Microsoft’s Last Stand

Microsoft’s Last Stand

Over the last couple of weeks big announcements from Apple, IBM and Microsoft have set the stage for what is likely to be Microsoft’s last stand to maintain any sense of personal technology leadership.

Custer Tries Holding Off An Unstoppable Native American Force

Custer Tries Holding Off An Unstoppable Native American Force

To many consumers the IBM and Apple partnership probably sounded semi-interesting.  An app for airplane fuel management by commercial pilots is not something most people want.  But what this announcement really amounted to was a full assault on regaining dominance in the channel of Value Added Resellers (VARs) and Value Added Dealers (VADs) that still sell computer “solutions” to thousands of businesses.  Which is the last remaining historical Microsoft stronghold.

Think about all those businesses that use personal technology tools for things like retail point of purchase, inventory control, loan analysis in small banks, restaurant management, customer data collection, fluid control tracking, hotel check-in, truck routing and management, sales force management, production line control, project management — there is a never-ending list of business-to-business applications which drive the purchase of literally millions of devices and applications.  Used by companies as small as a mom-and-pop store to as large  as WalMart and JPMorganChase.  And these solutions are bundled, sold, delivered and serviced by what is collectively called “the channel” for personal technology.

This “channel” emerged after Apple introduced the Apple II running VisiCalc, and businesses wanted hundreds of these machines. Later, bundling educational software with the Apple II created a near-monopoly for Apple channel partners who bundled solutions for school systems.

But, as the PC emerged this channel shifted.  IBM pioneered the Microsoft-based PC, but IBM had long used a direct sales force. So its foray into personal computing did a very poor job of building a powerful sales channel.  Even though the IBM PC was Time magazine’s “Man of the Year” in 1982, IBM lost its premier position largely because Microsoft took advantage of the channel opportunity to move well beyond IBM as a supplier.

Microsoft focused on building a very large network of developers creating an enormous variety of business-to-business applications on the Windows+Intel (Wintel) platform.  Microsoft created training programs for developers to use its operating system and tools, while simultaneously cultivating manufacturers (such as Dell and Compaq) to build low cost machines to run the software.  “Solution selling” was where VARs bundled what small businesses – and even many large businesses – needed by bringing together developer applications with manufacturer hardware.

It only took a few years for Microsoft to overtake Apple and IBM by dominating and growing the VAR channel.  Apple did a poor job of creating a powerful developer network, preferring to develop everything users should want itself, so quickly it lacked a sufficient application base.  IBM constantly tried to maintain its direct sales model (and upsell clients from PCs to more expensive hardware) rather than support the channel for developing applications or selling solutions based on PCs.

But, over the last several years Microsoft played “bet the company” on its launch of Windows 8.  As mobile grew in hardware sales exponentially, and PC sales flattened (then declined,) Microsoft was tepid regarding any mobile offering.  Under former CEO Steve Ballmer, Microsoft preferred creating an “all-in-one” solution via Win8 that it hoped would keep PC sales moving forward while slowly allowing its legions of Microsoft developers to build Win8 apps for mobile Surface devices — and what it further hoped would be other manufacturer’s tablets and phones running Win8.

This flopped.  Horribly. Apple already had the “installed base” of users and mobile developers, working diligently to create new apps which could be released via its iTunes distribution platform.  As a competitive offering, Google had several years previously launched the Android operating system, and companies such as HTC and Samsung had already begun building devices. Developers who wanted to move beyond Apple were already committed to Android.  Microsoft was simply far too late to market with a Win8 product which gave developers and manufacturers little reason to invest.

Now Microsoft is in a very weak position.  Despite much fanfare at launch, Microsoft was forced to take a nearly $1B write-off on its unsellable Surface devices.  In an effort to gain a position in mobile, Microsoft previously bought phone maker Nokia, but it was simply far too late and without a good plan for how to change the Apple juggernaut.

Apple is now the dominant player in mobile, with the most users, developers and the most apps.  Apple has upended the former Microsoft channel leadership position, as solution sellers are now offering Apple solutions to their mobile-hungry business customers.  The merger with IBM brings even greater skill, and huge resources, to augmenting the base of business apps running on iOS and its devices (presently and in the future.)  It provides encouragement to the VARs that a future stream of great products will be coming for them to sell to small, medium and even large businesses.

Caught in a situation of diminishing resources, after betting the company’s future on Windows 8 development and launch, and then seeing PC sales falter, Microsoft has now been forced to announce it is laying off 18,000 employees.  Representing 14% of total staff, this is Microsoft’s largest reduction ever. Costs for the downsizing will be a massive loss of $1.1-$1.6B – just one year (almost to the day) after the huge Surface write-off.

