Then, in 2007 Sam Zell bailed out management by putting together a leveraged buyout to acquire Tribune company. Saying that he read 3 newspapers every day, he believed people would never stop reading newspapers. Like a lot of leaders, Mr. Zell had more money than understanding of trends and shifting markets. He added a few billion dollars more debt to Tribune. By the end of 2008 Tribune was unable to meet its debt obligations, and filed for bankruptcy.
Now, new leadership has control of Tribune. They are splitting the company in two, seperating the print and broadcast businesses. The hope is to sell the newspapers, for which they believe there are 40 potential buyers. Even though profits continued falling, from $156M to $89M, in just the last year. Why anyone would buy newspaper companies, which are clearly buggy whip manufacturers, is wholly unclear. But hope springs eternal!
The new stand-alone Tribune Broadcasting company has decided to go all-in on a deal to borrow $2.7B and buy 19 additional local television stations raising total under their control to 42.
Let's see, what's the market trend in entertainment and news? Where once we were limited to local radio and television stations for most content, now we can acquire almost anything we want – from music to TV, movies, documentaries or news – via the internet. Rather than being subjected to what some programming executive decides to give us, we can select what we want, when we want it, and simply stream it to our laptop, tablet, smartphone, or even our large-screen TV.
A long time ago content was controlled by distribution. There was no reason to create news stories or radio programs or video unless you had access to distribution. Obviously, that made distribution – owning newspapers, radio and TV stations – valuable.
But today distribution is free, and everywhere. Almost every American has access to all the news and entertainment they want from the internet. Either free, or for bite-size prices that aren't too high. Today the value is in the content, not distribution.
In the last 2 years the number of homes without a classical TV connection (the cable) has doubled. Sure, it's only 5% of homes now. But the trend is pretty clear. Even homes that have cable are increasingly not watching it as they turn to more and more streaming video. Instead of watching a 30 minute program once per week, people are starting to watch 8 or 10 half hour episodes back to back. And when they want to watch those episodes, where they want to watch them.
While it might be easy for Tribune to ignore Hulu, Netflix and Amazon, the trend is very clear. The need for broadcast stations like NBC or WGN or Food Network to create content is declining as we access content more directly, from more sources. And the need to have content delivered to our home by a local affiliate station is becoming, well, an anachronism.
Yet, Tribune's new TV-oriented leadership is doubling down on its bet for local TV's future. Ignoring all the trends, they are borrowing more money to buy more assets that show all signs of becoming about as valuable whaling ships. It's a big, dumb bet. Similar to overpaying for Times-Mirror. Some leaders just seem destined to never learn.
by Adam Hartung | Jan 8, 2013 | Defend & Extend, In the Rapids, Innovation, Leadership, Web/Tech
The Harvard Business Review recently published its list of the 100 Best Performing CEOs. This list is better than most because it looks at long-term performance of the CEO during his or her time in the job – with many on the list in service more than a decade.
#1 was Steve Jobs. #2 is Jeff Bezos – making him the greatest living CEO. It is startling just how well these two CEOs performed. During Jobs' tenure Apple investors achieved a return of 66.8 times their money. During Mr. Bezos' tenure shareholders achieved a remarkable 124.3 times return on their money. In an era when most of us are happy to earn 5-10%/year – which equates to doubling your money about once a decade – these CEOs exceeded expectations 30-60 fold!
Both of these CEOs achieved greatness by transforming an industry. We all know the Apple story. From near bankruptcy as the Mac company Mr. Jobs led Apple into the mobile devices business, and created a transformation from Walkmen, Razrs and PCs to iPods, iPhones and iPads – to the detriment of Sony, Motorola, Nokia, Microsoft, HP and Dell.
The Amazon story is all the more remarkable because it has been written in the far more mundane world of retail – not known for being nearly as fast-changing at tech.
Lest we forget, Amazon started as an on-line seller of books frequently unavailable at your local bookstore. "What's a local bookstore?" you may now ask, because through continuous upgrading of its capability to build on the advances in internet usage – across machines, browsers, wi-fi and mobile – Amazon drove into bankruptcy such large booksellers as B.Dalton and Borders – leaving Barnes & Noble a mere shell of its former self and on tenous footing. And the number of small bookshops has dropped dramatically.
But Amazon's industry transformation has gone far beyond bookselling. Amazon was one of the first, and by most users considered the best, at offering a complete on-line storefront for any retailer who wants to sell goods through Amazon's site. You can set up your inventory, display products, provide user information, manage a shopping cart and handle check out all through Amazon – with minimal technical skill. This allowed Amazon to bring vastly more products to customers; and without adding all the inventory or warehousing cost.
As digital uses grew, Amazon moved beyond the slow-paced publishers to launch the Kindle and give us eReaders displacing paper books and periodicals. But this was just the first salvo in the effort to promote additional on-line buying, as Amazon next launched Kindle Fire which at remarkably low cost gave people a tablet already set up for doing retail shopping at Amazon.
As Amazon launched its book downloads and on-line services, it built its own cloud services business to aid businesses and people in using tablets, and doing more things on-line; which further reinforced the digital retail world in which Amazon dominates.
And make no doubt about it, Kindle Fire – and the use of all other tablets – is the WalMart and other traditional brick-and-mortar retail killer. Amazon is now a player in all pieces of the transition which is happening in retail, from traditional shopping to on-line.
Demand for retail space in the USA began declining in 2009 and has not stopped. Most analysts blamed it on the great recession. But in retrospect we can now see it was the watershed year for customers to begin looking more, and buying more, on-line. Now each year growth in on-line retail continues, while demand at traditional stores wanes.
Just look at this last holiday season. To (hopefully) drive revenue stores were opening on Thanksgiving, and doing 24 and 48 hours of non-stop staffing and promotions to drive sales. But it was mostly in vain, as traditional retail saw almost no gains. Despite doing more and more of what they've always done – trying to be better, faster and cheaper – they simply could not change the trend away from shopping on-line and back into the stores.
For the last year the #1 trend in retailing has been "showrooming" where customers stand in a store with a smartphone comparison pricing on-line (most frequently Amazon) to the product on the shelf. Retailers were forced to match on-line prices, despite their higher overhead, or lose the business. And now Target has implemented a policy of price-matching Amazon for all of 2013 in hopes of slowing the trend to on-line purchasing.
Circuit City went bankrupt, which saved Best Buy as it picked up their lost business. But now Best Buy is close to failure. Same store sales at WalMart have been flat. JCPenney recruited Apple's retail store wizard as CEO – but he's learned when you have to compete with Amazon life simply sucks. Nobody in traditional retail has found a way to reverse the on-line shopping trend, which is still dominated by Amazon.
We all can learn from these two CEOs and the companies they built. First, and foremost, is understand trends and align with them. If you help people move in the direction they want to go life is easy, and growth can be phenomenal. Trying to slow, stop or reverse a trend doesn't work, and is expensive.
Second, don't ask customers what they want, instead give them what they need. Customers may be on a trend, but they will frame their requests in the old paradigm. By creating new trend-promoting products and solutions you can capture the customer and avoid head-to-head competition with the "old guard" titans selling the increasingly outdated solutions. Don't build better brick-and-mortar, make brick-and-mortar obsolete.
So, what's stopping you from growing your business like Apple or Amazon? What keeps you from being the next Steve Jobs, or Jeff Bezos? Can you spot trends and provide trend-supporting solutions for customers? Or are you stymied because you're spending too much time trying to defend and extend your old business in the face of game changing trends.
