With revenues up 39% last quarter, it's far too soon to declare the death of Google. Even in techville, where things happen quickly, the multi-year string of double-digit higher revenues insures survival – at least for a while.
However, there are a lot of problems at Google which indicate it is not a good long-term hold for investors. For traders there is probably money to be made, as this long-term chart indicates:
While there has been enormous volatility, Google has yet to return to its 2007 highs and struggles to climb out of the low $600/share price range. And there's good reason, because Google management has done more to circle the wagons in self-defense than it has done to create new product markets.
What was the last exciting product you can think of from Google? Something that was truly new, innovative and being developed into a market changer? Most likely, whatever you named is something that has recently been killed, or receiving precious little management attention. For a company that prided itself on innovation – even reportedly giving all employees 20% of their time to do whatever they wanted – we see management actions that are decidedly not about promoting innovation into the market, or making sustainable efforts to create new markets:
killed Google Powermeter, a project that could have redefined how we buy and use electricity
killed Google Wave, a product that offered considerable group productivity improvement
killed Google Flu Vaccine Finder offering new insights for health care from data analysis
killed Google Related which could have helped all of us search beyond keywords
killed Google synch for Blackberry as it focuses on selling Android
killed Google Talk mobile app
killed the OnePass Google payment platform for publishers
All of these had opportunities to redefine markets. So what did Google do with these redeployed resources:
Bought Motorola for $12.5billion, which it hopes to take toe-to-toe with Apple's market leading iPhone, and possibly the iPad. And in the process has aggravated all the companies who licensed Android and developed products which will now compete with Google's own products. Like the #1 global handset manufacturer Samsung. And which offers no clear advantage to the Apple products, but is being offered at a lower price.
Google+, which has become an internal obsession – and according to employees consumes far more resources than anyone outside Google knows. Google+ is a product going toe-to-toe with Facebook, only with no clear advantages. Despite all the investment, Google continues refusing to publish any statistics indicating that Google+ is growing substantially, or producing any profits, in its catch-up competition with Facebook.
In both markets, mobile phones and social media, Google has acted very unlike the Google of 2000 that innovated its way to the top of web revenues, and profits. Instead of developing new markets, Google has chosen to undertaking 2 Goliath battles with enormously successful market leaders, but without any real advantage.
Google has actually proven, since peaking in 2007, that its leadership is remarkably old-fashioned, in the worst kind of way. Instead of focusing on developing new markets and opportunities, management keeps focusing on defending and extending its traditional search business – and has proven completely inept at developing any new revenue streams. Google bought both YouTube and Blogger, which have enormous user bases and attract incredible volumes of page views – but has yet to figure out how to monetize either, after several years.
For its new market innovations, rather than setting up teams dedicated to turning its innovations into profitable revenue growth engines Google leadership keeps making binary decisions. Messrs. Page and Brin either decide the product and market aren't self-developing, and kill the products, or simply ignore the business opportunity and lets it drift. Much like Microsoft – which has remained focused on Windows and Office while letting its Zune, mobile and other products drift into oblivion – or lose huge amounts of money like Bing and for years XBox.
I personalized that last comment onto the Google founders intentionally. The biggest news out of Google lately has been a pure financial machination done for purely political reasons. Announcing a stock dividend that effectively creates a 2-for-1 split, only creating a new class of non-voting "C" stock to make sure the founders never lose voting control. This was adding belt to suspenders, because the founders already own the Class B stock giving them 66% voting control. The purpose was purely to make sure nobody every tries to buy, or otherwise take over Google, because the founders will always have enough votes to make such an action impossible.
The founders explained this as necessary so they could retain control and make "big bets." If "big bets" means dumping billions into also-ran products as late entrants, then they have good reason to fear losing company control. Making big bets isn't how you win in the information technology industry. You win by creating new markets, with new solutions, before the competition does it.
Apple's huge wins in iPod, iTouch, iTunes, iPhone and iPad weren't "big bets." The Apple R&D budget is 1/8 Microsoft's. It's not big bets that win, its developing innovation, putting it into the market, shepharding it through a series of learning cycles to make it better and better and meeting previously unmet – often unidentified – needs. And that's not what the enormous investments in mobile handsets and Google+ are about.
