Microsoft recently announced it was offering Windows 10 on xBox, thus unifying all its hardware products on a single operating system – PCs, mobile devices, gaming devices and 3D devices. This means that application developers can create solutions that can run on all devices, with extensions that can take advantage of inherent special capabilities of each device. Given the enormous base of PCs and xBox machines, plus sales of mobile devices, this is a great move that expands the Windows 10 platform.
The big market shift to mobile devices started back in 2007 when the iPhone began challenging Blackberry. By 2010 when the iPad launched, the shift was in full swing. And that’s when Microsoft’s current problems really began. Previous CEO Steve Ballmer went “all-in” on trying to defend and extend the PC platform with Windows 8 which began development in 2010. But by October, 2012 it was clear the design had so many trade-offs that it was destined to be an Edsel-like flop – a compromised product unable to please anyone.
And that demise is clear in the ecosystem. Microsoft has long depended on OEM manufacturers selling PCs as the driver of most sales. But now Lenovo, formerly the #1 PC manufacturer, is losing money – lots of money – putting its future in jeopardy. And Dell, one of the other top 3 manufacturers, recently pivoted from being a PC manufacturer into becoming a supplier of cloud storage by spending $67B to buy EMC. The other big PC manufacturer, HP, spun off its PC business so it could focus on non-PC growth markets.
And, worse, the entire OEM market is collapsing. For the largest 4 PC manufacturers sales last quarter were down 4.5%, while sales for the remaining smaller manufacturers dropped over 20%! With fewer and fewer sales, consolidation is wiping out many companies, and leaving those remaining in margin killing to-the-death competition.
Which means for Microsoft to grow it desperately needs Windows 10 to succeed on devices other than PCs. But here Microsoft struggles, because it long eschewed its “channel suppliers,” who create vertical market applications, as it relied on OEM box sales for revenue growth. Microsoft did little to spur app development, and rather wanted its developers to focus on installing standard PC units with minor tweaks to fit vertical needs.
Today Apple and Google have both built very large, profitable developer networks. Thus iOS offers 1.5M apps, and Google offers 1.6M. But Microsoft only has 500K apps largely because it entered the world of mobile too late, and without a commitment to success as it tried to defend and extend the PC. Worse, Microsoft has quietly delayed Project Astoria which was to offer tools for easily porting Android apps into the Windows 10 market.
Microsoft realized it needed more developers all the way back in 2013 when it began offering bonuses of $100,000 and more to developers who would write for Windows. But that had little success as developers were more keen to achieve long-term sales by building apps for all those iOS and Android devices now outselling PCs. Today the situation is only exacerbated.
By summer of 2014 it was clear that leadership in the developer world was clearly not Microsoft. Apple and IBM joined forces to build mobile enterprise apps on iOS, and eventually IBM shifted all its internal PCs from Windows to Macintosh. Lacking a strong installed base of Windows mobile devices, Microsoft was without the cavalry to mount a strong fight for building a developer community.
In January, 2015 Microsoft started its release of Windows 10 – the product to unify all devices in one O/S. But, largely, nobody cared. Windows 10 is lots better than Win8, it has a great virtual assistant called Cortana, and it now links all those Microsoft devices. But it is so incredibly late to market that there is little interest.
Although people keep talking about the huge installed base of PCs as some sort of valuable asset for Microsoft, it is clear that those are unlikely to be replaced by more PCs. And in other devices, Microsoft’s decisions made years ago to put all its investment into Windows 8 are now showing up in complete apathy for Windows 10 – and the new hybrid devices being launched.
AM Multigraphics and ABDick once had printing presses in every company in America, and much of the world. But when Xerox taught people how to “one click” print on a copier, the market for presses began to die. Many people thought the installed base would keep these press companies profitable forever. And it took 30 years for those machines to eventually disappear. But by 2000 both companies went bankrupt and the market disappeared.
Those who focus on Windows 10 and “universal windows apps” are correct in their assessment of product features, functions and benefits. But, it probably doesn’t matter. When Microsoft’s leadership missed the mobile market a decade ago it set the stage for a long-term demise. Now that Apple dominates the platform space with its phones and tablets, followed by a group of manufacturers selling Android devices, developers see that future sales rely on having apps for those products. And Windows 10 is not much more relevant than Blackberry.
