How CEO Lampert’s BIAS Is Killing Sears – and Maybe Your Company Too

Sears has performed horribly since acquired by Fast Eddie Lampert's KMart in 2005.  Revenues are down 25%, same store sales have declined persistently, store margins have eroded and the company has recently taken to reporting losses.  There really hasn't been any good news for Sears since the acquisition.

Bloomberg Businessweek made a frontal assault on CEO Edward Lampert's leadership at Sears this week.  Over several pages the article details how a "free market" organization installed by Mr. Lampert led to rampant internal warfare and an inability for the company to move forward effectively with programs to improve sales or profits. Meanwhile customer satisfaction has declined, and formerly valuable brands such as Kenmore and Craftsman have become industry also-rans.

Because the Lampert controlled hedge fund ESL Investments is the largest investor in Sears, Mr. Lampert has no risk of being fired.  Even if Nobel winner Paul Krugman blasts away at him. But, if performance has been so bad – for so long – why does the embattled Mr. Lampert continue to lead in the same way?  Why doesn't he "fire" himself?

By all accounts Mr. Lampert is a very smart man.  Yale summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa, he was a protege of former Treasury Secretay Robert Rubin at Goldman Sach before convincing billionaire Richard Rainwater to fund his start-up hedge fund – and quickly make himself the wealthiest citizen in Connecticut.  

If the problems at Sears are so obvious to investors, industry analysts, economics professors, management gurus and journalists why doesn't he simply change? 

Mr. Lampert, largely because of his success, is a victim of BIAS.  Deep within his decision making are his closely held Beliefs, Interpretations, Assumptions and Strategies.  These were created during his formative years in college and business.  This BIAS was part of what drove his early success in Goldman, and ESL.  This BIAS is now part of his success formula – an entire set of deeply held convictions about what works, and what doesn't, that are not addressed, discussed or even considered when Mr. Lampert and his team grind away daily trying to "fix" declining Sears Holdings.

This BIAS is so strong that not even failure challenges them.  Mr. Lampert believes there is deep value in conventional retail, and real estate.  He believes strongly in using "free market competition" to allocate resources. He believes in himself, and he believes he is adding value, even if nobody else can see it.

Mr. Lampert assumes that if he allows his managers to fight for resources, the best programs will reach the top (him) for resourcing.  He assumes that the historical value in Sears and its house brands will remain, and he merely needs to unleash that value to a free market system for it to be captured.  He assumes that because revenues remain around $35B Sears is not irrelevant to the retail landscape, and the company will be revitalized if just the right ideas bubble up from management.

Mr. Lampert inteprets the results very different from analysts.  Where outsiders complain about revenue reductions overall and same store, he interprets this as an acceptable part of streamlining.  When outsiders say that store closings and reduced labor hurt the brand, he interprets this as value-added cost savings.  When losses appear as a result of downsizing he interprets this as short-term accounting that will not matter long-term.  While most investors and analysts fret about the overall decline in sales and brands Mr. Lampert interprets growing sales of a small integrated retail program as a success that can turn around the sinking behemoth.

Mr. Lampert's strategy is to identify "deep value" and then tenaciously cut costs, including micro-managing senior staff with daily calls.  He believes this worked for Warren Buffett, so he believes it will continue to be a successful strategy.  Whether such deep value continues to exist – especially in conventional retail – can be challenged by outsiders (don't forget Buffett lost money on Pier 1,) but it is part of his core strategy and will not be challenged.  Whether cost cutting does more harm than good is an unchallenged strategy.  Whether micro-managing staff eats up precious resources and leads to unproductive behavior is a leadership strategy that will not change.  Hiring younger employees, who resemble Mr. Lampert in quick thinking and intellect (if not industry knowledge or proven leadership skills) is a strategy that will be applied even as the revolving door at headquarters spins.

The retail market has changed dramatically, and incredibly quickly.  Advances in internet shopping, technology for on-line shopping (from mobile devices to mobile payments) and rapid delivery have forever altered the economics of retailing.  Customer ease of showrooming, and desire to shop remotely means conventional retail has shrunk, and will continue to shrink for several years.  This means the real challenge for Sears is not to be a better Sears as it was in 2000 — but to  become something very different that can compete with both WalMart and Amazon – and consumer goods manufacturers like GE (appliances) and Exide (car batteries.) 

There is no doubt Mr. Lampert is a very smart person.  He has made a fortune.  But, he and Sears are a victim of his BIAS.  Poor results, bad magazine articles and even customer complaints are no match for the BIAS so firmly underlying early success.  Even though the market has changed, Mr. Lampert's BIAS has him (and his company) in internal turmoil, year after year, even though long ago outsiders gave up on expecting a better result. 

Even if Sears Holdings someday finds itself in bankruptcy court, expect Mr. Lampert to interpret this as something other than a failure – as he defends his BIAS better than he defends its shareholders, employees, suppliers and customers.