Although this stock split has no real impact on Google today, it is a signal. A signal of a leadership team more obsessed with their own control than doing good for investors. It is clearly a diversion from creating new products, and opening new markets. But it was the centerpiece of communication at the last earnings call. And that is a avery bad signal for investors. A signal that the leaders see things likely to become much worse, with cash going out and revenue struggling, before too long. So they are acting now to protect themselves.
Meanwhile, even as revenues grew 39% last quarter, there are signs of problems in Google's "core" market leadership is so fixated on defending. As this chart shows, while volume of paid ads is going up, the price is now going down.
Prices go down when your product loses value. You have to chase revenue. Remember Proctor & Gamble's "Basics" product line launch? Chasing revenue by cutting price. In the short-term it can be helpful, but long-term it is not in your best interest. Google isn't just cutting price on its incremental sales, but on all sales. Increasingly advertisers are becoming savvy about what they can expect from search ads, and what they can expect from other venues – like Facebook – and the prices are reflecting expectations. In a recent Strata survey the top 2 focus for ad executives were "social" (69%) and "display" (71%) – categories where Facebook leads – and both are ahead of "search."
At Facebook, we know the user base is around 800million. We also know it's now the #1 site on the internet – more hits than Google. And Facebook has much longer average user times on site. All things attractive to advertisers. Facebook is acquiring Instagram, which positions it much stronger on mobile devices, thus growing its market. And while Google was talking about share splits, Facebook recently announced it was making Facebook email integrated into the Facebook platform much easier to use (which is a threat to Gmail) and it was adding a new analytics suite to help advertisers understand ad performance – like they are accustomed to at Google. All of which increases Facebook's competitiveness with Google, as customers shift increasingly to social platforms.
As said at the top of this article, Google won't be gone soon. But all signs point to a rough road for investors. The company is ditching its game changing products and dumping enormous sums into me-too efforts trying to catch well healed and well managed market leaders. The company has not created an ability to take new innovations to market, and remains stuck defending and extending its existing business lines. And the top leaders just signaled that they weren't comfortable they could lead the company successfully, so they implemented new programs to make sure nobody could challenge their leadership.
There are big fires burning at Google. Unfortunately, burning those resources is producing a lot of heat – but not much light on a successful future. It's time to sell Google.
“Buy Low, Sell High” was an industrial era investor expression. Before we shifted into an information economy, investors were admonished to invest along with economic cycles, buying during recessions, selling during booms.
In today’s information economy it’s not nearly so simple. While growth occurs, companies falter and disappear (Sun Microsystems and Silicon Graphics, for example.) Meanwhile, during bad economic periods there are flourishing growth companies.
Company performance today has much more to do with whether the company’s products and services are aligned with trends, and market shifts created by trends, than the overall economy. When revenues first show signs fo faltering, often the company fails completely, unable to react to market shifts. Competitors quickly steal customers, revenue and precious cash flow. Investors frequently have little warning, or time, before company value slides into the oblivion, leaving them with negative returns.
So now it’s more important to look at trends in where product and service markets are headed than overall economic conditions. The economy won’t save a company that’s against the trend – or hurt a company that’s delivering the market trend.
Yahoo caught the early trend toward internet usage. In the early years people didn’t quite know what to do on the internet, so content providers, aggregators, and ability to search were valuable. People like Yahoo because it gave them what they wanted, and the company flourished as it became the home page for over 80% of internet users. Advertisers loved the user base, so they bought ads.
Then the market shifted. Users gained more experience, and didn’t need the aggregation function Yahoo provided. Increasingly they wanted to find answers themselves, making the quality of search more important than content. A white page with a simple box (Google) that did great searching across the entire web overtook Yahoo’s content. And, as time progressed people started using the internet as a primary location for socially connecting with friends and colleagues, making the content aggregation even less valuable. Time spent on Yahoo as a percent of time on-line began dropping:
So, nobody should be surprised that revenue would fall – correct? It’s not that the folks at Yahoo are wasteful, or not working hard. They simply are becoming out of step with the market trend. The result one would expect is worsening results in the old, “core” business – and that’s exactly what is happening:
Meanwhile, where the eyeballs go is where the display ad revenues go as well. And with the trends, that means we would expect display ad revenu growth to move away from Yahoo – as it has done:
So yesterday when Yahoo announced sales and earnings, it was a disappointment. What increase Yahoo had in fast growing display ads (5%) was insufficient to cover the decline in search ads (down 15%). Clearly, Yahoo missed the market shift. But, the CEO did not admit that the business model was ineffective (as results indicate.) Rather, she said the company needed more salespeople!
