by Adam Hartung | Dec 10, 2012 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lifecycle, Television
Remember when almost everyone read a daily newspaper?
Newspaper readership peaked around 2000. Since then printed media has declined, as readers shifted on-line. Magazines have folded, and newspapers have disappeared, quit printing, dramatically cut page numbers and even more dramatically cut staff.
Amazingly, almost no major print publisher prepared for this, even though the trend was becoming clear in the late 1990s.
Newspapers are no longer a viable business. While industry revenue grew for
almost 2 centuries, it collapsed in a mere decade.
Chart Source: BusinessInsider.com
This market shift created clear winners, and losers. On-line news sites like Marketwatch and HuffingtonPost were clear winners. Losers were traditional newspaper companies such as Tribune Corporation, Gannett, McClatchey, Dow Jones and even the New York Times Company. And investors in these companies either saw their values soar, or practically disintegrate.
In 2012 it is equally clear that television is on the brink of a major transition. Fewer people are content to have their entertainment programmed for them when they can program it themselves on-line. Even though the number of television channels has exploded with pervasive cable access, the time spent watching television is not growing. While simultaneously the amount of time people spend looking at mobile internet displays (tablets, smartphones and laptops) is growing at double digit rates.
Chart Source: Silicone Alley Insider Chart of the Day 12/5/12
It would be easy to act like newspaper defenders and pretend that television as we've known it will not change. But that would be, at best, naive. Just look around at broadband access, the use of mobile devices, the convenience of mobile and the number of people that don't even watch traditional TV any more (especially younger people) and the trend is clear. One-way preprogrammed advertising laden television is not a sustainable business.
So, now is the time to prepare. And change your business to align with impending new realities.
Losers, and winners, will be varied – and not entirely obvious. Firstly, a look at those trying to maintain the status quo, and likely to lose the most.
Giant consumer goods and retail companies benefitted from the domination of television. Only huge companies like P&G, Kraft, GM and Target could afford to lay out billions of dollars for television ads to build, and defend, a brand. But what advantage will they have when TV budgets no longer control brand building? They will become extremely vulnerable to more innovative companies that have better products and move on fast lifecycles. Their size, hierarchy and arcane business practices will lead to huge problems. Imagine a raft of new Hostess Brands experiences.
Even as the trends have started changing these companies have continued pumping billions into the traditional TV networks as they spend to defend their brand position. This has driven up the value of companies like CBS, Comcast (owns NBC) and Disney (owns ABC) over the last 3 years substantially. But don't expect that to last forever. Or even a few more years.
Just like newspaper ad spending fell off a cliff when it was clear the eyeballs were no longer there, expect the same for television ad spending. As giant advertisers find the cost of television harder and harder to justify their outlays will eventually take the kind of cliff dive observed in the chart (above) for newspaper advertising. Already some consumer goods and ad agency executives are alluding to the fact that the rate of return on traditional TV is becoming sketchy.
So far, we've seen little at the companies which own TV networks to demonstrate they are prepared for the floor to fall out of their revenue stream. While some have positions in a few internet production and delivery companies, most are clearly still doing their best to defend & extend the old business – just like newspaper owners did. Just as newspapers never found a way to replace the print ad dollars, these television companies look very much like businesses that have no apparent solution for future growth. I would not want my 401K invested in any major network company.
And there will be winners.
For smaller businesses, there has never been a better time to compete. A company as small as Tesla or Fisker can now create a brand on-line at a fraction of the old cost. And that brand can be as powerful as Ford, and potentially a lot more trendy. There are very low entry barriers for on-line brand building using not only ad words and web page display ads, but also using social media to build loyal followers who use and promote a brand. What was once considered a niche can become well known almost overnight simply by applying the new dynamics of reaching customers on-line, and increasingly via mobile. Look at the success of Toms Shoes.
