by Adam Hartung | Dec 13, 2015 | In the Whirlpool, Innovation, Leadership
DuPont is one of America’s oldest corporations. Founded by Eleuthere Irenee duPont as a gunpowder manufacturer for the Revolutionary War, the company has long been one of America’s leading business institutions. From humble beginnings, DuPont became well known as a leader in Research & Development, a consistent leader in patent applications, and the inventor of products that proliferate in our lives from nylon to Teflon pans plastic bottles to Kevlar vests.
But in a series of fast actions during 2015, DuPont as it has been known is going away. And it is too bad the leadership wasn’t in place to save it. Now there will be a short-term bump to investors, but long-term cost cutting will decimate a once great innovation leader. When the bankers take over, it’s never pretty for employees, suppliers, customers or the local community.
It has been a long time since DuPont was the kind of business leader that gathered attention like, say, Apple or Google. From dynamic roots, the company had become quite stodgy and unexciting. Many felt leadership was over-spending on overhead costs like R&D,product development and headquarters personnel.
Thus Trian Fund, led by activist investor Nelson Peltz, set its sites on DuPont, buying 2.7% of the shares and launching a proxy campaign to place its slate of directors on the Board. The objective? Slash R&D and other costs, sell some divisions, raise cash in a hurry and dress up the P&L for a higher short-term valuation.
These sort of attacks almost always work. But DuPont’s CEO, Ellen Kullman, dug in her heels and fought back. She aligned her Board, spent $15M making her case to shareholders, and in a surprising victory beat back Mr. Peltz keeping the board and management intact. In a great rarity, this May DuPont’s management convinced enough shareholders to back their efforts for improving the P&L via their own restructuring and cost improvements, planned divestitures and organic growth that existing leadership remained intact.
But this victory was quite short-lived. By October, Ms. Kullman was forced out as CEO. A few days later the CFO reported quarterly profits that were only half the previous year. Sales had continued a history of declining in almost all divisions and across almost all geographic segments – with total revenue down to $5B from $7.5B a year ago. As it had done in July and previous quarters end-of-year projections were again lowered.
Net/net – CEO Kullman and management may have won the Trian battle, but they clearly lost the business war. Unable to actually profitably grow the company, the Board lost patience. They were willing to support management, but when that team could not produce the innovations to keep growing they were willing to accelerate cost cutting ($1B in 2015 alone) in order to prop up short-term stock valuation.
Now the newly placed transaction-oriented CEO of Dupont has cooked up a deal the bankers simply love. Merge DuPont with Saran Wrap and Ziploc inventor Dow Chemical, which itself has been the target of Third Point’s activist leader Dan Loeb (which Dow settled by giving Third Point 2 board seats rather than risk a proxy battle.) Then whack even more costs – some $3B – and lay off some 20,000 of the combined companies’ 110,000 employees. Then split the remaining operations into 3 new companies and spin those out publicly.
Sounds so good on paper. So simple. And think of the size of the investment banking and legal fees!!!! That will create some great partner bonuses in 2016!
Theoretically, this will create 3 companies that are more profitable, even though sales are not improving at all. Improved P&L’s will be projected into the future, and higher P/E (price to earnings) multiples on the stock should yield investors a very nice short-term gain. A one-time investor “Christmas present.”
But what will investors actually own? The lower cost companies will now be largely without R&D, new product development, internal patent departments, university research grant management programs, and many of the finance, marketing and sales personnel. Exactly how will future growth be assured? What will happen to these once-great sources of invention and innovation?
Nothing about this mega-transaction actually makes business better for anyone:
- The companies are no closer aligned with market trends than before. In fact, lacking people in innovation positions (product development, R&D and marketing) they are very likely to become even further removed from the leading trends that could create breakthrough products.
- Competition will be reduced short-term, so there will be less price pressure. But longer-term innovation will shift to smaller companies like Monsanto and Syngenta, or even companies currently not on the industry radar – as well as universities. These big companies will be removed from the leading edge of competition, the innovation edge, and will much more likely miss the next wave of products in all markets as new competitors emerge.
- There will be no resources to develop or manage new innovations that emerge internally, or externally. The much smaller staffs will have no bandwidth to explore new technologies, new products, new go-to-market channels or new ways of doing business. There will be no resources for white space teams to explore market shifts, consider major threats to their “core,” or develop potentially disruptive businesses that will generate future growth.