Hewlett Packard yesterday announced second quarter results. And they were undoubtedly terrible. Revenue compared to a year ago is down 7%, net income is down 21% as the growth stall at HP continues.
Yet, CEO Meg Whitman remains upbeat. She is pleased with “the continued success of our turnaround.” Which is good, because nobody else is. Rather than making new products and offering new solutions, HP has become a company that does little more than constantly restructure!
This latest effort, led by CEO Whitman, has been a split of the company into two corporations. For “strategic” (red flag) reasons, HP is dividing into a software company and a hardware company so that each can “focus” (second red flag) on its “core market” (third red flag.) But there seems to be absolutely no benefit to this other than creating confusion.
This latest restructuring is incredibly expensive. $1.8billion in restructuring charges, $1billion in incremental taxes, $400million annually in duplicated overhead services, then another $3billion in separation charges across the two new companies. That’s over $5B – which is more than HP’s net income in 2014 and 2013. There is no way this is a win for investors.
Additionally, HP has eliminated 48,000 jobs this this latest restructuring began in 2012. And the total will reach 55,000. So this is clearly not a win for employees.
The old HP will now be a hardware company, focused on PCs and printers. Both of which are declining markets as the world goes mobile. This is like the newspaper part of a media company during a split. An old business in serious decline with no clear path to sustainable sales and profits – much less growth. And in HP’s case it will be in a dog-eat-dog competitive battle to try and keep customers against Dell, Acer and Lenovo. Prices will keep dropping, and profits eroding as the world goes mobile. But despite spending $1.2billion to buy Palm (written off,) without any R&D, hard to see how this company returns profits to shareholders, generates new jobs, or launches new products for distributors and customers.
The new HP will be a software company. But it comes to market with almost no share against monster market leader Amazon, and competitors Microsoft and Cisco who are fighting to remain relevant. Even though HP spent $10B to buy ERP company Autonomy (written off) everyone has newer products, more innovation, more customers and more resources than HP.
Together there was faint hope for HP. The company could offer complete solutions. It could work with its distributors and value added resellers to develop unique vertical market solutions. By tweaking the various parts, hardware and software, HP had the possibility of building solutions that could justify premium prices and possibly create growth. But separated, these are now 2 “focused” companies that lack any new innovations, sell commodity products and lack enough share to matter in markets where share leads to winning developers and enterprise customers.
This may be the last stop for investors, and employees, to escape HP before things get a lot worse.
HP was the company that founded silicon valley. It was the tech place to work in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s. It was the Google, Facebook or Apple of that earlier time. When Carly Fiorina took over the dynamic and highly new product driven company in July, 1999 it was worth $45/share. She bought Compaq and flung HP into the commodity PC business, cutting new products and R&D. By the time the Board threw her out in 2005 the company was worth $35/share.
Mark Hurd took the CEO job, and he slashed and burned everything in sight. R&D was almost eliminated, as was new product development. If it could be outsourced, it was. And he whacked thousands of jobs. By killing any hope of growing the company, he improved the bottom line and got the stock back to $45.
Which is where it was 5 years ago today. But now HP is worth $35/share, once again. For investors, it’s been 25 years of up, down and sideways. The last 5 years the DJIA went up 80%; HP down 24%.
Companies cannot add value unless they develop new products, new solutions, new markets and grow. Restructuring after restructuring adds no value – as HP has demonstrated. For long-term investors, this is a painful lesson to learn. Let’s hope folks are getting the message loud and clear now.
Last week I gave 1,000 VHS video tapes to Goodwill Industries. These had been accumulated through 30 years of home movie watching, including tapes purchased for entertaining my 3 children.
It was startling to realize how many of these I had bought, and also surprising to learn they were basically valueless. Not because the content was outdated, because many are still popular titles. But rather because today the content someone wants can be obtained from a streaming download off Amazon or Netflix more conveniently than dealing with these tapes and a mechanical media player.
It isn’t just a shift in technology that made those tapes obsolete. Rather, a major trend has shifted. We don’t really seek to “own” things any more. We’ve become a world of “renters.”
The choice between owning and renting has long been an option. We could rent video tapes, and DVDs. But even though we often did this, most Boomers also ended up buying lots of them. Boomers wanted to own things. Owning was almost always considered better than renting.