What is your BIAS?  Are you managing for the needs of changing markets, or working hard to defend doing more of what worked in a bygone era?  As a leader, are you targeting the future, or trying to recapture the past?  Have market shifts made your beliefs outdated, your interpretations of what happens around you faulty, your assumptions inaccurate and your strategies hurting results?  If any of this is true, it may be time you address (and change) your BIAS, rather than continuing to invest in more of the same.  Or you may well end up like Sears.

Will Meg Whitman’s Layoffs Turn Around HP? Nope

Things are bad at HP these days.  CEO and Board changes have confused the management team and investors alike.  Despite a heritage based on innovation, the company is now mired in low-growth PC markets with little differentiation.  Investors have dumped the stock, dropping company value some 60% over two years, from $52/share to $22 – a loss of about $60billion. 

Reacting to the lousy revenue growth prospects as customers shift from PCs to tablets and smartphones, CEO Meg Whitman announced plans to eliminate 27,000 jobs; about 8% of the workforce.  This is supposedly the first step in a turnaround of the company that has flailed ever since buying Compaq and changing the company course into head-to-head PC competition a decade ago.  But, will it work? 

Not a chance.

Fixing HP requires understanding what went wrong at HP.  Simply, Carly Fiorina took a company long on innovation and new product development and turned it into the most industrial-era sort of company.  Rather than having HP pursue new technologies and products in the development of new markets, like the company had done since its founding creating the market for electronic testing equipment, she plunged HP into a generic manufacturing war.

Pursuing the PC business Ms. Fiorina gave up R&D in favor of adopting the R&D of Microsoft, Intel and others while spending management resources, and money, on cost management.  PCs offered no differentiation, and HP was plunged into a gladiator war with Dell, Lenovo and others to make ever cheaper, undifferentiated machines.  The strategy was entirely based upon obtaining volume to make money, at a time when anyone could buy manufacturing scale with a phone call to a plethora of Asian suppliers.

Quickly the Board realized this was a cutthroat business primarily requiring supply chain skills, so they dumped Ms. Fiorina in favor of Mr. Hurd.  He was relentless in his ability to apply industrial-era tactics at HP, drastically cutting R&D, new product development, marketing and sales as well as fixating on matching the supply chain savings of companies like Dell in manufacturing, and WalMart in retail distribution. 

Unfortunately, this strategy was out of date before Ms. Fiorina ever set it in motion.  And all Mr. Hurd accomplished was short-term cuts that shored up immediate earnings while sacrificing any opportunities for creating long-term profitable new market development.  By the time he was forced out HP had no growth direction.  It's PC business fortunes are controlled by its suppliers, and the PC-based printer business is dying.  Both primary markets are the victim of a major market shift away from PC use toward mobile devices, where HP has nothing.

HPs commitment to an outdated industrial era supply-side manufacturing strategy can be seen in its acquisitions.  What was once the world's leading IT services company, EDS, was bought in 2008 after falling into financial disarray as that market shifted offshore.  After HP spent nearly $14B on the purchase, HP used that business to try defending and extending PC product sales, but to little avail.  The services group has been downsized regularly as growth evaporated in the face of global trends toward services offshoring and mobile use.

In 2009 HP spent almost $3B on networking gear manufacturer 3Com.  But this was after the market had already started shifting to mobile devices and common carriers, leaving a very tough business that even market-leading Cisco has struggled to maintain.  Growth again stagnated, and profits evaporated as HP was unable to bring any innovation to the solution set and unable to create any new markets.

In 2010 HP spent $1B on the company that created the hand-held PDA (personal digital assistant) market – the forerunner of our wirelessly connected smartphones – Palm.  But that became an enormous fiasco as its WebOS products were late to market, didn't work well and were wholly uncompetitive with superior solutions from Apple and Android suppliers.  Again, the industrial-era strategy left HP short on innovation, long on supply chain, and resulted in big write-offs.

Clearly what HP needs is a new strategy.  One aligned with the information era in which we live.  Think like Apple, which instead of chasing Macs a decade ago shifted into new markets.  By creating new products that enhanced mobility Apple came back from the brink of complete failure to spectacular highs.  HP needs to learn from this, and pursue an entirely new direction.

But, Meg Whitman is certainly no Steve Jobs.  Her career at eBay was far from that of an innovator.  eBay rode the growth of internet retailing, but was not Amazon.  Rather, instead of focusing on buyers, and what they want, eBay focused on sellers – a classic industrial-era approach.  eBay has not been a leader in launching any new technologies (such as Kindle or Fire at Amazon) and has not even been a leader in mobile applications or mobile retail. 

While CEO at eBay Ms. Whitman purchased PayPal.  But rather than build that platform into the next generation transaction system for web or mobile use, Paypal was used to defend and extend the eBay seller platform.  Even though PayPal was the first leader in on-line payments, the market is now crowded with solutions like Google Wallets (Google,) Square (from a Twitter co-founder,) GoPayment (Intuit) and Isis (collection of mobile companies.) 

