by Adam Hartung | Nov 12, 2014 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Leadership
We see it all too often. A successful business seems to lose its way. Somehow, after decades of success, its results soften, then tumble and the company becomes a victim of its competition. We scratch our heads and wonder, “why did that happen?”
Pizza Hut is well on its way to disappearing. Kind of like Pizza Inn, A&W and Howard Johnson’s. And that seems kind of remarkable considering the company at one time defined pizza for most Americans. From a fast growing franchise in the 1960s to a high profile acquisition by PepsiCo in the 1970s, to anchoring the Yum Brands spin out from PepsiCo in 1997, Pizza Hut just finished 8 straight quarters of declining same store sales. Pizza Hut was once a concept as hot as Apple Stores, but now it looks more like Sears. How could this happen?
When Pizza Hut was growing it locked in on its success formula. And one of the biggest Lock-ins was its name. Pizza Hut was a place where you ate pizza, and the buildings all looked the same with that hut-like red roof. At a time when few Americans outside the northeast ate pizza, this Wichita, Kansas founded (and headquartered until the 1990s) company told people what a pizzeria should look like, and what you should eat.
The company was ardent about controlling what franchisees served. No nachos, or other trendy foods, because they didn’t fit the pizza theme. No delivery, because good pizza required you eat it immediately from the oven. Pizza should be thick and hearty, even served in a deep dish so you have plenty of bread and feel really full. Whether anyone in Italy ever a pizza anything like this really did not matter.
And Pizza Hut would help guide customers as to what toppings they wanted — and usually there should be at least 3 – by offering pre-designed pizzas with names like “meat lovers,” “supreme,” “super supreme” or “veggie lover’s” so an uninformed clientele (originally prairie state, then midwestern, then expanding into the southwest and the south) could buy the product without a lot of fuss.
This success formula may sound cliche today, but it worked. And it worked really well for 30 years, then pretty well for another 10-15. But, eventually, doing the same thing over, and over, and over, and over had less appeal. Almost everyone in the country knew what a Pizza Hut was, what the stores looked like and what the product was like. Competitors came along by the dozens with all kinds of variations, and different kinds of service – like being in a mall, or delivering the product. Inevitably this competition led to price wars. To keep customers Pizza Hut had to lower its prices, even offering 2 pizzas for the price of one. Pizza Hut never lost track of its success formula, and never stopped doing what once made it great. But margins eroded, and then sales started declining.
Lots of people don’t care about Pizza Hut any more. They want an alternative. An alternative product, like California Pizza Kitchen or Wolfgang Pucks. Or an alternative to pizza altogether like the new “fast casual” chains such as Chipotle’s, Baja Fresh or Panera. For a whole raft of reasons, people decided that although they once ate Pizza Hut (even ate a LOT of it) they were going to eat something else.
But Pizza Hut was locked in. First, its name. Pizza. Hut. To fulfill the “brand promise” of that name everything about that store is pre-designed. From the outside to the inside tables to the equipment in the kitchen. 6,300 stores that are almost identical. Any change and you have to make 6,300 changes. Adding new product categories means reprinting 126,000 menus, changing 6,300 kitchen layouts, buying 6,300 new ovens, figuring out the service utensils for 6,300 wait staff. That’s lock-in. Making any change is so hard that the incentive is entirely toward improve what you’ve always done rather than doing something new.
Growth Stalls are Deadly
Eventually, like Pizza Hut, growth stalls. It only takes 2 quarters of declining sales to hit a growth stall, and when that happens less than 7% of businesses will ever again consistently grow at a meager 2%. Growth stalls tell us “hey, the market shifted. What you’re doing isn’t selling any more.”
But most management teams don’t think about a market shift, and instead react by trying to do more of the same. They treat this like its an operational problem. More quality campaigns, more money spent on advertising, more promotions, asking employees to work a little harder, more product for the same (or lower) price – more, better, faster, cheaper. But this doesn’t work, because the problem lies in a market shift away from your “core” that requires an entirely different strategy.