Boomers wanted to own their cars, and often more than one. Auto renting was only for business trips. Boomers wanted to own their houses, and often more than one. Why rent a summer home, when, if you could afford it, you could own one. Rent a boat? Wouldn’t it be better to own your own boat (even if you only use it 10 times/year?)
Now we think very, very differently. I haven’t watched a movie on any hard media in several years. When I find time for video entertainment, I simply download what I want, enjoy it and never think about it again. A movie library seems – well – unnecessary.
As a Boomer, there’s all those CDs, cassette tapes (yes, I have them) and even hundreds of vinyl records I own. Yet, I haven’t listened to any of them in years. It’s far easier to simply turn on Pandora or Spotify – or listen to a channel I’ve constructed on YouTube. I really don’t know why I continue to own those old media players, or the media.
Since the big real estate meltdown many people are finding home ownership to be not as good as renting. Why take such a huge risk, paying that mortgage, if you don’t have to?
That this is a trend is even clearer generationally. Younger people really don’t see the benefit of home ownership, not when it means taking on so much additional debt. Home ownership costs are so high that it means giving up a lot of other things. And what’s the benefit? Just to say you own your home?
Where Boomers couldn’t wait to own a car, young people are far less likely. Especially in, or near, urban areas. The cost of auto ownership, including maintenance, insurance and parking, becomes really expensive. Compared with renting a ZipCar for a few hours when you really need a car, ownership seems not only expensive, but a downright hassle.
And technology has followed this trend. Once we wanted to own a PC, and on that PC we wanted to own lots of data – including movies, pictures, books – anything that could be digitized. And we wanted to own software applications to capture, view, alter and display that data. The PC was something that fit the Boomer mindset of owning your technology.
But that is rapidly becoming superfluous. With a mobile device you can keep all your data in a cloud. Data you want to access regularly, or data you want to rent. There’s no reason to keep the data on your own hard drive when you can access it 24×7 everywhere with a mobile device.
And the same is true for acting on the data. Software as a service (SaaS) apps allow you to obtain a user license for $10-$20/user, or $.99, or sometimes free. Why spend $200 (or a lot more) for an application when you can accomplish your task by simply downloading a mobile app?
So I no longer want to own a VCR player (or DVD player for that matter) to clutter up my family room. And I no longer want to fill a closet with tapes or cased DVDs. Likewise, I no longer want to carry around a PC with all my data and applications. Instead, a small, easy to use mobile device will allow me to do almost everything I want.
It is this mega trend away from owning, and toward a simpler lifestyle, that will end the once enormous PC industry. When I can do all I really want to do on my connected device – and in fact often do more things because of those hundreds of thousands of apps – why would I accept the size, weight, complexity, failure problems and costs of the PC?
And, why would I want to own something like Microsoft Office? It is a huge set of applications which contain dozens (hundreds?) of functions I never use. Wouldn’t life be much simpler, easier and cheaper if I acquire the rights to use the functionality I need, when I need it?
There was a time I couldn’t imagine living without my media players, and those DVDs, CDs, tapes and records. But today, I’m giving lots of them away – basically for recycling. While we still use PCs for many things today, it is now easy to visualize a future where I use a PC about as often as I now use my DVD player.
In that world, what happens to Microsoft? Dell? Lenovo?
The implications of this are far-reaching for not only our personal lives, and personal technology suppliers, but for corporate IT. Once IT managed mainframes. Then server farms, networks and thousands of PCs. What will a company need an IT department to do if employees use their own mobile devices, across common networks, using apps that cost a few bucks and store files on secure clouds?
If corporate technology is reduced to just operating some “core” large functions like accounting, how big – or strategic – is IT? The “T” (technology) becomes irrelevant as people focus on gathering and analyzing information. But that’s not been the historical training for IT employees.
Further, if Salesforce.com showed us that even big corporations can manage something as critical as their customer information in a SaaS environment on mobile devices, is it not possible to imagine accounting and supply chain being handled the same way? If so, what role will IT have at all?
The trend toward renting rather than owning is monumental. It affects every business. But in an ironic twist of fate, it may dramatically reduce the focus on IT that has been so critical for the Boomer generation.