Zappos and Amazon have shown that with almost no television ads they can create powerhouse retail brands. The new retailers do not compete just on price, but are able to offer selection, availability and customer service at levels unachievable by traditional brick-and-mortar retailers. They can suggest products and prices of things you're likely to need, even before you realize you need them. They can educate better, and faster, than most retail store employees. And they can offer great prices due to less overhead, along with the convenience of shipping the product right into your home.
And as people quit watching preprogrammed TV, where will they go for content? Anybody streaming will have an advantage – so think Netflix (which recently contracted for all the Disney content,) Amazon, Pandora, Spotify and even AOL. But, this will also benefit those companies providing content access such as Apple TV, Google TV, YouTube (owned by Google) to offer content channels and the increasingly omnipresent Facebook will deliver up not only friends, but content — and ads.
As for content creation, the deep pockets of traditional TV production companies will likely disappear along with their ability to control distribution. That means fewer big-budget productions as risk goes up without revenue assurances.
But that means even more ability for newer, smaller companies to create competitive content seeking audiences. Where once a very clever, hard working Seth McFarlane (creator of Family Guy) had to hardscrabble with networks to achieve distribution, and live in fear of a single person controlling his destiny, in the future these creative people will be able to own their content and capture the value directly as they build a direct audience. A phenomenon like George Lucas will be more achievable than ever before as what might look like chaos during transition will migrate to a much more competitive world where audiences, rather than network executives, will decide what content wins – and loses.
So, with due respects to Don McLean, will today be the day TV Died? We will only know in historical context. Nobody predicted newspapers had peaked in 2000, but it was clear the internet was changing news consumption behavior. And we don't know if TV viewership will begin its rapid decline in 2013, or in a couple more years. But the inevitable change is clear – we just don't know exactly when.
So it would be foolish to not think that the industry is going to change dramatically. And the impact on advertising will be even more profound, much more profound, than it was in print. And that will have an even more profound impact on American society – and how business is done.
What are you doing to prepare?
by Adam Hartung | Jul 8, 2011 | Books, Current Affairs, In the Rapids, Leadership, Lifecycle, Openness, Transparency, Web/Tech, Weblogs
Evolution doesn’t happen like we think. It’s not slow and gradual (like line A, below.) Things don’t go from one level of performance slowly to the next level in a nice continuous way. Rather, evolutionary change happens brutally fast. Usually the potential for change is building for a long time, but then there is some event – some environmental shift (visually depcted as B, below) – and the old is made obsolete while the new grows aggressively. Economists call this “punctuated equilibrium.” Everyone was on an old equilibrium, then they quickly shift to something new establishing a new equilibrium.
Momentum has been building for change in publishing for several years. Books are heavy, a pain to carry and often a pain to buy. Now eReaders, tablets and web downloads have changed the environment. And in June J.K. Rowling, author of those famous Harry Potter books, opened her new web site as the location to exclusively sell Harry Potter e-books (see TheWeek.com “How Pottermore Will Revolutionized Publishing.”)
Ms. Rowling has realized that the market has shifted, the old equilibrium is gone, and she can be part of the new one. She’ll let the dinosaur-ish publisher handle physical books, especially since Amazon has already shown us that physical books are a smaller market than ebooks. Going forward she doesn’t need the publisher, or the bookstore (not even Amazon) to capture the value of her series. She’s jumping to the new equilibrium.
And that’s why I’m encouraged about AOL these days. Since acquiring The Huffington Post company, things are changing at AOL. According to Forbes writer Jeff Bercovici, in “AOL After the Honeymoon,” AOL’s big slide down in users has begun to reverse direction. Many were surprised to learn, as the FinancialPost.com recently headlined, “Huffington Post Outstrips NYT Web Traffic in May.” 
Source: BusinessInsider.com
The old equilibrium in news publishing is obsolete. Those trying to maintain it keep failing, as recently headlined on PaidContent.org “Citing Weak Economy, Gannett Turns to Job Cuts, Furloughs.” Nobody should own a traditional publisher, that business is not viable.