Because management is incented to ignore this shift as long as possible, the company soon becomes irrelevant. Customers know they’ve been going to competitors, and they start to realize it’s been a long time since they bought from that old supplier. They realize their interest in that old company and its products has simply gone away. They don’t pay attention to the ads. And they don’t have any interest in new product announcements. Actually, they find the company irrelevant. Even when the discounts are big, they don’t buy. They do business where they identify with the company and its products, even when those products cost more.
And thus the results start to tumble horribly. Only by now management is so far removed from market trends that it has no idea how to regain relevancy. In Pizza Hut’s case, leadership is undertaking what they’d like to think is a brand overhaul that will change its position in customers’ minds. But, unfortunately, they are doing the ultimate in defend & extend management to try and save the old success formula.
Pizza Hut is introducing a maze of new ways to have its old product, in its old stores. 10 crust choices, 6 sauce choices, 22 of those pre-designed pizza offerings, 5 different liquids you can have dribbled over the pizza, and a rash of exotic new toppings – like banana. So now you can order your pizza 1,000 different ways (actually, more like 10,000.) Oh, and this is being launched with a big increase in traditional advertising. In other words, an insane implementation of what the company has always done; giving customers an American style pizza, in a hut, promoted on TV – even most likely buying what is now considered iconic – a Super Bowl ad.
Yum Brands investors have reasons to be concerned. Pizza Hut is really important to sales and earnings. But its leaders are intent on doing more of the same, even though the market has already shifted. The prognosis does not look good.
by Adam Hartung | Apr 11, 2013 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, In the Whirlpool, Leadership
The good folks at Wichita State (a final four contender as U.S. basketball fans know) and Purdue released their 2013 Airline Quality Rating. United Airlines came in dead last. To which United responded that they simply did not care. Oh my.
Interestingly, this study is based wholly on statistical performance, rather than customer input. The academics utilize on-time flight performance, denied passenger boardings, mishandled bags and complaints filed with the Department of Transportation. It does not even begin to explore surveying customers about their satisfaction. Anyone who flies regularly can well imagine those results. Oh my.
So how would you expect an innovative, adaptive growth-oriented company (think like Amazon, Apple, Samsung, Virgin, Neimann-Marcus, Lulu Lemon) to react to declining customer performance metrics? They might actually change the product, to make it more desirable by customers. They might hire more customer service representatives to identify customer issues and fix problems quicker. They might adjust their processes to achieve higher customer satisfaction. They might train their employees to be more customer-oriented.
But, United decidedly is not an innovative, adaptive organization. So it responded by denying the situation. Claiming things are getting better. And talking about how it is spending more money on its long-term strategy.
United doesn't care about customers – and really never has. United is focused on "operational excellence" (using the word excellence very loosely) as Messrs. Treacy and Wiersema called this strategy in their mega-popular book "The Discipline of Market Leaders" from 1995. United's strategy, like many, many businesses, is to constantly strive for better execution of an old strategy (in their case, hub-and-spoke flight operations) by hammering away at cutting costs.
Locked in to this strategy, United invests in more airplanes and gates (including making acquisitions like Continental) believing that being bigger will lead to more cost cutting opportunities (code named "synergies".) They beat up on employees, fight with unions, remove anything unessential (like food) invent ways to create charges (like checked bags or change fees), fiddle with fuel costs, ignore customers and constantly try to engineer minute enhancements to operations in efforts to save pennies.
Like many companies, United is fixated on this strategy, even if it can't make any money. Even if this strategy once drove it to bankruptcy. Even if its employees are miserable. Even if quality metrics decline. Even if every year customers are less and less happy with the product. All of that be darned! United just keeps doing what it has always done, for over 3 decades, hoping that somehow – magically – results will improve.
Today people have choices. More choices than ever. That's true for transportation as well. As customers have become less happy, they simply won't pay as much to fly. The impact of all this operational focus, but let the customer be danged, management is price degradation to the point that United, like all the airlines, barely (or doesn't – like American) cover costs. And because of all the competition each airline constantly chases the other to the bottom of customer satisfaction – each lowering its price as it mimics the others with cost cuts.
In 1963 National Airlines ran ads asking "is this any way to run an airline?" Well, no.