Recognizing its extraordinarily weak market position, and that it’s acquisition of Nokia did little to build strength with developers while putting it at odds with manufacturers of other mobile devices, the company is taking some 12,000 jobs out of its Nokia division – ostensibly the acquisition made at a cost of $7.2B to blunt iPhone sales.  Every other division is also suffering headcount reductions as Microsoft is forced to “circle the wagons” in an effort to find some way to “hold its ground” with historical business customers.

Today Apple is very strong in the developer community, already has a distribution capability with iTunes to which it is adding mobile payments, and is building a strong channel of VARs seeking mobile solutions.  The IBM partnership strengthens this position, adds to Apple’s iOS developers, guarantees a string of new solutions for business customers and positions iOS as the platform of choice for VARs and VADs who will use iBeacon and other devices to help businesses become more capable by utilizing mobile/cloud technology.

Meanwhile, Microsoft is looking like the 7th Cavalry at the Little Bighorn.  Microsoft is surrounded by competitors augmenting iOS and Android (and serious cloud service suppliers like Amazon,) resources are depleting as sales of “core” products stagnate and decline and write-offs mount, and watching as its “supply line” developer channel abandons Windows 8 for the competitive alternatives.

CEO Nadella keeps saying that that cloud solutions are Microsoft’s future, but how it will effectively compete at this late date is as unclear as the email announcement on layoffs Nokia’s head Stephen Elop sent to employees.  Keeping its channel, long the source of market success for Microsoft, from leaving is Microsoft’s last stand.  Unfortunately, Nadella’s challenge puts him in a position that looks a lot like General Custer.

 

Microsoft ReOrg – Crafty or Confusing?

Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer appears to be planning a major reorganization. The apparent objective is to help the company move toward becoming a "devices and services company" as presented in the company's annual shareholder letter last October. 

But, the question for investors is whether this is a crafty move that will help Microsoft launch renewed profitable growth, or is it leadership further confusing customers and analysts while leaving Microsoft languishing in stalled markets?  After all, the shares are up some 31% the last 6 months and it is a good time to decide if an investor should buy, hold or sell.

There are a lot of things not going well for Microsoft right now.

Everyone knows PC sales have started dropping.  IDC recently lowered its forecast for 2013 from a decline of 1.3% to negative 7.8%.  The mobile market is already larger than PC sales, and IDC now expects tablet sales (excluding smartphones) will surpass PCs in 2015.  Because the PC is Microsoft's "core" market – producing almost all the company's profitability – declining sales are not a good thing.

Microsoft hoped Windows 8 would reverse the trend.  That has not happened.  Unfortunately, ever since being launched Windows 8 has underperformed the horrific sales of Vista.  Eight months into the new product it is selling at about half the rate Vista did back in 2007 – which was the worst launch in company history.  Win8 still has fewer users than Vista, and at 4% share 1/10th the share of market leaders Windows 7 and XP. 

Microsoft is launching an update to Windows 8, called Windows 8.1 or "blue."  But rather than offering a slew of new features to please an admiring audience the release looks more like an early "fix" of things users simply don't like, such as bringing back the old "start" button.  Reviewers aren't talking about how exciting the update is, but rather wondering if these admissions of poor initial design will slow conversion to tablets.

And tablets are still the market where Microsoft isn't – even if it did pioneer the product years before the iPad. Bloomberg reported that Microsoft has been forced to cut the price of RT.  So far historical partners such as HP and HTC have shunned Windows tablets, leaving Acer the lone company putting out Windows a mini-tab, and Dell (itself struggling with its efforts to go private) the only company declaring a commitment to future products.

And whether it's too late for mobile Windows is very much a real question.  At the last shareholder meeting Nokia's investors cried loud and hard for management to abandon its commitment to Microsoft in favor of returning to old operating systems or moving forward with Android.  This many years into the game, and with the Google and Apple ecosystems so far in the lead, Microsoft needed a game changer if it was to grab substantial share.  But Win 8 has not proven to be a game changer.

In an effort to develop its own e-reader market Microsoft dumped some $300million into Barnes & Noble's Nook last year.  But the e-reader market is fast disappearing as it is overtaken by more general-purpose tablets such as the Kindle Fire.  Yet, Microsoft appears to be pushing good money after bad by upping its investment by another $1B to buy the rest of Nook, apparently hoping to obtain enough content to keep the market alive when Barnes & Noble goes the way of Borders.  But chasing content this late, behind Amazon, Apple and Google, is going to be much more costly than $1B – and an even lower probability than winning in hardware or software.