This proclivity to look inward, as if working harder, faster and better would “fix” Yahoo, defies the reality that the company is no longer competitive given where the market is headed. Ms. Bartz can’t succeed by trying to defend and extend the traditional Yahoo business model. Yahoo doesn’t need more salespeople, it needs an entirely different business!
Alternatively, Apple exemplifies the other side of this coin. I have been an unabashed bull on Apple for months. Why? Because it does create solutions tightly linked to market trends. People, as consumers or in business, demand more mobility. And Apple’s products deliver that mobility more seamlessly and effectively than any other solution provider.
Apple could well have kept itself focused on Mac sales. Had it done so, it would likely be out of business today. Instead, Apple focused the bulk of its development on delivering products that fulfilled trends. The result has been expansion into new markets, which have delivered massive revenue gains.
Last quarter Apple sold more iPhones and even more iPad tablets (9.25million units, $6.1B) than it sold Macs (~4 million units, $5.1B.) The old business has been replaced (cannibalized) by new, growing businesses that support the market trend. iPads are now 11% of the PC business overall, and growing fast as they obsolete PCs. Combined, iPads and Macs sold 13.25 million “computing devices” which would make it second in the world, behind only HP (15.3million PCs.) Bigger than Dell, for example, that has stuck to its “core” PC business.
Because Apple is all about delivering on trends, there’s really no reason to think revenues, and profits, won’t continue growing. The shift to mobility has just taken hold, and there are legions of people still without an apps-powerful smartphone (lots of Blackberry customers out there to shift.) The shift to tablets has just started. As these trends continue, Apple is continuing to develop new solutions that keep it ahead of competitors.
Where Yahoo’s CEO wants to add more salespeople, in hopes she can push outdated products, Mr. Jobs said in the earnings call yesterday “Right now we’re very focused and excited about bringing iOS5 and iCloud to our users this fall.” Yahoo is trying to do more of what it always did, as the market moves away. While Apple keeps its collective management eyes on the future – and where the market is headed – to constantly bring new solutions that deliver on the trends.
Sell Yahoo, if you haven’t already. And buy Apple. It’s all about investing with the trends.
Note: update on “Is Cisco a Value Stock? Skip It.” In the month since publishing that blog (6/23/11) Cisco has demonstrated that it is running headlong from the rapids of growth into the swamp of stagnation. Not only has it been killing off new products, but as it announced weak results the CEO has taken to a massive cutback. 11,500 employees are being laid off, or sent off to work for other companies as facilities are being sold to a Chinese company.
Worse, the CEO is now stooping to financial machinations in order to make the future look better. According to HuffingtonPost.comCisco is taking a massive $1.3B charge. This allows Cisco to write off various costs that are old, current and even future to the current P&L. This will inflate future earnings, regardless of actual performance, while deflating current results. The net impact is P&L manipulation designed to make the company – quarter over quarter or year over year – look better than it is actually performing. Transparency is being intentionally muddled, to hide the company’s inability to provide solutions delivering on market trends.
Cisco shows all the signs of a company in a growth stall. Unable to shift with market trends, it is now shedding products, employees and assets in an effort to pad the P&L. It is “reorganizing” the company, rather than linking to market needs. Remember that fewer than 7% of companies that slip into a growth stall ever successfully maintain an ongoing 2% growth rate. Because they are focused on internal issues, and financial management – rather being clearly focused market trends.
Don’t just skip buying Cisco – if you are a shareholder, SELL!