Success today – everywhere, not just airlines – requires more than operational focus. Constantly cutting costs ruins the brand, customer satisfaction, eliminates investment in new products and inevitably kills profitability. The litany of failed airlines demonstrates just how ineffective this strategy has become. Because operational improvements are so easily matched by competitors, and ignores alternatives (like trains, buses and automobiles for airlines) it leads to price wars, lower profits and bankruptcy.
Nobody looks to airlines as a model of management. But many companies still believe operational excellence will lead to success. They need to look at the long-term implications of this strategy, and recognize that without innovation, new products and highly satisfied new customers no business will thrive – or even survive.
by Adam Hartung | Jan 22, 2012 | Defend & Extend, In the Rapids, Innovation, Leadership, Lock-in, Transparency, Web/Tech
Turning over a new year inevitably leads to selections for "CEO of the Year." Investor Business Daily selected Larry Page of Google 3 weeks ago, and last week Marketwatch.com selected Jeff Bezos of Amazon. Comparing the two is worthwhile, because there is almost nothing similar about what the two have done – and one is almost sure to dramatically outperform the other.
Focusing on the Future
What both share is a willingness to focus their companies on the future. Both have introduced major new products, targeted at developing new markets and entirely new revenue streams for their companies. Both have significantly sacrificed short-term profits seeking long-term strategic positioning for sustainable, higher future returns. Both have, and continue to, spend vast sums of money in search of competitive advantage for their organizations.
And both have seen their stock value clobbered. In 2011 Amazon rose from $150/share low to almost $250 before collapsing at year's end to about $175 – actually lower than it started the calendar year. Google's stock dropped from $625/share to below $475 before recovering all the way to $670 – only to crater all the way to $585 last week. Clearly the analysts awarding these CEOs were looking way beyond short-term investor returns when making their selections. So it is more important than ever we understand what both have done, and are planning to do in the future, if we are to support either, or both, as award winners. Or buy their stock.
Google participates in great growth markets
The good news for Google is its participation in high growth markets. Search ads continue growing, supplying the bulk of revenues and profits for the company. Its Android product gives Google great position in mobile devices, and supporting Chrome applications help clients move from traditional architectures and applications to cloud-based solutions at lower cost and frequently higher user satisfaction. Additionally, Google is growing internet display ad sales, a fast growing market, by increasing participation in social networks.
Because Google is in high growth markets, its revenues keep growing healthily. But CEO Page's "focus" leadership has led to the killing of several products, retrenching from several markets, and remarkably huge bets in 2 markets where Google's revenues and profits lag dramatically – mobile devices and search.
Because Android produces no revenue Google bought near-bankrupt Motorola to enter the hardware and applications business becoming similar to Apple – a big bet using some old technology against what is the #1 technology company on the planet. Whether this will be a market share winner for Google, and whether it will make or lose money, is far from certain.
Simultaneously, the Google+ launch is an attempt to take on the King Kong of social – Facebook – which has 800million users and remarkable success. The Google+ effort has been (and will continue to be) very expensive and far from convincing. Its product efforts have even angered some people as Google tried steering social networkers rather heavy-handidly toward Google products – as it did with "Search plus Your World" recently.
Mr. Page has positioned Google as a gladiator in some serious "battles to the death" that are investment intensive. Google must keep fighting the wounded, hurting and desperate Microsoft in search against Bing+Yahoo. While Google is the clear winner, desperate but well funded competitors are known to behave suicidally, and Google will find the competition intensive. Meanwhile, its offerings in mobile and social are not unique. Google is going toe-to-toe with Apple and Facebook with products which show no great superiority. And the market leaders are wildly profitable while continuously introducing new innovations. It will be tough fighting in these markets, consuming lots of resources.
Entering 3 gladiator battles simultaneously is ambitious, to say the least. Whether Google can afford the cost, and can win, is debatable. As a result it only takes a small miss, comparing actual results to analyst expectations, for investors to run – as they did last week.