A very smart CFO once told me “when the finance guys are figuring out how to make money, rather than the business guys, you need to be very worried.” Clever transactions, like the one proposed between DuPont and Dow, do not replace great leadership. These are one-time events, and almost always leave the remaining assets weaker and less competitive than before.
Leadership requires understanding markets, managing innovation, creating new solutions, disrupting old businesses by launching new ones, and generating recurring profitable sales growth. Unfortunately, DuPont suffered from a lack of great leadership for several years, which left it vulnerable. Now the bankers are in charge, busy managing spreadsheets rather than products, customers and sales.
Don’t be confused. In no way does this merger and reorganization improve the competitiveness of these businesses. And for that reason, it will not offer a long-term value enhancement for shareholders. But even more obvious is the outcome negative outcome we can expect for employees, suppliers, customers and the communities in which these companies have operated. Bad leadership let the hyenas in, and they will pick the best meat off the bone for themselves first – leaving seriously damaged carcasses for everyone else.
by Adam Hartung | Jul 8, 2015 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in, Web/Tech
Microsoft announced today it was going to shut down the Nokia phone unit, take a $7.6B write-off (more than the $7.2B they paid for it,) and lay off another 7,800 employees. That makes the layoffs since CEO Nadella took the reigns almost 26,000. Finding any good news in this announcement is a very difficult task.
Unfortunately, since taking over as Microsoft’s #1 leader, Mr. Nadella has been remarkably predictable. Like his peer CEOs who take on the new role, he has slashed and burned employment, shut down at least one big business, taken massive write-offs, and undertaken at least one wildly overpriced acquisition (Minecraft) that is supposed to be a game changer for the company. He apparently picked up the “Turnaround CEO Playbook” after receiving the job and set out on the big tasks!
Yet he still has not put forward a strategy that should encourage investors, employees, customers or suppliers that the company will remain relevant long-term. Amidst all these big tactical actions, it is completely unclear what the strategy is to remain a viable company as customers move, quickly and in droves, to mobile devices using competitive products.
I predicted here in this blog the week Steve Ballmer announced the acquisition of Nokia in September, 2013 that it was “a $7.2B mistake.” I was off, because in addition to all the losses and restructuring costs Microsoft endured the last 7 quarters, the write off is $7.6B. Oops.
Why was I so sure it would be a mistake? Because between 2011 and 2013 Nokia had already lost half its market share. CEO Elop, who was previously a Microsoft senior executive, had committed Nokia completely to Windows phones, and the results were already catastrophic. Changing ownership was not going to change the trajectory of Nokia sales.
Microsoft had failed to build any sort of developer community for Windows 8 mobile. Developers need people holding devices to buy their software. Nokia had less than 5% share. Why would any developer build an app for a Windows phone, when almost the entire market was iOS or Android? In fact, it was clear that developing rev 2, 3, and 4 of an app for the major platforms was far more valuable than even bothering to port an app into Windows 8.
Nokia and Windows 8 had the worst kind of tortuous whirlpool – no users, so no developers, and without new (and actually unique) software there was nothing to attract new users. Microsoft mobile simply wasn’t even in the game – and had no hope of winning. It was already clear in June, 2012 that the new Windows tablet – Surface – was being launched with a distinct lack of apps to challenge incumbents Apple and Samsung.
By January, 2013 it was also clear that Microsoft was in a huge amount of trouble. Where just a few years before there were 50 Microsoft-based machines sold for every competitive machine, by 2013 that had shifted to 2 for 1. People were not buying new PCs, but they were buying mobile devices by the shipload – literally. And there was no doubt that Windows 8 had missed the mobile market. Trying too hard to be the old Windows while trying to be something new made the product something few wanted – and certainly not a game changer.
A year ago I wrote that Microsoft has to win the war for developers, or nothing else matters. When everyone used a PC it seemed that all developers were writing applications for PCs. But the world shifted. PC developers still existed, but they were not able to grow sales. The developers making all the money were the ones writing for iOS and Android. The growth was all in mobile, and Microsoft had nothing in the game. Meanwhile, Apple and IBM were joining forces to further displace laptops with iPads in commercial/enterprise uses.