But Forbes reports that Ms. Huffington has been given real White Space at AOL. She has permission to do what she needs to do to succeed, unbridled by past AOL business practices. That has included hiring a stable of the best talent in editing, at high pay packages, during this time when everyone else is cutting jobs and pay for journalists. This sort of behavior is anethema to the historically metric-driven “AOL Way,” which was very industrial management. That sort of permission is rarely given to an acquisition, but key to making it an engine for turn-around.
And HuffPo is being given the resources to implement a new model. Where HuffPo was something like 70 journalists, AOL is now cranking out content from some 2,000 journalists and editors! More than The Washington Post or The Wall Street Journal. Ms. Huffington, as the new leader, is less about “managing for results” looking at history, and more about identifying market needs then filling them. By giving people what they want Huffington Post is accumulating readers – which leads to display ad revenue. Which, as my last blog reported, is the fastest growing area in on-line advertising
Where the people are, you can find advertsing. As people are shift away from newspapers, toward the web, advertising dollars are following. Internet now trails only television for ad dollars – and is likely to be #1 soon:
Chart source: Business Insider
So now we can see a route for AOL to succeed. As traditional AOL subscribers disappear – which is likely to accelerate – AOL is building out an on-line publishing environment which can generate ad revenue. And that’s how AOL can survive the market shift. To use an old marketing term, AOL can “jump the curve” from its declining business to a growing one.
This is by no means a given to succeed. AOL has to move very quickly to create the new revenues. Subscribers and traditional AOL ad revenues are falling precipitously.
Source: Forbes.com
But, HuffPo is the engine that can take AOL from its dying business to a new one. Just like we want Harry Potter digitally, and are happy to obtain it from Ms. Rowlings directly, we want information digitally – and free – and from someone who can get it to us. HuffPo is now winning the battle for on-line readers against traditional media companies. And it is expanding, announced just this week on MediaPost.com “HuffPo Debuts in the UK.” Just as the News Corp UK tabloid, News of the World, dies (The Guardian – “James Murdoch’s News of the World Closure is the Shrewdest of Surrenders.“)
News Corp. once had a shot at jumping the curve with its big investment in MySpace. But leadership wouldn’t give MySpace permission and resources to do whatever it needed to do to grow. Instead, by applying “professional management” it limited MySpace’s future and allowed Facebook to end-run it. Too much energy was spent on maintaining old practices – which led to disaster. And that’s the risk at AOL – will it really keep giving HuffPo permission to do what it needs to do, and the resources to make it happen? Will it stick to letting Ms. Huffington build her empire, and focus on the product and its market fit rather than short-term revenues? If so, this really could be a great story for investors.
So far, it’s looking very good indeed.
by Adam Hartung | Feb 25, 2011 | Current Affairs, In the Whirlpool, Leadership
Since Craig Dubow took over as Gannett's CEO in 2005, Gannettblog reports that employment at the company has dropped from 52,600 to 32, 600. So 20,000 employees, or nearly 1 in 3, have disappeared.
- 2006 – 49,675 down 6%
- 2007 – 46,100 down 7%
- 2008 – 41,500 down 10%
- 2009 – 35,000 down 16%
- 2010 – 32,600 down 7%
Doesn't this look like dismantling the company? It is undoubtedly true that people are reading fewer newspapers than they did in 2000. But that fact does not mean Gannett has to head toward the whirlpool of failure, slowly cutting itself into a less relevant organization. There are a plethora of opportunities today – from creating a vital on-line news organization such as Huffington Post to moving into on-line news dissemination like Marketwatch.com to digital publishing like Amazon and its Kindle, to wholesale news distribution like the Apple iPad to on-line merchandising and ad distribution like Groupon, to —- well, let's just say that there are a lot of opportunities today to grow. To it's credit, Gannett owns 51% of CareerBuilder.com (who's employees are all included in the above numbers). But that one investment has been, as shown, insufficient to keep Gannett a vital, growing organization. At this rate, when will Gannett have to stop printing those hotel newspapers?