Amazon redefines competition in its markets
CEO Bezos' leadership at Amazon is very different. Rather than gladiator wars, Amazon brings out products that are very different and avoids head-to-head competition. Amazon expands new markets by meeting under- or unserved needs with products that change the way customers behave – and keeps competitors from attacking Amazon head-on:
- Amazon moved from simply selling books to selling a vast array of products on the web. It changed retail buying not by competing directly with traditional retailers, but by offering better (and different) on-line solutions which traditional retailers ignored or adopted far too slowly. Amazon was very early to offer web solutions for independent retailers to use the Amazon site, and was very early to offer a mobile interface making shopping from smartphones fast and easy. Because it wasn't trying to defend and extend a traditional brick-and-mortar retail model, like Wal-Mart, Amazon has redefined retail and dramatically expanded shopping on-line.
- Amazon changed the book market with Kindle. It utilized new technology to do what publishers, locked into traditional mindsets (and business models) would not do. As the print market struggled, Amazon moved fast to take the lead in digital publishing and media sales, something nobody else was doing, producing fast revenue growth with higher margins.
- When retailers were loath to adopt tablets as a primary interface for shoppers, Amazon brought out Kindle Fire. Cleverly the Kindle Fire is not directly positioned against the king of all tablets – iPad – but rather as a product that does less, but does things like published media and retail very well — and at a significantly lower price. It brings the new user on-line fast, if they've been an Amazon customer, and makes life simple and easy for them. Perhaps even easier than the famously easy Apple products.
In all markets Amazon moves early and deftly to fulfill unmet needs at a very good price. And then it captures more and more customers as the solution becomes more powerful. Amazon finds ways to compete with giants, but not head-on, and thus rapidly grow revenues and market position while positioning itself as the long term winner. Amazon has destroyed all the big booksellers – with the exception of Barnes & Noble which doesn't look too great – and one can only wonder what its impact in 5 years will be on traditional retailers like Kohl's, Penney's and even Wal-Mart. Amazon doesn't have to "win" a battle with Apple's iPad to have a wildly successful, and profitable, Kindle offering.
The successful CEO's role is different than many expect
A recent RHR International poll of 83 mid-tier company CEOs (reported at Business Insider) discovered that while most felt prepared for the job, most simultaneously discovered the requirements were not what they expected. In the past we used to think of a CEO as a steward, someone to be very careful with investor money. And someone expected to know the business' core strengths, then be very selective to constantly reinforce those strengths without venturing into unknown businesses.
But today markets shift quickly. Technology and global competition means all businesses are subject to market changes, with big moves in pricing, costs and customer expectations, very fast. Caretaker CEOs are being crushed – look at Kodak, Hostess and Sears. Successful CEOs have to guide their businesses away from investing in money-losing businesses, even if they are part of the company's history, and toward rapidly growing opportunities created by being part of the shift. Disruptors are now leading the success curve, while followers are often sucking up a lot of profit-killing dust.
Amazon bears similarities to the Apple of a decade ago. Introducing new products that are very different, and changing markets. It is competing against traditional giants, but with very untraditional solutions. It finds unmet needs, and fills them in unique ways to capture new customers – and creates market shifts.
Google, on the other hand, looks a lot like the lumbering Microsoft. It has a near monopoly in a growing market, but its investments in new markets come late, and don't offer a lot of innovation. Google's products end up competing directly, somewhat like xBox did with other game consoles, in very, very expensive – usually money-losing – competition that can go on for years. Google looks like a company trying to use money rather than innovation to topple an existing market leader, and killing a lot of good product ideas to keep pouring money into markets where it is late and not terribly creative.
Which CEO do you think will be the winner in 2015? Into which company are you prepared to invest? Both are in high growth markets, but they are being led very, very differently. And their strategies could not be more different. Which one you choose to own – as a product customer or investor – will have significant consequences for you (and them) in 3 years.