Then there's the new Microsoft Office.  In late May Microsoft leadership hoped investors would be charmed to hear that 1M $99 subscriptions had been sold in 3.5 months.  However, that was to an installed base of hundreds of millions of PCs – a less than thrilling adoption rate for such a widely used product.  Companies that reached 1M subscribers from a standing (no installed base) start include Instagram in 2.5 months, Spotify in 5 months, Dropbox in 7 months and Facebook (which pioneered an entire new marketplace in Social) in only 10 months.  One could have easily expected a much better launch for a product already so widely used, and offered at about a third the price of previous licenses.

A new xBox was launched on May 21st.  Unfortunately, like all digital markets gaming is moving increasingly mobile, and consoles show all the signs of going the way of desktop computers.  Microsoft hopes xBox can become the hub of the family room, but we're now in a market where a quarter of homes lead by people under 50 don't really use "the family room" any longer. 

xBox might have had a future as an enterprise networking hub, but so far Kinnect has not even been marketed as a tool for business, and it has not yet incorporated the full network functionality (such as Skype) necessary to succeed at creating this new market against competitors like Cisco. 

Thankfully, after more than a decade losing money, xBox reached break-even recently.  However, margins are only 15%, compared to historical Microsoft margins of 60% in "core" products.  It would take a major growth in gaming, plus a big market share gain, for Microsoft to hope to replace lost PC profits with xBox sales.  Microsoft has alluded to xBox being the next iTunes, but lacking mobility, or any other game changer, it is very hard to see how that claim holds water.

The Microsoft re-org has highlighted 3 new divisions focused on servers and tools, Skype/Lync and xBox.  What is to happen with the business which has driven three decades of Microsoft growth – operating systems and office software – is, well, unclear.  How upping the focus on these three businesses, so late in the market cycle, and with such low profitability will re-invigorate Microsoft's value is, well, unclear. 

In fact, given how Microsoft has historically made money it is wholly unclear what being a "devices and services" company means.  And this re-organization does nothing to make it clear. 

My past columns on Microsoft have led some commenters to call me a "Microsoft hater."  That is not true.  More apt would be to say I am a Microsoft bear.  Its historical core market is shrinking, and Microsoft's leadership invested far too much developing new products for that market in hopes the decline would be delayed – which did not work.  By trying to defend and extend the PC world Microsoft's leaders chose to ignore the growing mobile market (smartphones and tablets) until far too late – and with products which were not game changers. 

Although Microsoft's leaders invested heavily in acquisitions and other markets (Skype, Nook, xBox recently) those very large investments came far too late, and did little to change markets in Microsoft's favor. None of these have created much excitement, and recently Rick Sherland at Nomura securities came out with a prediction that Microsoft might well sell the xBox division (a call I made in this column back in January.)

As consumers, suppliers and investors we like the idea of a near-monopoly.  It gives us comfort to believe we can trust in a market leader to bring out new products upon which we can rely – and which will continue to make long-term profits.  But, good as this feels, it has rarely been successful.  Markets shift, and historical leaders fall as new competitors emerge; largely because the old leadership continues investing in what they know rather than shifting investments early into new markets.

This Microsoft reorganization appears to be rearranging the chairs on the Titanic.  The mobile iceberg has slashed a huge gash in Microsoft's PC hull.  Leadership keeps playing familiar songs, but the boat cannot float without those historical PC profits. Investors would be smart to flee in the lifeboat of recent share price gains. 

From the Frying Pan into the Fire – Google’s Motorola Problem


The business world was surprised this week when Google announced it was acquiring Motorola Mobility for $12.5B – a 63% premium to its trading price (Crain’s Chicago Business).  Surprised for 3 reasons:

  1. because few software companies move into hardware
  2. effectively Google will now compete with its customers like Samsung and HTC that offer Android-based phones and tablets,  and
  3. because Motorola Mobility had pretty much been written off as a viable long-term competitor in the mobile marketplace.  With less than 9% share, Motorola is the last place finisher – behind even crashing RIM.

Truth is, Google had a hard choice.  Android doesn’t make much money.  Android was launched, and priced for free, as a way for Google to try holding onto search revenues as people migrated from PCs to cloud devices.  Android was envisioned as a way to defend the search business, rather than as a profitable growth opportunity.  Unfortunately, Google didn’t really think through the ramifications of the product, or its business model, before taking it to market.  Sort of like Sun Microsystems giving away Java as a way to defend its Unix server business. Oops.