Yet, the CEO was paid $4.7M in 2009, including a cash bonus of $1.45M for implementing cost cuts. And that's what's quite wrong with CEO compensation America. And the problem, compensating CEOs for shrinking the company, has an enormous impact on American economic (and jobs) growth.
It is NOT hard to cut jobs. In fact, it is probably the easiest thing any executive can do. CEOs can simply order across the board cuts, or they can hand out downsizing requirements by function or business line. It's the one thing any executive can do that is guaranteed to give an improvement to the bottom line. Any newly minted 20-something MBA can dissect a P&L and identify headcount reductions. Anyone can fire salespeople, engineers, accountants or admins and declare that a victory. There are lots of ways to cut headcount costs, and the immediate revenue impact is rarely obvious. So, why would we pay a bonus for such behavior?
You can imagine the presentation the CEO gives the Board of Directors. "Our industry is doing poorly in this economy. Revenues have declined. But I moved quickly, and slashed xx,xxx jobs in order to save the P&L. As a result we preserved earnings for the next 2 years. Because of revenue declines our stock has been punished, so I recommend we take 50% (or more) of the cash saved from the headcount reductions and buy our own company stock in order to prop up the price/earnings multiple. That way we can protect ourselves from raiders in the short term, and continue to report higher earnings per share next year (there will be fewer shares – so even if earnings wane we keep up EPS), despite the terrible industry conditions."
Oh, by the way, because the CEO's compensation is tied to profits and EPS, he is now entitled to a big, fat bonus for this behavior. And, as Brenda Barnes did at Sara Lee, this can happen for several years in a row, leading to the company's collapse. As the company becomes smaller and smaller, its overall value declines, even if the EPS remains protected, until some vulture – either another company, private equity firm or hedge fund- buys the thing. The investors lose as value goes nowhere, employees lose as bonuses, benefits, pay and jobs are slashed, and vendors lose as revenues decline and price concessions become merciless. The community, state and nation lose as jobs and taxes disappear in the revenue decline. The only winner? The CEO – and any other top executives who are compensated on profits and EPS.
When a company grows, compensating profits is not a bad thing. But when a company isn't growing, well, as seen at Gannett, the incentives create perverse behavior. CEOs take the easy, and personally rewarding route of cutting costs, escalating the downward spiral. Without growth, you got nothing. So why isn't there a simple binary switch; if the CEO didn't grow revenues, the CEO doesn't get any bonus? Regardless.
"What about industry conditions?" you might ask. Well, isn't it the CEO's job to be foresightful about industry conditions and move the company into growth industries, rather than staying too long in poorly performing industries? CEOs aren't supposed to manage a slow death. Aren't they are supposed to lead vibrant, vital, growing companies that increase returns for investors, employees and suppliers?
"What about divestitures? What if the CEO sold a business at a huge multiple making an enormous profit?" Good move! Making the most of value is a good thing! But, once the sale is complete, isn't the critical question "What are you going to do with that money now?" If the CEO can't demonstrate the ability to invest in additional, replacement revenues that have a higher growth rate then shouldn't that money all be given to investors so they can invest it in something that will grow (rather than in buying company stock, for example, which just gets us back to the smaller company but higher EPS discussion above)? CEOs aren't investment bankers, who earn a bonus based upon buying and selling assets at a profit. Investment bankers can earn a bonus on transactions, but that's not the CEOs role, is it? Isn't the CEO is chartered with building a growing, profitable company.
Look at the CEOs of the Dow Jones Industrial companies. How many of them are compensated only if their company grows? As growth in these companies has floundered the last decade, how many CEOs continued to receive multi-million dollar compensation payouts?