It's worth taking the time to decide which you think is the right leadership today. And be sure you know what leadership principles you are adopting, and following in your organization.
by Adam Hartung | Oct 1, 2010 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Innovation, Leadership, Web/Tech
Summary:
- HP and Nokia have lost the ability to grow organically
- Both need CEOs that can attack old decision-making processes to overcome barriers and move innovation to market much more quickly
- Unfortunately, both companies hired new CEOs who are very weak in these skills
- HP’s new CEO is from SAP – which has been horrible at new product development and introduction
- Nokia’s new CEO is from Microsoft – another failure at developing new markets
- It is unlikely these CEO hires will bring to these companies what is most needed
Leo Apotheker is taking over as CEO of Hewlett Packard today. Formerly he ran SAP. According to MarketWatch.com “HP’s New CEO Has a Lot To Prove,” and investors were less than overwhelmed by the selection, “HP Shares Slip After CEO Appointment.” Rightly so. What was the last exciting new product you can remember from SAP, where Apotheker led the company from 2008 until recently? Well?
SAP is going nowhere good. Its best years are way behind it as the company focuses on defending its installed base and adding new bits to existing products It’s product is amazingly expensive, incredibly hard and expensive to install, and primarily keeps companies from doing anything new. Enterprise software packages are like cement, once you pour them in place nothing can change. They reinforce making the same decision over and over. But increasingly, that kind of management practice is failing. In a fast-changing world software that can take 4 years to install and limits decision-making options doesn’t add to desperately needed organizational agility. And during the last 10 years SAP has done nothing to make its products better linked to the needs of today’s markets.
So why would anyone be excited to see such a leader take over their company? If Apotheker leads HP the way he led SAP investors will see growth decline – not grow. What does this new CEO know about listening carefully to emerging market needs? The move to install SAP in smaller companies hasn’t moved the needle, as SAP remains almost wholly software for stodgy, low-growth, struggly behemoths. What does this CEO know about creating an organization that can moving quickly, create new products and identify market needs to position HP for growth? His experience doesn’t look anything like Steve Jobs, under who’s leadership Apple’s value has increased multi-fold the last decade.
Unfortunately, the same refrain applies at Nokia. Just last week I pointed out in “Another One Bites the Dust” that Nokia was at grave risk of following Blockbuster into bankruptcy court. Although Nokia has 40% worldwide market share in mobile phones, U.S. share has slipped to about 8% this year. In smartphones Nokia has nowhere near the margin of Apple, even though both will sell about the same number of units this year. Nokia once had the lead, but now it is far behind in a market where it has the largest overall share. And that was the problem which befell Motorola – #1 for 3 years early in this decade but now far, far behind competitors in all segments and a very likely candidate for bankruptcy when it spins out a seperate cell phone business.
According to the New York Times in “Nokia’s New Chief Faces a Culture of Complacency” Nokia had a very similar product to the iPhone in 2004 but never took it to market. The internal organization made the new advancement go through several rounds of “review” and the hierarachy simply shot it down in an effort to maintain company focus on the popular, traditional cell phones then being offered. Rather than risk cannibalization, the organization focused on doing more of what it had done well. Eschewing innovation for defending the old products is shown again and again the first step toward disaster. (Would your organization use layers of reviews to kill a new idea in a new market?)
Meanwhile, when an internal Nokia team tried to get approval to launch the smart phones management’s responses sounded like:
- We don’t know much about this technology. The old stuff we do.
- We don’t know how big this new market might be. The old one we do
- We can’t tell if this new product will succeed. Enhanced versions of old products we can predict very accurately.
- We might be too early to market. We know how to sell in the existing market.
Even though Nokia had quite a lead in touch screens, downloadable apps, a good smartphone operating system and even 3-D interfaces, the desire to Defend & Extend the old “core” business overwhelmed any effort to move innovation to market. (By the way, do these comments in any way sound like your company?)
The new CEO, Mr. Elop, is from Microsoft. Again, one of the weakest tech companies out there at launching new products. Microsoft had the smart phone O/S lead just 3 years ago, but lost it to maintain investment in its traditional Windows PC O/S and Office automation software. And again you can ask, exactly how excited have people been with Microsoft’s new products over the last decade? Or you might ask, exactly what new products?
Both HP and Nokia need CEOs ready to attack lock-in to old technologies, old business practices, old hierarchies and old metrics. They need to rejuvenate the companies’ ability to quickly get new products to market, learn and improve. They need experience at early market sensing of unmet needs, and using White Space teams to get products out the door and competitive fast. Both need to overcome traditional management approaches that inhibit growth and move fast to be first into new markets with new products – like Apple and Google.