Had Ms. Whitman applied an information-era strategy Paypal could have been a global platform changing the way payment processing is handled.  Instead its use and growth has been limited to supporting an historical on-line retail platform.  This does not bode well for the future of HP.

HP cannot save its way to prosperity.  That never works.  Try to think of one turnaround where it did – GM? Tribune Corp? Circuit City? Sears?  Best Buy? Kodak?  To successfully turn around HP must move – FAST – to innovate new solutions and enter new markets.  It must change its strategy to behave a lot more like the company that created the oscilliscope and usher in the electronics age, and a lot less like the industrial-era company it has become – destroying shareholder value along the way.

Is HP so cheap that it's a safe bet.  Not hardly.  HP is on the same road as DEC, Wang, Lanier, Gateway Computers, Sun Microsystems and Silicon Graphics right now.  And that's lousy for investors and employees alike.

It’s About Growth, Stupid – Sara Lee, Alcoa, Virgin


Nearly 20 years ago the Clinton campaign inspired itself with the mantra “It’s the Economy, Stupid.”  Their goal was to remind everyone that the economy was critical to the health of a nation, and the economy hadn’t been doing so well.  Now we could retread that for business leaders “It’s About Growth, Stupid.”  For some reason, all too many seem to have gotten caught up in downsizings and cost cutting, forgetting that without growth there’s no way to have a healthy business!

I’ve long been a detractor of Sara Lee.  As the company undergoes a change in leadership, the Chicago Tribune headlines “Nobody Doesn’t Like Sara Who?”  Under CEO Brenda Barnes, Sara Lee sold off business after business.  Now the company is so marginalized that it’s an open question if it will remain independent.  For years the leaders said asset sales were to help the company “focus.”  Only “focus” made the company smaller, without any growth businesses.  Why would an investor want to own this?  Why would a manager want to work there?

Had the asset sales been invested in growth, perhaps a positive outcome would have developed.  But Sara Lee was like most companies, as that rarely happens.  Had the money been paid out to investors perhaps they could have invested those gains in other growth businesses.  But instead the money went into the company, where it propped up no-growth businesses.  Leaving Sara Lee a smaller, no growth, low profit business.  This leadership has not benefited investors, employees, customers or suppliers.

Likewise, draconian cost cutting does more harm than good.  The National Public Radio headline reads “Extreme Downsizing May Hurt Companies Later.”  Using deep cuts at Alcoa as an example, Wayne Crascia, professor at University of Colorado, points out that it’s unlikely Alcoa has really “prepared itself for future growth.”  Instead, cost cutting often eliminates the ability to compete effectively, by cutting into R&D, marketing and sales in ways that are impossible to rebuild quickly or effectively.  By trying to save the old Success Formula with cuts, rather than growth initiatives, the leadership hurts the company’s long term viability.  Sort of like repeated vomiting by anorexia sufferers leaves them skinnier – but in far worse health.  Even though Alcoa still boasts 60,000 employees it’s very likely the company has permanently Locked-in its old Success Formula leaving itself unable to emerge as a stronger company aligned with new market needs.

Yet, while so many company leaders are trying to “retrench to success” it’s clear that growth still abounds for the companies that understand how to create value.  BrandChannel.com headlines “The Elastic Brand:  Virgin Expands in Every Direction.”  Instead of retrenching to focus on some sort of “core” the article points out how Virgin’s leader, Sir Richard Branson, keeps taking the business into new, far flung operations.  Defying conventional wisdom, Virgin is in money lending, mobile phones, gaming, social media, international airlines, domestic airlines and even intercontinental flight!  By intentionally avoiding any kind of “core” Virgin keeps growing – even during this recession – adding jobs for employees, higher value for investors, more sales opportunities for suppliers and more chances to buy Virgin for customers! 

Conventional wisdom be danged ….. maybe it’s time to look at results!  Organizations that whittle themselves down to “core” by asset sales or cutting destroy value.  While it may feel self-flaggelatingly good to talk about cuts, it does not create value.  Only growth can do that.  And there is growth, when we start focusing on market needs.  Virgin is finding those opportunities – so what’s stopping you?  Is it your “focus on your core” business?  If so, maybe you need to read the Forbes article  “Stop Focusing on Your Core Business.”  It may sound unconventional, but then again – isn’t it those who defy conventional wisdom that make the most money?

Postscript: I offer my personal best wishes to Ms. Barnes on her recovery. It has been reported in the press that Ms. Barnes recently suffered a stroke.  I know how difficult a time this can be, as my wife stroked at age 54, and I was her personal caregiver for 3 years of difficult recovery.  Stroke recovery is hard work.  For the patient as well as the family it is a tough time.  While I have been a detractor of Ms. Barnes leadership at Sara Lee, in no way did I ever wish my comments to be personal, and I would never wish anyone suffer such a difficult health concern as a stroke.  Again, my best wishes for a full recovery to Ms. Barnes, and for both her and her family to have the strength and tenacity to come through this ordeal stronger and even more tightly knitted.