Then we heard Windows 10 would change all of that. And flocks of people wrote me that a hybrid machine, both PC and tablet, was the tool everyone wanted. Only we continue to see that the market is wildly indifferent to Windows 10 and hybrids.
Imagine you write with a fountain pen – as most people did 70 years ago. Then one day you are given a ball point pen. This is far easier to use, and accomplishes most of what you want. No, it won’t make the florid lines and majestic sweeps of a fountain pen, but wow it is a whole lot easier and a darn site cheaper. So you keep the fountain pen for some uses, but mostly start using the ball point pen.
Then the fountain pen manufacturer says “hey, I have a contraption that is a ball point pen, sort of, and a fountain pen, sort of, combined. It’s the best of all worlds.” You would likely look at it, but say “why would I want that. I have a fountain pen for when I need it. And for 90% of the stuff I write the ball point pen is great.”
That’s the problem with hybrids of anything – and the hybrid tablet is no different. The entrenched sellers of old technology always think a hybrid is a good idea. But once customers try the new thing, all they want are advancements to the new thing. (Just look at the interest in Tesla cars compared to the stagnant sales of hybrid autos.)
And we’re up to Surface 3 now. When I pointed out in January, 2013 that the markets were rapidly moving away from Microsoft I predicted Surface and Surface Pro would never be important products. Reader outcry at that time from Microsoft devotees was so great that Forbes editors called me on the carpet and told me I lacked the data to make such a bold prediction. But I stuck by my guns, we changed some language so it was less blunt, and the article ran.
Two and a half years later and we’re up to rev number Surface 3. And still, almost nobody is using the product. Less than 5% market share. Right again. It wasn’t a technology prediction, it was a market prediction. Lacking app developers, and a unique use, the competition was, and remains, simply too far out front.
Windows 10 is, unfortunately, a very expensive launch. And to get people to use it Microsoft is giving it away for free. The hope is then users will hook onto the cloud-based Office 365 and Microsoft’s Azure cloud services. But this is still trying to milk the same old cow. This approach relies on people being completely unwilling to give up using Windows and/or Office. And we see every day that millions of people are finding alternatives they like just fine, thank you very much.
Gamers hated me when I recommended Microsoft should give (for free) xBox to Nintendo. Unfortunately, I learned few gamers know much about P&Ls. They all assumed Microsoft made a fortune in gaming. But anyone who’s ever looked at Microsoft’s financial filings knows that the Entertainment Division, including xBox, has been a giant money-sucking hole. If they gave it away it would save money, and possibly help leadership figure out a strategy for profitable growth.
Unfortunately, Microsoft bought Minecraft, in effect “doubling down” on the bet. But regardless of how well anyone likes the products, Microsoft is not making money. Gaming is a bloody war where Sony and Microsoft keep battling, and keep losing billions of dollars. The odds of ever earning back the $2.5B spent on Minecraft is remote.
The greater likelihood is that as write offs continue to eat away at profits, and as markets continue evolving toward mobile products offered by competitors hurting “core” Microsoft sales, CEO Nadella will eventually have to give up on gaming and undertake another Nokia-like event.
All investors risk looking at current events to drive decision-making. When Ballmer was sacked and Nadella given the CEO job the stock jumped on euphoria. But the last 18 months have shown just how bad things are for Microsoft. It is a near monopolist in a market that is shrinking. And so far Mr. Nadella has failed to define a strategy that will make Microsoft into a company that does more than try to milk its heritage.
I said the giant retailer Sears Holdings would be a big loser the day Ed Lampert took control of the company. But hope sprung eternal, and investors jumped on the Sears bandwagon, believing a new CEO would magically improve a worn out, locked-in company. The stock went up for over 2 years. But, eventually, it became clear that Sears is irrelevant and the share price increase was unjustified. And the stock tanked.
Microsoft looks much the same. The actions we see are attempts to defend & extend a gloried history. But they don’t add up to a strategy to compete for the future. HoloLens will not be a product capable of replacing Windows plus Office revenues. If developers are attracted to it enough to start writing apps. Cortana is cool, but it is not first. And competitive products have so much greater usage that developer learning curve gains are wildly faster. These products are not game changers. They don’t solve large, unmet needs.