In early August, Google was slammed when the German courts held that the Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 could not be sold – putting a stop to all sales in Europe (Phandroid.comSamsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 Sales Now Blocked in Europe Thanks to Apple.”) Clearly, Android’s future in Europe was now in serious jeapardy – and the same could be true in the USA.

This wasn’t really a surprise.  The legal battles had been on for some time, and Tab had already been blocked in Australia.  Apple has a well established patent thicket, and after losing its initial Macintosh Graphical User Interface lead to Windows 25 years ago Apple plans on better defending its busiensses these days.  It was also well known that Microsoft was on the prowl to buy a set of patents, or licenses, to protect its new Windows Phone O/S planned for launch soon. 

Google had to either acquire some patents, or licenses, or serously consider dropping Android (as it did Wave, Google PowerMeter and a number of other products.)  It was clear Google had severe intellectual property problems, and would incur big legal expenses trying to keep Android in the market.  And it still might well fail if it did not come up with a patent portfolio – and before Microsoft!

So, Google leadership clearly decided “in for penny, in for a pound” and bought Motorola. The acquisition now gives Google some 16-17,000 patents.  With that kind of I.P. war chest, it is able to defend Android in the internicine wars of intellectual property courts – where license trading dominates resolutions between behemoth competitors.

Only, what is Google going to do with Motorola (and Android) now?  This acquisition doesn’t really fix the business model problem.  Android still isn’t making any money for Google.  And Motorola’s flat Android product sales don’t make any money either. 

Motorola rev and profits thru Q2 11
Source: Business Insider.com

In fact, the Android manufacturers as a group don’t make much money – especially compared to industry leader Apple:

IOS v Android operating profit mobile companies july-2011
Source: Business Insider.com

There was a lot of speculation that Google would sell the manufacturing business and keep the patents.  Only – who would want it?  Nobody needs to buy the industry laggard.  Regardless of what the McKinsey-styled strategists might like to offer as options, Google really has no choice but to try running Motorola, and figuring out how to make both Android and Motorola profitable.

And that’s where the big problem happens for Google.  Already locked into battles to maintain search revenue against Bing and others, Google recently launched Google+ in an all-out war to take on the market-leading Facebook.  In cloud computing it has to support Chrome, where it is up against Microsoft, and again Apple.  Oh my, but Google is now in some enormously large competitive situations, on multiple fronts, against very well-heeled competitors.

As mentioned before, what will Samsung and HTC do now that Google is making its own phones?  Will this push them toward Microsoft’s Windows offering?  That would dampen enthusiasm for Android, while breathing life into a currently non-competitor in Microsoft.  Late to the game, Microsoft has ample resources to pour into the market, making competition very, very expensive for Google.  It shows all the signs of two gladiators willing to fight to the loss-amassing death.

And Google will be going into this battle with less-than-stellar resources.  Motorola is the market also ran.  Its products are not as good as competitors, and its years of turmoil – and near failure – leading to the split-up of Motorola has left its talent ranks decimated – even though it still has 19,000 employees Google must figure out how to manage (“Motorola Bought a Dysfunctional Company and the Worst Android Handset Maker, says Insider“).  

Acquisitions that “work” are  ones where the acquirer buys a leader (technology, products, market) usually in a high growth area – then gives that acquisition the permission and resources to keep adapting and growing – what I call White Space.  That’s what went right in Google’s acquisitions of YouTube and DoubleClick, for example.  With Motorola, the business is so bad that simply giving it permssion and resources will lead to greater losses.  It’s hard to disaagree with 24/7 Wall Street.com when divulging “S&P Gives Big Downgrade on Google-Moto Deal.”

Some would like to think of Google as creating some transformative future for mobility and copmuting.  Sort of like Apple. 

Yea, right.

Google is now stuck defending & extending its old businesses – search, Chrome O/S for laptops, Google+ for mail and social media, and Android for mobility products.  And, as is true with all D&E management, its costs are escalating dramatically.  In every market except search Google has entered into gladiator battles late against very well resourced competitors with products that are, at best, very similar – lacking game-changing characteristics. Despite Mr. Page’s potentially grand vision, he has mis-positioned Google in almost all markets, taken on market-leading and well funded competition, and set Google up for a diasaster as it burns through resources flailing in efforts to find success.

If you weren’t convinced of selling Google before, strongly consider it now.  The upcoming battles will be very, very expensive.  This acquisition is just so much chum in the water – confusing but not beneficial.

And if you still don’t own Apple – why not?  Nothing in this move threatens the technology, product and market leader which continues bringing game-changers to market every few months.