If we want to grow the economy, we have to grow the companies in the economy. And if we want to grow companies, we have to align compensation. Rewarding shrinkage seems to have an obvious problem.
by Adam Hartung | Jul 20, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, eBooks, General, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lock-in
Years ago there was a TV ad featuring the actor Pauly Shore. Sitting in front of a haystack there was a sign over his frowning head reading "Find the needle." The voice over said "hard." Then another shot of Mr. Shore sitting in front of the same haystack grinning quite broadly, and the sign said "Find the hay." the voice over said "easy." Have you ever noticed that in business we too often try to do what's hard, rather than what's easy?
Take for example The New York Times Company, profiled today on Marketwatch.com in "The Gray Lady's Dilemma." The dilemma is apparently what the company will do next. Only, it really doesn't seem like much of a dilemma. The company is rapidly on its way to bankruptcy, with cash flow insufficient to cover operations. The leaders are negotiating with unions to lower costs, but it's unclear these cuts will be sufficient. And they definitely won't be within a year or two. Meanwhile the company is trying to sell The Boston Globe, which is highly unprofitable, and will most likely sell the Red Sox and the landmark Times Building in Manhattan, raising cash to keep the paper alive.
Only there isn't much of a dilemma here. Newspapers as they have historically been a business are no longer feasible. The costs outweigh the advertising and subscription dollars. The market is telling newspaper owners (Tribune Corporation, Gannett, McClatchey, News Corp. and all the others as well as The Times) that it has shifted. Cash flow and profits are a RESULT of the business model. People now are saying that they simply won't pay for newspapers – nor even read them. Thus advertisers have no reason to advertise. The results are terrible because the market has shifted. The easy thing to do is listen to the market. It's saying "stop." This should be easy. Quit, before you run out of money.
Of course, company leadership is Locked-in to doing what it always has done. So it doesn't want to stop. And many employees are Locked-in to their old job descriptions and pay – so they don't want to stop. They want to do what's hard – which is trying to Defend & Extend a money-losing enterprise after its useful life has been exhausted. But if customers have moved on, isn't this featherbedding? How is it different than trying to maintain coal shovelers on electric locomotives? This approach is hard. Very hard. And it won't succeed.
For a full half-decade, maybe longer, it has been crystal clear that print news, radio news and TV news (especially local) is worth a lot less than it used to be. They all suffer from one-way communication limits, poor reach and frequently poor latency. All problems that didn't exist before the internet. This technology and market shift has driven down revenues. People won't pay for what they can get globally, faster and in an interactive environment. As these customers shift, advertisers want to go where they are. After all, advertising is only valuable when it actually reaches someone.
Meanwhile, reporting and commentary increasingly is supplied by bloggers that work for free – or nearly so. Not unlike the "stringers" used by news services back in the "wire" days of Reuters, UPI and AP. Only now the stringers can take their news directly to the public without needing the wire service or publishers. They can blog their information and use Google to sell ads on their sites, thus directly making a market for their product. They even can push the product to consolidators like HuffingtonPost.com in order to maximize reach and revenue. Thus, the costs of acquiring and accumulating news has dropped dramatically. Increasingly, this pits the expensive journalist against the low cost journalist. And the market is shifting to the lower cost resource — regardless of how much people argue about the lack of quality (of course, some [such as politicians] would question the quality in today's "legitimate" media.)
Trying to keep The New York Times and Boston Globe alive as they have historically been is hard. I would contend a suicide effort. Continuing is explained only by recognizing the leaders are more interested in extending Lock-in than results. Because if they want results they would be full-bore putting all their energy into creating mixed-format content with maximum distribution that leads with the internet (including e-distribution like Kindle), and connects to TV, radio and print. Pricing for newspapers and magazines would jump dramatically in order to cover the much higher cost of printing. And the salespeople would be trained to sell cross-format ads which run in all formats. Audience numbers would cross all formats, and revenue would be tied to maximum reach, not the marginal value of each format. That is what advertisers want. Creating that sale, building that company, would be relatively much easier than trying to defend the Lock-in. And it would produce much better results.