And employees see this. As I wrote in my last column, it is valuable to listen to employees. As the bloom fell off the rose, and Nadella started laying people off while freezing pay, employee support of him declined dramatically. And employee faith in leadership is far lower than at competitors Apple and Google.
As long as Microsoft keeps playing catch up, we should expect more layoffs, cost cutting and asset sales. And attempts at more “hail Mary” acquisitions intended to change the company. All of which will do nothing to grow customers, provide better jobs for employees, create value for investors or greater revenue opportunities for suppliers.
by Adam Hartung | Jul 28, 2014 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Web/Tech
Over the last couple of weeks big announcements from Apple, IBM and Microsoft have set the stage for what is likely to be Microsoft’s last stand to maintain any sense of personal technology leadership.
Custer Tries Holding Off An Unstoppable Native American Force
To many consumers the IBM and Apple partnership probably sounded semi-interesting. An app for airplane fuel management by commercial pilots is not something most people want. But what this announcement really amounted to was a full assault on regaining dominance in the channel of Value Added Resellers (VARs) and Value Added Dealers (VADs) that still sell computer “solutions” to thousands of businesses. Which is the last remaining historical Microsoft stronghold.
Think about all those businesses that use personal technology tools for things like retail point of purchase, inventory control, loan analysis in small banks, restaurant management, customer data collection, fluid control tracking, hotel check-in, truck routing and management, sales force management, production line control, project management — there is a never-ending list of business-to-business applications which drive the purchase of literally millions of devices and applications. Used by companies as small as a mom-and-pop store to as large as WalMart and JPMorganChase. And these solutions are bundled, sold, delivered and serviced by what is collectively called “the channel” for personal technology.
This “channel” emerged after Apple introduced the Apple II running VisiCalc, and businesses wanted hundreds of these machines. Later, bundling educational software with the Apple II created a near-monopoly for Apple channel partners who bundled solutions for school systems.
But, as the PC emerged this channel shifted. IBM pioneered the Microsoft-based PC, but IBM had long used a direct sales force. So its foray into personal computing did a very poor job of building a powerful sales channel. Even though the IBM PC was Time magazine’s “Man of the Year” in 1982, IBM lost its premier position largely because Microsoft took advantage of the channel opportunity to move well beyond IBM as a supplier.
Microsoft focused on building a very large network of developers creating an enormous variety of business-to-business applications on the Windows+Intel (Wintel) platform. Microsoft created training programs for developers to use its operating system and tools, while simultaneously cultivating manufacturers (such as Dell and Compaq) to build low cost machines to run the software. “Solution selling” was where VARs bundled what small businesses – and even many large businesses – needed by bringing together developer applications with manufacturer hardware.
It only took a few years for Microsoft to overtake Apple and IBM by dominating and growing the VAR channel. Apple did a poor job of creating a powerful developer network, preferring to develop everything users should want itself, so quickly it lacked a sufficient application base. IBM constantly tried to maintain its direct sales model (and upsell clients from PCs to more expensive hardware) rather than support the channel for developing applications or selling solutions based on PCs.
But, over the last several years Microsoft played “bet the company” on its launch of Windows 8. As mobile grew in hardware sales exponentially, and PC sales flattened (then declined,) Microsoft was tepid regarding any mobile offering. Under former CEO Steve Ballmer, Microsoft preferred creating an “all-in-one” solution via Win8 that it hoped would keep PC sales moving forward while slowly allowing its legions of Microsoft developers to build Win8 apps for mobile Surface devices — and what it further hoped would be other manufacturer’s tablets and phones running Win8.
This flopped. Horribly. Apple already had the “installed base” of users and mobile developers, working diligently to create new apps which could be released via its iTunes distribution platform. As a competitive offering, Google had several years previously launched the Android operating system, and companies such as HTC and Samsung had already begun building devices. Developers who wanted to move beyond Apple were already committed to Android. Microsoft was simply far too late to market with a Win8 product which gave developers and manufacturers little reason to invest.
Now Microsoft is in a very weak position. Despite much fanfare at launch, Microsoft was forced to take a nearly $1B write-off on its unsellable Surface devices. In an effort to gain a position in mobile, Microsoft previously bought phone maker Nokia, but it was simply far too late and without a good plan for how to change the Apple juggernaut.