But in both cases, it appears highly unlikely the Board has hired for what the companies need. Instead, they’ve hired for a stodgy resume. Executive who came from companies that are already in bad positions with limited growth prospects. Exactly NOT what the companies need. We can only hope that somehow both CEOs overcome their historical approaches and rapidly attack existing locked-in decision-making. Otherwise, this will be seen as when investors should have sold their stock and employees should have begun putting resumes on the street!
by Adam Hartung | Sep 22, 2010 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, Film, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lifecycle, Lock-in, Music, Web/Tech
Summary:
- Video retailer Blockbuster (and competitor Hollywood Video) are now bankrupt
- Video rentals/sales are at an all time high – but via digital downloads not DVDs
- Nokia, once the cell phone industry leader, is in deep trouble and risk of failure
- Yet mobile use (calls, texts, internet access, email) is at an all time high
- These companies are victims of locking-in to old business models, and missing a market shift
- Commitment to defending your old business can cause failure, even when participating in high growth markets, if you don’t anticipate, embrace and participate in market shifts
- Lock-in is deadly. It can cause you to ignore a market shift.
According to YahooNews, “Blockbuster Video to File Chapter 11.” In February, Movie Gallery – the owner of primary in-kind competitor Hollywood Video – filed for bankruptcy. It’s now decided to liquidate.
The cause is market shift. Netflix made it possible to rent DVDs without the cost of a store – as has the kiosk competitor Red Box. But everyone knows that is just a stopgap, because Netflix and Hulu are leading us all toward a future where there is no physical product at all. We’ll download the things we want to watch. The market is shifting from physical items – video cassettes then DVDs – to downloads. And both Blockbuster and Hollywood Video missed the shift.
Blockbuster (or Hollywood) could have gotten into on-line renting, or kiosks, like its competition. It even could have used profits to be an early developer of downloadable movies. Nothing stopped Blockbuster from investing in YouTube. Except it’s commitment to its Success Formula – as a brick-and-mortar retailer that rented or sold physically reproduced entertainment. Lock-in. And for that commitment to its historical Success Formula the investors now will get a great big goose egg – and employees will get to be laid off – and the thousands of landlords will be left in the lurch, unprepared.
As predictable as Blockbuster was, we can be equally sure about the future of former powerhouse Nokia. Details are provided in the BusinessWeek.com article “How Nokia Fell from Grace.” As the cell phone business exploded in the 1990s Nokia was a big winner. Revenues grew fivefold between 1996 and 2001 as people around the globe gobbled up the new devices. Another example of the fact that when you enter a high growth market you don’t have to be good – just in the right market at the right time.
But the cell phone business has become the mobile device business. And Nokia didn’t anticipate, prepare for or participate in the market shift. From market dominance, it has become an also-ran. The article author blames the failure, and decline, on complacent management. Weak explanation. You can be sure the leadership and management at Nokia was doing all it possibly could to Defend & Extend its cell phone business. The problem is that D&E management doesn’t work when customers simply walk away to a new technology. It may take a few years, and government subsidies may extend Nokia’s life even longer, but Nokia has about as much chance of surviving its market shift as Blockbuster did.
When companies stumble management sees the problems. They know results are faltering. But for decades management has been trained to think that the proper response is to “knuckle down, cut costs, defend the current business at all cost.” Yet, there are more movies rented now than ever – and Blockbuster is failing despite enormous market growth. There are more mobile telephony minutes, text messages, remote emails and mobile internet searches than ever in history – yet Nokia is doing remarkably poorly. It’s not a market problem, it’s a problem of Lock-in to a solution that is now outdated. When the old supplier didn’t give the market what it wanted, the customers went elsewhere. And unwillingness to go with them has left these companies in tatters.
These markets are growing, yet the purveyors of old solutions are failing primarily because they stuck to defending their old business too long. They did not embrace the market shift, and cannibalize historical product sales to enter the new, higher growth markets. Because they chose to protect their “core,” they failed. New victims of Lock-in.