Michael Dell has put together a hedge fund, one of his largest suppliers and some debt money to take his company, Dell, Inc. private. There are large investors threatening to sue, claiming the price isn't high enough. While they are wrangling, small investors should consider this privatization manna from heaven, take the new, higher price and run to invest elsewhere – thankful you're getting more than the company is worth.
In the 1990s everybody thought Dell was an incredible company. With literally no innovation a young fellow built an enormously large, profitable company using other people's money, and technology. Dell jumped into the PC business as it was born. Suppliers were making the important bits, and looking for "partners" to build boxes. Dell realized he could let other people invest in microprocessor, memory, disk drive, operating system and application software development. All he had to do was put the pieces together.
Dell was the rare example of a company that was built on nothing more than execution. By marketing hard, selling hard, buying smart and building cheap Dell could produce a product for which demand was skyrocketing. Every year brought out new advancements from suppliers Dell could package up and sell as the latest, greatest model. All Dell had to do was stay focused on its "core" PC market, avoid distractions, and win at execution. Heck, everyone was going to make money building and selling PCs. How much you made boiled down to how hard you worked. It wasn't about strategy or innovation – just execution.
Dell's business worked for one simple reason. Everybody wanted PCs. More than one. And everybody wanted bigger, more powerful PCs as they came available. Market demand exploded as the PC became part of everything companies, and people, do. As long as demand was growing, Dell was growing. And with clever execution – primarily focused on speed (sell, build, deliver, get the cash before the supplier has to be paid) – Dell became a multi-billion dollar company, and its founder a billionaire with no college degree, and no claim to being a technology genius.
But, the market shifted. As this column has pointed out many times, demand for PCs went flat – never to return to previous growth rates. Users have moved to mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets, while corporate IT is transitioning from PC servers to cloud services. iPad sales now nearly match all of Dell's sales. Dell might well be the world's best PC maker, but when people don't want PCs that doesn't matter any more.
Market watchers knew this. That's why Dell's stock took a long ride from its lofty value on the rapids of growth to the recent distinctly low value as it slipped into the whirlpool of failure.
If you think adding debt to Dell will save it from the market shift, just look at how well that strategy worked for fixing Tribune Corporation. A Sam Zell led LBO took over the company claiming he had plans for a new future, as advertisers shifted away from newspapers. Bankruptcy came soon enough, employee pensions were wiped out, massive layoffs undertaken and 4 years of legal fighting followed to see if there was any plan that would keep the company afloat. Debt never fixes a failing company, and Dell knows that. Dell has no answer to changing market demand away from PCs.
Now the buzzards are circling. HP has been caught in a rush to destruction ever since CEO Fiorina decided to buy Compaq and gut the HP R&D in an effort to follow Dell's wild revenue ride. Only massive cost cutting by the following CEO Hurd kept HP alive, wiping out any remnants of innovation. Now HP has a dismal future. But it hopes that as the PC market shrinks the elimination of one competitor, Dell, will give newest CEO Whitman more time to somehow find something HP can do besides follow Dell into bankruptcy court.
Watching as its execution-oriented ecosystem manufacturers are struggling, supplier Microsoft is pulling out its wallet to try and extend the timeline. Plundering its $85B war chest, Microsoft keeps adding features, with acquisitions such as Skype, that consume cash while offering no returns – or even strong reasons for people to stop the transition to tablets.
Additionally it keeps putting up money for companies that it hopes will build end-user products on its software, such as its $500M investment in Barnes & Noble's Nook and now putting $2B into Dell. $85B is a lot of money, but how much more will Microsoft have to spend to keep HP alive – or money losing Acer – or Lenovo? A billion here, a billion there and pretty soon it adds up to a lot of money! Not counting losses in its own entertainmnet and on-line divisions. The transition to mobile devices is permanent and Microsoft has arrived at the game incredibly late – and with products that simply cannot obtain better than mixed reviews.
The lesson to learn is that management, and investors, take a big risk when they focus on execution. Without innovation, organizations become reliant on vendors who may, or may not, stay ahead of market transitions. When an organization fails to be an innovator, someone who creates its own game changers, and instead tries to succeed by being the best at execution eventually market shifts will kill it. It is not a question of if, but when.
Being the world's best PC maker is no better than being the world's best maker of white bread (Hostess) or the world's best maker of photographic film (Kodak) or the world's best 5 and dime retailer (Woolworth's) or the world's best manufacturer of bicycles (Schwinn) or cold rolled steel (Bethlehem Steel.) Being able to execute – even execute really, really well – is not a long-term viable strategy. Eventually, innovation will create market shifts that will kill you.