Apple is now the dominant player in mobile, with the most users, developers and the most apps. Apple has upended the former Microsoft channel leadership position, as solution sellers are now offering Apple solutions to their mobile-hungry business customers. The merger with IBM brings even greater skill, and huge resources, to augmenting the base of business apps running on iOS and its devices (presently and in the future.) It provides encouragement to the VARs that a future stream of great products will be coming for them to sell to small, medium and even large businesses.
Caught in a situation of diminishing resources, after betting the company’s future on Windows 8 development and launch, and then seeing PC sales falter, Microsoft has now been forced to announce it is laying off 18,000 employees. Representing 14% of total staff, this is Microsoft’s largest reduction ever. Costs for the downsizing will be a massive loss of $1.1-$1.6B – just one year (almost to the day) after the huge Surface write-off.
Recognizing its extraordinarily weak market position, and that it’s acquisition of Nokia did little to build strength with developers while putting it at odds with manufacturers of other mobile devices, the company is taking some 12,000 jobs out of its Nokia division – ostensibly the acquisition made at a cost of $7.2B to blunt iPhone sales. Every other division is also suffering headcount reductions as Microsoft is forced to “circle the wagons” in an effort to find some way to “hold its ground” with historical business customers.
Today Apple is very strong in the developer community, already has a distribution capability with iTunes to which it is adding mobile payments, and is building a strong channel of VARs seeking mobile solutions. The IBM partnership strengthens this position, adds to Apple’s iOS developers, guarantees a string of new solutions for business customers and positions iOS as the platform of choice for VARs and VADs who will use iBeacon and other devices to help businesses become more capable by utilizing mobile/cloud technology.
Meanwhile, Microsoft is looking like the 7th Cavalry at the Little Bighorn. Microsoft is surrounded by competitors augmenting iOS and Android (and serious cloud service suppliers like Amazon,) resources are depleting as sales of “core” products stagnate and decline and write-offs mount, and watching as its “supply line” developer channel abandons Windows 8 for the competitive alternatives.
CEO Nadella keeps saying that that cloud solutions are Microsoft’s future, but how it will effectively compete at this late date is as unclear as the email announcement on layoffs Nokia’s head Stephen Elop sent to employees. Keeping its channel, long the source of market success for Microsoft, from leaving is Microsoft’s last stand. Unfortunately, Nadella’s challenge puts him in a position that looks a lot like General Custer.
by Adam Hartung | May 16, 2014 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Swamp, Leadership, Lifecycle, Web/Tech
IBM had a tough week this week. After announcing earnings on Wednesday IBM fell 2%, dragging the Dow down over 100 points. And as the Dow reversed course to end up 2% on the week, IBM continued to drag, ending down almost 3% for the week.
Of course, one bad week – even one bad earnings announcement – is no reason to dump a good company’s stock. The short term vicissitudes of short-term stock trading should not greatly influence long-term investors. But in IBM’s case, we now have 8 straight quarters of weaker revenues. And that HAS to be disconcerting. Managing earnings upward, such as the previous quarter, looks increasingly to be a short-term action, intended to overcome long-term revenues declines which portend much worse problems.
This revenue weakness roughly coincides with the tenure of CEO Virginia Rometty. And in interviews she increasingly is defending her leadership, and promising that a revenue turnaround will soon be happening. That it hasn’t, despite a raft of substantial acquisitions, indicates that the revenue growth problems are a lot deeper than she indicates.
CEO Rometty uses high-brow language to describe the growth problem, calling herself a company steward who is thinking long-term. But as the famous economist John Maynard Keynes pointed out in 1923, “in the long run we are all dead.” Today CEO Rometty takes great pride in the company’s legacy, pointing out that “Planes don’t fly, trains don’t run, banks don’t operate without much of what IBM does.”
But powerful as that legacy has been, in markets that move as fast as digital technology any company can be displaced very fast. Just ask the leadership at Sun Microsystems that once owned the telecom and enterprise markets for servers – before almost disappearing and being swallowed by Oracle in just 5 years (after losing $200B in market value.) Or ask former CEO Steve Ballmer at Microsoft, who’s delays at entering mobile have left the company struggling for relevancy as PC sales flounder and Windows 8 fails to recharge historical markets.