Evolution doesn’t happen like we think. It’s not slow and gradual (like line A, below.) Things don’t go from one level of performance slowly to the next level in a nice continuous way. Rather, evolutionary change happens brutally fast. Usually the potential for change is building for a long time, but then there is some event – some environmental shift (visually depcted as B, below) – and the old is made obsolete while the new grows aggressively. Economists call this “punctuated equilibrium.” Everyone was on an old equilibrium, then they quickly shift to something new establishing a new equilibrium.
Momentum has been building for change in publishing for several years. Books are heavy, a pain to carry and often a pain to buy. Now eReaders, tablets and web downloads have changed the environment. And in June J.K. Rowling, author of those famous Harry Potter books, opened her new web site as the location to exclusively sell Harry Potter e-books (see TheWeek.com “How Pottermore Will Revolutionized Publishing.”)
Ms. Rowling has realized that the market has shifted, the old equilibrium is gone, and she can be part of the new one. She’ll let the dinosaur-ish publisher handle physical books, especially since Amazon has already shown us that physical books are a smaller market than ebooks. Going forward she doesn’t need the publisher, or the bookstore (not even Amazon) to capture the value of her series. She’s jumping to the new equilibrium.
And that’s why I’m encouraged about AOL these days. Since acquiring The Huffington Post company, things are changing at AOL. According to Forbes writer Jeff Bercovici, in “AOL After the Honeymoon,” AOL’s big slide down in users has begun to reverse direction. Many were surprised to learn, as the FinancialPost.com recently headlined, “Huffington Post Outstrips NYT Web Traffic in May.” Source: BusinessInsider.com
The old equilibrium in news publishing is obsolete. Those trying to maintain it keep failing, as recently headlined on PaidContent.org “Citing Weak Economy, Gannett Turns to Job Cuts, Furloughs.” Nobody should own a traditional publisher, that business is not viable.
But Forbes reports that Ms. Huffington has been given real White Space at AOL. She has permission to do what she needs to do to succeed, unbridled by past AOL business practices. That has included hiring a stable of the best talent in editing, at high pay packages, during this time when everyone else is cutting jobs and pay for journalists. This sort of behavior is anethema to the historically metric-driven “AOL Way,” which was very industrial management. That sort of permission is rarely given to an acquisition, but key to making it an engine for turn-around.
And HuffPo is being given the resources to implement a new model. Where HuffPo was something like 70 journalists, AOL is now cranking out content from some 2,000 journalists and editors! More than The Washington Post or The Wall Street Journal. Ms. Huffington, as the new leader, is less about “managing for results” looking at history, and more about identifying market needs then filling them. By giving people what they want Huffington Post is accumulating readers – which leads to display ad revenue. Which, as my last blog reported, is the fastest growing area in on-line advertising
Where the people are, you can find advertsing. As people are shift away from newspapers, toward the web, advertising dollars are following. Internet now trails only television for ad dollars – and is likely to be #1 soon:
So now we can see a route for AOL to succeed. As traditional AOL subscribers disappear – which is likely to accelerate – AOL is building out an on-line publishing environment which can generate ad revenue. And that’s how AOL can survive the market shift. To use an old marketing term, AOL can “jump the curve” from its declining business to a growing one.
This is by no means a given to succeed. AOL has to move very quickly to create the new revenues. Subscribers and traditional AOL ad revenues are falling precipitously.
But, HuffPo is the engine that can take AOL from its dying business to a new one. Just like we want Harry Potter digitally, and are happy to obtain it from Ms. Rowlings directly, we want information digitally – and free – and from someone who can get it to us. HuffPo is now winning the battle for on-line readers against traditional media companies. And it is expanding, announced just this week on MediaPost.com “HuffPo Debuts in the UK.” Just as the News Corp UK tabloid, News of the World, dies (The Guardian – “James Murdoch’s News of the World Closure is the Shrewdest of Surrenders.“)
News Corp. once had a shot at jumping the curve with its big investment in MySpace. But leadership wouldn’t give MySpace permission and resources to do whatever it needed to do to grow. Instead, by applying “professional management” it limited MySpace’s future and allowed Facebook to end-run it. Too much energy was spent on maintaining old practices – which led to disaster. And that’s the risk at AOL – will it really keep giving HuffPo permission to do what it needs to do, and the resources to make it happen? Will it stick to letting Ms. Huffington build her empire, and focus on the product and its market fit rather than short-term revenues? If so, this really could be a great story for investors.