Apple's latest news to start paying a big dividend, and buying back shares, is a boon for investors. And it signals the company's future strength. Often dividends and share buybacks indicate a company has run out of growth projects, so it desires to manipulate the stock price as it slowly pays out the company's assets. But, in Apple's (rare) case the company is making so much profit from existing businesses that they are running out of places to invest it – thus returning to shareholders!
I've called Apple the lowest risk, highest return stock for investors (the stock to own if you can only own one stock) for several years. And Apple has not disappointed. At $600/share the stock is up some 75% over the last year (from about $350,) and up 600% over the last 5 years (from about $100.) And now the company is going to return investors $10.60/year, currently 1.8% – or about 4 times your money market yield, or about 75% of what you'd get for a 10 year Treasury bond. Yet investors still have a tremendous growth in capital opportunity, because Apple is still priced at only 14x this year's projected earnings, and 12 times next year's projected earnings!
Apple keeps winning. It's leadership in smart phones continues, as the market converts from traditional cell phones to smart phones. And its lead in tablets remains secure as it sells 3 million units of the iPad 3 over the weekend. In every area, for several years, Apple has outperformed expectations as it leads the market shift away from traditional PCs and servers to mobile devices and using the "cloud."
The Bad – Google
Google was once THE company to emulate. At the end of 2008 its stock peaked at nearly $750/share, as everyone thought Google would accomplish nothing short of world domination (OK, a bit extreme) via its clear leadership in search and the way it dominated internet usage. But that is no longer the case, as Google is being eclipsed by upstarts such as Facebook and Groupon.
What happened? Even though it had a vaunted policy of allowing employees to spend 20% of their time on anything they desired, Google never capitalized on the great innovations created. Products like Google Wave and Google Powermeter were created, launched – and then subsequently left without sponsors, management attention, resources or even much interest. Just as recently happened with GoogleTV.
They floundered, despite identifying very good solutions for pretty impressive market needs, largely because management chose to spend almost all its attention, and resources, defending and extending its on-line ad sales created around search.
YouTube is a big user environment, and one of the most popular sites on the web. But Google still hasn't really figured out how to generate revenue, or profit, from the site. Despite all the user activity it produces a meager $1.6B annual revenue – and nearly no profit.
Android may have share rivaling Apple in smartphones, but it is nowhere in tablets and thus lags significantly in the ovarall market with share only about half iOS. Worse, Android smartphones are not nearly as profitable as iPhones, and now Google has made an enormous, multi-billion investment in Motorola to enter this business – and compete with its existing smartphone manufacturers (customers.) To date Android has been a product designed to defend Google's historical search business as people go mobile – and it has produced practically no revenue, or profit.
Chrome browsers came on the scene and quickly grew share beyond Firefox. But, again, Google has not really developed the product to reach a dominant position. While it has good reviews, there has been no major effort to make it a profitable product. Possibly Google fears fighting IE will create a "money pit" like Bing has become for Microsoft in search?
Chromebooks were a flop as Google failed to invest in robust solutions allowing users to link printers, MP3 players, etc. – or utilize a wide suite of thin cloud-based apps. Great idea, that works well, they are a potential alternative to PCs, and some tablet applications, but Google has not invested to make the product commercially viable.
Google tried to buy GroupOn to enter the "local" ad marketplace, but backed out as the price accelerated. While investors may be happy Google didn't overpay, the company missed a significant opportunity as it then faltered on creating a desirable competitive product. Now Google is losing the race to capture local market ads that once went to newspapers.
While Google chose to innovate, but not invest in market development, it missed several market opportunities. And in the meantime Google allowed Facebook to sneak up and overtake its "domination" position.
Facebook has led people to switch from using the internet as a giant library, navigated by search, to a social medium where referrals, discussions and links are driving more behavior. The result has advertisers shifting their money toward where "eyeballs" are spending most of their time, and placing a big threat on Google's ability to maintain its historical growth.
Thus Google is now dumping billions into Google+, which is a very risky proposition. Late to market, and with no clear advantage, it is extremely unclear if Google+ has any hope of catching Facebook. Or even creating a platform with enough use to bring in a solid, and growing, advertiser base.