CEO Rometty may take pride in her earnings management. But we all know that came from large divestitures of the China business, and selling the PC and server business. As well as significant employee layoffs. All of which had short-term earnings benefits at the expense of long-term revenue growth. Literally $6B of revenues sold off just during her leadership.
Which in and of itself might be OK – if there was something to replace those lost sales. (Even if they didn’t have any profits – because at least we have faith in Amazon creating future profits as revenues zoom.)
What really worries me about IBM are two things that are public, but not discussed much behind the hoopla of earnings, acquisitions, divestitures and all the talk, talk, talk regarding a new future.
CNBC reported (again, this week,) that 121 companies in the S&P 500 (27.5%) cut R&D in the first quarter. And guess who was on the list? IBM, once an inveterate leader in R&D has been reducing R&D spending. The short-term impact? Better quarterly earnings. Long term impact????
The Washington Post reported this week about the huge sums of money pouring out of corporations into stock buybacks rather than investing in R&D, new products, new capacity, enhanced marketing, sales growth, etc. $500B in buybacks this year, 34% more than last year’s blistering buyback pace, flowed out of growth projects. To make matters worse, this isn’t just internal cash flow going for buybacks, but companies are actually borrowing money, increasing their debt levels, in order to buy their own stock!
And the Post labels as the “poster child” for this leveraged stock-propping behavior…. IBM. IBM
“in the first quarter bought back more than $8 billion of its own stock, almost all of it paid for by borrowing. By reducing the number of outstanding shares, IBM has been able to maintain its earnings per share and prop up its stock price even as sales and operating profits fall.
The result: What was once the bluest of blue-chip companies now has a debt-to-equity ratio that is the highest in its history. As Zero Hedge put it, IBM has embarked on a strategy to “postpone the day of income statement reckoning by unleashing record amounts of debt on what was once upon a time a pristine balance sheet.”
In the case of IBM, looking beyond the short-term trees at the long-term forest should give investors little faith in the CEO or the company’s future growth prospects. Much is being hidden in the morass of financial machinations surrounding acquisitions, divestitures, debt assumption and stock buybacks. Meanwhile, revenues are declining, and investments in R&D are falling. This cannot bode well for the company’s long-term investor prospects, regardless of the well scripted talking points offered last week.
by Adam Hartung | Aug 23, 2013 | In the Swamp, Leadership, Software, Web/Tech
Steve Ballmer announced he would be retiring as CEO of Microsoft within the next 12 months. This extended timing, rather than immediately, shows clear the Board is ready for him to go but there is nobody ready to replace him.
The big question is, who would want Ballmer's job? It will be very tough to make Microsoft an industry leader again. What would his replacement propose to do? The fuse for a turnaround is short, and the options faint.
Microsoft has been on a downhill trajectory for at least 4 years. Although the company has introduced innovations in gaming (xBox and Kinect) as well as on-line (games and Bing), those divisions perpetually lose money. Stiff competitors Sony, Nintendo and Google have made these forays intellectually interesting, but of no value for investors or customers. The end-game for Microsoft has remained Windows – and as PC sales decline that's very bad news.
Microsoft viability has been firmly tied to Windows and Office sales. Historically these have been unassailable products, creating over 100% of the profits at Microsoft (covering losses in other divisions.) But, these products have lost growth, and relevancy. Windows 8 and Office 365 are product nobody really cares about, while they keep looking for updates from Apple, Google, Amazon and Samsung.
The market started going mobile 10 years ago. As Apple and Google promoted increased mobility, Microsoft tried to defend & extend its PC stronghold. It was a classic business inflection point in the making. Everyone knew at some point mobile devices would be more important than PCs. But most industry insiders (including Microsoft) kept thinking it would be later rather than sooner.
They were wrong. The shift came a lot faster than expected. Like in sailboat racing, suddenly the wind was taken out of Microsoft's sails as competitors shot to the lead in customer interest. While people were excited for new smartphones and tablets, Microsoft tried to re-engineer its historical product as an extension into the new market.
Windows 8 tablets and Surface tablets were ill-fated from the beginning. They did not appeal to the huge installed base of Windows customers, because changes like touch screens and tiles simply were too expensive and too behaviorally different. And they offered no advantage for people to switch that had already started buying iOS and Android products. Not to mention an app availability about 10% of the market leaders. Simply put, investing in Windows 8 and its own tablet was like adding bricks to a downhill runaway truck (end-of-life for PCs) – it sped up the time to an inevitable crash.