The only dilemma at The New York Times Company is between dying as a newspaper company, or surviving as something else. The path it's on now says the management would rather die a newspaper company than do the smart thing and change to meet the market shift. For investors, this poses no dilemma. Investors would be foolhardy to be long the equity or bonds of The New York Times. There will be no GM-style bailout, and the current direction is into the Whirlpool. Employees had better be socking away cash for the inevitable pay cuts and layoffs. Suppliers better tighten up terms and watch the receivables. Because the company is in for a hard ending. And faster than anyone wants to admit.
Don't miss my recent ebook, "The Fall of GM" for a
quick read on how easily any company (even the nation's largest employer) can be
easily upset by market shifts. And learn what GM could have done to avoid
bankruptcy – lessons that can help your business grow!
http://tinyurl.com/mp5lrm
by Adam Hartung | May 18, 2009 | Current Affairs, Defend & Extend, In the Whirlpool, Leadership, Lifecycle, Lock-in, Web/Tech
"Newspapers face pressure in selling online advertising" is today's headline about newspapers. Seems even when the papers realize they must sell more online ads they can't do it. Instead of selling what people want, the way they want it, the newspapers are trying to sell online ads the way they sold paper ads – with poor results.
We all know that newspaper ad spending is down some 20-30%. But even in this soft economy internet ad spending is up 13% versus a year ago. Except for newspaper sites. At Gannett, NYT and McClatchy internet ad sales are down versus a year ago!
People don't treat internet news like they do a newspaper. The whole process of looking for news, retrieving it, reading it, and going to the next thing is nothing like a newspaper. Yet, daily newspapers keep trying to think of internet publishing like it's as simple as putting a paper on the web! What works much better, we know, are sites focused on specific issues – like Marketwatch.com for financial info, or FoodNetwork.com. Also, nobody wants to hunt for an on-line classified ad at a newspaper site – not when it's easier to go to cars.com or vehix.com to look for cars, or monster.com to look for jobs. Web searching means that you aren't looking to browse across whatever a newspaper editor wants to feed you. Instead you want to look into a topic, often bouncing across sites for relevant or newer information. But a look at ChicagoTribune.com or USAToday.com quickly shows these sites are still trying to be a newspaper.
Likewise, online advertisers have far different expectations than print advertisers. Newspapers simply said "we have xxxx subscribers" and expected buyers to pay. But on the web advertisers know they can pay for placement against specific topics, and they can expect a specific number of page views for their money. As the article says "if newspapers want to get their online revenue growing again, once the economy recovers, they have to tie ad rates more closely to results, charge less for ads and provide web content that readers can't get at every news aggregation site."
When markets shift, it's not enough to try applying your old Success Formula to the new market. That kind of Defend & Extend practice won't work. You're trying to put a square (or at least oblong) peg into a round hole. Shifted markets require new solutions that meet the new needs. You have to study those needs, and project what customers will pay for. And you have to give them product that's superior to competitors in some key way. Old customers aren't trying to buy from you. Loyalty doesn't go far in a well greased internet enabled world. You have to substantiate the reason customers need to remain loyal. You have to offer them solutions that meet their emerging needs, not the old ones.
Years ago IBM almost went bust trying to be a mainframe company when people found hardware prices plummeting and off-the-shelf software good enough for their needs. IBM had to develop new scenarios, which showed customers needed services to implement technology. Then IBM had to demonstrate they could deliver those services competitively. Only by Disrupting their old Success Formula, tied to very large hardware sales, and implementing White Space where they developed an entirely new Success Formula were they able to migrate forward and save the company from failure.
Unfortunately, most newspaper companies haven't figured this out yet. They don't realize that bloggers and other on-line content generators are frequently scooping their news bureaus, getting to news fans faster and with more insight. They don't realize that on-line delivery is not about a centralized aggregation of news, but rather the freshness and insight. And they haven't figured out that advertisers take advantage of enhanced metrics to demand better results from their spending. The New York Times, Gannett and other big newspaper companies better study the IBM turnaround before it's too late.