The result is that today, despite the innovation, the well-known (and often good) products, and even all the users to its sites Google has the most concentrated revenue base among large technology companies. 95% of its revenues still come from ad dollars – mostly search. And with that base under attack on all fronts, it's little wonder analysts and investors have become skeptical. Google WAS a great company – but it's decisions since 2008 to lock-in on defending and extending its "core" search business has made the company extremely vulnerable to market shifts. A bad thing in fast moving tech markets.
Google investors haven't fared well either. The company has never paid a dividend, and with its big investments (past and future planned) in search and handsets it won't for many years (if ever.) At $635/share the stock is still down over 15% from its 2008 high. Albeit the stock is up about 8.5% the last 12 months, it has been extremely volatile, and long term investors that bought 5 years ago, before the high, have made only about 7%/year (compounded.)
Google looks very much like a company that has fallen victim to its old success formula, and is far too late adjusting to market shifts. Worse, its investments appear to be a company spending huge sums to defend its historical business, taking on massive gladiator battles against Apple and Facebook – two companies far ahead in their markets and with enormous leads and war chests.
The Ugly – Dell
Go back to the 1990s and Dell looked like the company that could do no wrong. It went head-to-head with competitors to be the leader in selling, assembling and delivering WinTel (Windows + Intel) PCs. Michael Dell was a modern day hero to other leaders hoping to match the company's ability to focus on core markets, minimize investments in anything else, and be a world-class supply chain manager. Dell had no technology or market innovation, but it was the best at beating down cost – and lowering prices for customers. Dell clearly won the race to the bottom.
But the market for PCs matured. And Dell has found itself one of the last bachelors at the dance, with few prospects. Dell has no products in leading growth markets, like smartphones or tablets. Nor even other mobile products like music or video. And it has no software products, or technology innovation. Today, Dell is locked in gladiator battles with companies that can match its cost, and price, and make similarly slim (to nonexistent) margins in the generic business called PCs (like HP and Lenovo.)
Dell has announced it intends to challenge Apple with a tablet launch later in 2012. This is dependent upon Microsoft having Windows 8 ready to go by October, in time for the holidays. And dependent upon the hope that a swarm of developers will emerge to build the app base for things that already exist on the iPad and Android tablets. The advantage of this product is as yet undefined, so the market is yet undefined. The HOPE is that somehow, for some reason, there is a waiting world of people that have delayed purchase waiting on a Windows device – and will find the new Dell product superior to a $299 Apple 2 already available and with that 500,000 app store.
Clearly, Dell has waited way, way too long to deal with changing its business. As its PC business flattens (and soon shrinks) Dell still has no smartphone products, and is remarkably late to the tablet business. And it offers no clear advantage over whatever other products come from Windows 8 licensees. Dell is in a brutal world of ever lower prices, shrinking markets and devastating competition from far better innovators creating much higher, and growing, profits (Apple and Amazon.)
For investors, the ride from a fast moving boat in the rapids into the swamp of no growth – and soon the whirlpool of decline – has been dismal. Dell has never paid a dividend, has no free cash flow to start paying one now, and clearly no market growth from which to pay one in the future. Dell's shares, at $17, are about the same as a year ago, and down about 20% over the last 5 years.
Leaders in all businesses have a lot to learn from looking at the Good, Bad and Ugly. The company that has invested in innovation, and then invested in taking that innovation to market in order to meet emerging needs has done extremely well. By focusing on needs, rather than business optimization, Apple has been able to shift with markets – and even enhance the market shift to position itself for rapid, profitable growth.
Meanwhile, companies that have focused on their core markets and products are doing nowhere near as well. They have missed market shifts, and watched their fortunes decline precipitously. They were once very profitable, but despite intense focus on defending their historical strengths profits have struggled to grow as customers moved to alternative solutions. By spending insufficient time looking outward, at markets and shifts, and too much time inward, on defending and extending past successes, they now face future jeopardy.
And, worse, the entire OEM market is collapsing. For the largest 4 PC manufacturers sales last quarter were down 4.5%, while sales for the remaining smaller manufacturers dropped over 20%! With fewer and fewer sales, consolidation is wiping out many companies, and leaving those remaining in margin killing to-the-death competition.