And spending money on poorly thought out investments like the Barnes & Noble Nook merely demonstrated Microsoft had money to burn, rather than a strategy for competing. Skype cost some $8B, but how has that helped Microsoft become more competive? It's not just an overspending on internal projects that failed to achieve any market success, but a series of wasted investments in bad acquisitions that showed Microsoft had no idea how it was going to regain industry leadership in a changing marketplace going more mobile and into the cloud every month.
Now the situation is pretty dire, and now is the time for Microsoft to give up on its defend and extend strategy for Windows/Office. Customers are openly uninterested in new laptops running Windows 8. And Win 8.1 will not change this lackadaisical attitude. Nobody is interested in Windows 8 phones, or tablets. This has left companies in the Microsoft ecosystem like HP, Dell and Nokia gasping for air as sales tumble, profits evaporate and customers flock to new solutions from Apple and Samsung. Instead of seeking out an update to Office for a new PC, people are using much lighter (and cheaper) cloud services from Amazon and office solutions like Google docs. And most of those old add-on product sales, like printers and servers, are disappearing into the cloud and mobile displays.
So now, after being forced to write off Surface and report a horrible quarter, the Board has pushed Ballmer out the door. Pretty remarkable. But, incredibly late. Just like the leaders at RIM stayed too long, leaving the company with no future options as Blackberry sales plummeted, Ballmer is taking leave as sales, profits and cash flow are taking a turn for the worst. And only months after a reorganization that simply made the whole situation a lot more confusing for not only investors, but internal managers and employees.
Microsoft has a big cash hoard, but how long will that last? As its distribution system falters, and sales drop, the costs will rapidly catch up with cash flow. Big layoffs are a certainty; think half the workforce in 2 years. Equally certain are sales of divisions (who can buy xBox market share and turn it competitively profitable?) or shut-downs (how long will Bing stay alive when it is utterly unnecessary and expensive to maintain?)
But, there is a better option. Without the cash from
Windows/Office, you can't keep much of the rest of Microsoft walking. So
now is the time to cut investments in Windows/Office and put money into the
best things Microsoft has going – primarily Kinect and cloud services. A radical restructuring of its spending and investments.
Kinect is an incredible product. It has found multiple applications Microsoft fails to capitalize upon. Kinect has the possibility of becoming the centerpiece for managing how we connect to data, how we store data, how we find data. It can bring together our smartphone, tablet and historical laptop worlds – and possibly even connect this to traditional TV and radio. It can be the centerpiece for two-way communications (think telephone or skype via all your devices.) Coupled with the right hardware, it can leapfrog iTV (which we still are waiting to see) and Cisco simultaneously.
In cloud services it will take a lot to compete with leaders Amazon, IBM, Apple and Google. They have made big investments, and are far in front. But, this is the bread-and-butter market for Microsoft. Millions of small businesses that want easy to use BYOD (bring your own device) environment, and easy access to data, documents and functionality for IT, like guaranteed data back-up and uptime, and user functionality like all those apps. These customers have relied on Microsoft for these kind of services for years, and would enjoy a services provider with an off-the-shelf product they can implement easily and cheaply that supports all their needs. Expensive to develop, but a growing market where Microsoft has a chance to leapfrog competitors.
As for Bing, give it to Yahoo – if Marissa Mayer will take it. Stop the bloodletting and get out of a market where Microsoft has never succeeded. Bing is core to Yahoo's business. If you can trade for some Yahoo stock, go for it. Let Yahoo figure out how to sell content and ads, while Microsoft refocuses on the new platform for 2017; from the user to the infrastructure services.
Strong leaders have their benefits. But, when they don't understand market shifts, and spend far too long trying to defend & extend past markets, they can put their organizations in terrible jeopardy of total failure. Ballmer leaves no with clear replacement, nor with any vision in place for leapfrogging competitors and revitalizing Microsoft.
So it is imperative the new leader provide this kind of new thinking. There are trends developing that create future scenarios where Microsoft can once again be a market leader. And it will be the role of the new CEO to identify that vision and point Microsoft's investments in the right direction to regain viability by changing the game on the current winners.