"CraigsList is for hookers." That's what the General Manager at the Los Angeles Times told me in 2005. In a meeting to discuss the newspaper's future profitability I pointed out that 1/3 of his newspaper's revenues came from Classified ads, and I had asked him if he was concerned about CraigsList.com. As you can tell, he was not.
At the same time, I asked him if he was concerned about on-line ads and the Google placement engine undermining his display ad business. He assured me that the internet was all for bloggers and no reputable news reader would pay much attention to on-line news. So no, he wasn't worried about internet competition to the newspaper sucking away this advertiser base. He just needed to keep old customers focused on the value of newspaper ads. In less than 6 months GM removed 70% of its newspaper ads – shifting all the money to on-line advertising – leading the auto pack on-line. And movie companies moved nearly 75% of their newspaper ad budget to on-line, while more than half of real-estate ads went on-line. Those happen to be the top 3 sources of display ad revenue for newspapers.
Today Tribune Corporation is in bankruptcy, and classified ads have dropped to a trickle for all major newspapers. Meanwhile, things are going pretty well at CraigsList and Google:
As can be seen, revenues per employee are phenomenal at CraigsList, and extremely good at Google. Much better than at the Tribune Company newspapers such as the Los Angeles Times and Chicago Tribune – despite them shedding a high percentage of employees over the last 7 years!
According to Gavin O'Malley, at OnlineMediaDaily of MediaPost.com in "CraigsList Revenues Soar: But Problems Loom" revenues at CraigsList may exceed $4M/employee/year! Margins he asserts are in the range of 75-80%! And revenues, while still small at about $125M, are growing at 25%/year (for what everyone thinks of as "free.") Albeit, this is a small business. But what if Tribune Company had paid attention back 5 years ago and invested hard in creating the world's best CraigsList – rather than ignoring it? What would the possible revenues be today? And margins? And impact on Tribune Company growth in revenues and profits?
Most companies do only a surface analysis of competition. They are so busy listening to, and reacting to, big customers it's all they can do to keep operations going and make the marginal changes to keep big customers happy. As a result, maybe they look at 2 or 3 of their most similar competitors (like other newspapers in the local market for our example.) And that will be cursory, examining total revenues, perhaps margins (if public and data is available) and a quick glimpse at impact on existing customers and any new products recently launched. But overall, very little attention is paid to competition.
And practically none is paid to "fringe" competitors. Those with different business models. Polaroid ignored digital camera manufacturers (despite licensing them technology) until Polaroid went bankrupt. Digital Equipment(DEC) ignored AutoCad – calling their CAD/CAM products "toys." Wang and Lanier said no big company would use a PC, rather than an integrated centralized system, for corporate word processing so they discounted Apple and Microsoft. Motorola largely ignored Apple in mobile phones, even after doing a joint venture with them to create and launch the RoKR. Failure lists are strewn with companies that simply ignored "fringe" competitors – saying they didn't understand the industry, the customers and how "the business works."
Large or small size is not important when studying competition, it's the ability to change how customers buy that is important. As we've seen in the case of companies like Google, Apple, eBay and Amazon we can see that fringe competitors can grow extremely fast. They can alter the competitive landscape quicker than almost any traditional corporate planning group will give them credit. Just ask the folks at Sears or Home Depot about he impact of Amazon and other on-line retailers (do you think either of those traditional retailers have anywhere near $1M revenue/employee like Amazon?) Or ask Merrill Lynch about the impact of Schwab, eTrade and ScotTrade.
The second step in The Phoenix Principle is to obsess about competition. When you're "the big gun" in the industry it can be incredibly easy to ignore fringe competitors. But do so at your risk. When profits are something like $2M to $3M per employee (as in the case of CraigsList) there is a lot of resource to invest in growth. And strong indications that the business is able to very profitably grow! Ignoring "fringe" competition – especially because you are focused on existing large customers who are Locked-In to your Success Formula – leaves you remarkably vulnerable to rapid market shifts and a really fast demise.
